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Lalit Mohan Roy v. Kishori Mohan Roy

Calcutta High Court
Sep 27, 1948
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

Jiban Krishna Roy executed a deed of settlement on 15 August 1908 creating a family trust. He dedicated his half share in a putni (referred to in the opinion as "the putni") and other properties to trustees; he was first trustee, to be succeeded by his widow and sons as co-trustees acting in rotation. The principal objects included small monthly maintenance to daughters, provision for ancestor sradh, reserve funds for grandchildren's marriages, annual rotation of management among branches, remuneration to managing trustees, and distribution of surplus income equally among the five sons or their heirs.

In 1924 two sons filed Title Suit No. 34 of 1924 for accounts; that suit was compromised and accounts up to the compromise date were treated as correct. During Jiban Krishna's lifetime his half share in dar putni had been let to his co-sharer Bakhal Mukherji on 15 March 1905; Bakhal Mukherji defaulted in payment of the putni rent for 1343 B.S. The Maharaja of Burdwan instituted a putni sale procedure and the entire putni was sold on 15 May 1937; Bato (Bata/Bata) Krishna Mondal (defendant 17) purchased the entire putni (both the 8 annas share of Jiban Krishna and the other 8 annas share).

On 4 December 1938 defendants 1–15 repurchased the entire putni from Bato Krishna. On 30 January 1942 the plaintiffs (sons of Raj Krishna, the eldest son of Jiban Krishna) instituted the present suit against the other trustees (and other beneficially interested parties and Bato Krishna). The plaintiffs sought administration of the trust by the court, accounts, framing of a scheme, and a declaration that the trust attached to the entire putni as purchased by defendants 1–15 from Bato Krishna.

The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit in its entirety. The District Judge modified that decree by holding that no trust attached to the 8 annas share that belonged to Jiban Krishna's co-sharer and declared that the trust attached only to Jiban Krishna's original half share; he ordered proportionate contribution by others to the defendants purchasers for the 8 annas share. Two Second Appeals ensued: No. 276 of 1945 by the plaintiffs (challenging the District Judge's modification) and No. 378 of 1945 by some defendants (challenging the remainder of the District Judge's decree). The Court below (this Court) dismissed Second Appeal No. 276 of 1945 (without costs) and dismissed Second Appeal No. 378 of 1945 (with costs), and affirmed the District Judge's decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trust created by Jiban Krishna attached to the entire putni (including the co-sharer's 8 annas) after repurchase by the defendants, or only to Jiban Krishna's original half share.
  2. Whether Section 65 of the Trusts Act applies where trustees' breach of duty leads to an involuntary sale (sale in invitum) and a subsequent repurchase by trustees — i.e., does re-purchase from an intermediate bona fide purchaser at an involuntary sale render the property subject to the trust?
  3. Whether the trust (or portions thereof, specifically provisions for grandchildren's marriages) was invalid as offending the rule against perpetuities, and if so whether trustees who had accepted the trust could attack its validity in the present suit.
  4. Whether defendants 1 to 3 (managing trustees at the material time) were negligent or guilty of breach of trust in allowing the putni to be sold, and whether Bato Krishna was a bona fide purchaser or had been part of collusion.

Arguments of the Parties

Pleadings and Arguments Advanced on Behalf of the Defendants (Appellants in Second Appeal No. 378, represented by Dr. Naresh Chandra Sen Gupta)

  • The trust was invalid, at least in large part, because provisions for grandchildren's marriages offended the law of perpetuity.
  • Defendants 1 to 3 were not trustees at the time of the putni sale but merely agents of co-sharers and had no knowledge of the intended sale; therefore they were not liable for the sale.
  • The District Judge was wrong to find negligence on the part of defendants 1 to 3; they were not negligent in the manner found by the Subordinate Judge.
  • The Subordinate Judge wrongly found Bato Krishna (defendant 17) was not a bona fide purchaser; on the contrary, Bato Krishna was an innocent purchaser for value without notice (a conclusion the District Judge accepted and which respondents did not contest on appeal).
  • As Bato Krishna was an innocent transferee, subsequent repurchase from him by defendants 1–15 was not invalid and did not make the repurchased half share subject to the trust; defendants 1–3, whether trustees or agents at the time of repurchase, had not acted in breach such as to saddle the repurchase with the trust. (Dr. Sen Gupta had in view the decision Deo Nandan Prasad v. Janhi Singh.)
  • Question was also raised (not fully developed) whether Section 65 of the Trusts Act applies to sales in invitum or only to sales by the trustee himself.

Pleadings and Arguments Advanced on Behalf of the Plaintiffs (represented by Mr. Gupta)

  • Some objects of the trust were valid; moreover the defendants had accepted and acted as trustees and therefore were not entitled in this suit to challenge the validity of the trust.
  • The suit must proceed on the basis that the defendants are trustees and were trustees at the time of the putni sale.
  • Failure by Bakhal Mukherji to pay rent did not automatically expose the putni to sale under the Putni Regulations; the Maharaja had alternative remedies but chose the Putni Regulations route, and the sale occurred at a time when defendants 1–3 were in charge of management and failed to take steps to save the putni.
  • By failing to act to prevent the sale the managing trustees breached their duty; whether described as "gross" negligence or otherwise, there was a breach of trust.
  • Defendants 1–15 remained trustees at the time of repurchase and had not been divested of trusteeship; therefore the trust attached to Jiban Krishna's portion of the putni after repurchase.
  • Section 65 of the Trusts Act should be interpreted to apply not only where a trustee sells to an intermediate purchaser and repurchases from that purchaser, but also to cases of repurchase after involuntary sale if there was breach of trust in connection with the sale; the trust should attach on repurchase when the trustees had been in breach.

Concession by Counsel for the Respondents in Second Appeal No. 378

  • Respondent's counsel (Mr. Gupta appearing for respondents in that appeal) conceded that the District Judge's factual finding that Bato Krishna was an innocent purchaser for value without notice was reasonable and accepted that finding.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Deo Nandan Prasad v. Janhi Singh, 44 I.A. 30 : (A.I.R. (3) 16 P.C. 227) Relied upon by Dr. Sen Gupta in support of the contention that repurchase from an innocent intermediate transferee by co-sharers/parties might not saddle the repurchased property with the trust. The opinion records that Dr. Sen Gupta had this decision in view; the Court did not base its reasoning on this precedent and did not adopt it as determinative for the present issues.
Manohar Mukherjee v. Peary Mohan Mukherjee, 24 C.W.N. 478 : (A.I.R. (7) 1920 Cal. 210) That courts have power to administer private trusts (not only public trusts) — including ordering accounts and framing schemes. The Court relied on this authority (and noted its affirmation on appeal by the Judicial Committee) to support the conclusion that the courts below were right to decree administration of the trust by the Court, the framing of a scheme, and accounts.
Ex parte Bennet (1805) 10 Ves 381 : (8 R.R. 1) Principle (as stated by Lord Eldon) that permitting trustees to buy could open the door to undetectable cases where advantage is taken; reason for strict scrutiny of trustee purchases. The Court quoted this authority to explain the policy rationale that justifies close scrutiny of trustee purchases and to support the interpretation and application of Section 65 of the Trusts Act to protect trusts.
Williams v. Scott (1900) A.C. 499 : (69 L.J.P.C. 77) Statement that although in a particular case a trustee may not have made an advantage, it is generally impossible to examine the transactions sufficiently to be satisfied in most cases; supports rule that trustee purchases are suspect. The Court cited this authority alongside Ex parte Bennet to justify the application of strict rules (including S.65) to trustee repurchases, including repurchases after involuntary sales resulting from trustees' breach.
Subbaiya Pandaram v. Mohammad Mustafa Marcayar, 46 Mad. 751 : (A.I.R. (10) 1923 P.C. 175) District Judge referred to this Judicial Committee decision as an authority indicating that the distinction between voluntary and involuntary sales might not affect certain legal consequences (here referenced in connection with limitations and adverse possession). The present Court observed that the District Judge relied on this decision to suggest S.66 applied to involuntary sales; however, the present Court held that the decision was not applicable to the present question about Section 65 of the Trusts Act and that the Judicial Committee did not decide the applicability of Section 65 to involuntary sales in that case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal conclusions grounded in the facts found by the courts below and the evidence reviewed by the District Judge:

  1. Existence and survival of the trust: The Court observed that the trust continued to exist despite any partial invalidity (for example, if provisions for grandchildren's marriages offended the rule against perpetuities). The provisions for daughters and for the sradh were valid and the trust therefore was not extinguished. Acceptance of the trust by the sons (as shown in the title suit of 1924) and their performance of rotational management confirmed that the defendants had accepted trusteeship.
  2. Locus to attack validity: Because the defendants had accepted and acted as trustees, they could not, in a suit brought by plaintiffs for administration of the trust, defeat the action by selectively attacking part of the trust's validity. If they wished to have the trust determined or property returned for failure of objects, they should institute proper proceedings for that purpose; they could not do so as a defence to a suit for administration.
  3. Duty of all trustees to preserve estate: The Court emphasised that the duty to preserve the estate and prevent loss rests on all trustees regardless of whether a particular trustee was the managing trustee at the relevant time. Consequently both plaintiffs and defendants (all trustees) bore responsibility for the sale that occurred; there was a breach of duty by all trustees.
  4. Continued trusteeship at repurchase: The Court found that defendants had neither been discharged nor had they got the trust determined prior to repurchase; as a result, they remained trustees (whether managing or not) at the time of repurchase from Bato Krishna.
  5. Interpretation and application of Section 65 of the Trusts Act: The Court addressed whether Section 65 — which provides that where a trustee wrongfully sells or transfers trust property and afterwards becomes owner of that property, the property becomes subject to the trust notwithstanding intervening bona fide transferees — applies to involuntary sales resulting from trustees' breach. The Court held that the phrase "wrongfully sells or otherwise transfers" should be read to include cases of involuntary sales caused by trustees' default/breach, because excluding involuntary sales would open the door to fraud and make detection of such fraud difficult. The Court referred to equitable policy (citing Ex parte Bennet and Williams v. Scott) underpinning strict scrutiny of trustee purchases and to the danger that honest appearances may conceal misconduct.
  6. Application to present facts: The District Judge had carefully reviewed the evidence and concluded that Bato Krishna was an innocent purchaser for value without notice; the present Court accepted that finding. Nevertheless, because the defendants (as trustees) repurchased Jiban Krishna's half-share after the involuntary sale caused by breach of duty, Section 65 applied and the repurchased portion became subject to the trust even though the intermediate purchaser was bona fide.
  7. On the question of acquiescence: The Court rejected a vague suggestion of acquiescence by the plaintiffs — there was no acquiescence by the plaintiffs to the repurchase and they had instituted the present suit to recover the property for the trust.
  8. Procedural outcome: The Court accepted the District Judge's modification of the Subordinate Judge's decree (that the trust attached to Jiban Krishna's original half-share and not to the co-sharer's 8 annas), and affirmed the District Judge's decree as a whole. The appeals were dismissed accordingly.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The decree of the District Judge is affirmed. Second Appeal No. 276 of 1945 (by the plaintiffs) is dismissed without costs. Second Appeal No. 378 of 1945 (by certain defendants) is dismissed with costs. The Court held that the trust attached to Jiban Krishna's original half-share of the putni upon repurchase by trustees, and that Section 65 of the Trusts Act applies to cases where an involuntary sale results from trustees' breach so that a subsequent repurchase by trustees saddles the property with the trust even if an intermediate purchaser was bona fide and without notice.

Implications and consequences:

  • The defendants who remained trustees were subject to the trust on repurchase of Jiban Krishna's half-share because they had not been discharged or had the trust determined before repurchase.
  • The Court recognised that some provisions of the trust might be invalid (e.g., potential perpetuity issues), but that partial invalidity does not terminate the trust where valid objects remain; trustees who have accepted the trust cannot defeat a suit for administration by attacking validity in that suit.
  • The Court applied and explained the protective policy underlying Section 65 of the Trusts Act, holding that it extends to involuntary sales caused by trustees' breach — an important practical consequence for trustees who participate in reacquisition of trust property after such sales.
  • The District Judge's modification (limiting the declaration of trust to Jiban Krishna's original half-share and providing for proportionate contribution towards the 8 annas purchase money) was affirmed; thus the direct effect on the parties is that the trust remains enforceable over Jiban Krishna's half-share after repurchase and the decree as modified stands.
  • The opinion does not state that it intended to lay down an expansive new principle beyond the interpretation of Section 65 in the particular factual context; it applies established equitable policy to the facts before the Court and affirms the District Judge's balanced factual findings and legal conclusions.

Disposition: Appeals dismissed; decree of the District Judge affirmed.

Show all summary ...

K.C Chunder, J.:— These are two appeals from a decree of the District Judge of Howrah modifying the decree of the Subordinate Judge, first Court of the same district. Second Appeal No. 276 of 1945 is by the plaintiffs and Second Appeal No. 378 of 1945 is by some of the defendants.

2. One Jiban Krishna Roy executed a deed of settlement on 15th August 1908. It is a very big document with only a portion of which we are concerned in the present case. He created a family trust. He dedicated for the purpose of the trust his half share in a putni, which we shall hereafter refer to as ‘the putni’ and considerable other properties divesting himself completely of ownership of the same and vesting the ownership in the trustees. He was to be the first trustee and after him his widow and his sons (and if any of the sons be dead his heirs) were to be co-trustees in a body. He left five sons. Defendants 1 to 3 who are the principal appellants in second Appeal no. 378 are the sons of his son Gopi Krishna. The plaintiffs are the sons of his eldest son Raj Krishna. The other defendants are the heirs of his other children and one Bato Krishna Mondal has been made a defendant in the present case as haring purchased the putni at a putni sale. It is not necessary to set out all the objects of the trust in full as in the document. The main objects were that each of his four daughters was to get monthly a sum of Rs. 6 as maintenance, an amount was to be spent every year on the Sradh of his ancestor. Then he provided for the creation of a reserve fund for the marriage of each of his grandson and grand-daughter. Each branch of the family, that is, his sons, or in the absence of any of the sons the heirs of that particular son, would manage the trust in rotation each year and the managing trustee or trustees would get a remuneration of Rs. 10 per month. After meeting all the charges the balance of the income would go to the five sons or their heirs in equal shares. In 1924 two of the sons of Jiban Krishna filed a suit which was Title Suit No. 34 of 1924 for accounts by the trustees. The suit was compromised and accounts up to the date of the compromise were taken as correct. Jiban Krishna during his life time had let out in dar putni his half share of the putni to his co-sharer Bakhal Mukherji on 15th March 1905. The dar-putnidar was to pay the head rent, that is the rent payable to the zemindar, the Maharaja of Burdwan, and he was to pay a net profit of Rs. 922 and odd to the putnidar. It is not disputed that Bakhal Mukherji failed to pay the putni rent of 1343 B.S The Maharaja of Burdwan filed his application for sale of the putni under the Putni Begulations on 14th April 1937, that is, 1st; Baisakh 1344 B.S The entire putni was sold on 15th May 1937 at a putni sale. Bata Krishna Mondal who is defendant 17 purchased the entire putni, that is not only the 8 annas share of Jiban Krishna but also the remaining 8 annas share of Jiban Krishna's co-sharer. On 4th December 1938 defendants 1 to 15 who are the appellants in Second Appeal No. 378 of 1945, in their personal capacities repurchased the entire putni from Bato Krishna. On 30th January 1942, the plaintiffs instituted the present suit against the other trustees making therein also the surviving daughters and the heirs of the deceased daughters parties as beneficially interested in the trust, and Bato Krishna was also aided as a party as the purchaser of the putni at the putni sale. The plaintiffs prayed for administration of the trust by the court, accounts, framing of a scheme, and foe a declaration that the trust attached itself to the entire putni as purchased by defendants 1 to 15, from Bato Krishna.

3. The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit in its entirety. The District Judge pointed out that no trust attached to 8 annas share of the putni which used to belong to the cosharer of Jiban Krishna and he therefore modified the decree of the Subordinate Judge that the entire putni was to be declared as held in trust and he gave a declaration that the trust attached itself to the original half Bhare of Jiban Krishna. He further directed that proportionate contribution should be made by others to the defendants purchasers of the share of the purchase money for 8 annas of the putni. With this modification he affirmed the decree of the Subordinate Judge. The plaintiffs filed second Appeal no. 276 of 1946 which is directed against that portion of the decree of the District Judge which modified the decree of the Subordinate Judge. Mr. Gupta appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants in that appeal intimated to the Court that he was not prepared to support the appeal as he considered that the District Judge had acted quite legally and rightly.

4. Under the circumstances second Appeal No. 276 of 1945 is dismissed but without costs.

5. The defendants filed Second Appeal no. 378 of 1945 against the rest of the decree of the District Judge. Dr. Naresh Chandra Sen Gupta appearing on behalf of the appellants in this second appeal has briefly urged that the trust was invalid, at least to a great portion of it, as it offended against the law of perpetuity in connection with the provisions made for the marriage of the grand-children. He, therefore, further argued that defendants 1 to 3 were not trustees at the time of the putni sale but they were merely agents of the other cosharers and had no knowledge that the putni was to be sold. The Subordinate Judge had found that there was negligence on the part of defendants 1 to 3 who were the managing trustees at the time of the sale. The District Judge accepted the contention on behalf of defendants 1 to 3 that the plaintiffs were also negligent in not taking steps to see whether the putni rent had been paid by Bakhal Mukherji. He held farther that defendants 1 to 3 were “grossly” negligent in allowing the putni to be sold. Dr. Sen Gupta contended that the District Judge was wrong in holding that there was any negligence, with or without a vituperative adjective added to it, on the part of defendants 1 to 3. The Subordinate Judge had found that Bato Krishna, defendant 17 was not a bona fide purchaser. He found collusion and design in which the defendants as also Bato Krishna took part. The District Judge, after a very careful review of the evidence, overrules this finding of the Subordinate Judge and held that Bato Krishna was an innocent purchaser for value without notice. Mr. Gupta appearing on behalf of the respondents in this second appeal conceded that as the District Judge's finding was reasonable he was not going to contest the same but would accept it. Dr. Sen Gupta's further contention was that as Bato Krishna was an innocent transferee subsequent re-purchase from him by defendants 1 to 15 was not in any way bad and that no trust attached itself to the repurchased half share. His contention was that at the time of the purchase defendants 1 to 3 were not managing the properties. Therefore, as they were neither trustees nor agents at the time of re-purchase and the only reason for which according to him the sale can be challenged is if it can be shown that as co-sharers there was any want of full disclosure or good faith on their part. Obviously Dr. Sen Gupta had in view the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Deo Nandan Prasad v. Janhi Singh, 44 I.A 30 : (A.I.R (3) 16 P.C 227).

6. Mr. Gupta has urged that as it is incontestible that some of the objects of the trust are-valid and as the defendants bad accepted the trust and were acting as trustees they are not entitled in the present suit to question the validity of the trust. The suit must proceed on the basis that; they are trustees and were also such at the time of the putni sale. Mr. Gupta has pointed out that mere failure by Bakhal to pay the rent of 1343 B.S did not at once expose the putni to the, risk of a sale under the Putni Regulations. The Maharaja had two remedies open to him. He could realise the rent by the ordinary procedure of a rent suit. He could avail himself of the special provisions of the Putni Regulations. It was on 1st Baisakh 1344 B.S the date when defendants 1 to 3 became entrusted with the management, that the Maharaja exercised his option and further the putni was sold at the? time defendants 1 to 3 were in charge of management. They did nothing to save the putni and whether this course was “gross” negligence or not there certainly was a breach of duty on their part as trustees. Mr. Gupta further urged that defendants 1 to 15 remained trustees at the time of the re-purchase of the putni from Bato Krishna though they were not managing trustees then. They had not lost their character as trustees, whether they were managing or not. Therefore, be contended that the trust attached itself to Jiban Krishna's portion of the putni after the re-purchase. Dr. Sen Gupta raised the question whether Section 65 of the Trusts Act, would apply also to cases of sales in invitum or they would apply only to sales by the trustee himself. In view of his line of argument he did not develop this point. Mr. Gupta contended that the trust under Section 65 of the Trusts Act, would attach not only to repurchase from a bona fide purchaser to whom the trustee had himself sold but also to repurchase from a purchaser at an involuntary sale if there was breach of trust in connection with the sale.

7. It is settled law that if there is a total or partial failure of object of a trust there is a resulting trust to that extent in favour of the settlor or his representatives and in proper proceedings the settlor or his representatives can get back either the whole or part of the property free from the trust. But this must be done in proper proceedings. In the present case the trust still exists. The provisions made for the daughters as also for the sradh were valid objects of the trust. Even if the trust had failed partially because the object of the trust as regards the provisions for the marriage of the grand-children was against the law of perpetuity this did not put an end to the trust itself. In the title suit of 1924, the sons of Jiban Krishna had shown that they had accepted and were acting as trustees in the trust. The annual term of management is solely in accordance with the trust and it is also admitted by these defendants that they had been performing their turns of management which was in accordance with the trust. They bad accepted the trust and having accepted the trust and become trustees they cannot now in a suit brought by the plaintiffs based upon the trust for the administration of the trust itself put an end to the trust wholly or partly by questioning its validity as to part of the object. If they want to determine the trust they are perfectly at liberty to file a proper suit for the purpose and have the trust determined partially or wholly and recover back partially or wholly the property, subject to the trust. In the present case they are in the position of trustees. The law is too well established to be questioned. The Court can therefore order them to render accounts and administer the trust and also frame a scheme relating to it. That the Court has this power not only in regard to public trusts but to private trusts has been held by this Court in the case of Manohar Mukherjee v. Peary Mohan Mukherjee, 24 C.W.N 478 : (A.I.R (7) 1920 Cal. 210) which was affirmed on appeal by the Judicial Committee. The Courts below were therefore right in decreeing administration of the trust by the Court, the framing of a scheme, and accounts.

8. In our opinion it is immaterial to enter into the question who is more to blame for the sale of the putni, the plaintiffs or the defendants, as contended by the two sides. The duty of preserving the estate and saving it from loss is on all the trustees irrespective of the fact whether a particular trustee is managing the properties at the time or not. This is well-settled law. Therefore, for the sale of the half share of the putni, both the defendants and the plaintiffs were responsible. There was a breach of duty as trustees on the part of both parties, i.e, all the trustees. It is, therefore, pure waste of time to calculate the difference in degrees of breach of trust between these trustees who were all guilty of breach of trust as regards the sale of the putni. It is also perfectly clear that as the defendants had neither got themselves discharged, i.e, divested of their trusteeship, or got the trust determined, they remained trustees whether managing or not at the time of the re-purchase of the putni. The question, therefore, arises whether the purchase by the defendants of Jiban Krishna's half share of the putni made the purchase subject to the trust as the purchase was by trustees who had been guilty of breach of trust at the time of the sale. Section 65 says where a trustee wrongfully sells or otherwise transfers trust property and afterwards himself becomes the owner of the property the property becomes subject to the trust notwithstanding any want of notice on the part of intervening transferees in good faith for consideration. The only question under this section is whether the words “where the trustee wrongfully sells or otherwise transfers” would refer to an involuntary sale as well because under S. 65, even if re-purchase is from an innocent intermediate transferee for consideration without notice (as in this case) the property on re-purchase becomes saddled with the trust. It has been always the policy of Courts of equity to prevent trustees from having an interest in conflict with their duty and therefore purchase by trustees have been looked into with jealous scrutiny by the Courts. It may be that in some cases the re-purchase is a perfectly honest one whilst in other cases the re-purchase may be thoroughly dishonest. But as was pointed out by Lord Eldon in Ex parte Bennet, (1805) 10 Ves 381 at page 385 : (8 R.R 1) that if a trustee were permitted to buy in a honest case, he might buy in a case having that appearance, but which, from the infirmity of human testimony might remain undetected. It was also said in Williams v. Scott, (1900) A.C 499 at page 503 : (69 L.J.P.C 77) that the ground of the rule is that though you may see in a particular case that the trustee has not made an advantage, it is impossible to exmine sufficiently in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred whether he has made an advantage or not.

9. In our opinion the words “otherwise transfers” in S. 65, would invite the application of the section to cases of involuntary sales through the default of breach of trust of the trustees. The door otherwise would be open to fraud and it will be very difficult for any Court in some cases to be able to detect the fraud perpetrated upon the trust. The present case is a good example. The Subordinate Judge who heard the evidence and examined the witnesses after careful consideration came to the conclusion that it was fraudulent. The District Judge after applying equal care, in a very reasonable, cogent and well balanced judgment, came to the opposite conclusion, namely, that the sale to Bato Krishna was not fraudulent. The District Judge referred to a decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Subbaiya Pandaram v. Mohammad Mustafa Marcayar, 46 Mad. 751 : (A.I.R (10) 1923 P.C 175) and held that this was an authority for saying that S. 66 applied to involuntary sales as well, and not merely to voluntary sales. In that case the Judicial Committee was concerned with the question of Article Section 134 and 144 of Sch. 2 of the Limitation Act, and in that connection their Lordships of the Judicial Committee pointed out that it made no difference whether the sale was involuntary or voluntary. They said this in connection with the question of adverse possession and limitation. That decision is not applicable to the present case, and their Lordships did not proceed to decide upon the question of the applicability of Section 65 of the Trusts Act, to involuntary sales. For the reasons we have given above as to proper interpretation of Section 65 of the Trusts Act, we hold that the trust attached itself to the 8 annas of the putni in the present case on re-purchase though the sale to Bato Krishna was an involuntary sale and he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

10. Dr. Sen Gupta faintly raised the question of acquiescence. It is not very clear what he was trying to establish. Acquiescence in what? There was certainly no acquiescence by the plaintiffs to the repurchase of the property from Bato Krishna by the defendants. The plaintiffs as also the other trustees withdrew their shares of the surplus sale proceeds after the putni sale and purchase by Bato Krishna. But that sale was a perfectly legal and valid sale under the Putni Regulations in which the purchase had been made by an innocent third party without notice and so no one was entitled to question it. No question, therefore, of acquiescence as regards the putni sale or the purchase by Bato Krishna could arise, and as regards the subsequent repurchase by the defendants it is nobody's case that this was done with the consent of the plaintiffs or they acquiesced in it later on. On the other hand, they filed the present suit for recovery of the property by the trust.

11. The decree of the learned District Judge was right and is affirmed and Second Appeal No. 378 of 1945 is dismissed with costs.

Blank, J.:— I agree.

K.S

12. Appeals dismissed.