Radha Rani And Ors. Accused, v. Rahim Sardar, Complainant Opposite Party.

The Judgment of the Court was as follows:

Lodge, J.:— This Rule was issued on the District Magistrate of Rajshahi and on the Opposite Party to show cause why proceedings pending in the Court of Mr. D.N Chakravarti should not be quashed.

2. The material facts are as follows.

3. A petition of complaint was filed by one Rahim Sardar in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer of Naogaon against six persons. The allegation was that the wife of the complainant was a girl named Rupjan Bibi aged 15 or 16 years. She had been enticed away by two persons named Nalo and Ramo and taken to Khagra in the District of Purnea where she was sold to Radha Rani and Jamat Ali for the sum of Rs. 100. When the complainant came to hear of the occurrence, he gave a missing information at the police station and subsequently sent some friends to Khagra to bring back his wife. These friends found the girl Rupjan in the custody of Radha Rani and Jamat Ali and the latter did not allow the girl to be taken away. On these allegations a warrant without bail was issued against four persons — Radha Rani, Jamat Ali, Malo and Ramo under secs. 372, 373 and 498 of the Indian Penal Code. Only Radha Rani and Jamat Ali were arrested. The other accused persons are said to be still absconding. Radha Rani and Jamat Ali were produced before the Magistrate and evidence was recorded. All the prosecution witnesses with the exception of an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police were examined and the learned Magistrate applied his mind to the question of framing a charge. He then passed the following order:

“21st September 1845. Examined 8 more witnesses. It now appears that the only charge with which the present two accused can be charged is under sec. 373, I.P.C But that offence was committed in the jurisdiction of Purnea District in a different province, the accused being resident there and having made the alleged purchase also there. The question now is whether these two accused can be tried here. To 8th October 1945 for arguments of both parties as required by them”.

4. On October 8th, the accused filed a petition objecting to the jurisdiction of the Naogaon Court. The case was then adjourned to November 8th, to consider the question of jurisdiction. The learned Magistrate then passed the following order:

“8th November 1945. Examined one A.S.I Prosecution declines to adduce any further evidence. Heard arguments. Following the cases of Emperor v. Badlu Shah(1) and Badlu Shah v. Emperor(2) and also in accordance with the provision of sec. 531, Cr.P.C I hold that the case should be tried here. Accordingly I frame charges under sec. 373 and 36S, I.P.C against both the accused.”

5. As a consequence of this order the present Rule was issued.

6. It has been contended before us that the learned Magistrate at Naogaon had no jurisdiction to try the present two Petitioners, Radha Rani and Jamat Ali.

7. We have examined the evidence in this case. There is not one word of evidence on record as yet to show that the Petitioners had any knowledge that the woman Rupjan had been kidnapped or abducted. The learned Magistrate was perfectly right in his order of September 21st, 1945, that the only charge which could properly be framed against the Petitioners was a charge under sec. 373 of the Indian Penal Code and that he had no jurisdiction to try that charge. It seems to us apparent that the framing of the charge under sec. 368 was little more than a device to justify the learned Magistrate in assuming jurisdiction in this case and that the evidence on record justifies a charge under sec. 373 and scarcely justifies a charge under sec. 368 of the Indian Penal Code.

8. It is clear that the Purnea Court has jurisdiction to try the offence under sec. 373 of the Indian Penal Code, and also the charge under sec. 368 if framed. The Naogaon Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to try the offence under sec. 368 if the evidence justifies the framing of a charge under that section. It is even then open to question whether the Naogaon Court has any jurisdiction to try the charge under sec. 373.

9. Mr. Chakravarty opposing this Rule has adopted the argument of the learned Magistrate and argued that sec. 531 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives the Magistrate jurisdiction. We do not read sec. 531 in that sense. In our opinion sec. 531 cures irregular proceedings wrongly held in a wrong local area unless it appears that the error as to territorial jurisdiction has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. Sec. 531 does not entitle a Magistrate to proceed with a trial in the wrong local area with his eyes open to the fact that he has no territorial jurisdiction. It does not in fact confer a jurisdiction on the Magistrate.

10. In our opinion the proper Court in which this case should be tried is the Court in the District of Purnea where the offence alleged to have been committed by these two Petitioners was committed. The Naogaon Court has apparently no jurisdiction and we must therefore quash the proceedings in that Court.

11. The Rule is accordingly made absolute. The proceedings in the Court at Naogaon are quashed. The present Petitioners will execute a bond to appear in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer at Kishenganj when called upon to do so. This bond will remain in force for a period of three months only.

Ellis, J.:— I agree.