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Prag Datt And Another Objector v. Hari Bahadur And Others Landlords

Allahabad High Court
Feb 5, 1947
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judicial Opinion — Structured Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act. Hari Bahadur and others made an application under section 4 of that Act and listed, among other property, a share of "five annas and four pies" in the village of Akbarpur Barni, Mahal Hori Lal. An objection was taken by Prag Dutt and Mrs. Ram Dulari (widow of Chheda Lal), who claimed ownership of the property.

The underlying transaction was a transfer dated 18-1-1915 in which Hori Lal (deceased), the father of Hari Bahadur, transferred the property to Prag Dutt and Chheda Lal. The central factual dispute was whether the deed constituted an absolute sale or a mortgage by conditional sale. The learned judge in the court below held the transaction to be a mortgage. The objectors (Prag Dutt and Mrs. Ram Dulari) appealed that decision.

A connected appeal (No. 381 of 1942) arising from the same Encumbered Estates Act proceedings raised whether certain houses were transferred by Hori Lal to one Mt. Sunder Kunwar on 4-2-1915; the applicants under section 4 had listed houses Nos. 1/181 and 1/182 and the appellants claimed those houses under the deed already mentioned.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the transfer dated 18-1-1915 should be characterized as an absolute sale or as a mortgage by conditional sale (i.e., is the transaction a mortgage under the Transfer of Property Act, particularly having regard to Section 58(c)).
  2. Whether the intention of the parties or the presence of conditions enumerated in Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act determines the nature of such a transaction (i.e., whether the Transfer of Property Act modified the previously prevailing rule that intention controls).
  3. In the connected appeal (No. 381 of 1942): whether the houses described in the deed are identical with houses Nos. 1/181 and 1/182 as entered in the section 4 application.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the nature of the transaction must depend upon the intention of the parties, not merely upon whether the property was sold subject to any of the conditions mentioned in Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • The deed of sale dated 18-1-1915 expressly stated that the property was sold subject to a separate deed of agreement for re-conveyance; a separate agreement executed on the same date set out terms for reconveyance if the vendor repaid the price within eleven years either in a lump sum or in two instalments.
  • Counsel contended the two documents were one transaction and that, while Section 58(c) might point to a conditional sale being a mortgage, precedent authority supported the proposition that intention of the parties is decisive.
  • Counsel relied on considerable authority (several reported cases) for the proposition that the intention of the parties should be the controlling criterion.

Other Parties' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the opposing party's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
12 ALL. 3871 Referred to as authority for the earlier rule that the intention of the parties is the criterion in deciding whether a transaction is a sale or a mortgage. Cited as part of a group of cases showing prior law that emphasized intention; used to illustrate that at one time intention was decisive.
22 ALL. 1492 Also cited among cases supporting that intention was the controlling test; elsewhere a remark in 22 ALL. 149 was noted that the Transfer of Property Act had not changed the law. Relied upon in discussion of whether Section 58 altered earlier law; the court noted the remark but observed it was made in another context.
38 ALL. 5703 Cited as another precedent indicating the rule that intention governs classification of the transaction. Placed alongside other decisions evidencing the pre-Transfer of Property Act approach to intention; used to show earlier judicial inclination.
47 Mad. 7294 Decision in which the determination depended upon intention (as described by the opinion). Noted by the court as a case where the decision turned on intention, but the Privy Council were not called upon to decide the precise point whether intention must be the basis.
33 ALL. 3376 A Bench of this Court relied upon the English case (1858) 2 De G. & J. 978; used as the basis for later Privy Council decisions. The court observed that 33 ALL. 3376 relied on the English decision but did not seem to notice that Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act might have affected the issue.
(1858) 2 De G. & J. 978 English authority relied upon as foundational for subsequent Privy Council decisions; emphasised construction of documents according to their terms. Referred to as the English case forming the basis of Privy Council decisions; Court noted its use in earlier Indian decisions.
45 ALL. 5817 Cited for the approach that a document must be construed by its terms unless circumstances justify otherwise and that a mortgage by conditional sale must first be a mortgage. Quoted as an example where judges asked what circumstances justified treating a document not as a sale on its face; used in the comparative discussion of authorities.
(1858) 2 De G. & J. 97 English case stressing that documents be construed according to their terms unless contrary circumstances appear. Relied upon in some Indian decisions; mentioned by the court when discussing the weight given to document terms in earlier authorities.
42 Mad. 4078 Raised the question whether the Transfer of Property Act had modified existing law; the learned judges held that it had not. Cited as an instance where it was held that the Transfer of Property Act did not change prior law, and as a basis for discussion about whether that conclusion is sound.
42 Mad. 407 Mentioned in relation to the earlier discussion that a mortgage by conditional sale must first be a mortgage. Referred to as one of the authorities considered in the line of precedent about characterising conditional sales.
A.I.R. 1929 ALL. 1749 Cited for the observation that subsection (c) of Section 58 does not give a complete definition of "mortgage" and that one must look to sub-section (a) to understand mortgage. Used by the court to support the proposition that S.58(c) alone is not exhaustive and that one must consider other subsections (and related concepts such as "loan" and "debt").
12 ALL. 387 Another reference (similar to other 12 ALL citations) used among authorities supporting intention as the test. Cited by later decisions; the court recorded that such decisions have been relied upon in the course of adjudicating similar issues.
38 ALL. 570 Cited alongside other "ALL." reports as authority for previous law giving weight to intention. Noted by the court as part of the body of cases that previously emphasised intention rather than an exclusive reliance on S.58(c).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two linked strands of analysis: (1) doctrinal/legal: whether Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act definitively alters the earlier rule that the parties' intention is the controlling criterion; and (2) fact-specific: whether the documents and evidence in the record disclose an intention to create a mortgage rather than an absolute sale.

On the doctrinal point, the court reviewed authorities that had previously held intention to be decisive and contrasted them with the explicit terms of Section 58(c). The court acknowledged that many High Court decisions and some Bench rulings had relied on English authorities (notably (1858) 2 De G. & J. cases) and prior Indian decisions emphasizing construction according to the document's terms unless there are circumstances to show otherwise. The court observed that Section 58(c) does not itself supply a complete definition of "mortgage" (a point supported by A.I.R. 1929 ALL. 1749) and that one must look to sub-section (a) as well to understand mortgage as a transfer of an interest in specific immovable property for securing payment of money advanced or to be advanced (i.e., the concepts of "loan" or "debt" remain relevant).

The court stated that it was "somewhat doubtful" whether Section 58 had, in some measure, modified the previous law but declined to express a definite opinion on that broader legal question because the issue was unnecessary to decide for the case before them and because counsel for the other side had not been heard on that point. Thus the court did not authoritatively resolve whether intention or the statutory wording is now decisive in all cases.

On the facts of the present case, the court accepted the lower court's construction of the documents and its findings of fact. The court emphasized these factual points supporting the mortgage characterization:

  • The deed of sale and the separate agreement for reconveyance were executed on the same date and the deed referred expressly to the agreement—indicating a single transaction with a condition for re-transfer.
  • The agreement allowed reconveyance if the vendor repaid the price within eleven years—an unusually long term that suggested the transferors were giving themselves extended time to repay, consistent with a mortgage-like arrangement.
  • The learned judge below had found that the property was worth more than Rs. 6,000 (the consideration stated). Although challenged on appeal, the appellate court accepted the judge's credibility findings, including testimony from witnesses who said the transferors had sought Rs. 12,000 and that Rs. 6,000 was adopted as a means to effect a mortgage-like transaction.
  • Oral evidence addressing value and the negotiation context (two witnesses testified they were present during discussions and gave evidence about the amount sought) was held admissible to show the probable value of the property even if not admissible to prove the nature of the transaction directly.
  • Contractual terms that permitted repayment in two instalments and specified that payment of one half would not entitle the vendor to interest or to a reduction of profits were regarded as inconsistent with an outright sale and more consistent with a mortgage by conditional sale.

Based on the combined documentary construction and the assessment of witness credibility and evidence as to value and the surrounding circumstances, the court concluded there was an intention to mortgage rather than to effect an absolute sale.

In the connected appeal about houses Nos. 1/181 and 1/182, the court noted evidentiary limitations: absence of plans or maps made identification by boundaries difficult. The court found that the objectors (appellants in that appeal) failed to prove that the houses in the deed were identical to those entered in the section 4 application and therefore declined to disturb the lower court's finding against the appellants.

Holding and Implications

Holding (disposition): APPEALS DISMISSED. The court dismissed the principal appeal (challenging the characterization of the 18-1-1915 transfer) and the connected appeal (No. 381 of 1942) about the identification of houses, and ordered costs against the appellants.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the decision of the learned judge of the court below—that the 18-1-1915 transaction was a mortgage by conditional sale—is affirmed and the appellants' claim to have it treated as an absolute sale is rejected.
  • The connected appeal concerning the identity of houses set out in the section 4 application was likewise dismissed; the lower court's factual findings (including the assessment that the objectors failed to prove identity) stand.
  • On the broader legal question whether Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act has altered the prior rule that the parties' intention controls, the court expressly declined to give a definitive ruling: it expressed doubts that the Act had not in some measure modified the prior law but stated it was unnecessary to pronounce finally on that question in this case. Therefore, no new precedent definitively resolving that statutory-interpretation issue was established by this opinion.

Outcome in short: appeals dismissed with costs; factual findings and mortgage characterization upheld; no conclusive pronouncement on whether Section 58(c) wholly displaced the prior "intention" test.

Show all summary ...

Allsop, J.:— This appeal arises out of proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act. Hari Bahadur and others made an application under section 4 of the Act and mentioned in the list of their property, which they had to supply, a share of five annas and four pies in the village of Akbarpur Barni, Mahal Hori Lal. An objection was taken by Prag Datt and Mt. Ram Dulari, widow of Chheda Lal that they were the owners of the property. The property was transferred to Prag Dutt and Chheda Lal by Hori Lal, deceased the father of Hari Bahadur on-18-1-1915. The question at issue is whether this deed evidenced a sale or a mortgage by conditional sale. The learned Judge of the Court below held that the transaction was a mortgage, and there is an appeal before us by the objectors.

2. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the nature of the transaction must depend upon the intention of the parties and not upon the question whether the property was sold on any of the conditions mentioned in Section 58 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act. The deed of sale dated 181-1915 specifically said that the property was sold subject to a separate deed of agreement for the re-conveyance of the property. That separate agreement was evidenced by another document executed on the same date. It recited that the vendees had agreed to reconvey the property if the vendor repaid to them, within 11 years, the full price in a lump sum or in two instalments. It was also agreed that the vendees would not give up possession if the vendor paid half the price only and that the vendor would not be entitled to any interest on the half share paid nor would be entitled to claim a reduction in the profits of the vendees. The learned Judge of the Court below has held that the two documents are evidence of one transaction and we have no doubt that he is right upon this point. As we have already said, the two documents were executed on the same date and there was a reference to the agreement in the deed of sale. This was then a transaction by which the transferor transferred the property on condition that he would retransfer the property to the seller if the price of the property was repaid to him within a certain time. If we were to rely upon the terms of Section 58 (c) of the Transfer of Propery Act, alone, there could be no doubt that this was a mortgage by conditional sale. Learned counsel for the appellants has produced considerable authority in support of his argument that we are not to look to that sub-section alone, but to the intention of the parties. There can be no doubt that it was at one time the law that the intention of the parties was to be the criterion. We may refer to the cases in 12 ALL. 3871, 22 ALL. 1492 and 38 ALL. 5703. The question is whether the Transfer of Property Act made the law more definite and certain.

4. There is no authority of their Lordships of the Privy Council upon this point, although in a subsequent case 47 Mad. 7294 the decision depended upon intention. That, however, was a case where their Lordships were not called upon to decide whether it was necessary to base their decision upon intention. They decided that the transaction was a mortgage by conditional sale. There are decisions of various High Courts in favour of the appellants, but it may be doubtful whether the question should not be reconsidered. In 33 ALL. 3376 a Bench of this Court relied upon the English case in (1858) 2 De G. & J. 978 which was the basis of the decisions of their Lordships of the Privy Council to which we have referred, although the document with which they were dealing was executed in the year 1894. It does not seem to have been noticed that section 58 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act, might have affected the issue. In 45 ALL. 5817 the learned Judges relied upon the cases in 12 ALL. 387, 38 ALL. 570 and (1858) 2 De. G. &. J. 97 although the document before them was executed in the year 1886. (1858) 2 De G. &. J. 97 was a case in which emphasis was laid upon the principle that a document must be construed according to its terms, unless there are circumstances to prove that it is not what it appears to be. In 45 ALL. 58l the learned Judges asked themselves what the circumstances were which justified them in holding that the transaction with which they were dealing was not a sale which, on the face of it, it seemed to be. They also said that a mortgage by conditional sale must first be a mortgage. They mentioned the case in 42 Mad. 4078. In that case the question did arise whether the Transfer of Property Act had made any modification in the law. The learned Judges held that it had not. They relied upon a remark in 22 ALL. 149, that the Transfer of Property Act had not changed the law. That remark certainly appears in the judgment but it is made in another context. Their Lordships mentioned that the question had been raised before them whether it was necessary to look to the intention of the parties and they specifically refused to decide it. They were dealing with a document executed in the year 1883. The other basis of the decision in 42 Mad. 407 is that the Transfer of Property Act by S. 58 (c) did not change the law because the terms “mortgagor”and”mortgaged property”are used in that sub-section and the use of these terms shows that it is necessary to look elsewhere to discover whether the transaction is a “mortgage” or not. In a sense this, of course, is so as was pointed out by a learned Judge of this Court in A.I.R 1929 ALL. 1749. Subsection (c) of s. 58 does not give a complete definition of a “mortgage.” It is necessary to look to sub-s. (a) of this section to discover that a “mortgage” is the transfer of an interest in specific immovable property for the purposes of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan or any existing or future debt. This does not take us very much further because the questions remain, what is a “loan” or a “debt”? We are inclined to think that a loan or a debt is a sum of money which the parties intend to be repaid and it is at least arguable that any condition for re-transfer on payment of a sum of money necessarily implies that there is an intention that the money may be re-paid. It seems that the terms “debt” or ‘loan’ in S. 58 do not necessarily imply that the money advanced can be recovered by the creditor in a Court of law, because, otherwise, a usufructuary mortgage would not be a mortgage at all. It is certainly one of the incidents of a mortgage that the mortgage money can be recovered if the security is destroyed, but we doubt whether this contingency would ever be present in the minds of the parties in ordinary circumstances. On the whole we are somewhat doubtful whether section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, has not, in some measure, modified the previous law, but we express no definite opinion because we find it unnecessary to do so and because we have not heard counsel on the other side. There are certainly some decisions in favour of the view that the condition for re-transfer would necessarily convert a sale into a mortgage provided that the agreement and the sale were parts of the same transaction.

5. The reason why we do not think it necessary to express any definite opinion upon this point of law is that we are satisfied on the construction of the document before us that the learned Judge of the Court below was right in holding that there was an intention to mortgage rather than to sell. As the learned Judge has pointed out, the term given is eleven years, which, we think, suggests that the transferors were giving themselves as long as possible to repay the money. Then the learned Judge has come to the conclusion that the property was worth more than the sum of Rs. 6000, in consideration of which it was transferred. This finding has been contested before us. It is true that the price might be a fair one if the profit from rents alone was taken into consideration, but the learned Judge has pointed out that there must have been considerable miscellaneous profits accruing from forest land and grazing land. Learned counsel has drawn our attention to oral evidence suggesting that the miscellaneous profits were not large. There may be some force in what he says, but on the other hand we notice’ that Prag Dutt and one of his witnesses said that the property had decreased by a third in value and still Prag Dutt said that he was not willing to transfer it now for a sum of Rs. 8000. As it was not an ancestral property it is unlikely that any sentimental interest was attached to it and the attitude of the witness rather suggests that Rs. 6000 was not the full value in 1915. The learned Judge also relied upon the evidence of two witnesses, who appeared before him, Raj Narain, a teacher, and Durga Shanker Maewall, the director of a company. The learned Judge believed them. They said that they were present when the transaction was being discussed; that the transferors wanted a sum of Rs. 12,000, for their property which the transferees were not able to supply and that it was suggested that the property might be transferred for the smaller sum of Rs. 6000, in the form of a mortgage. This evidence would not be admissible to prove what the transaction was, but it seems to us that it is admissible to prove the probable value of the property. The term in the agreement that the money might be repaid in two instalments and that the payment of one half would not give a right to any interest or reduction of profits also seems to us to be inconsistent with the idea that the property was to be sold outright. On the whole we are satisfied that there is no reason for disturbing the decision of the learned Judge of the Court below. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.

6. We have before us a connected appeal, No. 381 of 1942 arising out of the same proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act. The question is whether certain houses were transferred by Hori Lal to one Mt. Sunder Kunwar on 4-2-1915. The applicants under section 4 of the Encumbered Estates Act, entered houses Nos. 1/181 and 1/182 as items 5 and 8 of their list of property. The appellants claimed these houses as theirs under the deed of sale to which we have referred. In that deed the property transferred was half of one house and the whole of another house, the latter being to the south of the former. The question is whether these are identical with houses Nos. l/181 and 1/182 which are items 5 and 8 in the application.

7. The learned Judge has come to a conclusion against the appellants on the evidence produced before him and learned counsel has not been able to satisfy us that that conclusion was wrong. Unfortunately there are no plans or maps upon the record. It is, therefore, difficult from the boundaries alone to come to a definite conclusion. The objectors had to prove their case and, in our judgment, they failed to do so. We see no reason to interfere with the decision of the learned Judge of the Court below and we dismiss this appeal also with costs.

8. Appeals dismissed.