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Dayamoyee Ray Choudhury v. Lalit Mohal Pal Ray
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff instituted a suit to recover certain properties as an heir of her father Bharat Chandra Basu. The properties were described in two schedules in the plaint: Schedule ka and Schedule kha. The Schedule ka properties were acquired by Bharat as heir of his son (who had earlier inherited them from his maternal grandfather). The Schedule kha properties were described as ancestral properties of Bharat.
Bharat died leaving two daughters: the plaintiff (married at the time) and Mon Mohini (a maiden). Mon Mohini succeeded to Bharat's property, obtaining a Hindu woman's estate. Bharat also had three nephews; one nephew, Krishna, was appointed guardian of Mon Mohini during her minority.
Bharat had debts. A creditor, Ram Kumar Nag, obtained a decree dated 13 July 1883 in a suit in which both of Bharat's daughters were defendants. To pay off that debt, Krishna as guardian of Mon Mohini executed a bond dated 31 May 1884 for Rs. 100 (a personal undertaking without any property charged). A later bond was executed on 17 October 1887 for Rs. 160, again by Krishna purporting to act as guardian. Kali Kumar Pal (the creditor under the renewed bond) sued in 1890 naming Mon Mohini (the minor) and her guardian as defendants; the suit was decreed on 14 February 1890, resulting in an ex parte decree against defendant No. 1 (Mon Mohini) for Rs. 226-8.
The decree was put into execution and the properties in Schedule ka were sold; the sale-certificate is dated 27 November 1891. Those Schedule ka properties are now in the possession of the decree-holder's heir, identified in the opinion as defendant No. 1. The Schedule kha properties were said to have been transferred by Bharat by an oral gift in favor of his brother's sons (one of whom was Krishna); those donees later executed mortgages and the properties were sold in execution of those mortgage decrees and were purchased by defendants Nos. 9 and 10, who are now in possession.
Mon Mohini died in 1908. The plaintiff (the surviving daughter) brought the present suit seeking recovery of the properties as next heir of Bharat. The trial Court dismissed the suit in its entirety. The plaintiff appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sale in 1891 of the properties described in Schedule ka conveyed the entire interest in those properties (including any reversionary interest) or only the limited interest held by the judgment-debtor, Mon Mohini, in her woman's estate.
- Whether the evidence of an oral gift by Bharat in favor of his nephews (relating to the properties in Schedule kha) was reliable and, if credible, whether the plaintiff could claim those properties.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The plaintiff alleged that the auction sales (execution sales) were fraudulent and collusive.
- She asserted that defendant No. 1's father was actually acting as the guardian of Mon Mohini (implying impropriety in the transactions).
- She denied that Bharat had incurred the debts that led to the decree and subsequent sale.
- Specifically as to Schedule ka, she contended that the sale transferred only the limited interest of the minor (Mon Mohini) and not the entire estate.
- As to Schedule kha, she disputed the reliability of evidence of any gift by Bharat to his nephews.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Baijun Dubey v. Brij Bhookun Lall Auasti (Privy Council) (1878-80) 1 Cal. 133 | The opinion invokes the "principles laid down by the Privy Council" in this case relating to whether a sale under execution of a decree framed as a personal decree can convey the entire estate or merely the rights and interest of the judgment-debtor. | The Court held that, under the circumstances of this case (a personal decree against the minor, no charge on the property in the bond, and no proceedings showing intent to sell the whole estate), the principles of this Privy Council decision govern. Applying those principles, the Court concluded the execution sale did not transfer more than the woman's limited interest; consequently, the plaintiff, as next heir, is entitled to the Schedule ka properties after Mon Mohini's death. |
| Jugul Kishore v. Jatindra Mohan Tagore (Privy Council) (1884) 10 Cal. 985 | The case is cited for the proposition that an entire interest may be held to have been sold where the judgment and related documents disclose that the decree-holder intended to sell the whole interest. | The Court distinguished this case from the present: the lower Court had relied on Jugul Kishore, but in Jugul Kishore the Privy Council examined the judgment to determine that the entire interest had been intended for sale. In the present matter, the decree and sale materials do not show an intention to sell any interest beyond the judgment-debtor's personal interest, so Jugul Kishore does not support upholding the sale of the entire interest here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court divided the analysis by the two schedules and proceeded as follows:
(a) Schedule kha properties:
- The Court reviewed the evidence concerning the alleged oral gift by Bharat to his nephews and observed that the properties were of very small value (income and produce described in evidence).
- The Court noted testimony that Bharat had affection for his brother's sons, that those nephews had tended him in old age, and that Krishna had acted benevolently towards the plaintiff and Mon Mohini to preserve their interest.
- On this factual foundation, the Court found no good ground to disbelieve the evidence of an oral gift. Consequently, the plaintiff could not claim the Schedule kha properties and the appeal in respect of those properties was dismissed.
(b) Schedule ka properties:
- The central legal question was whether the 1891 execution sale conveyed the entire estate or only the limited interest of Mon Mohini (the judgment-debtor) in her woman's estate.
- The Court reviewed the documentary history: a creditor's decree against Bharat's daughters (1883); a guardian's bond of 31 May 1884 for Rs. 100 (personal undertaking only); a subsequent bond of 17 October 1887 for Rs. 160; and a suit in 1890 on the renewed bond resulting in a decree on 14 February 1890 against the minor alone.
- The Court observed that, although a guardian could have created a valid charge on the property, the bonds in question were simple personal money bonds and did not expressly charge the property. The decree entered in 1890 was a personal decree against the minor and did not show that the minor was made a party in her representative capacity or that the creditor was seeking to bind the whole estate.
- The sale-certificate recited the sale of "all rights and interest of the judgment-debtor" — but the Court explained that this phrase alone does not demonstrate that any interest beyond what the woman possessed in her woman's estate was sold. To affect reversionary or other interests, the creditor ought to have framed the suit and the proceedings to show that a larger remedy was sought so that other interested persons could be put on notice and protected.
- Because the suit was for a personal decree, the decree and sale proceedings (as produced) did not establish that the decree-holder intended to sell the entire interest in the properties. Relying on the principles in Baijun Dubey (Privy Council), and distinguishing Jugul Kishore (in which the judgment showed an intention to sell the whole interest), the Court concluded the execution sale did not transfer more than the limited interest of Mon Mohini.
- On that basis, upon Mon Mohini's death the plaintiff, as next heir of Bharat, was held entitled to the Schedule ka properties (subject to an exception noted below).
(c) Costs and conduct:
- The Court found that the plaintiff had stated various untrue facts in the lower Court and thereby unnecessarily complicated the litigation; for that reason she was denied the costs of the lower Court.
- The Court apportioned costs of the appeal between the parties in a specified manner and ordered assessment of mesne profits against defendant No. 1 to be determined by the Court below.
Holding and Implications
CORE RULING: The appeal is allowed in part: the plaintiff is entitled to recover the properties described in Schedule ka (except property No. 3, which was the subject of a compromise), and the plaintiff's claim to the Schedule kha properties is dismissed.
Direct consequences for the parties (as ordered by the Court):
- The decree of the lower Court is varied so that the plaintiff obtains a decree for the Schedule ka properties except property No. 3.
- The plaintiff's suit as to the Schedule kha properties is dismissed.
- The plaintiff will receive two-thirds (2/3) of her costs of this appeal from defendant No. 1. Defendants Nos. 9 and 10 (respondents here) will receive one-third (1/3) of their costs of the appeal from the plaintiff and will also recover their costs in the First Court. Defendant No. 1 will bear his own costs in both Courts. The plaintiff is not entitled to costs in the Court below.
- The plaintiff is to receive a decree for mesne profits against defendant No. 1; the quantum of mesne profits is to be assessed by the Court below.
Broader implications: The opinion is confined to the application of established principles (including reliance on a Privy Council authority) to the facts of this case. The decision resolves the parties' rights to the specified properties and allocates costs and mesne profits; the Court did not assert that it was establishing any novel legal principle beyond applying cited precedents to the facts. No new precedent is announced in the opinion beyond the Court's application of existing authorities.
1. The suit giving rise to this appeal was brought by the plaintiff to recover certain properties as heir of her father one Bharat Chandra Basu. The properties had been placed in two schedules ka and kha of the plaint. Bharat obtained the properties described in schedule ka as heir of his son who had pre-deceased him, the son having inherited the properties from his maternal grand. father. The properties in schedule kha were the ancestral properties of Bharat. Bharat died leaving two daughters, the plaintiff who was married at the time and Mon Mohini a maiden daughter. Mon Mohini, therefore, succeeded to the property left by Bharat obtaining a Hindu woman's estate. Bharat had also three nephews, his brother's sons. One of them Krishna was appointed guardian of Mon Mohini during her minority. It appears that Bharat died leaving some debts and a decree was obtained by the creditor one Ram Kumar Nag in a suit in which he made both the daughters of Bharat defendants, The decree was for Rs. 88 odd and was dated 13th July, 1883. In order to pay off this debt Krishna as guardian of Mon Mohini borrowed a sum of Rs. 100 from one Kali Kumar Pal by a simple bond, dated 31st May, 1884. He executed this bond as the certificated guardian of Mon Mohini, and under that bond there was only the personal liability of the executant, no property left by Bharat being charged for the debt. No money was paid for that bond but a fresh bowl was executed in favour of the creditor on the 17th October, 1887, by Krishna purporting to act as guardian on behalf of Mon Mohini. This bond was for Rs. 160. The creditor, Kali Kumar Pal, brought a suit on the renewed bond in 1890 making both the minor Mon Mohini and her guardian Krishna defendants in the suit. The suit was decreed on the 14th February, 1890, and the ordering portion of the decree runs thus. It is ordered that an ex parte decree be passed as against the defendant No. 1 for the claim in suit with costs together with interest...and that the defendant No. 1 do pay to the plaintiff the sum of Rs. 226-8. The defendant No. 1 was the lady Mon Mohini. This decree was put in execution and the properties mentioned in Schedule ka of the plaint were sold and purchased by the decree-holder. The date of the sale-certificate is 27th November, 1891, and the properties in Schedule ka are now in the possession of his heir, the defendant No. 1. The properties described in Schedule kha were said to have been transferred by Bharat in his lifetime by oral gift in favour of his brother's sons one of whom was Krishna aforesaid. Those donees had executed mortgages in favour of certain persons with regard to these properties and the defendants Nos. 9 and 10 purchased those properties on being sold in execution of the mortgage decree by the creditors and they are now in possession of those properties.
2. Mon Mohini died sometime in 1908 and the plaintiff brings this suit for the recovery of the properties on the allegation that she is entitled to those properties as the next heir of Bharat. The Court below has dismissed the suit entirely. The plaintiff claimed the properties in various grounds. She impeached the auction sales as fraudulent and collusive and also alleged that the defendant No. 1's father was actually acting as the guardian of Mon Mohini, and also denied that Bharat had any debts. The real question, however, and that is the point which has been urged before us, is whether the sale in 1891 of the properties in Schedule ka conveyed the entire interest in the properties or only the limited interest of the minor Mon Mohini. With regard to the properties in schedule kha it was urged that there was no reliable evidence of the gift and the lower Court was wrong in holding that the evidence of the gift had not been contradicted by the plaintiff.
3. The claim with regard to the properties in Schedule kha may be disposed of at once. "We find from the evidence that the properties were of very small value, the income only being Rs. 3 realised as rent and about 12 maunds of paddy per year. It is in evidence that Bharat had affection for his brother's sons and also that those brother's sons had nursed him during his old age. It also appears from the evidence on the plaintiff's side that Krishna was very affectionate towards his cousins the plaintiff and Mon Mohini, and had acted for the purpose of preservation of their interest. It does not appear to us that there is any good ground for disbelieving the evidence that there was an oral gift by Bharat in favour of his nephews. If that is so the plaintiff cannot lay any claim to those properties. The appeal, therefore, with regard to the properties in Schedule kha is dismissed.
4. The decision of the right as regards the properties in Schedule ka depends upon the fact as to whether the sale in 1891 conveyed the entire interest in the properties to the father of defendant No. 1. It is no doubt true that a decree was obtained against Mon Mohini for the debts owed by Bharat and that money was borrowed upon the bond of 31st May, 1884, in order to pay off that decree. The guardian could certainly under the law have created a valid charge on the property for that debt, but apparently the creditor was satisfied with having only the personal undertaking of the guardian to pay that amount. This bond was renewed on the 17th October, 1887. One objection was made on behalf of the appellant that this renewal was after the date when the previous bond had been barred by limitation. This point was, however, not raised in the Court below, and although from the dates of the two bonds it would appear that the debt was barred on the 17th October, 1887, it may be that it was kept alive by acknowledgment or payment of interest. However that may be, by the second bond of 1887 the creditor was satisfied by taking a simple money bond, as it is called, without any charge having been created on the property. It is possible that although no charge was created the original debt having been for lawful purposes the creditor might have recovered his debt from the estate left by Bharat if he had chosen to do so, But in order to make the estate liable he ought to have framed his suit in a proper manner. What he asked for was simply to have a personal decree against Mon Mohini and the guardian who was made the second defendant. The Court passed a decree against the minor alone. It does not appear anywhere that the minor was made a party to the suit as representing her father's estate.
5. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that a decree against the minor ought not to have been passed on the bond executed by the guardian. But it is not open to us to decide whether the decree of 1890 was wrongly made against the minor. Besides having regard to the question urged that the sale only transferred the interest of Mon Mohini in the property the question is immaterial. The sale certificate which was granted to the father of defendant No. 1 does rot show that the entire interest in the property was sold as is contended on behalf of the defendant No. 1. What was sold was all rights and interest of the judgment-debtor in the property which does not of itself show that any interest beyond what the lady possessed in her woman's estate was sold. No doubt if the proceedings in the suit and the sale notification had contained any materials from which it could have been held that the decree-holder bad intended to sell the entire interest in the property and not merely the limited interest of the daughter, the statement that only the rights and interest of the judgment-debtor was gold would not have been of value in representing what interest in the property had been purchased. The decree itself shows that it was only a personal decree and, therefore, we must hold even if the foundation of the decree be a liability which might bind the reversioner this is not sufficient. The suit ought to have been so framed that it would show that it was intended to bind the entire estate and not merely to enforce a personal liability against the daughter. The female heir, no doubt, represents the entire estate in respect of her own as well as the reversionary interest, and for that very reason the creditor is bound to give notice that he is seeking a larger remedy so as to put the other persons interested on their guard and to enable them to protect the estate if they bad thought fit. Here the bond did not charge the property as it might have done. The decree was not against the lady as representing the estate but a mere personal decree and the proceedings leading up to the sale have not been produced and, therefore, under these circumstances we hold that the case is governed by the principles laid down by the Privy Council in Baijun Dubey v. Brij Bhookun Lall Auasti (1878-80) 1 Cal. 133. The Court below has relied on the Privy Council case of Jugul Kishore v. Jatindra Mohan Tagore (1884) 10 Cal. 985. But in that case their Lordships held that the entire interest was sold after looking into the judgment in the case in order to ascertain what was sold.
6. We must, therefore, hold that the plaintiff is entitled to the property in Schedule ka after the death of her sister Mod Mohini. Having regard to the fact that the plaintiff by stating various untrue facts in the lower Court unnecessarily complicated the matter, we are of opinion that she is not entitled to the costs in the Court below.
7. The decree of the lower Court is varied to this extent that the plaintiff will get a decree for the property described in Schedule ka except property No. 3 about which there was a compromise and her suit with regard to property in Schedule kha will be dismissed. She will get 2/3rds of her costs of this appeal from defendant No. 1. The defendants Nos. 9 and 10 who are respondents in this Court will get 1/3rd of their costs of this appeal from the plaintiff-appellant and they will also get their costs in the First Court. The defendant No. 1 will bear his own costs in both Courts. The plaintiff will also get a decree for mesne profits to be assessed by the Court below against defendant No. 1.
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