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Durga Baksh Singh v. Fateh Bahadur Singh
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an application for revision of an order of the Court below dated 22nd December 1914, which passed a decree in the terms of a certain award under para. 16, Schedule 2 to the Code of Civil Procedure. An award had been filed after an extension of time was granted on 11th December 1914. Notice was given to the vakil for the applicant that objections could be filed within ten days (the usual time) and that the hearing of objections would take place the following day after the ten-day period, i.e., on 22nd December.
The applicant filed objections to the award, including (in substance) an allegation of misconduct against the arbitrator under para. 15, Schedule 2. On the fixed hearing day the applicant appeared but was not ready with evidence and filed a lengthy application for an adjournment to enable production of evidence. The learned Subordinate Judge rejected the adjournment application and, on the same day, passed a decree upon the award, recording that the applicant had produced no evidence.
The applicant sought revision of that order in this Court. The opinion is delivered by Walsh, J., with which Piggott, J. concurs (with some reservations expressed in his separate reasoning). The final disposition by the Court is to allow the revision application, set aside the order and decree of the Court below, and remand the case for hearing of the applicant's objections on the merits.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the refusal by the lower Court to grant an adjournment and the subsequent passing of a decree on an award without hearing the applicant's objections (after the applicant had been given leave to file them) constituted a material irregularity justifying interference by this Court in revision.
- Whether, after an award and participation in arbitration proceedings, a party may in revision challenge the validity of the original submission to arbitration on the ground that the real litigant's authority to submit was not given (i.e., whether such a point can be raised at that stage).
- What is the scope of this Court's revisional jurisdiction in addressing errors of the lower Court comparable to remedies available in England (certiorari or mandamus) — specifically whether the revision section is to be treated as a substitute for those writs in cases of material irregularity.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The applicant filed objections to the award within the prescribed time; those objections included, in substance, an attack on the arbitrator for misconduct under para. 15, Schedule 2.
- The applicant sought an adjournment on the hearing day to enable production of evidence in support of the objections; a formal application for adjournment was filed requesting additional time to prepare and present evidence.
- A point was also argued that the authority of the real litigant was not given to the original submission to arbitration (i.e., that the document relied upon to show authority did not bear such interpretation).
- By implication, the applicant contended he was entitled to have his objections heard on the merits before a decree under the award could be passed against him.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent's Advocate suggested that the application for adjournment may have been a dishonest attempt merely to gain time, implying the applicant was not bona fide in seeking an adjournment.
- On the point attacking the validity of the reference to arbitration, the respondent maintained that the document evidencing authority to refer to arbitration was properly signed on behalf of the named party (noting that Piggott, J. observed there was no force in the plea attacking validity).
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Walsh, J.'s reasoning proceeds step-by-step from the record and the statutory procedure for awards under the Code:
- Notice and procedure: The award was filed after an extension (11th December 1914), notice was given allowing ten days to file objections, and a hearing of any objections was fixed for the day after the ten days (22nd December). This gave the applicant a right to object on any grounds under para. 15, Schedule 2.
- Nature of objections and adjournment application: The applicant filed objections which, although not artfully drafted, included a substantive allegation of arbitrator misconduct (a ground under para. 15). On the hearing day the applicant was not ready and sought an adjournment by a lengthy application to produce evidence.
- Lower Court's treatment of the adjournment: The learned Subordinate Judge rejected the adjournment application. Walsh, J. inspected the order-sheet and the judgment and found the adjournment was dismissed without any reasons given—there is nothing on the record to show the judge exercised judicial reasoning to deal with the application (e.g., findings that the application was not bona fide, that ten days was ample, or that the applicant had been negligent).
- Effect of dismissal on evidence and merits: Because the adjournment was refused, the applicant produced no evidence, and the learned Judge's substantial ground for deciding against the applicant on the merits was that he had produced no evidence. Walsh, J. regarded this as a material irregularity on the face of the record: the Court had given leave to file objections but then effectively refused to hear them by dismissing the adjournment without reason.
- On revisional jurisdiction and analogy to writs: Walsh, J. discussed English remedies (certiorari and mandamus) as illustrations of when intervention is appropriate — where proceedings are bad on their face or a lower Court has failed to hear and determine an application. While he does not definitively decide whether the revision section is a substitute for those writs, he holds that the standards for granting such writs form a satisfactory test for identifying material irregularity under the Code. Applying that test, he concluded there was a material irregularity warranting revision.
- Bona fides and remedial necessity: Walsh, J. framed his conclusion on the assumption (required for his decision) that the applicant acted bona fide in the Court below and in seeking revision. He reasoned that if no power existed in this Court to correct such a mistake, a bona fide litigant could be left without remedy where deprived of a proper opportunity to be heard.
- On the objection to validity of the original submission to arbitration: Walsh, J. observed that questioning the authority to submit to arbitration after participating in the arbitration proceedings is too late; once parties have taken part in the arbitration and an award has been made, they cannot in revision successfully object on the ground that the submission was originally defective. He nevertheless stated he expressed no final opinion on whether that point could have been raised earlier.
- Relief ordered: Walsh, J. concluded the decree should be reversed and the case remanded to the Subordinate Judge of Cawnpore to be dealt with on the merits as res integra. The order expressly did not include an adjournment (the applicant had already had abundant time to prepare), but required the lower Court to hear and determine the objections and to take such evidence as the parties might adduce.
- Piggott, J.'s concurrence: Piggott, J. stated he would not have fully agreed with Walsh, J.'s reasons if sitting alone — he would have been prepared to hold the lower Court was within its jurisdiction in fixing the date for disposal and in rejecting the adjournment without giving reasons — yet he agreed that the lower Court's proceedings were unsatisfactory and did not formally dissent from Walsh, J.'s order. He therefore concurred in setting aside the lower Court's order and decree and in remanding the case.
Holding and Implications
Holding (core ruling): The application for revision is allowed; the order and decree of the Court below dated 22nd December 1914 are set aside, and the case is remanded to the Court below with directions to hear the applicant's objections on the merits and dispose of them according to law.
Direct implications for the parties:
- The Subordinate Judge of Cawnpore must hear the applicant's objections as though the hearing were taking place for the first time (res integra), and must receive such evidence as the parties wish to produce.
- The remittal does not include an order granting an adjournment; the Court noted the applicant had already had abundant time to prepare his case.
- The applicant will have an opportunity to be heard on the merits and to present evidence in support of his objections (including the allegation of arbitrator misconduct). If successful on the merits he may still obtain relief despite the prior decree having been set aside.
Broader implications and precedent: The opinion discusses the scope of revisional jurisdiction and analogizes material irregularity to grounds for certiorari or mandamus in English practice, but it does not purport to lay down a new binding precedent beyond the decision in this case. The decision is directed to correcting a material irregularity on the face of the record and to ensuring the applicant's objections are heard on the merits.
Disposition
By the Court: the application is allowed; the lower Court's order is set aside; the case is remanded to the Subordinate Judge of Cawnpore to hear the applicant's objections on the merits and dispose of them according to law. (Piggott, J. concurred; the final entry records "Application allowed.")
V.B/R.K
Walsh, J.:— In this case I have no doubt in my own mind as to what is the proper course for this Court to take. It is an application for revision of an order of the Court below, dated 22nd December 1914, passing a decree in the terms of a certain award under para. 16, Sch. 2 to the Code of Civil Procedure. To an award of this kind the law has given, for reasons which may be good or bad but which do not concern us, a right to either party to object. The award was filed in this particular case after some further time had been given on 11th December 1914. Notice was then given of the vakil for the applicant, that objections could be filed within ten days (the usual time) and that hearing of the objections would take place on the following day after the expiration of the ten days, that is, on 22nd December. That in my opinion gave the party a right, if be saw fit, to object to the award on any of the grounds under para. 15, Sch. 2. He did in fact file objections to the award which although not artistic in form included in substance at any rate an attack on the arbitrator on the ground of misconduct. This was a ground under para. 15. It therefore followed that the Court could not pass a decree without hearing the objection. On the day fixed for the hearing the applicant appeared but was not ready with his evidence. About that there can be no possible doubt whatever, because he filed a long application asking the Court to grant him an adjournment for the purpose of enabling him to produce his evidence. Whether he had ample time to get his evidence but had failed, whether there was some evidence there, such as the arbitrator himself who might have been put into the witness-box and examined as a preliminary to his attack, or whether it was a dishonest application merely to gain time I have no means of knowing. It is suggested by the respondent's Advocate that it was a dishonest application. It may have been so; but I cannot for myself find facts without materials upon which to base my decision. I therefore have to look at the judgment of the Court below. So far as the application for adjournment is concerned there is an order to be found in the order sheet showing that the learned Judge rejected it for reasons given in the judgment. I have looked at the judgment and it is right to say that the language of the judgment rather indicates that the learned Judge had in his mind some suspicion with regard to the application and with regard to the solidity of the grounds upon which it was baaed. He however unfortunately fails to deal with the adjournment at all. He gives no reason. It therefore stands plain on the face of the record that this application for adjournment was dismissed without giving any reasons. I am not prepared to say that even that was an irregularity if there was anything to show to this Court that he had dealt judicially with the application for adjournment, that he thought that it was not a bona fide application, that he thought that the time of 10 days given for filing objections was ample for the applicant to prepare his case and that he had been guilty of neglect in not coming before the Court ready with his case.
2. That would have been decision with which, even if I thought it unsatisfactory, I could not have interfered. This order is not subject to an appeal and if the matter was dealt with judically however unsatisfactory the reasons may appear to this Court, this Court cannot overrule it. But there is nothing to show what was the real ground in the learned Judge's mind. I cannot sitting here assume without any evidence or a finding to guide me that the application was necessarily without bona fides. It therefore stands thus: On the record as it stands the application for adjournment was refused apparently for no reason. That in itself as I have stated above might not be sufficient; but in the substantial judgment by means of which the learned Judge passed a decree under the terms of the award, his ground for deciding against the applicant upon the merits is that he has produced no evidence whatever. Whether it was his fauit or not, the fact remains that he produced no evidence and this was due to the dismissal of his application for adjournment. To my mind that was a material irregularity. It is always a little difficult to say what is material irregularity which justifies a revision by this Court. It is perhaps dangerous to speculate; but in England mistakes of jurisdiction which are apparent on the face of the record or cases in which a lower Court can be shown to have failed to exercise its jurisdiction there is a speedy remedy. Where proceedings are bad on their face they can be set right by certiorari, and where a Court has failed to hear and determine a proceeding or application it can be ordered to hear and determine by means of a writ of mandamus. Whether the revision section was intended as a substitute for those two rather technical proceedings I am unable to say. But to my mind the grounds upon which writs, of certiorari or mandamus may be granted in England form no unsatisfactory test as to whether or not there is material irregularity within the meaning of this-Code. Being of opinion that there has been, as far as is shown on the face of the proceedings or by any other evidence before us, a failure by the lower appellate Court to hear and determine the application for adjournment or the objection which the Court itself gave the applicant leave to file, I think there was material irregularity within the meaning of the section and I think further that, assuming as I am bound to assume for the purpose of this judgment that the applicant was acting bona fide in the Court below and bona fide applied to this Court in revision because he wishes that his case should be properly dealt with, it would be a great misfortune if there were no power inherent in this Court to correct such mistake as has been complained of here.
3. If there were no such power, the result would be that in a bona fide case where a party really wished to attack an award and the Court refused to give him a proper opportunity he would be wholly without remedy. There is nothing before us in this case throwing any light upon the merits. The substantial part of Mr. Dube's argument was really directed to the merits. In that matter he has yet to be heard by a proper Tribunal. If he is right, the order which I suggest will do him no harm. He can yet succeed upon the merits. He will have the additional satisfaction of having succeeded upon the merits after his case has been fully heard. At present he appears to have succeeded without the case being heard at all. It is perhaps desirable to refer to the first point which was argued on behalf of the applicant. I take an equally strong view with regard to that. The point submitted was that he authority of the real litigant was not given to the original submission to arbitration and shat the document under which I understand it was held that the authority was conferred does not bear such interpretation. I do not care in the least whether the document gives such authority or not. It seems to me wholly immaterial.
4. It may be that there was no original authority to consent to a submission to arbitration and that if an objection had been taken at the proper time that might also have been raised in revision. I express no opinion about it. It is sufficient for ma to say that after an award had taken place the parties have however dissatisfied they may be with the same, no right to object on the ground that the submission was bad. After they have taken part in the arbitration proceedings, it is certainly too late for them to coma to this Court in revision to question the original proceeding. Taking the view which I do upon the second point argued I think that the decree of the Court below should be reversed and the case be sent back to that Court to be dealt with on the merits and I order accordingly. This order does not include the application for adjournment, as the applicant has already had abundant time to prepare his case and when the case gets back the objections made by the applicant must be heard and the case ultimately disposed of by the Court below after taking such evidence as the parties may adduce. The case will therefore come before the Subordinate Judge of Cawnpore on the merits as res integra, that is to say, the objections must be dealt with by him and heard according to law as though the hearing was taking place before him for the first time, the parties being at liberty to produce material evidence.
Piggott, J.:— It seems to me that this application for revision was probably admitted because of the plea assailing the validity of the reference to arbitration. I am satisfied that there was no force in that plea and that the application for reference to arbitration was duly signed on behalf of Mt. Sheorani Kunwar by a person who had her authority to do so. On the question of the manner in which the objections taken to the award were disposed of by the Court below I am not prepared to agree unreservedly with the reasons given by my learned colleague for his decision. Had I been sitting alone I should have been prepared to hold that the Court below was within its jurisdiction in fixing the 26th December for final disposal of any objections that might be filed, also that in rejecting the application for adjournment, without giving his reasons and apparently on inadequate grounds, the learned Subordinate Judge had not been guilty of such irregularity as to justify interference of this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. I think however that the proceedings in the Court below were very unsatisfactory and by no means regret the fact that my learned colleague has seen his way to take a wider view of the authority of this Court as applicable to this particular case. The matter has already occupied a disproportionate amount of the time of this Court and I certainly do not propose fromally to dissent from the order passed by my learned colleague. For these reasons I concur in setting aside the lower Court's order dismissing the applicant's objections and the decree which followed thereon.
5. By the Court.— The application is allowed. The order of the Court below set aside and the case is remanded to that Court with directions to hear the objections of the present applicant on the merits and dispose of them according to law.
V.B/R.K
6. Application allowed.
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