- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
The Public Prosecutor v. Marati Kunti Venkoba Rao And Another
Judgment Summary — Mockett, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The first and second accused were charged before the Sessions Judge of Kurnool under two sections of the Indian Penal Code: (1) s. 364 (abduction with intent to murder) and (2) s. 302 (murder). The person concerned in each case was Veeramma, who was murdered on October 13, 1935.
The Sessions Judge acquitted both accused of murder (s. 302) but convicted both under s. 364. The first accused was sentenced to transportation for life; the second accused was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years.
Two appeals were brought: the first accused appealed against his conviction (Criminal Appeal No. 660 of 1936), and the Crown appealed against the acquittal of the accused for murder (Criminal Appeal No. 615 of 1936). The Court considered these appeals and delivered the following results.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appeal of the first accused against his conviction under s. 364 should be allowed or dismissed.
- Whether the Crown's appeal against the acquittal for murder (s. 302) should be allowed in respect of the first accused and/or the second accused.
- What sentence, if any, should be imposed on the first accused following allowance of the Crown's appeal in his case.
- Whether notice should be issued to the second accused to show cause why her sentence should not be enhanced.
- What is the proper method of recording and admitting statements made by accused persons under s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, and how much of such statements may be proved in evidence.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Criminal Appeal No. 530 of 1936 | Emphasizes that statements made by an accused which contain information provable under s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act should be clearly and carefully recorded by the police officer in the first person, i.e., in the words used by the accused, and should not be paraphrased. | The Court repeated and endorsed this point, criticizing the practice of paraphrasing and directing that Courts and police should follow the method of recording in the first person. |
| Periayakaruppan, In re (cited as (1)) | Deals with the topic that under s. 27 the whole statement which leads to the discovery may be given in evidence and that a statement should not be altered. | The Court relied on this authority to explain admissibility under s. 27, stating that so much of the information (whether amounting to confession or not) may be proved provided it relates distinctly to the fact discovered; the decision was cited as dealing with this topic. |
| Sogaimuthu Padayachi v. King-Emperor (cited as (2)) | Sets out principles relating to admission of statements that lead to discovery; the Court noted agreement with the principles laid down in that case. | The Court stated agreement with the principles but observed some uncertainty about how they were applied in that particular case; it suggested that the statement in that case might have been admitted in its entirety and reinforced that application of the principles depends on the facts of each case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court announced its results: the appeal of the first accused (against his conviction under s. 364) was dismissed; the Crown's appeal in respect of the second accused was dismissed; the Crown's appeal in respect of the first accused was allowed. The Court then addressed sentencing for the first accused.
In considering sentence on allowance of the Crown's appeal (i.e., where the Court was reversing an acquittal), the Court stated that it had "given this matter the most anxious consideration" and acknowledged there is no fixed practice but a general reluctance to impose the death penalty on appeal against an acquittal. Despite that reluctance, the Court concluded that the facts here (described as a "particularly cruel murder, carefully planned and deliberately carried out") warranted the death sentence for the first accused. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the first accused "should be hanged by the neck till he is dead."
Regarding the second accused, the Court did not order an immediate enhancement of sentence but directed that notice should be given to the second accused to show cause why her sentence should not be enhanced.
Separately, the Court examined the treatment of statements recorded under s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Court criticized the common practice of police paraphrase and incomplete reporting (for example, police saying "the accused said he would show the aruval" rather than recording the accused's exact words). The Court reiterated that statements which contain information leading to discovery should be recorded in the first person and not paraphrased, that the whole statement which leads to the discovery may be given in evidence, and that it is for the trial Court to decide how much of such a statement is admissible under s. 27. The Court cited Periayakaruppan and Sogaimuthu Padayachi in support of these principles and emphasized that on no account should a statement be altered.
Holding and Implications
Core Rulings:
- The appeal of the first accused against his conviction under s. 364 was dismissed.
- The Crown's appeal against the acquittal for murder of the first accused was allowed, and the Court sentenced the first accused to death by hanging.
- The Crown's appeal with regard to the second accused was dismissed, and the second accused remains convicted under s. 364 with the existing sentence subject to a notice to show cause why her sentence should not be enhanced.
Implications: The immediate consequences are the upholding of the first accused's conviction under s. 364 and imposition of the death sentence following allowance of the Crown's appeal in respect of murder; and the dismissal of the Crown's appeal in respect of the second accused with a direction to serve notice on her regarding possible enhancement of sentence. The opinion also gives authoritative guidance on the recording and admissibility of statements under s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act—requiring first-person recording and cautioning against paraphrase—but does not purport to establish a broader new legal doctrine beyond application of existing authorities cited.
Order: "Order accordingly." (as stated in the opinion)
Mockett, J.:— The 1st and 2nd accused were charged before the Sessions Judge of Kurnool under two sections of the Indian Penal Code, viz., (1) under s. 364, abduction with intent to murder, and (2) under s. 302 murder, the person concerned in each case being one Veeramma who, it will later be seen, was unquestionably murdered on October 13, 1935. The learned Sessions Judge has acquitted both the accused of murder and has convicted them both under s. 364, Indian Penal Code, has sentenced the 1st accused to transportation for life, and the 2nd accused to rigorous imprisonment for 3 years. The 1st accused has appealed against his conviction (Criminal Appeal No. 660 of 1936) and the Crown has appealed against the acquittal of the accused for murder (Criminal Appeal No. 615 of 1936). (Their Lordships after dealing with facts proceeded).
2. The result will be that the appeal of accused No. 1 will be dismissed; the appeal of the Crown with regard to accused No. 2 will be dismissed.
3. The appeal of the Crown with regard to accused No. 1 will be allowed. With regard to the sentence, we have naturally given this matter the most anxious consideration, because this is after all an appeal against an acquittal, and although there is no practice laid down, we should often be reluctant in an appeal against an acquittal to pass a sentence of death. In this case, however, we consider we should be failing in our duty if we did anything else. This was a particularly cruel murder, carefully planned and deliberately carried out, and we consider that the proper sentence for us to pass is that the 1st accused should be hanged by the neck till he is dead. With regard to the question of sentence on the 2nd accused, we consider that notice should go to the 2nd accused to show cause why her sentence should not be enhanced.
4. Before leaving this case, we desire to point out that the method of recording statements given under s. 27 followed in this case is most unfortunate, and this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 530 of 1936 has pointed out that statements made by an accused person which contain information provable in evidence under s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, should be clearly and carefully recorded by the Police Officer, and they should be recorded in the first person, that is to stay, in the words used by the accused. They should not be paraphrased. Obviously if what a man says is to be used in evidence, his exact words should be used and not what a Policeman or any one else says he said. That is sufficient comment with regard to that aspect of it. When the Police have recorded the statement, it will in each case be for the trial Court to decide how much of the statement is admissible under s. 27, that is to say, how much of such information as relates distinctly to the fact discoverable may be proved. And in considering that the Court should bear in mind the fact, which seems to have entirely escaped the notice of many Sessions Judges in this Presidency recently, that is, that so much of such information whether it amounts to a confession or not may be proved, provided that it relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered. A decision of this Court in Periayakaruppan, In re (1), deals with this topic. It is pointed out there that under s. 27, the whole statement which leads to the discovery may be given in evidence and it was further held that, on no account should a statement be altered. See also Sogaimuthu Padayachi v. King-Emperor (2). We agree with the principles laid down in that case although we are not wholly able to follow how they were applied to the actual facts before the Court. The statement in that case sought to be admitted might well, we think, have been admitted in its entirety. Of course, it will be for the Court in each case to say how much of the statement leads to the discovery of the fact in each case. If it is necessary in order to make sense of the statement of the accused to set out any question put to him that should obviously be done. The present practice which frequently occurs of Police Officers going into the box and saying some such thing as this “the accused said he would show the aruval” or “the accused said he would show the body” or “the jewels” is wrong. Obviously those are no the words of the accused but a mangled and incomplete paraphrase. We hope that the Courts Will take notice of these observations.
5. Order accordingly.
Alert