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Tarak Nath Roy v. Panchanan Banerjee And Others Opposite Parties.
Factual and Procedural Background
This revision concerns the proper court-fees payable on a memorandum of appeal filed against an order made in a restitution proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).
In 1913 a mortgage suit was instituted against the present petitioner (then a minor) by Rama Nath Banerjee (predecessor of opposite parties 1–3) concerning a mortgage bond alleged to have been executed by the petitioner's father. The petitioner was represented by his mother, who was illiterate; a decree was entered in that mortgage suit based on an award made by an arbitrator who was a brother of the mortgagee. Execution of that decree led to sale of the petitioner's properties, and Rama Nath also took forcible possession of property described in schedule (gha).
After attaining majority, the petitioner sued (in 1928) opposite parties 1–4 (the first three being Rama Nath's sons/heirs and the fourth an alienee of the gha property) for recovery of possession and a declaration that the mortgage decree and consequent ex-sale were fraudulent and void. The trial court decreed for the petitioner on 31 July 1931; the decree was affirmed on appeal. The petitioner regained possession on 20 August 1931.
The petitioner had not claimed mesne profits in that suit (rights were reserved). Instead of bringing a separate suit for mesne profits, he commenced a proceeding purporting to be under Section 144 and Section 151 CPC to recover mesne profits (claimed ≈ Rs. 46,000). The trial court rejected that application as not falling within Section 144 or Section 151. On appeal the District Judge held that ad valorem court-fees were payable under Schedule 1, Article 1 of the Court-fees Act. The petitioner obtained the present rule challenging that decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- What amount of court-fees is payable on a memorandum of appeal filed against an order passed in a restitution proceeding under Section 144 CPC (i.e., whether ad valorem fees under Sch. 1, Art. 1 of the Court-fees Act are payable or only a fixed Rs. 2 under Article 11, Sch. 2 in conjunction with the cited Government of India notification)?
- Whether an application under Section 144 CPC is to be treated as coming within Section 47 CPC (execution) for the purpose of the Government of India notification limiting the fee to Rs. 2 (i.e., whether appeals from orders under S.144 fall within the notification that applied to S.47)?
- Whether the appeal can be treated as an appeal from an order under Section 151 CPC (for which a Rs. 2 fee would be payable) rather than under Section 144 CPC?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Sen)
- Primary contention: The case is governed by Article 11, Schedule 2 of the Court-fees Act read with Clause (6) of Government of India Notification No. 4650 dated 10 September 1899 (and the corresponding Bengal Government Notification), so that the court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal is only Rs. 2.
- Reliance on precedents: Mr. Sen relied on two decisions of this Court reported as 11 CLJ 541 and 21 CWN 544 (as supporting the proposition that restitution proceedings fall within the scope of provisions that permit the lower fixed fee).
- Alternative contention: Even if not covered by Article 11, the order appealed from may be regarded as an order under Section 151 CPC, for which a court-fee of Rs. 2 only is payable.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any separate, specific arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents in opposition to the petitioner's contentions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 11 CLJ 541 | Held that an application for mesne profits made by a defendant by way of restitution under the old Code (S.583) would come under S.244 of the old CPC and that an appeal against such an order could be filed with the benefit of the notification (i.e., limited fee). | The Court observed this decision rather assumed than fully decided the issue; it noted the decision distinguished restitution applications by defendants from applications by plaintiffs and did not treat it as controlling for the present facts. |
| 21 CWN 544 | Held that a proceeding for restitution was really an application for execution and hence came within Section 47 CPC (thereby bringing it within the notification limiting fee). | The Court noted this decision (by Mr. Chatterjee, J.) and explained the judge's reliance on old S.583; but the present Court did not accept the view that S.144 proceedings are execution proceedings for the purposes of the notification. |
| 28 Cal 1133 | Exhibits the general trend of opinion of this Court against holding restitution applications to be applications for execution. | The Court cited this as part of a series of authorities reflecting reluctance to equate restitution with execution within this Court's jurisprudence. |
| 21 CWN 5644 | Also cited as reflecting the trend against treating restitution as execution. | Used as part of the weight of authority within this Court against Mr. Sen's contentions. |
| 59 Cal 337 | Rankin, C.J. noted room for comment; the point was not clearly or elaborately discussed in prior cases, but the Chief Justice adhered to the view (that restitution is not execution) with hesitation. | The Court relied on the observation that the issue has been treated with hesitation and not conclusively in earlier decisions. |
| 41 Bom 625 | Example of Bombay High Court authority holding that the word "execution" is wide enough to cover proceedings under S.144. | The Court cited this as part of the set of High Court decisions contrary to the view adopted by this Court; it noted the existence of conflicting High Court authority. |
| 45 Bom 1137 | Another Bombay High Court decision supporting the view that execution covers S.144. | Cited as part of the Madras/Bombay grouping of authorities taking the execution-inclusive view. |
| 40 Mad 780 | Madras High Court decision maintaining that "execution" is wide enough to cover S.144 proceedings. | Cited as supporting authority for the contrary position; the Court noted the split of authority among High Courts. |
| 47 All 98 | Allahabad High Court decision taking the contrary view (that restitution under S.144 is not execution). | Cited as part of the grouping of High Courts that disagreed with the execution-inclusive approach; the Court accepted this line as consistent with its own view. |
| 3 Pat 371 | Patna Full Bench decision distinguishing execution from restitution and concluding S.144 proceedings are not execution. | The Court relied on this as a key authority showing a clear distinction between execution and restitution, especially noting differences in powers (e.g., awarding interest and compensation). |
| 8 Rang 271 | Bangoon High Court decision taking the view that S.144 proceedings are not execution. | Used to show the existence of High Court authorities contrary to the Bombay/Madras line; supports the Court's conclusion. |
| 35 CWN 105 | Decision relied on to suggest that when a Court decides a matter under S.151 that is in substance of the same nature as one under S.144, an appeal may lie in the same way as from S.144. | The Court explained this decision can be reconciled by treating an order under S.151 as appealable only when in substance it falls within S.47 or S.144. It held that does not assist the present petitioner. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two stages addressing each of the appellant's contentions.
- On the primary contention (application of Article 11, Sch. 2 Court-fees Act and the Government of India notification): the Court observed that Article 11 Sch. 2 provides a fixed fee (Rs. 2) for a memorandum of appeal to the High Court "when the appeal is not from a decree or an order having the force of a decree." The Court held that an order under Section 144 CPC is "an order having the force of a decree" and therefore Article 11 does not apply to S.144 appeals.
- The Court then considered the Government of India notification (No. 4650 dated 10 September 1899, repeated in Bengal Notification No. 1872-J dated 23 May 1921) which had limited the fee for appeals from orders under Section 47 CPC to the amount chargeable under Article 11 Sch. 2. Mr. Sen's argument that S.144 proceedings fall within S.47 (and thus benefit from the notification) required the Court to decide whether S.144 is, in substance, an execution proceeding.
- The Court reviewed authorities. Some High Courts (Madras and Bombay) had held that "execution" is wide enough to cover S.144, while Allahabad, Patna and Bangoon High Courts had taken the contrary view. The Court noted a general trend in this Court against treating restitution applications as execution proceedings and referred specifically to Patna Full Bench (3 Pat 371) which emphasized that the Court in a S.144 application has wider jurisdiction than an executing court (e.g., can award interest and compensation).
- The Court emphasized textual and structural considerations: S.144 is not located in the chapter on execution in the Code but treated as a miscellaneous proceeding. A party seeking restitution is not strictly seeking execution of a decree; restitution follows from a judgment of reversal and is based on the principle that the acts of Court should prejudice no party, but it is not execution of a decree. Because the Government notification specifically mentioned S.47 and omitted S.144, the Court concluded that the omission was deliberate and that the notification did not apply to S.144 appeals.
- On the alternative contention (that the order may be treated as one under S.151 CPC): the Court observed that the memorandum of appeal explicitly purported to be from an order under S.144 and not S.151. Moreover, an order under S.151 by itself is not an appealable order under the Code; appeal rights are creatures of statute. While 35 CWN 105 could be read to allow an appeal where an order under S.151 is in substance of the same nature as one under S.144 or S.47, the Court found that the present order was properly an order under S.144 and not one under S.47 or S.151 that would attract the reduced fee. Consequently, the S.151 argument did not assist the petitioner.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Rule discharged with costs.
Consequent orders and direct effects on the parties:
- The Court held that the memorandum of appeal filed in respect of the order in the restitution proceeding under Section 144 CPC must be stamped with an ad valorem court-fee under Schedule 1, Article 1 of the Court-fees Act (i.e., the reduced Rs. 2 fee under Article 11 Sch.2 and the cited notification did not apply).
- The petitioner's alternative contention that the appeal could be treated as arising under Section 151 CPC likewise failed because an order under S.151 is not, by itself, an appealable order; and the present order was correctly regarded as under S.144 and not S.47.
- The rule was discharged with costs; the hearing fee was assessed at one gold mohur; and the court-fees were ordered to be paid within one month from the arrival of the record in the lower Court.
The opinion reasons from and applies existing authorities and decisions; it resolves the fee question for the case at hand by rejecting the petitioner's reliance on Article 11 Sch. 2 plus the notification and by rejecting the S.151 characterization. The opinion does not purport to set out a novel general principle beyond its application to these facts.
B.K Mukherji, J.:— The question raised in this revision case relates to the amount of court-fees that are payable on a memorandum of appeal filed against an order passed in a proceeding for restitution, under Section 144 of the CPC. The facts shortly stated are these: In the year 1913, when the present petitioner was a minor, there was a mortgage suit started against him by one Rama Nath Banerjee, predecessor of opposite parties 1 to 3, on a moortgage bond alleged to be executed by the petitioner's father. The petitioner was represented by his mother, who was an illiterate lady and could not look to his-interest properly, and a decree was passed in this mortgage suit which was based on an award made by an arbitrator, who was no other than a brother of the said mortgagee, Ramanath. In execution of this mortgage decree all the properties of the petitioner were gradually sold and purchased by the decree-holder except the properties described in schedule (gha), but Rama Nath took forcible possession of this property as well.
2. After the petitioner attained majority he instituted a suit in the year 1928, against opposite parties 1 to 4, the first three defendants being the sons and heirs of Rama Nath, and the fourth an alienee from Rama Nath of the (gha) schedule property, for recovery of possession of all these properties, on a declaration that the mortgagee decree and the ex-sale consequent thereon were fraudulent and void. This suit culminated in a decree in favour of the petitioner on 31st July 1931, which was subsequently affirmed in appeal.
3. The petitioner in execution of his decree got back possession of all the properties on 20th August 1931. It may be said here that though there was a prayer for delivery of possession in the suit instituted by the petitioner, he did not make any prayer for recovery of mesne profits, the rights-being reserved for another litigation. Instead of filing a suit for mesne profits, however, the petitioner was advised to commence this present proceeding which-purported to be under S. 144 and Section 151 of the CPC, and therein he claimed., recovery of mesne profits to the extent of nearly Rs. 46,000 for the period of his dispossession. The trial Court rejected the application holding that S. 144 was inapplicable to the facts of the case, and it was not a case which could properly be dealt with under Section 151 of the CPC. Against this order of rejection an appeal was taken to the lower appellate Court, and a preliminary point was raised as regards the court-fees that were payable upon this memorandum of appeal. The District Judge held that ad valorem court, fees were payable under Sch. 1, Article 1, Court-fees Act, and it is against this order that the present rule has been obtained.
4. Mr. Sen who has appeared in support of the Rule has contended before us in the first place that the present case is governed by Article 11, Sch. 2, Court-fees Act, read with Cl. (6) of the notification of the Government of India No. 4650, dated 10th September 1899, and the court-fee payable is two rupees only. In support of this contention he has relied upon two decisions of this Court, viz., 11 CLJ 5411 and 21 CWN 5442. The second contention of Mr. Sen is that in any view of the case the order appealed from may be taken to be an order under Section 151 of the CPC, for which a court-fee of Rs. 2 only is payable.
5. Now on the first point, Article 11, Sch. 2, Court-fees Act, standing by itself is of no assistance to the petitioner. That article lays down that in a memorandum of appeal presented to the High Court when the appeal is not from a decree of an order having the force of a decree, the court-fee payable is Rs. 2. An order under Section 144 of the CPC, is obviously an order having the force of a decree, and the Article therefore has no application to the present case. There was, however, a notification by the Government of India which is mentioned above, and which is repeated in Bengal Government's Notification No. 1872-J, dated 23rd May 1921, under which the fee charge, able on appeals from orders under Section 47 of the CPC, was limited to the amount chargeable under Article 11, Sch. 2. Mr. Sen contends that the application under Section 144 of the CPC, really comes under S. 47 of the Code and as such the present case comes within the benefit of the notification mentioned above. The controversy therefore narrowed down to the short point as to whether the application under Section 144 of the CPC, comes within the purview of S. 47. In 11 CLJ 541 the application for mesne profits was made not by the I plaintiff, but by the defendant by way of restitution under Section 583 of the old CPC, after the suit was dismissed against him with costs. The application, it was held, would come under Section 244 of the CPC, and an appeal against the order would be within the purview of the notification, and could be filed with a court-fee of two rupees only. This case rather assumed than decided that an application for restitution would be within the scope of S. 244 of the old Code, though a distinction was made between a proceeding for recovery of mesne profits started at the instance of the defendant and one at the instance of the plaintiff, implying thereby that it would not lie within the plaintiff to avail himself of the procedure for restitution, for recovery of mesne profits, which he could and should have claimed in a suit. This was followed by Mr. Chatterjee, J. in 21 CWN 544 and it was held that a proceeding for restitution was really an application for execution and hence came within Section 47 of the CPC. Mr. Chatterjee, J. referred to the provisions of S. 583 of the old Code, which expressly provided that the Court should proceed to execute the decree passed on appeal according to the rules for execution of decree in suits. It is true that in S. 144 of the Code of 1908 this provision was omitted, but this was immaterial according to the learned Judge, for in substance the Court granting-restitution, executes the decree of reversal, which by necessary implication carries with it the right to restitution. It may be pointed out that since the introduction of the new Code, the general trend of opinion of this Court was against holding restitution applications as applications for execution: see 28 Cal 1133 and 21 CWN 5644.
6. As observed by Rankin, C.J in 59 Cal 337,5 there is room for comment on each one of these cases, and the point was not clearly or elaborately discussed in any one of them but it showed the general opinion and the learned Chief Justice himself adhered to this view though not without some hesitation. As matters stand, there is a clear conflict of opinion on this point entertained by the various High Courts in India. The Madras and Bombay High Courts have consistently maintained the view that the expression “execution” is wide enough to cover all proceedings under S. 144: see 41 Bom 625;6 45 Bom 11377 and 40 Mad 7808. The Allahabad, Patna and Bangoon High Courts on the other hand have taken the contrary view: see 47 All 98;9 3 Pat 37110 and 8 Rang 27111. In this state of authorities we are not prepared to differ from the opinion of this Court expressed in the cases noted above. Indeed a distinction between execution and restitution's noticeable on more grounds than one. S. 144 appears not in the chapter on execution, but is treated as a sort of miscellaneous proceeding in the Code. A party seeking restitution, does not strictly speaking want to execute any decree, and it is by some violence to the language that we can speak of the judgment of reversal, making by implication, an additional decree that the successful party will get from the other side that the latter had got in the meantime by execution of the original decree, and restitution is nothing but execution of this implied negative aspect of the decree of reversal. The right of restitution undoubtedly follows from the judgment of reversal and is based on the broad principle that the acts of Court should prejudice none of the parties, but it cannot be said that the Court granting restitution is executing a decree. As pointed out by the Patna High Court in the Full Bench case mentioned above (3 Pat 371), the Court in an application binder S. 144 has a wider range of jurisdiction than an executing Court which can only enforce the decree or order as it stands. It can award interest and compensation, which the executing Court cannot. But apart from this we are concerned in this case with an interpretation of the Government notification mentioned above. If it were the intention of the Government that appeals from orders under S. 144 would also be exempted from payment of ad valorem fees it is not clear, why the section was not specifically mentioned. It appears to us that restitution applications being miscellaneous proceedings in the nature of suits, where large amounts claimed as damages might be involved, the Government deliberately omitted Section 144 of the CPC, from the notification exempting payment of ad valorem court-fees in appeals from such orders. We, therefore, overrule the first contention of Mr. Sen and hold that the memorandum of appeal ought to be stamped with an ad valorem court-fee under Sch. 1, Article 1, Court-fees Act.
7. The second contention of Mr. Sen amounts to this that: the application for restitution was alternatively under Section 151 of the CPC, and hence the appeal may be taken to be an appeal from an order under S. 151 and not under Section 144 of the CPC and the question whether S. 144 proceedings are really proceedings in execution will not in that event arise.
8. We are unable to see how the contention assists Mr. Sen's client. In the first place, the memorandum-of appeal purports to be one from an order under Section 144 of the CPC, and not from an order under S. 151 of the Code. But leaving aside this technical point, an order under S. 151 is not an appealable order under the Code and so the appeal cannot be treated as an appeal from an order within the meaning of Article 11, Sch. 2. Mr. Sen relies upon the decision in 35 CWN 105,12 as an authority for the proposition that when the Court decides a matter under Section 151 of the CPC, which is of the same nature as one under Section 144 of the CPC, there is an appeal from the order in the same way as there is an appeal from an order under Section 144 of the CPC. This decision further lays down that on the facts of that case, the proceedings for restitution which were started before the executing Court by a judgment-debtor for recovery of mesne profits after setting aside of an execution sale could come within Section 47 of the CPC. Now an appeal is undoubtedly a creature of statute, and no appeal could possibly lie from an order under Section 151 of the CPC, taken by itself. The decision can be explained however by saying that an appeal may lie if the order passed under S. 151, is one which in substance comes under S. 47 or S. 144 of the Code. In the present case if the order is taken as one under Section 144 of the CPC, it does not benefit the petitioner. It cannot, in our opinion, be taken as an order under Section 47 of the CPC. It was not an application before the executing Court at all as in the decision reported in 35 CWN 105, nor did it relate to any question regarding execution, satisfaction and discharge of a decree. The jurisdiction which the Court was called upon to exercise could at the best be said to be the same jurisdiction which the Court could exercise under Section 144 of the CPC. As we have said already an application under Section 144 of the CPC, does not come within Section 47 of the CPC. Hence the second contention also fails.
9. The result is that the rule is discharged with costs. The hearing fee is assessed at one gold mohur. The court-fees must be paid within a month from the date of the arrival of the record in the lower Court.
M.C Ghose, J.:— I agree.
K.B/A.L
10. Rule discharged.
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