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Calcutta Landing And Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Victor Oil Co. Ltd.
Legal Opinion Summary: Calcutta Landing & Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Victor Oil Co., Ltd.
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiffs (Calcutta Landing & Shipping Co., Ltd.) brought a suit for ejectment and mesne profits against the Respondents (Victor Oil Co., Ltd.). The parties had a verbal agreement that the Defendant Company would take a lease of a disputed godown for three years "from the 1st June, 1936" at a monthly rent of Rs. 250. The Defendant went into possession on 1 June 1936 and remained in possession thereafter. A written lease had been contemplated but none was executed or registered.
On 13 November 1940 the Plaintiff served a notice upon the Defendant to give up possession of the premises "on the expiry of the 1st December, 1940." Both Courts below held that this was not a valid notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and the Plaintiffs appealed. The appeal raises the validity of that notice, with sections 106 and 110 of the Transfer of Property Act being central to the dispute.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the notice served by the Plaintiff to quit "on the expiry of the 1st December, 1940" was a valid notice to determine a monthly tenancy under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
- Whether section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act (which provides interpretative rules as to computation of lease periods and exclusion of the day of commencement) applies to leases created by oral/verbal agreements or only to written/registered leases.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (represented before the Court by the Advocate‑General)
- The Advocate‑General argued that section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act is applicable even where there is no formal written lease, i.e., it can govern interpretation where letters or other evidence show that the lease was expressed to commence from a particular day.
- It was submitted that letters exchanged between the parties indicated the lease was to commence from 1 June 1936, and by applying section 110 (excluding the stated commencement day), the tenancy would be construed to begin on the 2nd day of each month and end on the 1st day of the following month, which would make the notice that sought vacation "on the expiry of the 1st December, 1940" valid.
- The Advocate‑General relied upon Benoy Krishna Das v. Salsiccioni and other reported decisions where section 110 was applied to resolve commencement/expiry questions arising out of written leases.
Arguments Opposing the Appeal (as presented in the opinion)
- A substantial defence raised by the Defendant Company was that the notice to quit was insufficient in law to determine the tenancy; the tenancy being monthly according to the English calendar could not be terminated by a notice expiring on the first day of a calendar month when another month would have already begun.
- Mr. Gupta argued that the word "expressed" in section 110 could only sensibly apply when the time limited by a lease is expressed in a written instrument; thus section 110 should be understood as applicable to written leases (or to terms expressed in writing), and not to oral agreements whose terms must be proved by extrinsic evidence.
- It was pointed out for the defence that the parties never executed the contemplated written and registered lease for three years; therefore, under section 107 the purported three‑year lease could not be given effect, and the tenancy must be treated as month‑to‑month under section 106.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Benoy Krishna Das v. Salsiccioni (Judicial Committee) | Applied section 110 to determine the period of a written lease expressed to commence on a particular day; the commencement day was excluded in computing the period, with consequences for a later monthly tenancy. | Relied on by the Advocate‑General to support the proposition that section 110 may be used to exclude the stated commencement day and thereby affect the computation of the subsequent monthly tenancy. The Court discussed the case but concluded it did not govern the present facts because there was no effective written lease in this case. |
| Sushil Chandra v. Birendrajit | Instance where section 110 was invoked to determine the period of a written lease on expiry and the consequences for holding over. | Noted as one of the reported cases involving written leases in which section 110 was applied; used to show that reported applications of section 110 have arisen in the context of written leases. |
| Charu (Cham) Chandra v. Bankim | Illustration of section 110 being applied to written leases; Ameer Ali, J. described section 110 as rendering certain what would otherwise have been doubtful under English law. | Referred to for the proposition that section 110 attempts to make certain rules of construction which in English law would have been matters of doubt; discussed by the Court in comparing interpretative approaches. |
| Ackland v. Lutley; Sidebotham v. Holland; Meggeson v. Groves | English authorities cited to illustrate that English rules about inclusion/exclusion of commencement days are not inflexible and depend on context and subject matter. | Cited by the Court to show that English law treats the inclusion/exclusion of a commencement day as context‑dependent; used as comparative material to contrast the more definite rule in section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act. |
| Knights‑bridge Estates Trust, Ltd. v. Byrne (Viscount Maugham) | Observation that statutory definitions or phrases often carry an implied qualification such as "unless the context otherwise requires". | Quoted by the Court (Rau, J.) to support the view that section 110 may have to be read subject to contextual qualifications rather than as an inflexible rule in every circumstance. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The opinion contains two concurring judgments (Rau, J. and Mukherjea, J.). Both judges focused on whether section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act applied to the facts and whether the challenged notice complied with section 106 (the deeming provision for leases where no agreement fixes the period).
Rau, J. — analysis:
- Considered the textual meaning of "expressed" in section 110 and observed that it need not necessarily imply expression in writing; comparison was made with section 7(2) of the Contract Act (acceptance must be "expressed" in a usual and reasonable manner) and with section 25(1) (which explicitly requires writing where the legislature intends a writing requirement).
- Concluded that section 110 is essentially interpretative in nature and not obviously confined to written leases; however, he did not finally decide the general point because it was unnecessary for the present case.
- Found that the parties' verbal agreement purported to create a three‑year lease "from the 1st June, 1936," but under section 107 a lease of that duration could only be validly created by a registered instrument. Because no registered instrument was executed, the alleged three‑year lease must be ignored.
- Explained that it was not possible to sever the words "from the 1st June, 1936" from the invalid term; both the term and the stated commencement must be rejected for want of the required registration.
- As a result, the tenancy falls under section 106 and is to be deemed a month‑to‑month tenancy. The General Clauses Act (through the reproduction of the earlier General Clauses definition) makes "month" mean a calendar month according to the British calendar.
- Because the Defendant entered on the first day of a calendar month (1 June 1936), the month‑to‑month tenancy is measured by calendar months; accordingly the notice to quit (ending "on the expiry of the 1st December") did not terminate at the end of a calendar month and was therefore ineffective.
- Concluded that the appeal must be dismissed and ordered parties to bear their own costs.
Mukherjea, J. — analysis:
- Rendered a substantially concurring analysis. Restated material facts and the procedural history, including the views of the Subordinate Judge and the District Judge, both of whom held the notice to be insufficient and applied the monthly tenancy rule in accordance with the English calendar.
- Summarised the Advocate‑General's contention that section 110 should apply even without a formal written lease and his reliance on Benoy Krishna Das v. Salsiccioni.
- Addressed the question whether section 110 applies where there is no lease in writing. Although inclined to accept the position that it is improbable the legislature meant section 110 to apply to spoken language (because such a technical rule of interpretation is unlikely to have been intended for oral agreements), he expressly stated the point need not be finally decided for the present appeal.
- Explained that section 110 applies when (a) the time is limited by the lease and (b) that period is expressed to commence from a particular date. In the present case there was no operative agreement fixing the period of the lease, since the contemplated written lease was not executed; therefore the tenancy is governed by section 106 as month‑to‑month and section 110 cannot be applied to determine when the tenancy commenced.
- Observed that the letters mentioning commencement from 1 June 1936 did not constitute the operative basis of the lease as actually constituted; hence the date of commencement must be ascertained from facts before the Court (possession on 1 June 1936 and rent accepted according to English calendar months) and there was no evidence the parties intended to exclude the first day of the month.
- Therefore concurred that the appeal must fail.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed. DISPOSED OF by affirming the decision of the Court below that the notice to quit which sought vacation "on the expiry of the 1st December, 1940" was not a valid notice to determine the tenancy.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The Plaintiffs' appeal fails and the order of the lower Court (dismissing the ejectment suit) stands.
- Costs: each party is to bear their own costs throughout.
Broader legal implications stated or implied in the opinion:
- The Court declined to finally decide the broader interpretive question whether section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act applies generally to oral leases; both judges expressed reservations or doubt on that question but found it unnecessary to decide it for the purposes of this case.
- No definitive new precedent was laid down resolving the general applicability of section 110 to oral agreements; the decision is narrowly based on the factual conclusion that no valid written/registered lease was executed and that the tenancy therefore stood as month‑to‑month under section 106 measured by calendar months.
Note: This summary is confined to the matters explicitly discussed in the provided opinion. It does not invent or infer facts or holdings beyond the text.
Rau, J.:— This appeal is by the Plaintiffs, the Calcutta Landing and Shipping Co., Ltd. in a suit for ejectment and mesne profits brought against the Respondents, the Victor Oil Co., Ltd. The facts are briefly these: There was a verbal agreement between the parties to the effect that the Defendant Company would take a lease of the disputed godown for a period of 3 years “from the 1st June, 1936,” on a monthly rent of Rs. 250. The Defendant Company went into possession on June 1st, 1936, and has been in possession ever since. A written lease had been contemplated but none was actually executed. On November 13th, 1940, the Plaintiff Company served a notice upon the Defendants to give up possession of the premises “on the expiry of the 1st December, 1940.” Both the Courts below have held that this was not a valid notice under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Hence this second appeal.
2. The sole question raised before us is as to the validity of the notice. The sections to be considered are secs. 106 and 110 of the Transfer of Property Act. The relevant portions of these sections run thus Sec. 106:
“In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall fie deemed to foe a lease from year to year terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy, and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy”.
3. Sec. 110:—
“Where the time limited by a lease of immovable property is expressed as commencing from a particular day, in computing that time, such day shall be excluded. Where no day of commencement is named, the time BO limited begins from the making of the lease.
Where the time so limited is a year, or a number of years, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary the lease shall last during the whole anniversary of the day from which such time commences.
Where the time so limited is expressed to be terminable before its expiration and the lease omits to mention at whose option it is so terminable, the; lessee and not the lessor shall have such option.”
4. Both the Courts below have held that sec. 110 has no application except to a written lease. I shall first comment on this point. Under sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property-Act, a lease of immovable property can in certain cases be made only by a registered instrument but in all other cases leases may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Ordinarily therefore the word “expressed” in sec. 110 would seem to mean “expressed” either in the registered instrument or in the oral agreement by which the lease is made. I am not quite convinced that the word “expressed” necessarily implies expression in writing. For example, sec. 7(2) of the Contract Act indicates that in order to convert a proposal into a promise the acceptance must be “expressed” in some usual and reasonable manner; clearly, this applies to verbal as well as written acceptances. By way of contrast I may notice sec. 25(1) of the same Act which provides that an agreement made without consideration is void unless it is expressed in writing and registered under the law for the time being in force. Thus where the legislature means expression in writing, it may be expected to say so in plain terms. Nor am I quite convinced that the last paragraph of sec. 110 which speaks of the lease omitting to mention at whose option it is terminable necessarily implies that the section contemplates a written lease. An oral agreement may omit to mention a thing just as much as a written instrument.
5. On the language of sec. 110 it is not therefore clear to me that it cannot apply to a lease created by oral agreement as well as to one created by a registered instrument. The provision is really in the nature of an interpretation clause and it would be plainly inconvenient to have one dictionary for written words and another for words spoken. If, for example, it were proved in a particular case that a lease for one year had been made by oral agreement in which the term had been expressed to commence from 1st January, it would be difficult to hold that the term should be computed in a manner different from that prescribed by sec. 110.
6. Nor am I satisfied that the rule laid down in the section is inflexible, whether for written or verbal leases. If, for example, a written lease provides that it is for a term of 3 years, commencing from 1st January, 1946, and ending on 31st December, 1948, both days inclusive, it would be impossible to apply the rule laid down in sec. 110 without making the lease self-contradictory. As observed by Viscount Maugham in Knights-bridge Estates Trust, Ltd. v. Byrne(1), some such phrase as “unless the context otherwise requires” is often necessarily implied in statutory definitions even where it is not expressly inserted, and it may well be that sec. 110 must be read as subject to a similar qualification.
7. However, in this particular case it is not necessary for ma to decide any of these points. Here there was a verbal agreement for a term of 3 years from the 1st June, 1936. Such a lease can only be created by a registered instrument. No registered instrument having been executed, the verbal agreement has to be ignored. It is not possible to sever the words “from the 1st June, 1936,” from the term which they were meant to limit and to hold that the words are good while the term is bad. Both have to be rejected. The case would then fall to be governed by sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and the lease must therefore be deemed to be a lease from “month to month.” According to the General Clauses Act, 1897, which reproduces the definition given by sec. 2(4) of the General Clauses Act, 1868, the word “month” in this section must mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar. Therefore, the lease must be held to be a lease from month to month according to the British calendar. There is no dispute that the Defendant Company went into possession on the first day of a calendar month, namely, 1st June, 1936. The notice to quit should therefore have ended with a calendar month. Instead of this it was expressed to end on the expiry of the 1st December. Much as I regret to have to decide the case on a technicality, I do not think that there is any alternative but to dismiss the appeal.
8. In the circumstances of the case the parties must bear their own costs throughout.
Mukherjea, J.:— This appeal arises out of an action in ejectment commenced by the Plaintiff Appellant to recover khas possession of the premises in suit on the allegation that the Defendant was a monthly tenant in respect to the-same, and the tenancy was determined by a notice to quit. The material facts lie within a very short compass and may be stated as follows:— The premises in suit which is a godown at Howrah belongs to the Plaintiff Company. There was an arrangement come to between the Plaintiff and the Defendant under which the latter agreed to take a lease of the godown for a period of three years with effect from 1st June, 1936, at a monthly rental of Rs. 250. The Defendant actually occupied the godown on 1st June, 1936, but no lease was executed and registered in accordance with the agreement, and the result was that the Defendant continued to hold the premises as a tenant from month to month. Or. November 13th, 1940, the Plaintiff served a notice to quit upon the Defendant, asking the latter to vacate the godown on the expiry of December 1st, 1940. As the Defendant did not comply with this notice, the present suit was instituted.
9. The substantial defence raised on behalf of the Defendant Company was that the notice to quit was insufficient in law to determine the tenancy. The Subordinate Judge who tried the suit, accepted this contention as correct and dismissed the Plaintiff's suit. The Subordinate Judge was of opinion that as the tenancy commenced on the 1st of June, 1936, and continued from month to month according to the English Calendar, it could be terminated by a notice which would expire at the end of any such month. The tenant therefore could not be asked to vacate on the expiry of the 1st day of December, when another month of the tenancy would actually begin. According to the Subordinate Judge there being no document of lease, sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act was not attracted to this case and the Plaintiff was not right in excluding the 1st day in computing the period of tenancy.
10. This decision was affirmed on appeal by the District Judge, Howrah. It is against the judgment of the District Judge that this second appeal has been preferred.
11. The learned Advocate-General who appears in support of the appeal has contended before us that the Court below was wrong in holding that sec. 110, Transfer of Property Act, is not applicable except where there is a formal lease in writing. In the present case, he says, there were letters exchanged between the parties which clearly stated that the lease was to-commence from 1st June, 1936. As this day is to be excluded for purposes of computing the period of the lease, the tenancy must be deemed to begin on the 2nd day of each month and continue till expiry of the first day of the month following. In support of this contention the learned Counsel has relied, amongst others, upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Benoy Krishna Das v. Salsiccioni(2). Now sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act embodies certain technical rules of interpretation. The first paragraph lays down that if the time limited by a lease of immovable property is expressed as commencing from a particular day, in computing the time such day shall be excluded. In English law also when the term is expressed in the habendum to commence from a specified day, that day is not ordinarily included in the term, while if it is stated to commence on a particular day, that day is included. But in English law these rules are not inflexible and whether the date of commencement is to be excluded or included is to be determined according to the context and subject-matter, and the deed must always be interpreted to give effect to the substantive rights of the parties [vide Redham's Law of Landlord and Tenant, 9th Edition, p. 31; Foa, p. 113; vide also the cases of Ackland v. Lutley(3), Sidebotham v. Holland(4), Meggeson v. Groves(5)]. I agree with what has been said by Ameer Ali, J., in Cham Chandra v. Bankim(6) that sec. 110, Transfer of Property Act, attempts to render certain what in England would have been a matter of some doubt, and lays down the artificial rule of construction that where a lease is said to commence from a certain date, it means from the end of that date and will have another day added on at the end.
12. The first point that has been raised in this appeal is whether sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act is at all applicable when there is no lease in writing. The section does not say that there must be an instrument in writing but Mr. Gupta argues that this must have been the intention of the Legislature.
13. The “time limited by a lease,” says Mr. Gupta, could not be “expressed” as commencing from a particular day unless the lease is in writing. The “naming of a date” is also possible when there is a deed, and in the third paragraph of the section which speaks of the lease omitting to mention certain things, the word “lease” could not but refer to the instrument of lease.
14. On the other hand, the learned Advocate-General points out that the definition of “lease” as given in sec. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act is perfectly general, and under sec. 107 of the Act, a document in writing and registered is necessary when the lease is for a period exceeding one year or reserves an yearly rent. In other cases a lease may be made by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. It is further said that the word “expressed “does not necessarily mean “expressed in writing” and though the question is one of interpretation of certain words in the lease, there may be evidence of the actual words used by the parties when the oral agreement was concluded. The decided cases which are reported so far all relate to written leases. In Benoy Krishna Das v. Salsiccioni there was a written lease for a term of 4 years expressed to be from 1st June, 1921. This lease expired in the year 1925, but the tenant held over as a monthly tenant which was determinable by 15 days' notice on either side under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The notice to quit in this case was given by the tenants on 1st February, 1928, where it was stated that they would vacate the premises on the 1st day of the succeeding month. It was held by their Lordships that the notice was a good notice. The provision of sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act was applied to determine the period of the written lease and as it expired at the end of 1st June, 1925, the monthly tenancy began on the 2nd of June and not on the first. There are two reported cases, which have been decided by this Court since the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Salsiccioni's case, viz., Sushil Chandra v. Birendrajit(7) and Charu Chandra v. Bankim. In both of them there was written leases for a fixed period on the expiry of which the tenant held over, and the provision of sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act was invoked to determine the period of the written lease and not that of the tenancy constituted by holding over of the tenant.
15. The point certainly is not free from doubt. Speaking for myself I would be inclined to agree with Mr. Gupta; for it seems to me to be improbable that the legislature intended that a technical rule of interpretation which involves attaching particular meaning to particular words should be applied to spoken language where the actual words used would have to be proved by extrinsic evidence. In such cases, I think, the question would be one of gathering the intention of the parties from the words used and sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act would not in terms apply. The point however need not be finally decided in this appeal, for I concur with my learned brother in holding that sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application to the facts of the present case, even if we assume that the section is not confined to written leases. The first paragraph of sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act, which is relevant for our present purposes, contemplates that a time or period should be limited by the lease and the period must be expressed to commence from a particular date. When both these conditions are fulfilled, the rule of interpretation laid down in the paragraph applies and in computing the period that day is to be excluded. In the case before us there were negotiations between the parties for a three years' lease, and there was an agreement arrived at that the lease would be for a period of three years from June 1st, 1936, and a formal instrument of lease for that period would be executed and registered. No document was however executed, and the tenancy was constituted by the Defendant's taking possession of the godown, and paying rents which were accepted by the Plaintiff. According to the case made by the Plaintiff in his plaint, there was a tenancy from month to month under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Thus there was no agreement between the parties regarding the period of the lease. As there was no agreement fixing the period, the tenancy has been taken to be from month to month under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, which applies only where there is no agreement to the contrary. As no time was fixed by the lease itself, there could be no question of expressing it to begin from a particular date, and sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act has in these circumstances got no application whatsoever. The letters exchanged by the parties do indeed speak of the tenancy commencing from 1st June, 1936, but they do not constitute the basis of the present lease. That agreement was not given effect to by the parties and the transaction was ultimately concluded on a different basis altogether. This being the position, we cannot determine the time of the commencement of the tenancy by simply applying the rule of interpretation contained in sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act to the words actually used in these letters. As sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act does not apply, the date of the commencement of the tenancy has got to be ascertained like any other fact from such materials as have been placed by the parties before the Court. Here we have these facts, vis., that the tenant went into possession on the 1st June, 1936, and the rents have since then been paid all along according to the months of the English Calendar. There is nothing in the evidence to show that the 1st day of June was intended to be excluded from the month of tenancy. In these circumstances, I agree with my learned brother in holding that the decision of the Court below is right and this appeal must fail
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