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Dominion Of India v. Jagadish Prosad Pannalal
Judgment Summary — Harries, C.J. (with Chakravartti, J. concurring)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a petition for revision of an order of a Full Bench of the Presidency Small Cause Court, Calcutta, which dismissed an application made by the Governor-General in Council. The underlying proceedings arose from a suit for compensation brought by the plaintiffs against the Governor-General in Council as representing the Bengal Nagpur Railway and the East Indian Railway.
A consignment of goods (black ???) was loaded at a town on the South Indian Railway for delivery at Gaya on the East Indian Railway and had to pass over three railways (South Indian Railway, Bengal Nagpur Railway and East Indian Railway). Upon delivery at Gaya there was a shortage of 9 ??? and the plaintiffs sued for Rs. 495 in the Presidency Small Cause Court, Calcutta.
The Small Cause Court judge held that he had jurisdiction and eventually decreed the suit against the Governor-General in Council as representing the Bengal Nagpur Railway for Rs. 360 with costs. An application to a Full Bench raising the jurisdictional point was dismissed by the Full Bench, which held the Court had jurisdiction under Section 18(c) of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act because the East Indian Railway carried on business within the local limits and leave of the Court had been obtained.
The Governor-General in Council (now the Dominion of India) sought revision of that Full Bench decision on the ground that the Small Cause Court lacked jurisdiction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Presidency Small Cause Court, Calcutta, had jurisdiction to entertain the suit against the Governor-General in Council (as representing the railways) under the provisions of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act.
- Whether the suit should be regarded as a suit against a single defendant (the Governor-General in Council / Dominion of India, owner of both railways) such that Section 18(a) applies, or as a suit against two distinct railway entities such that Section 18(c) applies.
- Whether service of notices under Section 77 of the Railways Act and Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code within Calcutta (in respect of the East Indian Railway) and the obtaining of leave of the Court suffice to make part of the cause of action arise within the local limits for jurisdictional purposes.
Arguments of the Parties
Governor-General in Council (Petitioner's) Arguments
- The Governor-General in Council (and now the Dominion of India) owned both the East Indian Railway and the Bengal Nagpur Railway, and the business of both railways was carried on by the Governor-General in Council; therefore the suit must be regarded as a suit against that single entity.
- Neither the Governor-General in Council nor the Dominion of India resides in, or carries on business within, the local limits of the Small Cause Court in Calcutta; consequently Section 18(c) cannot apply and no part of the cause of action arose within Calcutta, so the Court lacks jurisdiction.
- The cause of action arose entirely on the property of the Bengal Nagpur Railway (outside Calcutta), and therefore the Small Cause Court cannot entertain the suit.
Plaintiffs / Respondents and Full Bench Position
- The plaintiffs relied on the fact that notices under Section 77 of the Railways Act and Section 80 CPC were served (at least in respect of the East Indian Railway) within Calcutta, and that leave of the Court had been obtained prior to institution of the suit.
- The Full Bench held the East Indian Railway carried on business at its headquarters within the Small Cause Court's local limits and, because leave had been obtained, the suit could be maintained not only against the East Indian Railway but also against the co-defendant Bengal Nagpur Railway under Section 18(c).
- There was a concession (noted by the Court) that the proper way to view the suit might be as one against the Governor-General in Council (one defendant) rather than as suits against two separate railway entities.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dominion of India v. Gopal Chandra Tapadar, Civil Revision No. 1832 of 1947, decided 24 Feb 1943; reported A.I.R. (35) 1948 Cal. 268 | Whether the Small Cause Court had jurisdiction to decree against a railway (Oudh & Tirhut Railway) whose headquarters were outside the Court's local limits; consideration of Section 18 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (particularly (c)). | The Court cited this single-judge decision as addressing a similar multi-railway carriage situation and the question whether Section 18 applied. The earlier decision held the Small Cause Court had no jurisdiction to decree against the Oudh & Tirhut Railway where that railway's headquarters were outside the local limits and there was no indication that leave had been obtained. The present Court distinguished that decision on the basis that leave had been obtained here and, alternatively, because the suit could be viewed as against one owner (Governor-General/Dominion) bringing Section 18(a) into play. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded by examining two possible legal characterisations of the suit and applying the text of Section 18 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act as found in the record:
- Suit regarded as against one defendant (the Governor-General in Council / Dominion of India): The Court reasoned that if the suit is a suit against the Governor-General in Council (owner of both railways), then Section 18(a) applies because part of the cause of action arose within the local limits of the Small Cause Court. The factual basis for this conclusion is that notices under Section 77 of the Railways Act and Section 80 CPC (at least in respect of the East Indian Railway) were served in Calcutta; leave of the Court had been obtained; and therefore part of the cause of action occurred within the Court's limits. The Court emphasized that the owner (Governor-General / Dominion) is the same entity in respect of both railways and thus the plaintiff required only one set of statutory notices.
- Suit regarded as against two separate railway entities (East Indian Railway and Bengal Nagpur Railway): The Court held that even if the railways were treated as distinct entities, Section 18(c) would apply. The reasoning was that Section 18(c) requires that any one of the defendants at the time of institution actually and voluntarily reside, carry on business, or personally work for gain within the local limits and that either leave of the Court had been obtained or the out-of-jurisdiction defendants acquiesced. Here, the East Indian Railway's head office was within the Small Cause Court's local limits, leave had been obtained, and therefore jurisdiction would exist as against both defendants under Section 18(c).
- Effect of subsequent dismissal of the East Indian Railway as a defendant: The Court addressed the argument that the eventual finding that the Bengal Nagpur Railway alone was responsible (and dismissal of the East Indian Railway) meant the Court could not have jurisdiction because the defendant who carried on business within the jurisdiction had been dismissed. The Court rejected that contention: jurisdiction is to be determined on the pleadings before trial; if on the face of the pleadings the Court had jurisdiction, later dismissal of the in-jurisdiction defendant does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction that existed at the outset.
- Interaction with the cited single-judge precedent: The opinion reviewed the Dominion of India v. Gopal Chandra Tapadar decision in which Lodge, J. held the Small Cause Court had no jurisdiction against a railway whose headquarters were outside the local limits. The present Court distinguished that case because, in the earlier judgment, there was nothing to show leave had been obtained (making Section 18(c) inapplicable), whereas in the present matter leave had been obtained; furthermore, the present Court also found that the case could properly be viewed as a suit against a single owner (bringing Section 18(a) into play).
On these grounds the Court concluded that the Full Bench's decision was correct, albeit that the present Court upholds it for somewhat different reasons than those stated by the Full Bench.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Rule (petition for revision) is DISCHARGED. The Court upholds the decision of the Full Bench of the Presidency Small Cause Court, Calcutta.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The Full Bench decision that the Small Cause Court had jurisdiction is sustained, so the decree entered by the Small Cause Court (against the Governor-General in Council as representing the Bengal Nagpur Railway for Rs. 360 with costs) stands. The Rule to call for revision is discharged with costs; the hearing fee is assessed at three gold mohurs.
- Broader precedent: The Court explicitly stated it upholds the Full Bench decision for somewhat different reasons but did not purport to lay down a broader new rule beyond applying Sections 18(a) and 18(c) to the facts of this case. No novel or sweeping jurisdictional doctrine was announced beyond the application of the statutory text to the factual permutations discussed (single-owner view v. separate-entity view).
Order: Rule discharged. (Chakravartti, J. agreed.) Costs: hearing fee three gold mohurs.
This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond the material contained in that opinion.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Harries, C.J:— This is a petition for revision an order of a Full Bench of the Court of mall Causes Calcutta, dismissing an application lade to it by the Governor General of India in council.
2. To appreciate the points in issue in is revision it will be necessary shortly to set ??? the facts of the case. The proceedings arise ??? of a suit for compensation brought against ??? Governor-General in Council as representing ??? Bengal Nagpur Railway and the East Indian Railway. It appears that a quantity of black ??? was consigned for carriage to the plaintiffs, the consignment was loaded at a town called ??? on the South Indian Railway and delivery was to take place at Gaya on the East ??? Railway. The goods bad to travel over ??? railways, the South Indian Railway, the bengal Nagpur Railway and the East Indian Railway. When the goods were delivered at Gaya was found that there was a shortage of 9 ??? and a suit was brought against the Governor General in Council representing the ??? Indian Railway and the Bengal Nagpur Railway for compensation amounting to Rs. 495, his suit was filed in the Presidency Small-Cause court, Calcutta and was heard by one of the learned Judges of that Court. On behalf of the ??? petitioner it was urged that the Court ??? no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The ??? seems to have been regarded as one against ??? defendants, namely, the East Indian Railway and the Bengal Nagpur Railway. The notices under Section 77 of the Railways Act and Section 80 of the CPC, ??? duly been served and the plaintiffs argued ??? the Small Cause Court had jurisdiction by ??? of the fact that the headquarters of the ??? Indian Railway were within the local ??? of the Court's jurisdiction and that as ??? had been obtained the Bengal Nagpur Railway could also be properly regarded as defendants. The contention on behalf of the Governor-General was that neither of these railways carried on business within the local limits the Court and no part of the cause of action ??? within those limits. That being so it was ??? that the Court had no jurisdiction. It was other contended that the results showed that ??? Court could not have jurisdiction by reason Section 18(c) of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act ??? relevant portion of Section 18 of the Presidency Small ??? Courts Act is in these terms:
“Subject to the exceptions in S. 19, the Small Cause ??? shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil ???—when the amount of value of the subject-matter does not exceed two thousand rupees; and—
(a) the cause of action has arisen, either wholly or in part, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court, and the leave of the Court has, foe reasons to be recorded by it in writing, been given before the institution of the suit: or….
(c) any of the defendants at the time of the institution of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business or personally works for gain, within such local limits, and either the leave of the Court has been given before the institution of the suit, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution……”
3. According to the argument addressed to the Court on behalf of the Governor-General, neither of these railways carried on business within the local limits of the Court and therefore S. 18(c) could have no application; neither could S. 18(a), because according to the case for the Governor-General no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction. The learned Small Cause Court Judge held that he had jurisdiction to hear the case and it appears to have been conceded eventually that the loss was caused on the Bengal Nagpur Railway. Eventually the suit was decreed against the Governor-General in Council as representing the Bengal Nagpur Railway for Rs. 360 with costs.
4. An application was then made to a Full Bench of the Small Cause Court and the point as to jurisdiction was again argued. The Full Bench was of opinion that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit by reason of the-provisions of Section 18(c) of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. The Court held that the East Indian Railway carried on its business at its headquarters situate within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court, and as leave of the Court had been obtained the suit could be maintained not only against the East Indian Railway, but against the co-defendant, the Bengal Nagpur Railway also. The result, therefore, was that the application to the Full Bench failed and was dismissed.
5. On behalf of the Governor-General in Council it has been urged before us that the decision of the Full Bench is clearly erroneous. It is contended that the Governor-General in Council, and at the present time the Dominion of India, owns both the East Indian Railway and the Bengal Nagpur Railway. It was urged that the business of both the Railways was at that time carried on by the Governor. General in Council and is now carried on by the Dominion of India and it cannot be said that either the Governor-General in Council carries on his business in Calcutta or does the Dominion of India do so to-day. It was urged that if the suit be regarded, as it must be regarded, as a suit against the Governor-General in Council and now the Dominion of India, then clearly the Small Cause Court had no jurisdiction, as neither the Governor-General in India nor the Dominion of India resides nor carries on business within the local limits, and no part of the cause of action arose in Calcutta. The cause of action, it was urged, arose entirely on the property of the Bengal Nagpur Railway.
6. It appears to me that if this suit is to be regarded as a suit against one defendant, namely, the Governor-General in Council, and now the Dominion of India as owner of both these railways, then the Small Cause Court clearly had jurisdiction by reason of Section 18(a) of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act.
7. It is true that the goods were lost on the property of the Bengal Nagpur Railway which would be outside the jurisdiction. But it is clear that part of the cause of action against the Governor-General or the Dominion of India is the service of notice under Section 77 of the Railways Act and Section 80 of the CPC. These notices, in so far as they concern the East Indian Railway, at least were served in Calcutta within the local limits of the jurisdiction. If the suit is to be regarded as against one defendant then only one set of notices were required and those notices were served on the Governor-General at a place within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court and therefore part of the cause of action against the Governor-General in Council or the Dominion of India arose within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court. Further, leave of the Court was obtained and that being so, the case falls precisely within the terms of Section 18(a) of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. It is to be observed that learned Advocate for the petitioner concedes that the proper way of viewing this suit is as a suit against the Governor-General in Council and not as a suit against the Governor-General in Council representing two railways. The Governor-General in Council, and now the Dominion of India, does own these two railways. But as owner of the railways, the Governor-General in Council or the Dominion of India is the same entity. It does not own the East Indian Railway in one capacity and the Bengal Nagpur Railway in another capacity. It owns both, and therefore it may well be that upon the true view of the facts in this case, this was a suit against one defendant and one defendant only, namely, the Governor-General in Council, and now the Dominion of India. As I have said, regarded in that way this case clearly falls within Section 18(a) of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, and the Court had jurisdiction.
8. If the suit is regarded, as it was regarded as a suit against two entities, namely, the East Indian Railway and the Bengal Nagpur Railway, it appears to me clear that the Court ??? jurisdiction under S. 18(c). If these railway are two distinct entities then each railway ??? carry on its business at some particular placed. A company carries on business at its registers office, and it would appear to me that a railway treated as a separate entity would carry on ??? business at its head office. Admittedly the ??? office of the East Indian Railway is within ??? local limits of the jurisdiction of the ??? Cause Court, though the headquarters of ??? Bengal Nagpur Railway, being at ??? is outside such limits. It must be remembere that leave of the Court was obtained for ??? this suit, and that being so the case falls precisely within the terms of S. 18(c). What ??? provision requires is that any one of the defendants at the time of the institution of the ??? actually and voluntarily resided or carried ??? business within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court and either that leave of ??? Court had been given for the institution of ??? suit, which had been done in this case, or ??? the defendant who did not reside or carry ??? business within the limits acquiesced in ??? institution of the suit.
9. Clearly, the Bengal Nagpur Railway ??? not acquiesce in the institution of the suit, ??? the case falls within the provision because ??? East Indian Railway carried on its business within the limits of the jurisdiction and leave the Court had been given. That being so, ??? Court had jurisdiction.
10. It was urged, however, that eventually was held that the Bengal Nagpur Railway ??? solely responsible and the suit as against ??? East Indian Railway was dismissed. If the ??? could be regarded as a suit against two ??? that would be so. But if it is to be regarded, I think it might well be regarded, as a ??? against one entity, there was no dismissal the suit in part at all. However, the argument was that as the suit was dismissed against ??? East Indian Railway, which was the ??? that carried on business within the local ??? of the Court, then the Court could have jurisdiction to make any decree against the ??? railway, namely, the Bengal Nagpur Railway which carried on its business outside the ??? of the jurisdiction of the Court.
11. The question of jurisdiction must decided upon the allegations in the pleading and it must be decided, before the case ??? whether or not there is jurisdiction. If on ??? face of the pleadings the Court has jurisdiction it matters not that later the suit as against ??? person who carried on business or resided within the jurisdiction is dismissed. If the suit is to be regarded as a suit against the two defendants, the Court clearly had jurisdiction upon the allegations alleged in the pleadings.
12. A single Judge decision of this Court, namely Dominion of India v. Go pal Chandra Tapadar, Civil Revn. No. 1832 of 1947, decided on 24th February 1943 : (A.I.R (35) 1948 Cal. 268), has been cited to us. In that case a number of bags of cement were consigned from a station on the East Indian Railway for delivery to the plaintiff at a station on the Bengal Assam Railway. The goods had to be carried not only on the East Indian Railway, but also on the Oudh & Tirhut Railway, then known as the Bengal and North Western Railway, before they reached the Bengal Assam Railway. It seems that when these goods reached Mahadepur Ghat on the Oudh and Tirhut Railway, they were lost and a suit was brought in the Small Cause Court, Calcutta, against the East Indian Bail way administration, the Oudh and Tirhut Railway and the Bengal Assam Railway.
13. A point was taken as to whether the Small Cause Court had jurisdiction to decree the suit against the Oudh and Tirhut Railway. It seems to have been conceded by learned advocate on behalf of the railways that the Court had jurisdiction with regard to the East Indian Railway and the Bengal Assam Railway as both those railways, it was said, carried on their business within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court. On the other hand, it was clear that the headquarters of the Oudh and Tirhut Railway were not within the local limits of the jurisdiction. Lodge, J. who decided the case held that the Small Cause Court had no jurisdiction to make a decree against the Oudh and Tirhut Railway, because the case did not fall within the provisions of Section 18 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. The learned Judge appears to have thought that the appropriate paragraph of that section was para, (c), but in his view that para, graph did not give the Court jurisdiction because it was clear that the Oudh and Tirhut Railway had not acquiesced in the institution of the suit, dearly, they had not acquiesced because they had taken the point of jurisdiction. There is nothing in the judgment of Lodge, J. to suggest that leave of the Court had been obtained to bring the suit, and that being so, it might be said that S. 18(c) did not apply. This case before Lodge, J. of course proceeds on the assumption that these three rail, ways which are now owned by the Dominion of India were three separate entities. But it may lie said that they are now merely three pieces of property owned by one owner, the Dominion of India. The Dominion in that case might have been sued and if the requisite notices were served at the head offices of either the East India Railway or the Bengal Assam Railway, it might be said that the case fell within s. 18(a) and no question of jurisdiction would have arisen.
14. For the reasons which I have given I am satisfied that the decision of the Full Bench of the Presidency Small Cause Court was right, though I uphold the decision for somewhat different reasons from those stated in the judgment of the Full Bench.
15. The Rule must therefore be discharged with costs, the hearing fee being assessed at three gold mohurs.
Chakravartti, J.:— I agree.
G.M.J
16. Rule discharged.
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