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Ramgulam Teli v. King-Emperor
Summary of the Opinion (Ross, J. and Jwala Prasad, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter arose from an application by the petitioners to quash their commitment to the Court of Session on the ground that the Magistrate had not complied with the provisions of section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petitioners had applied for copies of statements of prosecution witnesses recorded before the police. The order-sheet in the record did not make clear the precise stage at which the application for copies was made, but it was, in any event, before cross-examination had opened.
The learned Magistrate, following the decision in Madari Sikdar v. Emperor, refused to furnish the copies on the ground that some foundation must be laid in cross-examination for the suggestion that the evidence in Court was contradicted by the prior police statements. The petitioners were subsequently committed to the Court of Session. The learned Sessions Judge ordered that copies of all the statements of the witnesses be furnished to the accused. The petitioners applied to quash the commitment on the said non-compliance; the High Court heard the matter and ultimately discharged the rule.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the learned Magistrate complied with the provisions of section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in refusing to furnish copies of witnesses' statements to the accused.
- What is the correct interpretation and scope of the proviso to clause (1) of section 162 CrPC — specifically, at what stage an accused is entitled to a copy of a witness's prior statement recorded by the police (i.e., whether entitlement requires that cross-examination have commenced or foundation be laid in cross-examination).
Arguments of the Parties
Government Advocate's Submission
- The Government Advocate submitted that the word "when" in the phrase "when any witness is called for the prosecution" should be read as "after" and that "called" should be read as "examined in chief." Under that construction, entitlement to the copy would follow the witness's examination-in-chief (but the Government Advocate's construction did not go so far as to require that the accused first lay a foundation in cross-examination showing contradiction).
No detailed account of other specific party arguments (for example, an express statement of the petitioners' legal arguments) is contained in the provided opinion beyond the fact that they applied for copies of the police statements.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Madari Sikdar v. Emperor | Cited for the proposition that before a copy of a witness's police statement can be given to the accused some foundation must be laid in cross-examination showing contradiction between the in-court testimony and the police statement. | The High Court (Ross, J. and Jwala Prasad, J.) rejected this constricted reading. Ross, J. expressly dissented from the part of Madari Sikdar that went beyond his interpretation of section 162; Jwala Prasad, J. similarly disagreed with requiring cross-examination foundation as a precondition for furnishing the copy. |
| In Re Peramasami Ragudu | Applied (as cited) for the view that a foundation in cross-examination is required before copies of police statements are furnished. | The court dissented from any interpretation of that case that imposed a cross-examination precondition to furnishing copies under section 162. |
| Saadat Mian v. King-Emperor | Referred to for the fact that one of the Judges of a Division Bench had adopted the view requiring cross-examination foundation (i.e., a limiting construction). | The court disagreed with that limiting construction and held it was not supported by the statutory text of section 162. |
| Dadan Gazi v. Emperor | Concluded that the words "called for the prosecution" mean the time when the witness appears before the Court, and described the proper procedure: the accused should, when the witness appears, ask the Court to refer to the writing and, if necessary, be furnished with copies. | The court accepted and followed this construction as supporting the view that the accused is entitled to copies when the witness is produced/appears in Court (and not only after cross-examination has begun or a foundation laid). |
| Chedi Prasad Singh v. The King-Emperor | Cited as authority expressing a view consistent with the interpretation that the accused's right to copies arises when a witness is produced/appears in Court (Sen, J.'s view). | The court expressly agreed with the view expressed in Chedi Prasad Singh and relied on it as supporting the conclusion that no cross-examination foundation is required. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in two complementary strands, reflected in the separate but concurring opinions of Ross, J. and Jwala Prasad, J.
Ross, J. — Key analytical points
- Ross, J. read the plain language of section 162: a witness must be called (i.e., produced) for the prosecution, and once that occurs, if the accused applies for a copy of the witness's police statement recorded in writing the Court is bound to refer to that writing and direct that the accused be furnished with a copy.
- This statutory obligation is subject to the second proviso, which allows the Court to record an opinion and exclude any part of the statement that is not relevant to the inquiry/trial or whose disclosure is not essential in the interests of justice or is inexpedient in the public interest.
- Once the copy has been furnished, parts of the statement (if duly proved) may be used in the manner provided by section 145 of the Evidence Act to contradict the witness, but the witness's attention must be called to those parts before the writing can be proved for contradiction purposes.
- Ross, J. rejected decisions (Madari Sikdar and In Re Peramasami Ragudu) insofar as they required that cross-examination must have been opened or that the accused must have laid a foundation in cross-examination before a copy is furnished. He saw nothing in the section that supports such a limitation; it would be impossible for the accused to contradict the witness by a prior written statement without first seeing that statement. The Magistrate was therefore in error in the procedure followed by him.
- On the remedial question, Ross, J. observed that the commitment to the Sessions Court had already taken place and that the Sessions Judge had ordered that copies be furnished to the accused. Given those circumstances, Ross, J. concluded that quashing the commitment would serve no useful purpose and discharged the rule.
Jwala Prasad, J. — Key analytical points
- Jwala Prasad, J. framed the core interpretive question as the proper construction of the proviso to clause (1) of section 162 CrPC: at what stage an accused is entitled to a copy of a police-recorded statement of a prosecution witness.
- He compared the old and new wording of the proviso. Under the old Code the Court had a discretionary power ("may ... if the Court thinks it expedient in the interests of justice") to furnish copies; the new wording removes that discretion by requiring the Court to refer to the writing and direct that a copy be furnished upon the accused's request, subject only to the second proviso which permits the Court to exclude parts for relevance or public interest reasons.
- Thus, the discretion formerly vested in the Court to decide whether to grant copies was taken away by the Legislature; the right to obtain a copy became, for the limited purpose of contradiction under section 145 Evidence Act, essentially absolute except where the second proviso allows exclusion of portions.
- The phrase "refer to such writing" is intended to enable the Court to exercise the limited discretion granted by the second proviso (i.e., to determine if any part should be excluded), and is not intended to restrict the accused's right to obtain a copy by imposing a precondition such as that the accused must first show contradiction by cross-examination.
- It is impractical and unfair to require the accused, without having a copy, to lay a foundation in cross-examination for contradiction; doing so would invite surreptitious methods and impede the accused's rights. The words "called for the prosecution" mean the time when the witness appears before the Court (as construed in Dadan Gazi) and do not mean that the accused must wait until after examination-in-chief or the commencement of cross-examination.
- Jwala Prasad, J. therefore rejected the restrictive constructions adopted in Madari Sikdar, In Re Peramasami Ragudu and by one Judge in Saadat Mian. He agreed with the construction in Dadan Gazi and the view expressed by Sen, J. in Chedi Prasad Singh.
- He concurred with the ultimate order discharging the rule.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The rule was discharged. The High Court held that the Magistrate erred in refusing to furnish copies of the witnesses' police statements on the ground that the accused had not first laid a foundation in cross-examination; under section 162 CrPC the accused is entitled to obtain copies when the witness is produced/appears for the prosecution, subject only to the limited exclusions permitted by the second proviso to section 162.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The Magistrate's procedure in refusing the copies was held to be erroneous.
- Because the Sessions Judge had already ordered that copies of the statements be furnished to the accused and the commitment had already been made, the High Court declined to quash the commitment, finding that quashing would serve no useful purpose; instead the rule was discharged.
Broader implications:
The opinion interprets section 162 as creating an affirmative obligation on the trial Court to furnish copies to the accused when a prosecution witness is produced/appears in Court, subject to the limited discretion in the second proviso to exclude parts of the statement for irrelevance or in the public interest. The court expressly dissented from earlier authorities that imposed a requirement of preliminary foundation in cross-examination before copies could be furnished. The court thus adopts and follows the construction in Dadan Gazi and Chedi Prasad Singh.
The summary above is limited strictly to the reasoning and outcomes expressly contained in the provided opinion.
Ross, J.:— This is an application to quash the commitment of the petitioners to the Court of Session on the ground that the Magistrate has not complied with the provisions of section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
It appears that the petitioners applied for copies of the statements of the witnesses before the police. The order-sheet is not clear as to the precise stage at which the application was made, but it was at all events before the cross-examination opened. The learned Magistrate following the decision in Madari Sikdar v. Emperor held that before copy could be given some foundation must be laid in cross-examination for the suggestion that the evidence given in Court is contradicted by the previous statement recorded under section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure, and refused the application.
The meaning of section 162 seems plain. The witness has to be called for the prosecution, that is to say he must be produced in Court; and if then the accused applies for a copy of his statement before the police recorded in writing the Court is bound to refer to the writing and to direct that the accused be furnished with a copy thereof, subject to the proviso that if the Court is of opinion that any part of such statement is not relevant to the subject matter of the enquiry or trial, or that its disclosure to the accused is not essential in the interests of justice and is inexpedient in the public interest, then the Court shall record such opinion and exclude such part from the copy furnished to the accused. When this copy has been given any part of the statement, if duly proved, can be used in the manner provided by section 145 of the Evidence Act to contradict the witness by the writing, i.e, his attention must be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him before the writing can be proved. So are as the decisions in Madari Sikdar v. Emperor and In Re Peramasami Ragudu go beyond this interpretation of the section, I respectfully dissent from them. There is nothing in the section which requires that the cross-examination shall have been opened; nor do I see how the defence can be in a position to contradict the witness by his previous statement or to lay any foundation for the suggestion that there is a contradiction before it has seen the statement. Nor indeed is the Magistrate in a position to say whether there may not be a material contradiction between the two statements. All that the section requires is that the witness should be produced in Court and the right conferred upon the accused by the section arises. The Magistrate was, therefore, in error in the procedure that he followed in this matter.
The further question remains as to what the consequence of the Magistrate's having failed to grant the copy applied for should be. The commitment has already taken place, and the learned Government Advocate states that the learned Sessions Judge has ordered that copy of all the statements of the witnesses should be granted to the accused. In these circumstances I think that no useful purpose would be served by quashing the commitment. I would therefore discharge the rule.
Jwala Prasad, J.:— I fully agree.
The question is at what stage an accused is entitled to a copy of the statement of a witness recorded by the police during investigation. In other words, what is the true interpretation and scope of the proviso to clause (1) of section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the old Code the proviso stood as follows:
“provided that, when any witness is called for the prosecution whose statement has been taken down in writing as aforesaid, the Court shall on the request of the accused, refer to such writing, and may then, if the Court thinks it expedient in the interests of justice, direct that the accused be furnished with a copy thereof.”
The words italicised in the aforesaid passage have been changed into
“the Court shall on the request of the accused refer to such writing and direct that the accused be furnished with a copy thereof etc.”.
The discretion which vested in the Court formerly of granting such copies has now been taken away, and it has now become imperative upon the Court to grant copies to the accused at his request. The aforesaid words
“if the Court thinks it expedient in the interests of justice”
in the old section have been substituted by the second proviso to the new section under which the Court has a discretion to exclude from the copy any part of such statement which in the opinion of the Court
“is not relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry or trial, or that its disclosure to the accused is not essential in the interests of justice and is inexpedient in the public interests;”
otherwise the accused's right to obtain copy is absolute for the limited purpose of using the statement contained therein to contradict the witness in the manner provided by section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Court at the request of the accused is bound to
“refer to such writing mid direct that the accused be furnished with a copy thereof.”
If these words are read along with the second proviso referred to above, the meaning becomes clear that at the request of the accused the Court shall refer to the writing and direct copies to be furnished provided that under the second proviso to section 162 the Court may exclude any part of the statement if it is of opinion that the statement asked for is not essential in the interests of justice, or is not relevant to the subject-matter of the enquiry or trial, or that it is inexpedient in the public interests. Therefore, the words
“the Court shall refer to such writing”
are obviously for the purpose of enabling the Court to exercise, discretion under the second proviso, and not for the purpose of restricting the right of the accused to obtain a copy the discretion wherein was expressly taken away by the Legislature, and hence the Court cannot refuse the granting of a copy till the accused has by his cross-examination showed that there is contradiction between the statement in Court and the statement referred to before the police, which would assume that the accused has already got an insight into the police record without having got a copy. It is impossible for the accused, without having got a copy of the statement and without knowing the contents thereof, to lay the foundation in cross-examination for showing that there is contradiction, and it will open a wide door for obtaining surreptitious copies. The words
“refer to such writing”
do not in any way restrict the right of the accused to obtain the copy, nor is the writing to be referred to for the purpose of seeing whether there is any contradiction or not between the statement made in Court and the statement recorded by the police officer. Again, the trial Court is not the sole tribunal for determining whether in substance and in fact there is a contradiction or not. It might be a contentious matter, and the accused has a right to have the opinion of a higher tribunal in the matter. There is nothing in the section to show that the accused, should by his questions lay the foundation in cross-examination for the granting of a copy as was held in Madari Sikdar v. Emperor and In re Peramasami Ragudu and by one of the Judges of a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Saadat Mian v. King-Emperor. This is not to be found in the section itself, and I do not think we can add those words to it in order to restrict the right of the accused to obtain the copy. The section has expressly provided the time when the accused is to obtain the copy and that is
“when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial”.
The learned Government Advocate submitted that the word “when” should be read as “after” and the word “called” as “examined in chief”. Even if this interpretation is accepted, it would simply mean that after the witness has been examined in chief; but it would not go further than that, namely, that the accused should have laid the foundation in cross-examination for showing that there was contradiction in the statement made in Court and that before the police officer in order to entitle him to apply for and obtain the copy. The word “when” may mean, “after”, but that does not matter much. The sole question is what is the meaning of “called for the prosecution.” The word “called” is not a word of art and is, therefore, used in its ordinary sense. It has various meanings: to shout or cry out, to commend or request to come or be present, to summon, cite; in law the expression “to call for the plaintiff” means to cry aloud his name in open Court. On his failure to answer to which the trial is at an end and he becomes nonsuited: (vide The Imperial Dictionary, Webster's International Law Dictionary and Bouvier's Law Dictionary).
The words “called for the prosecution” in the present section are the same as in the old section 162. In Dadan Gazi v. Emperor a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court construed the aforesaid words to mean the time when the witness appears before the Court. As to the procedure for granting copies, their Lordships say. “The proper procedure is for the accused, at the time the witness, whose statement is so recorded, appears before the Court, to ask the Court to refer to such writing, and if necessary, furnish the accused with copies”. That appears to be the plain meaning of the word “called,” and we have no right to add to the word so as to restrict its meaning by holding that the witness for the prosecution should not only have been produced in Court, but that his examination in chief should, have been finished and the accused should have commenced his cross-examination and by his questions laid the foundation for holding that the statements made by the witnesses are contradictory to those recorded by the police.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent from the contrary view taken in the cases referred to above, and agree with the view expressed by Sen, J. in Chedi Prasad Singh v. The King-Emperor.
I also agree with the order passed by my learned brother in all these cases.
S.A.K
Rule discharged.
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