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Surendra Nath Chatterjee v. Sivadas Mookerjee

Calcutta High Court
May 10, 1922
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Probate Appeal concerning the Will and Codicil of Rai Bahadur Krishna Mohan Mookerjee

Factual and Procedural Background

Rai Bahadur Krishna Mohan Mookerjee executed a Will on 24 November 1914. He executed a second Will on 24 June 1916 which expressly cancelled any previous wills, and on the same date he executed a separate document described as a Codicil. On 14 April 1918 he executed two deeds of gift: one in favour of five daughters (Saraswati, Lilabati, Satyabati, Kamala and Durgar-mani) and another in favour of Probodh Chandra Chatterjee (the son of his daughter Kamala). The deed in favour of the daughters referred to the Will and Codicil of 24 June 1916 and stated that it cancelled “the said Will.” On the date of the deeds of gift the second Will was alleged to have been partially torn and thrown away. Mookerjee died on 1 June 1918.

On 31 May 1919 Surendranath Chatterjee, the testator's grandson by his daughter Saraswati, instituted proceedings for probate of the Will and Codicil of 24 June 1916, alleging the documents were in the custody of the testator's sons, Sivadas Mookerjee and Kedarnath Mookerjee. The sons opposed the application, denying due execution and/or existence of the Will and Codicil at the time of death. The trial court admitted secondary evidence (copies) of the Will and Codicil but dismissed the probate application on the grounds that the Will and Codicil were revoked by the deed of gift and by the testator's subsequent conduct with the documents. The present appeal challenges that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the deed of gift of 14 April 1918 (and the testator's subsequent acts) operated to revoke the Will of 24 June 1916 and/or the Codicil executed the same day.
  2. Whether revocation of a Will by such a deed (or by tearing) also operates to revoke a separately executed Codicil as a matter of law.
  3. Whether, on the evidence, the Codicil of 24 June 1916 was actually revoked by mutilation or destruction by the testator.
  4. Whether probate should be granted in respect of the Codicil of 24 June 1916.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that the deed of gift cancelled only the Will and left the Codicil untouched; thus the Codicil remained effective and entitled to probate.
  • The appellant disputed that the Codicil had been mutilated or destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents (the testator's sons and objectors) denied that the alleged Will and Codicil had been duly executed or existed at the time of death.
  • They argued that the deed of gift revoked both the Will and the Codicil — either by its express words or by making the Codicil an integral part of the Will so that revocation of the Will impliedly revoked the Codicil.
  • As an alternative, they contended that the testator actually revoked the Codicil by mutilating or destroying it after executing the deed of gift.
  • They relied in the lower court upon their own subsequent conduct after the father's death (applications for arrears of pension, succession certificate, notice in a partition suit) as indicative of absence of a will.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Cutto v. Gilbert Authority reflecting the principle in Section 60 of the Indian Succession Act that a revoked Will is not revived except by re-execution or by a Codicil executed with intention to revive. Cited to support the statutory rule in S.60 regarding revival of revoked wills; used to justify ignoring the first Will of 1914 and focusing on the second Will and Codicil.
In the goods of Brown Listed alongside authorities aligning with Section 60's rule on revival of wills. Cited as supporting authority for the same principle; used in conjunction with Cutto v. Gilbert.
Brown v. Brown Listed as authority consistent with Section 60's rule on revival. Referenced to support statutory interpretation of S.60.
Dickinson v. Swatman Listed as an authority supporting the non-revival principle under S.60. Referenced along with other authorities to show established principle on revival of revoked wills.
In the goods of Hodgkinson Listed with cases supporting S.60's principle. Used as part of the cluster of authorities confirming S.60 principle.
Subba Reddi v. Dorasami Held that Section 57 is exhaustive for modes of revocation; read with Section 3 of the Hindu Wills Act to mean Hindu wills are revocable only as S.57 prescribes (subject to proviso in Hindu Wills Act). Relied on to support the proposition that a Codicil cannot be revoked except in the modes specified by S.57; used to reject the respondents' contention that the Codicil was implicitly revoked by revocation of the Will.
Coppin v. Dillon Established that a Codicil may be given effect to stand by itself if it can be shown the testator intended it to survive the revocation of the Will. Cited to show that despite a general dependence of a Codicil on a Will, courts may give effect to a Codicil standing alone where intention to that effect is shown.
In the goods of Greig Same principle as Coppin v. Dillon — Codicil may survive revocation of Will if intended. Used to support the proposition that a Codicil could be effective independently of the revoked Will if intention exists.
Black v. Jobling Lord Penzance's view: under the Wills Act, a Codicil is not impliedly revoked by mere revocation of the Will; Codicil remains unless intent to revoke it appears. Followed as authority for the proposition that revocation of a Will does not automatically revoke the Codicil; the Court treated this line of authority as supportive.
In the goods of Savage One of Lord Penzance's decisions endorsing that Codicil is not impliedly revoked by revocation of the Will. Grouped with Black v. Jobling as supporting authority for non-implied revocation of codicil.
In the goods of Turner Another of Lord Penzance's decisions to same effect as Black v. Jobling. Used to show consistent authority that a Codicil will not be impliedly revoked by mere revocation of the Will.
Clogstoun v. Walcott Earlier decision that might support the contrary view (i.e., that codicil falls with a revoked will). Noted as earlier authority taken to be not properly decided and therefore not followed for the present purpose.
Grimwood v. Cozens Earlier decision that could support implied revocation of codicil; contrasted with Lord Penzance's later approach. Noted as earlier contrary authority which the Court regarded as not properly decided in light of later authorities.
In the goods of Bleckley Sir James Hannen took the earlier view supporting revocation where Codicil and Will were on same sheet, thus potentially implicating revocation of both. Distinguished on the facts (Codicil was separate) and noted as not controlling here.
Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards Contains observations consonant with the view in Bleckley regarding dependence of Codicil in certain circumstances. Referenced as part of the case-law landscape but not followed as determinative in this case.
Gardiner v. Courttope Decision following Black v. Jobling and consistent with the view that Codicil is not impliedly revoked by revocation of the Will. Cited to show later judicial support for Lord Penzance's approach; used to bolster the authority for non-implied revocation.
Beardsley v. Lacey Sir Francis Jeune treated Black v. Jobling as the binding authority on the subject. Referred to as evidence that Black v. Jobling had been treated as authoritative by later courts.
In the goods of Clements Another later case cited in the same line as supporting the non-implied-revocation principle. Used as additional supporting authority for the conclusion that a Codicil does not fall merely because the Will is revoked.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in stages, applying statutory provisions and authorities cited in the opinion to the facts:

  1. Scope and preliminary point: The Court observed the 24 November 1914 Will was revoked by the second Will of 24 June 1916 and could not be revived except in the manner prescribed by Section 60 of the Indian Succession Act. Accordingly, the focus was confined to the 1916 Will and the Codicil.
  2. Construction of the deed of gift: The deed executed on 14 April 1918 contained a clause stating that a Will and Codicil had been executed on 24 June 1916 but then declared “I cancel the said Will” and executed the deed of gift. The Court emphasised that the testator was legally trained and had used precise language; he distinguished between “Will” and “Codicil” earlier in the clause but later cancelled only “the said Will.” On the plain language, the Court held this clause revoked the Will but did not expressly revoke the Codicil.
  3. Statutory constraints on modes of revocation: The Court relied on Section 57 of the Indian Succession Act, which exhaustively lists methods of revocation (including another Will/Codicil, a writing declaring intention to revoke, or burning/tearing/destroying by the testator with intent). The Court treated Subba Reddi v. Dorasami and related statutory discussions to conclude that a Codicil cannot be treated as implicitly revoked merely because the Will is revoked unless the statutory modes apply or the testator's intent to revoke the Codicil is shown.
  4. Precedent and principle concerning Codicils: The Court surveyed English authorities and recognized an evolution in the law: earlier decisions sometimes held a Codicil fell with a revoked Will, but later authorities (notably Lord Penzance's decisions and subsequent cases adopting that line) established that a Codicil is not necessarily impliedly revoked by revocation of the Will; it survives unless there is evidence the testator intended otherwise. The Court relied on these decisions (Black v. Jobling and its progeny) to support its construction of the deed of gift and S.57.
  5. Independence of Will and Codicil on the facts: The Court analysed the dispositions in the Will and Codicil and found the Codicil contained provisions (family worship and distribution among sons) that were independent and distinct from the dispositions for the daughters (which were covered by the deed of gift). Given that the deed of gift addressed the daughters' dispositions but said nothing about the matters covered by the Codicil, the Court considered it consistent with a rational testator's intention that the Will be revoked in respect of dispositions to the daughters while the Codicil remain operative in respect of other matters.
  6. Evidence regarding mutilation/destruction: The respondents' contention that the Codicil was actually mutilated or destroyed was examined. The Court found the evidence insufficient: although the Will had been mutilated, the Codicil was a separate document and it was doubtful it had been presented to the testator for mutilation on that date. The witness Nilmani Mitter, a pleader and intimate friend of the testator who was present when the deed of gift was executed, testified that the Codicil was not mutilated on that occasion. Consequently, the Court held there was no proof of actual revocation by destruction with intent to revoke.
  7. Conduct of the sons after death: The Court noted the sons' post-mortem conduct (applications for pension arrears and succession certificate, and a partition notice) but concluded this conduct could not be accepted as evidence of the testator's intention to revoke the Codicil.
  8. Conclusion of analysis: Applying statutory provisions (Sections 57 and 60) and the cited authorities, and on the facts before it, the Court concluded that the second Will was revoked by the deed of gift (and by tearing) but the Codicil was not revoked either in law or in fact.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed; the decree of the District Judge is set aside; probate is to be issued in respect of the Codicil dated 24 June 1916.

Direct consequences and orders:

  • Probate is to be issued to the appellant in respect of the Codicil dated 24 June 1916.
  • The appellant is to be paid his costs out of the estate for both this Court and the Court below.
  • The Court assessed the hearing fee in this Court at five gold mohurs.

Broader implications: The Court applied and relied upon established statutory provisions (Sections 57 and 60 of the Indian Succession Act) and existing case-law to reaffirm that a Codicil is not automatically revoked by revocation of the Will unless the statutory modes of revocation are satisfied or the intention to revoke the Codicil is shown. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general rule beyond the application of these authorities to the facts at hand; the immediate effect is the grant of probate of the Codicil and costs and fee orders as noted above.

Disposition: Appeal allowed.

Show all summary ...

1. This appeal is directed against an order of dismissal made on an application for probate of a Will and Codicil alleged to have been executed on the 24th June, 1916 by Rai Bahadur Krishna Mohan Mookerjee, formerly a member of the Provincial Judicial Service. Mookerjee executed a Will on the 24th November, 1914. On the 24th June 1916 he executed a second Will which stated explicitly that all previous Wills, if any, were thereby cancelled. On the same date he executed another document described as a Codicil. On the 14th April, 1918 he executed two deeds of gift, one in favour of his five daughters Saraswati Lilabati, Satyabati, Kamala and Durgar-mani, the other in favour of Probodh Chandra Chatterjee, the only son of his daughter Kamala. The former of these two deeds of gift refers to the Will and Codicil executed on the 24th June, 1916, and cancels “the said Will.” On the date of execution of the deeds of gift, the second Will is alleged to have been partially torn and thrown away. Mookerjee died on the 1st June, 1918. On the 31st May, 1919, Surendranath Chatterjee, his grandson by his daughter Saraswatij instituted the present proceedings for probate of the Will and Codicil executed on the 24th June, 1916, which he alleged were in the custody of the sons of the testator, Sivadas Mookerjee and Kedarnath Mookerjee. The application was opposed by the sons who denied that the alleged Will and Codicil had been duly executed or were in existence at the time of the death of the testator.

2. The contents of the Will and Codicil have, however, been satisfactorily proved by means of secondary evidence, namely, by copies which are-undoubtedly genuine. But the Court below has refused probate on the ground that the Will and Codicil were revoked by the deed of gift in favour of the daughters and also by reason of what the testator did with the documents after he had executed the deed of gift. We are not concerned with the contents of first Will executed on the 24th November, 1914, which was unquestionably revoked by the second Will executed on the 24th June, 1916, and could not be revived by the revocation of the Will. Reference may in this connection be made to Section 60 of the Indian Succession Act which provides that no unprivileged Will or Codicil nor any part thereof, which shall be in any manner revoked, shall be revived otherwise than by the re-execution thereof or by a Codicil executed in the required manner and showing an intention to revive the same. This accords with the opinion expressed by the Judicial Committee in Cutto v. Gilbert(1); see also In the goods of Brown(2), Brown v. Brown(3), Dickinson v. Swatman(4) and In the goods of Hodgkinson(5). We need consequently examine the provisions only of the second Will and the Codicil.

3. It is plain from the dispositions made by the testator in his second Will that the chief objects he had in view fell into three categories, namely, first, provisions for his daughters, some of whom had become widows, secondly, arrangement for the preservation and continuance of the worship of the family deities and, thirdly, peaceful enjoyment of the family estate by his two sons. As regards the sons, his hope as expressed in the Will was that they should live jointly in amity and commensality. But he was evidently not satisfied with the direction given in this behalf in the: will and proceeded in the Codicil to make alternative provisions. The provisions so made were fourfold; first, that the ancestral house and lands shall be deemed dedicated for the worship of the family deities; secondly, that two of his houses and some lands in the suburb of Calcutta should be taken by his two sons according to the distribution directed; thirdly, that his other landed properties should be taken by the two sons in the manner specified, and, fourthly, that another house should be taken jointly and three plots of land in his native village should be partitioned. It is thus obvious that the provisions in the Will were, as explicitly stated, alternatives to the provisions in the Will except as regards the disposition in favour of the daughters which remained unaffected. The deed of gift executed in favour of the daughters on the 14th April, 1918, was plainly intended to supersede at least those provisions of the will which contained dispositions in their favour, but it was clearly designed to go much further. The deed contains the following statement:— “Prior to this, I executed a Will and Codicil on the 24th June, 1916, and made a different provision for you. But in apprehension that disputes may arise therefrom, I cancel the said Will and execute and sign the present deed of gift and deliver to you the possession of the said property.” There has been much discus ion at the Bar as to the true construction of this clause. The appellant has contended that the testator intended to cancel the Will alone, leaving the Codicil untouched: the respondents have argued that not the Will alone but the Codicil also was therewith intended to be revoked. We are of opinion that there is no room for doubt as to the true interpretation of the clause. The intention of the executant of the deed must be judged from the plain language used. He was himself a lawyer and fully appreciated the distinction between a Will and a Codicil; indeed, he expressly refers to both the Will and the Codicil in the earlier part of the passage, yet in the subsequent portion he cancels only “the said Will” and not “the Will and the Codicil.” It would be contrary to establ shed principle of construction if we were to hold that the term “Will” when used for the second time signifies what is described immediately before by the phrase “Will and Codicil.” We hold accordingly that this clause in the deed of gift operated to revoke the Will but not the Codicil.

4. The respondents have, however, contended that the Codicil must be deemed an integral component of the Will and that the mere fact of the revocaton of the will operated to revoke the Codiiil. We are of opinion that this contention cannot be supported in view of the provisions of Section 57 of the Indian Succession Act which lays down as follows:—

“No unprivileged Will or Codicil nor any part thereof, shall be revoked otherwise than by marriage or by another Will or Codicil, or by some writing, declaring an intention to revoke the same and executed in the manner in which an unprivileged Will is hereinbefore required to be executed or by the burning, tearing or otherwise destroying the same by the testator or by some person in his presence and by his direction with the intention of revoking the same.”

5. This provision, it has been held is exhaustive. Subba Reddi v. Dorasami(6), consequently read with Section 3 of the Hindu Wills Act, the statute must be understood to mean that a Hindu Will cannot be revoked except in the manner mentioned in S. 57, subject to the proviso contained in Section 3 of the Hindu Wills Act. S. 57, it may be observed, is based on Section 20 of the English Wills Act, 1837. Under that statute, it was now settled that Codicil will not be impliedly revoked merely by the destruction or mutilation of the Will, and that the Codicil notwithstanding remains effectual unless it appears that in revoking the Will the testator thereby intended to revoke the Codicil as well. No doubt, a Codicil is prima facis dependent on the Will, and before the passing of the Wills Act the principle had been generally recognised that a Codicil fell to the ground with the Will when the Will was revoked, but that if it could be established that the testator intended the Codicil to stand by itself, notwithstanding the revocation of the Will, the Court Would give effect to the Codicil, Coppin v. Dillon(7), In the goods of Greig(8).

6. There was a divergence of opinion, by no means easy to reconcile, in the cases on the point decided since the Wills Act, and governed thereby. Lord Penzance held in the cases of Black v. Jobling(9). In the goods of Savage(10), and In the goods of Turner(11), that the Court could not, in the teeth of the plain language of the statute, sustain the proposition that a Codicil is revoked by the mere fact of the revocation of the Will. The earlier decisions in Clogstoun v. Walcott(12) and Grimwood v. Cozens(13) which might support the contrary view, were taken to have been not properly decided. The earlier view found favour with Sir James Hannen in the case of In the goods of Bleckley(14) where, however, the Codicil and the Will were in the same sheet of paper; and to the same effect is the observation in Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards(15). But the decision in Black v. Jobling, was followed in a later case, Gardiner v. Courttope(16), by Mr. Justice Butt and the last decision was “treated as the binding authority on the subject” by Sir Francis Jeune in Beardsley v. Lacey(17); see also In the goods of Clements(18).

7. It is consequently impossible for us to accept the contention that the revocation of the Will by virtue of the clause in the deed of gift operated in law as a revocation also of the Codicil. We are fortified in our opinion by the circumstance that the Will and the Codicil were so independent of each other that either could stand alone. The testator, as already stated, had provided for his daughters by the deed of gift. He could consequently very well intend to revoke the Will which also contained provisions for his daughters, but there was nothing in the deed of gift on the subject of the family worship or the distribution of his property amongst his sons, such as were set out in the Codicil. We feel no doubt that if the Court were to hold that the legal effect of the revocation of the Will was a concurrent revocation of the Codicil, assuming that such a position could be seriously maintained in the face of Section 57 of the Indian Succession Act, the Court would really defeat the intention of the testator.

8. As a last resort we have been pressed with the contention that after the deed of gift in favour the daughters had been executed, the testator did in fact revoke the Codicil by mutilating, if not destroying it. But the evidence is wholly in-sufficient to justify such a conclusion. The Will was no doubt mutilated but the Codicil was a separate document, and it is very doubtful whether the Codicil was ever brought to the testator on that date. At the request of both the parties, we examined Babu Nilmani Mitter a pleader who was an intimate friend of the testator and was present when the deed of gift was executed. His testimony leaves no room for doubt that the Codicil was not mutilated on that date by the testator with intention to revoke the same.

9. We note that before the District Judge reliance was placed on behalf of the objectors upon their own conduct after the death of their father. They had applied for arrears of pension and for a succession certificate on the assumption that there was no will. A notice in connection with a suit for partition was also issued on a similar supposition.

10. It is plain that the conduct of the sons could not be accepted as evidence of the intention of the testator in the matter of revocation of the Will, though no doubt his own declaration might under certain circumstances be admissible. Blackley in the goods of.

11. Our conclusion is that the second will executed on the 24th June, 1916, was revoked by the testator on the 14th April, 1918, by the execution of the deed of gift and also by tearing; but that the codicil was not revoked either in law or in fact. The result is that this appeal is allowed and the decree of the District Judge set aside. We direct that probate be issued to the appellant in respect of the codicil dated the 24th June, 1916.

12. The appellant will be paid out of the estate his costs both in this Court and in the Court below. We assess the hearing fee in this Court at five gold mohurs.

13. Appeal allowed.