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Ram Dayal v. Kanpur Urban Area Development Board

Allahabad High Court
Aug 9, 1956
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Mehrotra, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Thirty-five residents of Kanpur filed a petition under Article 226 seeking a writ of mandamus restraining the opposite parties from dispossessing them or acquiring their houses under the Tarwal Hata (Tarwala Hata) Scheme notified on 24 January 1942.

The petitioners' factual account: Tarwala Hata, near Northern Railway station, comprised many small houses originally owned by a single proprietor and let to tenants; many houses were transferred to occupying tenants between 1932–1948. The Kanpur Improvement Trust published notifications under Sec. 40(3) (1938) and the State Government sanctioned the general improvement scheme under Sec. 41(1) of the U.P. Improvement Trust Act (notification dated 24 January 1942). Petitioners say the Trust thereafter took no steps to implement the scheme and (they allege) gave out that the scheme was abandoned; the opposite parties deny the abandonment.

Subsequently the Kanpur Urban Area Development Board Act (Act No. VI of 1945) was enacted and the Kanpur Development Board was constituted by the end of 1954. Notices under Sec. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act were served on the applicants to claim compensation and acquisition proceedings were started by the Development Board. The petition challenges those acquisition proceedings.

The opposite parties filed a counter-affidavit describing the administrative history (Gazette notifications in 1938–1942, scheme coming into force 1 April 1942), explaining delay as due to wartime constraints and shortage of housing materials, and stating that when materials became available the Board prioritised slum clearance and commenced acquisition steps in 1954. The counter-affidavit also states that the Land Acquisition Officer had awarded compensation for 33 of 54 houses involved, that the land was Nazul land managed by the Board, and that the Board offered lessees an option to purchase sites. The Board denied any intention to resell plots at exorbitant prices and denied some factual assertions made by petitioners.

The petitioners filed a rejoinder affidavit asserting there was no shortage of building materials or accommodation after 1942 and reiterating the allegation that the Board intends to acquire valuable sites to resell at higher prices without arranging suitable alternative accommodation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, after the Kanpur Improvement Trust was dissolved by the Kanpur Urban Area Development Board Act, 1945, the Kanpur Development Board can lawfully carry into effect a general improvement scheme that was sanctioned in 1942 by the Trust (i.e., can the Board execute a scheme sanctioned before the Trust's dissolution under Sec. 4(d) of the 1945 Act)?
  2. Whether, by conduct (delay and communications to tenants), the Development Board (or the former Trust) had effectively abandoned the 1942 scheme so as to prevent the Board from executing it.
  3. Whether a statutory obligation under Sec. 42 to proceed with execution "forthwith" makes later execution steps (taken after delay) illegal or renders subsequent acquisition proceedings ultra vires.
  4. Whether the scheme was improperly framed or being implemented for an ulterior motive — namely, to acquire valuable sites cheaply and resell them at high prices instead of effecting genuine improvement and rehousing (i.e., challenge to bona fides and to whether the conditions for framing a scheme under Sec. 25 existed).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Improvement Trust ceased to exist after the 1945 Act; consequently the 1942 scheme terminated and the new Board cannot proceed under the old sanction unless fresh proceedings are taken under the new Act. (Relied on interpretation of Sec. 4 of the Kanpur Urban Area Development Board Act, 1945.)
  • The conduct of the Trust/Board — delay in execution and communications to lessees to purchase sites — demonstrates that the scheme had been abandoned, so the Board should not be permitted to carry it out.
  • Sec. 42 imposes an obligation to proceed with execution forthwith; failure to do so renders subsequent proceedings illegal (i.e., the delay vitiates the legality of later acquisition steps).
  • The Board's real intention is to acquire sites cheaply and resell them at higher prices for profit rather than to effect genuine improvement; petitioners will be deprived of homes and suitable alternative accommodation has not been arranged.

Opposite Parties' (Board/State) Arguments

  • The Tarwala Hata scheme was notified in the Gazette in 1938, submitted and sanctioned by the State (sanction notified 24 January 1942) and declared to come into force 1 April 1942.
  • Wartime conditions and a shortage of housing materials prevented immediate execution and rehousing; delay was therefore caused by circumstances (war) and later, with availability of materials, the Board in 1954 prioritised slum clearance and resumed steps to implement the sanctioned scheme.
  • On management grounds: the land was Nazul land with management vested in the Board; the Board legitimately offered lessees the option to purchase sites as part of its management functions and this did not amount to abandonment of the scheme.
  • The Land Acquisition Officer had already made awards in respect of many houses (33 out of 54), and the stated purposes are slum clearance, general improvement and sanitation of the locality.
  • The Board denies any intention to sell plots at exorbitant rates for profit and asserts that plots would be sold as far as possible at cost price and that petitioners could purchase them.

Petitioners' Rejoinder

  • Reassertion that there was no shortage of building materials after 1942 sufficient to justify the Board's failure to execute the scheme earlier.
  • Renewed assertion that the Board's motive is acquisition for resale at higher prices and that no suitable accommodation arrangements have been made for affected inhabitants.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the principal points raised by petitioners sequentially, applying statutory text and the facts as presented.

1. Power of the Board to execute a scheme sanctioned earlier (Sec. 4(d) of the 1945 Act)

The court examined Sec. 4(d) of the Kanpur Urban Area Development Board Act, 1945, which transfers functions to the Board "for the purpose of completing the execution of any scheme sanctioned under the Uttar Pradesh Town Improvement Act, 1919." The petitioners' narrow reading — that "completing the execution" presupposes that execution must have started prior to dissolution of the Trust — was rejected. The judge observed:

  • Under the Town Improvement Act there is no particular statutory stage marking the start of execution analogous to execution of a civil decree; once a scheme is sanctioned it is capable of execution and various steps can be taken to bring it into effect.
  • Sec. 4(d) was intended to enable the Board to effect completion of schemes sanctioned while the Trust existed; steps taken by the Board (including acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act) are steps towards completion of the sanctioned scheme.
  • There is no limitation in the statute prescribing a time after which a scheme cannot be enforced by the Board.

2. Alleged abandonment of the scheme by conduct

The court considered whether the Trust's or Board's conduct (delay, offering lessees option to purchase) amounted to abandonment. The analysis concluded:

  • The statutory mechanism to abandon a scheme is found in the Town Improvement Act (provisions described, including Sec. 40 and similar provision in Sec. 57 of the Kanpur Urban Area Development Act) but those provisions relate to abandonment before submitting a scheme for sanction; there is no express power in either Act to abandon a scheme after it has been submitted and sanctioned by the State Government.
  • Delay alone in implementation does not conclusively prove abandonment; the fact the Board gave tenants options to purchase sites was within the Board's management powers over Nazul land and did not necessarily amount to abandonment of the sanctioned scheme.
  • Therefore the contention of abandonment had no force in law on the materials before the Court.

3. Obligation under Sec. 42 to execute "forthwith" and the effect of delay

Petitioners argued delay rendered later steps illegal. The court held:

  • Sec. 42 cannot be read to mean that failure to execute immediately renders later action illegal or ultra vires.
  • Even if an obligation to proceed forthwith could be inferred, the proper remedy in suitable cases might be a writ of mandamus compelling performance; it does not automatically invalidate subsequent execution steps.
  • Sec. 4(d) of the 1945 Act supports the view that a Board may execute a scheme sanctioned during the Trust's period of existence, and such schemes do not lapse merely because execution is carried out by the Board at a later date.

4. Allegation of improper motive (acquiring to resell at a profit) and challenge under Sec. 25

The court addressed the petitioners' challenge to the substance and motive of the scheme:

  • Sec. 25 sets out the conditions under which the Trust may determine an area to be insanitary and frame a scheme (matters such as unfitness for habitation, danger to health, lack of light/ventilation, other sanitary defects).
  • The language of Sec. 25 ("whenever it appears to the Trust") indicates that the initial assessment whether conditions exist lies within the Trust's (and by statutory transfer, the Board's) jurisdiction; it is not a matter the Court could re-evaluate at this stage of proceedings.
  • On the evidence before the Court it was not possible to conclusively determine that the Board's motive was to profit by resale of plots; the Board asserted they intended to sell, as far as possible, at cost price and that petitioners could purchase plots.

Conclusion of legal analysis

Having considered the statutory provisions, the historical facts (notifications, sanction, wartime delay, later Board action) and the parties' affidavits, the court found no legal basis to sustain the petition: the statutory framework permits the Board to complete a scheme sanctioned while the Trust existed; abandonment post-sanction is not supported by the statute or the conduct described; delay does not automatically invalidate later action; and the allegation of ulterior motive could not be conclusively established on the record before the Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is rejected. (The court expressly stated: "There is, therefore, no force in this writ petition and it is rejected." and "Petition rejected.")

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioners' request for a writ of mandamus restraining dispossession or acquisition under the Tarwal Hata Scheme was denied; the Court made no order as to costs.
  • The Court's ruling indicates that the Kanpur Development Board may proceed with steps to implement the scheme sanctioned in 1942 (including acquisition proceedings) under the powers conferred by Sec. 4(d) of the 1945 Act and related statutory provisions, subject to the rights and remedies otherwise available to affected persons under law (as reflected in the Court's reasoning).
  • The opinion does not purport to set a new precedent on broader issues beyond the immediate statutory interpretation and factual context; no precedential case law was cited in the judgment to establish novel principles.

Order in the original opinion: petition rejected; no costs ordered.

Show all summary ...

Mehrotra, J.:— This is a petition on behalf of 35 persons who are residents of Kanpur, under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying that a writ of Mandamus be issued directing the opposite parties not to take steps for dispossessing the applicants or acquiring their houses under the Tarwal Hata Scheme as notified on the 24th January, 1942.

2. The facts as set out in the petition are that in the city of Kanpur near the railway station Northern Railway there is a locality known as Tarwal Hata. In this locality there are a number of small houses. The houses were originally owned by one single proprietor and they were let out to tenants but during the period of 1932–48 these houses were sold to tenants who were in occupation by deeds of transfer. On the 19th March, 1938, the then Improvement Trust of Kanpur published a notification under Sec. 40(3) of the U.P Improvement Trust Act intimating that the Tarwala Hata general scheme has been submitted to the State Government for sanction. On the 24th January, 1942, a notification under Sec. 41(1) of the U.P Improvement Trust Act VIII of 1919 was issued by the State Government, sanctioning the general improvement scheme as proposed by the Trust of Kanpur regarding this area known as Tarwala Hata. Thereafter according to the petitioners nothing was done in pursuance of the said scheme and it was given out by the Trust authorities that they have abandoned the scheme. This assertion, however, is not accepted by the opposite parties.

3. Thereafter Act No. VI of 1945 known as Kanpur Urban Area Development Board Act was passed and under the said Act the Kanpur Development Board was established in the end of 1954. Notices under Sec. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act were served upon the applicants asking them to file their claim for compensation. The proceedings of acquisition started at the instance of the Development Board are now being challenged by the present petition. It is necessary to point out that after the sanction of the scheme in 1942 and before starting the acquisition proceedings the Improvement Trust, according to the petitioner, claimed the land on which the houses were situate and gave notices to the owners of the houses to purchase the site from the Improvement Trust otherwise steps will be taken against them. The petitioners further alleged that they are small proprietors and are residing in these houses carrying on business in this locality and the locality is a very neat and healthy one. They further added that if the small proprietors are deprived of their houses, it would be difficult for them to obtain residential quarters. The petitioners have further asserted that the main intention of the Development Board is not to improve the area but to acquire these sites on cheap price and then resell them at higher price thereby making huge profits in the transactions. Notices have been issued to the opposite parties by the Court to the Kanpur Urban Area Development Board, the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Land Acquisition Officer, Kanpur and a counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the opposite parties. In the counter affidavit it is stated that the Kanpur Improvement Trust duly notified the Tarwala Ahata Scheme No. 29 in the U.P Gazette dated the 5th, 12th and 19th of March, 1938. The scheme was submitted to the State Government for sanction in the year 1939. Thereafter the required notification under Sec. 40 of the Act was published in the Gazette. The scheme was sanctioned under Sec. 41(1) of the Act, and the sanction as required under Sec. 41(1) of the Act was notified in the Gazette dated the 24th January, 1942. It was then notified on behalf of the Governor that the aforesaid scheme will come into force with effect from the 1st April, 1942. Then due to the war and the shortage of housing accommodation it was not possible for the Trust to construct quarters for the residents of this locality, who had to be rehoused nor was it possible for the Trust to arrange for an alternative accommodation for them. Consequently further operation of the scheme remained in abeyance. In September, 1945 the Kanpur Urban Area Development Board came into existence. Thereafter when the facilities of obtaining building materials became available the administrator of the Board in the year 1954 ordered that highest priority should be given to slum clearance schemes and accordingly steps were taken to complete the; execution of the scheme and necessary proceedings for the acquisition were started. In paragraph No. 11 of the counter affidavit it has also been stated that the Land Acquisition Officer has already given his award for 33 houses out of the 54 which are involved in the said housing scheme. The purpose for which the scheme has been started is to clean the slum areas and for the general improvement and the sanitation of the locality. In paragraph No. 18 of the counter affidavit it is stated that the land on which houses stood were Nazul land and as such its management was entrusted to the Board on behalf of the State Government and in the exercise of the powers of management given to the Development Board, the Board gave option to the lessees to purchase the sites of the houses, if they so desired, otherwise steps will be taken in accordance with the terms of the contract. No assurance, however, was given to the lessees that the scheme had been abandoned. The opposite parties have also denied that they have any intention to sell out these plots on exorbitant rates thereby making huge profits. The fact that these persons are carrying on business in these houses, has also been denied and stated that these applicants will be able to get alternative accommodation. A rejoinder affidavit has been filed on behalf of the applicants in which it is emphatically asserted that there was no shortage of building materials or accommodation after 1942 which prevented the Board from carrying into effect the scheme. It is reasserted in the rejoinder affidavit that the purpose for which the scheme is being executed is to acquire valuable sites with a view to sell them on higher prices and no arrangement has so far been made for providing suitable accommodation to the applicants.

4. Mr. Khare learned counsel for the petitioners has urged three points before me. Firstly he has contended that the Kanpur Improvement Trust which got the scheme sanctioned in the year 1942 by the State Government came to an end in the year 1945 by the passing of the Kanpur Urban Area Development Board Act and thereafter the Improvement Trust ceased to exist. The scheme sanctioned in the year 1942 came to an end and unless fresh proceedings were started under the new Act, it is not open to the Board to carry into effect the old scheme sanctioned in the year 1942. Reliance has been placed on behalf of the State on Sec. 4 of the Kanpur Urban Area Development Board Act, 1945, which provides as follows:—

“With effect from the date this Act comes into force—

(a) the Trust shall be deemed to have been dissolved, and the trustees shall vacate their office, and

(b) all properties, funds, and dues which are vested in or realizable by the Trust and its Chairman respectively shall vest in and be realizable by the Board and its President, respectively, and

(c) all liabilities enforceable against the Trust shall be enforceable only against the Board, and

(d) for the purpose of completing the execution of any scheme sanctioned under the Uttar Pradesh Town Improvement Act, 1919, the functions of the Kanpur Improvement Trust and the Chairman of the said Trust shall be discharged by the Kanpur Development Board and the President of the Board respectively, and

(e) the management of all land classed as Special Nazul shall be transferred to the Board.”

5. Particular emphasis has been laid on clause (d) of Sec. 4 and it has been contended by the State Counsel that for the purpose of completing the scheme sanctioned under the United Provinces Town Improvement Act, 1919, the President of the Board will have the same power as the Chairman of the Trust. This sub-section gives power to the Development Board to carry out the scheme already sanctioned under the Town Improvement Act. By the repeal of the Town Improvement Act the Trust stood dissolved but the Scheme did not come to an end and power has been given under this section to the new Board to carry into effect the scheme already sanctioned. The petitioners have urged that clause (d) does not apply to the present case, the words used in clause (d) are for the purpose of completing the execution of any scheme; the use of the words “completing the execution of any scheme” necessarily implies that the execution must have started before the Trust was dissolved and the Board came into existence; it does not contemplate a power in the Board to start the execution itself after the Trust has ceased to exist but only gives power to continue the execution and finish the execution which has already started before coming into force of this Act. In my opinion, there is no substance in this contention of the petitioners. Under the Town Improvement Act there is no specific provision under which it can be pointed out that at a particular stage the execution of the scheme can be said to have started. It is not like a decree of a Civil Court where a specific stage for the starting of the execution proceedings is laid down in the Civil Procedure Code itself. As soon as a scheme is sanctioned it is capable of being executed and different steps are to be taken by the Improvement Trust to bring into effect the scheme and to finalise it. Certain powers are given under the Act to the Trust in order to effect the execution of the scheme and what Sec. 4, sub-sec. (d) really was intended for is that after any scheme had been sanctioned when the Trust was in existence, it will be open to the Board to effect completion of that scheme. Any steps taken now by the Development Board is nothing but a step towards the completion of the execution of the scheme. The Board has started proceedings for the acquisition of the land under the Land Acquisition Act and these proceedings are nothing but steps towards the completion of the execution of the scheme sanctioned in the year 1942. Apart from it there is no limitation prescribed in the Act for the enforcement of the scheme.

6. The next point which was urged by the petitioners counsel was that from the conduct of the Eoard it is manifestly clear that the Board had abandoned the scheme. The scheme was sanctioned in the year 1942. In the year 1945, the Development Board came into existence. The next question which has to be considered in this connection will be how far the conduct of the Development Board itself after the year 1945 can justify an inference that the Development Board had abandoned the scheme. The only power to abandoned a scheme is given under the Town Improvement Act of 1919 under Sec. 40 which provides that after the expiry of the periods respectively prescribed in clause (a) of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 36, in Sec. 37 and in clause (b) of sub-sec. (2) in Sec. 36 in respect of any scheme, the Board shall forthwith consider any objection or representation, received thereunder and may, after hearing all such persons making any such objection or representation as may desire to be heard, either abandon the scheme or sanction the scheme with such modifications, if any, as it may consider necessary. This section gives powers to the Board to abandon a scheme before sending it for sanction. Similar provision is to be found in Sec. 57 of the Kanpur Urban Area Development Act. There is no express power therefore, given under any of these two Acts either to the Improvement Trust or to the Development Board to abandon any scheme after it has been submitted to the State Government for sanction and has been sanctioned. It may be that the Development Board may for some reasons not carry out a particular scheme but there is no provision giving power to the Board to abandon any scheme. No law has been shown which disentitles the Board to carry into effect the scheme after a specified period. There is no limitation prescribed in the Act for carrying out a particular scheme. The only conduct attributed to the Trust is that the Trust did not bring into effect the scheme for three years of their existence after the sanction of the scheme but, to my mind, it does not necessarily imply that they had given out to those tenants that they were not going to bring into effect the scheme any more. The conduct attributed to the Development Board apart from the delay in executing the scheme is that they gave notices to the tenants to purchase the sites and the tenants did purchase the sites. This action of the Development Board legitimately gave an impression to the tenants that the Board had abandoned the scheme. As has been pointed out in the counter affidavit, the Development Board was authorised to manage the Nazul land. The owners of the houses had only right in the buildings and not on the sites and as the management of the sites vested in the Board, it was open to the Board to give an option to the tenants to purchase the sites. There is, therefore, no force in this contention too.

7. It was then contended by the petitioners that under Sec. 42 of the Act there is an obligation on the Trust to proceed with the execution of the scheme forthwith, and the consequence of the failure to execute the scheme soon after the sanction of the scheme is that the entire proceedings are illegal. In my judgment there is nothing in Sec. 42 from which it can be argued that if the scheme is not executed forthwith, no steps can be taken to execute it afterwards. Even if any corresponding obligation to carry into effect the scheme forthwith can be inferred from Sec. 42, in suitable cases it may be open to the inhabitants to ask for a writ of Mandamus directing the Board to carry out the obligation but it cannot be argued that the failure to execute the scheme forthwith renders the subsequent proceedings ultra vires. Sec. 4(d) of the Kanpur Urban Area Development Act itself indicates that the Development Board can execute the scheme sanctioned during the period of existence of the Town Improvement Trust and any scheme though sanctioned during the period of the existence of the Trust will not lapse if the execution is carried out by the Board.

8. Lastly it was urged that the intention of the Board is not to effect any real improvement of the locality but to sell the plots on higher prices thereby making huge profits. It was urged in this connection that under Sec. 25 the general improvement scheme can be sanctioned by the State only when it appears to the Trust—

(a) that any buildings in any area which are used or are intended or likely to be used as dwelling places are unfit for human habitation, or

(b) that danger to the health of the inhabitants of buildings in any area, or in any neighbouring buildings is caused by—

(i) the narrowness, closeness or bad arrangement and condition of streets or buildings or groups of buildings in such area, or

(ii) the want of light, air ventilation, proper convenience in such area, or

(iii) any other sanitary defects in such area, the Trust may pass a resolution to the effect that such an area is an insanitary area, and that a scheme ought to be framed in respect of such area, and may then proceed to frame such a scheme.”

9. After such a resolution has been passed objections are invited and thereafter it is sent to the State Government for sanction. It is not open to the applicants after the scheme had been sanctioned, to urge that the conditions under which the Board is authorised to pass a resolution that a scheme should be framed did not exist in the present case. The language of Sec. 25 also suggests that the question whether such a condition exists or not lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Trust to determine. The opening words of Sec. 25 are “whenever it appears to the Trust” and not “whenever it is found by the Trust”. It is not a matter which can be gone into by this Court at this stage. As regards the complaint of the petitioners that the Development Board intends to sell the plots at higher prices without making any suitable arrangements for alternative accommodation for the inhabitants, on the materials before me it is not possible to conclusively determine this fact. It has been asserted by the opposite parties that they intend to sell these plots as far as possible on the cost price and that it will be open to the petitioners to purchase those plots.

10. There is, therefore, no force in this writ petition and it is rejected. But in the circumstances of the case I make no orders as to costs.

11. Petition rejected.