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Satindra Mohun Tagore And Another v. Sarala Sundari Debi And Another

Calcutta High Court
Apr 20, 1917
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Judgment Summary — Sanderson, C.J.; Woodroffe, J. concurring

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an order of Chitty, J., discharging a caveat filed on 20 December 1916 by Satindra Mohun Tagore and Ronendra Mohun Tagore in respect of the will of Atanunandan Tagore.

The will concerned the estate of Atanunandan Tagore, who died at age 19, leaving a widow who was 13 at his death and about 16 at the time of the suit. The main provisions of the will (as reported in the opinion) left property to the widow with a power to adopt a son.

Caveats had been entered by several persons: Diptendra Mohun Tagore (now dead), Bidyut Prokash Ganguly (alive), Srimati Hazari Dassi Debi (the mother of the widow), and the two appellants (Satindra and Ronendra Mohun Tagore). The appellants had previously withdrawn caveats on 8 March 1915 after communications including a solicitor's letter dated 17 November 1914 asserting that the appellants had no interest and refusing inspection of the will.

Bidyut Prokash Ganguly had been actively contesting the will; on 11 March 1915 he swore an affidavit alleging serious wrongdoing affecting the testator's capacity and alleging the will to be the result of undue influence by Ashutosh Bannerjee and Srimati Sarala Sundari Debi (the executor and executrix).

Procedurally: the suit was placed down as a contested suit on 30 June 1915; a commission for examination of witnesses had been ordered on 22 May 1915; Diptendra Mohun Tagore died on 11 November 1915 and the commissioner was given liberty to proceed. A proposed settlement between the executor/executrix and Bidyut Prokash Ganguly was evidenced by a letter dated 9 December 1916 (said to be in relation to a proposed settlement made in December 1915) and set out significant monetary terms for Bidyut as next reversioner, subject to court sanction and a certificate of benefit to the infant widow.

After learning of the proposed settlement, the appellants filed a second caveat on 20 December 1916 (their affidavit paragraph 14 explains their reasons). Chitty, J. ordered that this caveat be struck off; the appellants appealed that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Satindra Mohun Tagore and Ronendra Mohun Tagore had sufficient legal interest to file caveats against the will at the time they filed their second caveat (20 December 1916).
  2. Whether the appellants should be precluded from filing caveats at that stage on account of their having previously entered and then withdrawn caveats (i.e., whether their prior withdrawal operated as an estoppel or justified striking off a later caveat for inconsistency or "blowing hot and cold").

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • In paragraph 14 of their affidavit the appellants stated they had not earlier thought it necessary to enter caveat because they were under the impression that Bidyut Prokash Ganguly, who had consistently maintained the will was a forgery, would properly prosecute the proceedings initiated by his caveat.
  • They asserted that, having learned Bidyut was now willing to accept probate of a will he previously alleged to be forged in return for a large sum of money, they had been advised to contest the will and therefore filed a caveat on 20 December 1916.

Arguments and Positions Identified for Other Parties / Counsel

  • It was argued (by Mr. Das) that the mother of the widow, Srimati Hazari Dassi Debi, was contesting the will and there was no suggestion she would abandon that position — implying Bidyut's settlement did not necessarily leave the estate unprotected.
  • Mr. Sarkar (on behalf of the plaintiffs) agreed that if the appellants were added as defendants they would accept evidence already taken on commission, provided they were allowed an opportunity to put further questions in cross-examination if advised to do so.
  • Chitty, J. in the court below had struck off the appellants' caveat (this action is part of the procedural posture being appealed).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Brindaban Chunder Shaha v. Sureshwar Saha Paramanik Authority that an immediate reversioner is entitled to contest a will; cited as supporting the proposition that any interest, however slight, or even the bare possibility of an interest, can be sufficient to oppose a testamentary paper (an English rule). The Chief Justice noted the authority but declined to decide whether the broad English rule should be adopted generally in the jurisdiction. Instead, he relied on the admitted principle that if an immediate reversioner does not protect the estate, a next reversioner may do so; he decided the present case on its specific facts rather than laying down a general rule.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a fact-focused analysis rather than laying down a new general rule about the quantum of interest required to file a caveat.

  1. Interest analysis: The court accepted (for purposes of the dispute) the proposition that an immediate reversioner (Bidyut) is entitled to contest the will and that where the immediate reversioner does not protect the estate, the next reversioner may. The Court explicitly declined to determine whether the broad English rule (that any interest, however slight, suffices) applies generally in this jurisdiction.
  2. Effect of Bidyut's settlement: The court emphasised that Bidyut Prokash Ganguly had entered into an agreement to accept payment (Rs.155,000) in settlement of his claimed reversionary rights and to meet costs. The Chief Justice held that by entering into that agreement Bidyut had "done his best to render it impossible for him successfully to challenge the will" and thus could not be relied upon to contest the will seriously in the future.
  3. Effect on appellants' standing: Because Bidyut's settlement undermined the active protection of the estate by the immediate reversioner, the court found the circumstances had materially changed since the appellants had earlier withdrawn their caveats. Even assuming the widow's mother had not agreed to the compromise, the new circumstances meant that Satindra and Ronendra had sufficient interest to enter caveat and contest the will.
  4. Previous withdrawal of caveat: The court rejected the characterization that the appellants were "blowing hot and cold." The basis was that the factual situation when the appellants first withdrew their caveats (an active and genuine opposition by Bidyut) had changed because Bidyut's settlement removed that genuine opposition. Therefore the appellants' re-entry by new caveat was justified by changed conditions.
  5. Remedy and practical directions: The court concluded it would be preferable to avoid another separate suit; accordingly the appellants should be added as defendants to the existing suit. The plaintiffs' counsel (Mr. Sarkar) agreed the appellants could accept evidence already taken on commission, on the condition they be allowed to apply to put further cross-examination questions if advised to do so. Leave to permit further cross-examination was left to the trial judge to decide in the first instance.
  6. Costs and disposition: For these reasons, the Chief Justice ordered the appeal allowed with costs in this Court and in the Court of first instance. Woodroffe, J. concurred on the practical ground that with one original caveator dead and another having compromised, intervention by the reversioner appellants was necessary to adequately protect their interests.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The two appellants, Satindra Mohun Tagore and Ronendra Mohun Tagore, are to be allowed to enter caveats and are to be added as defendants in the ongoing testamentary suit.
  • They will accept the evidence already taken on commission, subject to their right to apply to the trial judge for leave to put further questions in cross-examination; the trial judge will decide whether such leave should be granted.
  • Costs of the appeal were awarded to the appellants in this Court and in the Court of first instance.
  • The court refused to strike off the appellants' caveat on the grounds that (i) Bidyut's settlement undermined his continued effective opposition and (ii) the appellants' earlier withdrawal of a caveat did not bar their subsequent re-entry given materially changed circumstances.

Broader legal implications: The court explicitly avoided expressing a new general rule on whether any interest, however slight, or even the bare possibility of an interest, is sufficient to entitle a party to oppose a testamentary paper. The decision was taken on the specific facts of this case, and no new general precedent was established on that broader point.

Additional Court Notes

Justice Woodroffe's concurrence emphasised the practical protection of interests: with one caveator dead (Diptendra Mohun Tagore) and one (Bidyut) having compromised, only Srimati Hazari Debi remained from the original caveators to represent the minor widow; Woodroffe, J. was not satisfied that the reversioner appellants' interests would be adequately protected unless they were allowed to intervene.

Source: Summary strictly based on the legal opinion text provided. No information has been added beyond that opinion.

Show all summary ...

Sanderson, C.J:— In this case the appeal is from the judgment of my learned brother Chitty, J., which was given upon an application by the plaintiffs in a testamentary suit that a certain caveat, which was filed on 20th December 1916 by Satindra Mohun Tagore and Ronendra Mohun Tagore should be discharged. The will which was the subject matter of the suit was the will of one Atanunandan Tagore who died, as we are informed, at the age of 19 years, and left a widow who was then 13 years old and who at the time of the suit was said to be 16 years old. Caveats had been entered against the will by three persons, Diptendra Mohun Tagore, Bidyut Prokash Ganguly and Srimati Hazari Dassi Debi. Of these, Diptendra Mohun Tagore is now dead; Bidyut Prokash Ganguly is alive; and so is Srimati Hazari Dassi Debi who is the mother of the widow of the testator Atanunandan. Oaveats had also been entered by the two appellants Satindra Mohun Tagore and Ronendra Mohun Tagore. But on 17th November 1914, a letter had been written by the solicitor for the plaintiffs alleging on behalf of his clients, namely, the widow of the deceased testator and the executor and the executrix named in the will, that the appellants had not any interest whatsoever, and that consequently the solicitor was instructed not to allow inspection of the will for which the appellants had been asking. The result of that, and, I think of further communications, was that on 8th March 1915 the caveats which had been entered by Satiodra Mohun Tagore and Ronendra Mohun Trgore were withdrawn.

2. Now, the position at that time was as follows: Bidyut Prokash Ganguly was contesting the validity of the will as is shown by the fact that on 11th March 1915 he affirmed an affidavit in which he set up very serious allegations. In para. 9 of his affidavit be alleged that the brother in law of Srimati Sarala Sundari Debi, who was the executrix of the will, had not only murdered his mothar-in law but that also one Triguna Sundari Debi and had cut off four of the fingers of the hand of the said Srimati Sarala Sundari Debi and in addition to that, he struck the testator such a blow upon his face that he lost the sight of both his eyes and that in consequence of that unfortunate incident he had no training or education of any sort whatever and by constantly brooding over his misfortune he practically lost his memory aud intelligence as well as balance of mind and lived the life of practical imbecility until his death: and in para. 22 he went on to allege that the will was simply and wholly the act of Ashutosh Bannerjee and Srimati Sarala Sundari Debi (who are the executor and executrix of the will), in order to get the estate absolutely in their clutches and to get the son of the said Ashutosh Bannerjee adopted. I ought to have said that, although we have not the will before us, we are informed that the main provisions of it are to the effect that the property was left to the widow with power to adopt a son if she so desired.

3. That was the position of affairs at the time when Satindra Mohun Tagore and Bonandra Mohun Tagore withdrew their caveats.

4. On 30th June 1915 the suit was set down as a contested suit. It appears that before that date an order had been made for a commission to issue for the examination of certain witnesses, namely on 22nd May 1915; and, inasmuch as on 11th November, Diptendra Mohun Tagore died, the death was recorded, and liberty was given to the Commissioner to proceed with the commission. That was the state of affairs up to the end of November 1915. The next fact which is necessary for me to mention is this: Apparently, in December 1915, a proposed settlement with Bidyut Prokash Ganguly was made, and that is evidenced by a letter which was written on 9th December 1916 by Mr. Sen acting on behalf of the executor and the executrix, addressed to Messrs Manuel, Agarwalla and De who were acting as solicitors on behalf of the mother of the widow in these terms:

“I have the pleasure to inform you that subject to the sanction of the Court my clients and Mr. B. Ganguly have arranged to settle this case amicably on the terms of which I enclose for for your information a copy. Having regard to the relationship of the parties and seeing that your client has no personal interest in the matter I trust you will agree with me that this settlement, is very desirable and should be carried out.”

5. The material provisions of the settlement were as follows: Mr. B. Ganguly being the next reversioner after the widow of the deceased, in case no adoption takes place or fails, was to be paid out of the estate of the said A.N Tagore the sum of Rs. 155,000

“out of which he will meet and pay his own costs and the costs of Srimati Hazari Dasi Debi, the mother of the said widow, one of the defendants in the suit;”

6. And that the said sum of Rs. 1,55,000 should be paid by the executor and executrix by sale or mortgage of a portion of the estate of the deceased within two months after the grant of probate. That agreement was to be subject to the sanction of the Court, as was provided by Cl. 6 of the agreement, namely, that these terms would be treated as without prejudice to any or either of the parties to she suit until recorded and confirmed by the Court with the usual certificate that they were for the benefit of the infant widow. We do not know what took place after that, but we must approach the case on the basis that the widow's mother has not agreed to that proposal up to the present time. Apparently Satindra Mohun Tagore and Bonendra Mohun Tagore having got to-know of this proposal proceeded on 20th December 1916 to file their second caveat and the paragraph in their affidavit upon which they rely is para. 14 which is to this effect:

“That previous to this there was no necessity for our entering caveat as we were under the impression that Bidyut Prokash Ganguly, who had always maintained that the will was a forgery would properly prosecute the proceedings started on the caveat entered into by him, but now that he is willing to have probate granted of a forged will on being promised a large sum of money we have been advised to contest the will which has been set up as aforesaid.”

7. That is the caveat which the learned Judge in the Court below has directed should be struck off the file. Now, two main points have been raised in the argument in this Court. The first is that Satindra Mohun Tagore and Ronendra Mohun Tagore have not got sufficient interest to entitle them to file caveats against the will. The relationship is as, follows: there is no doubt that Bidyut Prokash Ganguly is the immediate reversioner in case of the death of the widow without a son being adopted; and, that if Bidyut were to die before the widow then the persona who would then become the immediate reversioners are the appellants Satindra Mohun Tagore and Bonendra Mohun Tagore. There is no doubt that Bidyut Prokash Ganguly, the immediate reversioner, is entitled to contest the will on the authority of the decision in the case of Brindaban Chunder Shaha v. Sureshwar Saha Paramanik (1), and it is said that case is an authority for the proposition that any interest, however slight, and even the bare possibility of an interest, is sufficient to entitle a party to oppose a testamentary paper. In my judgment I do not think it necessary in this case for us to consider whether the rule laid down in the English cases has been adopted in this country as the rule applicable to such a case as this, because it was admitted during the course of the argument that if the immediate reversioner is not protecting the estate, then the next reversioner is entitled so to do; and I intend to base my judgment in this case on the facts of this case and not to lay down any general rule upon the question whether any interest, however slight, or even the bare possibility of an interest is enough to entitle a party to oppose a testamentary paper. With regard to Bidyut Prokash Ganguly, as I have already pointed out, he has entered into this agreement to the material terms of which I have already referred; and in my judgment, he has thereby done his best to render it impossible for him successfully to challenge the will; or, looking at it from another point of view, in my judgment, he, by the agreement into which he has entered, has shown that at all events he cannot be relied upon seriously and successfully to contest the will. But Mr. Das argued that it is not a concluded matter because there is the mother of the widow who is contesting and there is no suggestion that she is going to abandon the position which she has taken up in Contesting the will.

8. I assume that and I decide this case upon that assumption, because Mr. Das has pointed out that he has not had an opportunity of answering the affidavit which had been put forward on the actual day of hearing before Chitty, J. But even assuming that the widow's mother at the present moment has not agreed to compromise the suit, I still think that under the special and peculiar circumstances of this case, the appellants Satindra Mohun Tagore and Ronendra Mohun Tagore have sufficient interest to entitle them to enter caveat and contest the suit. I do not think it necessary for me to say anything more upon that point. The second point urged is that the appellants ought not to be allowed to enter caveats at this stage, because they had already entered caveat on a previous occasion and withdrew them and, to use the words of the learned Judge, “they ought not to be allowed to blow not and cold in that way.”

9. The answer to that seems to me to be that it cannot be said to be a case of blowing not and cold, because the conditions which existed when caveats were first entered and withdrawn do not exist at the present moment. The caveats were withdrawn, as I have already pointed out when the opposition of Bidyut Prokash Ganguly could certainly be regarded as a genuine and strenuous opposition; but having regard to agreement into which he has entered I think, as I have already said, he cannot be relied upon in future seriously to contest the will. Therefore the conditions being different, the accusation of “blowing hot and cold” cannot reasonably be made against the appellants, and I do not think that, that is sufficient reason for preventing them from filing caveats on 20th December 1916. The result therefore in my judgment is that the two appellants ought to be allowed to enter caveats. I think it would be a misfortune if there should be another suit, and consequently they ought to be added as defendants to the suit which is now proceeding. Mr. Sarkar has agreed that he will accept the evidence which has already been taken on commission, provided that he is allowed to have an opportunity of putting further questions in cross-examination, if he is advised so to do and the appellants will therefore be added as defendants to the suit upon the understanding that they will accept the evidence which has already been given, subject to any application which may be made by the appellants to the Judge trying the case for leave to put further questions in cross-examination.

10. We cannot decide whether that leave ought to be granted or not, and it will be for the learned Judge trying the case to decide that. For these reasons I think that the appeal should be allowed with costs here and in the Court of first instance.

Woodroffe, J.:— I agree with the order proposed by the learned Chief Justice on this ground: the caveator Diptendra Mohun Tagore is dead, and the caveator Bidyut Prokash Ganguly has entered into a compromise to settle this litigation, and there is thus left out of the original caveators, only Srimathi Hazari Debi acting on behalf of the minor widow. It seems to me that it is very likely that Hazari Debi was consulted about the compromise, and though it has not been shown that she has actually assented to this compromise, I am not satisfied under the circumstances of this case that the interests of the reversioner appellants will be sufficiently protected unless they are allowed to intervene.

V.B/R.K

11. Appeal allowed.