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Krishna Behari Sen And Another v. The Corporation Of Calcutta

Calcutta High Court
Jul 14, 1904
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Factual and Procedural Background

This is an action for malicious prosecution originally brought by the now-deceased Plaintiff. The original Plaintiff died intestate and the present Appellants, his heirs, were substituted in his place though they have not taken out administration to his estate. At trial in the Court below an objection was taken that the cause of action did not survive to the heirs; the trial court upheld that objection, dismissed the suit with costs, and the Appellants appealed the dismissal to the present court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a cause of action for malicious prosecution survives to the executors or administrators under Section 89 of the Probate and Administration Act.
  2. Whether a malicious prosecution constitutes an "other personal injury not causing the death of the party" so as to fall within the exceptions to survivorship in Section 89.
  3. Whether the action can proceed when the substituted heirs have not yet taken out Letters of Administration and what procedural steps, if any, should be directed by the court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The cause of action should survive under the general words of Section 89 of the Probate and Administration Act.
  • The Appellants (heirs) are willing to obtain Letters of Administration to revive the action and continue the suit in the place of the deceased Plaintiff.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The Defendant Corporation contended that malicious prosecution is a "personal injury not causing the death of the party" within the meaning of the exception in Section 89, and therefore the cause of action does not survive.
  • Implicitly, the lack of administration was relied upon to show the action had not been revived and so should not proceed.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by noting that English authorities on survivorship were referred to but considered it unnecessary to rely on them because the question is governed by the statutory text of Section 89 of the Probate and Administration Act.

The court quoted and analysed Section 89, observing its wide and general language: that "all demands whatsoever, and all rights to prosecute any suit … existing in favour of a person at the time of his decease" survive to his executors or administrators, subject to specified exceptions. The court then examined the exceptions listed in the section: (1) causes of action for defamation, (2) assault as defined in the Indian Penal Code, and (3) "other personal injuries not causing the death of the party."

The court rejected the respondents' contention that malicious prosecution falls within the third exception. Its analysis proceeded as follows:

  • The word "other" should be read ejusdem generis with "assault," so the class of "other personal injuries" is to be understood as physical injuries akin to those resulting from an assault (or physical injuries such as from a railway accident), rather than covering injuries of a purely personal or reputational nature like malicious prosecution or defamation.
  • It is not reasonable to classify defamation as a "personal injury not causing death," which supports reading the phrase as referring to physical bodily injury.
  • The statutory illustration and the natural meaning of the words reinforce that the exception targets physical injuries, not a cause of action for malicious prosecution.
  • Consequently, malicious prosecution falls within the general survivorship provision of Section 89 and not within the enumerated exceptions.

On the procedural point that the action had not yet been revived by administrators, the court observed that the Appellants were willing to obtain Letters of Administration. The court held that it would be unduly narrow to prevent the Appellants from continuing the action for failure so far to obtain administration and that the appropriate course was to permit revival upon compliance with conditions (obtaining administration, substitution, and payment of costs).

Two concurring judges agreed, adding that the exceptions in Section 89 ought to be strictly construed and that it would strain the language to include the present action within the exceptions.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court directed that the decree under appeal be discharged and the case remitted for trial on the merits on the following conditions. If the Appellants, within one month, obtain Letters of Administration and secure an order substituting them as Plaintiffs in their capacity as administrators, and within a fortnight after taxation pay all costs thrown away in the Court below (including costs of the hearing), then the decree will be discharged and the matter sent back for trial; the costs of the appeal will be costs in the action.

Conversely, if the Appellants do not comply with these terms, the appeal will stand dismissed with costs.

Implications: The direct effect is procedural — the heirs are permitted to revive and continue the malicious prosecution suit provided they take out administration and meet the specified cost conditions. The opinion does not state any broader precedent being established beyond the court's statutory interpretation and procedural directions; the judges emphasized a strict reading of the exceptions in Section 89 and limited the decision to the application of that statutory text to the facts before them.

Show all summary ...

Maclean, C.J:— This is a suit for malicious prosecution. The original Plaintiff is dead. He died intestate. The present Appellants have been substituted in his place as his heirs. They have not taken out administration to his estate.

The case came on for trial in the Court below and an objection was taken that the cause of action did not survive. The learned Judge in the Court below upheld that objection and has dismissed the suit with costs, and hence the present appeal.

We have been referred to various authorities in the Courts of England upon the question, in cases of this description, of whether or not the cause of action survives to the representatives of the deceased Plaintiff; but it seems unnecessary to go into those cases because the law in India on the subject has been codified by sec. 89 of the Probate and Administration Act, and all we have to look to is the law as so codified. Now what does sec. 89 of the Probate and Administration Act say? It says:— “All demands whatsoever, and all rights to prosecute any suit … existing in favour of a person at the time of his decease.” Pausing there for a moment, one notices how general the language is. Undoubtedly there was a right in the original Plaintiff to prosecute the present suit. The section then goes on:— “Survive to … his executors or administrators.” If we stop there, it could not be reasonably contended that in the present case the right to prosecute would not survive to the executors or administrators of the deceased Plaintiff. But then there are certain exceptions:— “(1) except causes of action for defamation,”—the present suit does not fall within that definition, “(2) assault as defined in the Indian Penal Code”—the present suit is not of that nature, “(3) or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party.” It is contended for the Defendant Corporation that a malicious prosecution is a “personal injury not causing the death of the party,” within the meaning of the section, and consequently that the present action is within that exception. I do not think that is the meaning of the words “other personal injuries.” The word “other” if to be read as referring to personal injuries ejusdem generis, is satisfied by being regarded as attributable to the “assault” previously mentioned, for an assault may well result in personal injury in the ordinary and natural acceptation of the term. It is hardly reasonable to say that “defamation” is a “personal injury not causing death.” But reading the words according to their natural and ordinary meaning the words “personal injuries not causing the death of the party” appear to me to refer to physical injuries to the person which do not cause death, as, for instance, physical injuries to the person resulting from a Railway accident. This seems to me the class of action aimed at by this exception, and this view is fortified by the illustration to the section now under discussion. To place upon the words “other personal injuries” the construction for which the learned counsel for the Respondents contends, viz., that it includes a case of malicious prosecution, would, to my mind, be straining the language used by the legislature and placing upon it an unnatural and forced construction. I, therefore, think that the case falls within the general words of the section and not within any of the exceptions.

But the present action has not been revived at the instance of the administrators of the original Plaintiff and, it may be said, therefore, that the case does not fall within the section. The present Appellants, however, are willing to take out Letters of Administration, and I think we should be taking too narrow a view of the situation if we were to shut them out altogether from further continuing the action. If the Court below had taken the same view of sec. 89, as we have done, it could have ordered the trial to stand over to enable the Appellants to take out administration, and then continue the suit, on terms, of course. And this we can also do. Counsel for the Appellants has expressed the willingness of his clients to take out administration to the estate of the original Plaintiff. We, therefore, direct that, upon the Appellants obtaining such Letters of Administration and an order substituting them, as such administrators, as Plaintiffs, within one month from this date, and paying all the costs which have been thrown away in the Court below and which necessarily include the costs for the hearing in the Court below, within a fortnight after taxation, the decree now under appeal be discharged and the case be sent back to the Court below for trial on the merits. The costs of this appeal will be costs in the action. In default of the Appellants' complying with the above terms, the appeal will stand dismissed with costs.

Sale, J.:— I agree I would only say that it appears to me that the exception to sec. 89 ought to be strictly read, and that it would be putting too great a strain upon the language of the section if we were to hold that an action such as the present fell within the exception. I conour in the order made by the learned Chief Justice.

Bodilly, J.:— I am of the same opinion.

Messrs B.N Bose & Co., Attorneys for the Appellants.

Messrs Sanderson & Co., Attorneys for the Respondents.

A.N.C