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Lachhiram Baldeodas v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax Opposite Party.

Patna High Court
May 7, 1936
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summary of the Opinion (Court of Record)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a case stated by the Commissioner of Income-tax under the direction of the Court. The question submitted for consideration was:

“Under the circumstances of this case is the family to be considered joint or separated in law?”

Facts as presented in the opinion: Lachhiram's family had been assessed as a joint Hindu family up to 1931. The year of assessment in dispute is 1931–1932. In 1931 three members of the family — described as the sons of Lachhiram (referred to as Baldeodas, Mulchand and Mahabir Prasad) — executed a deed of partnership dated 1st June 1931. In August 1931 they applied to the Income-tax Officer under Section 26-A of the Income-tax Act to be registered as a firm.

The Income-tax Officer decided that the alleged partnership was fictitious, not being acted upon, and that the members still remained a joint Hindu family. That decision was questioned up the departmental chain (Assistant Commissioner and Commissioner) and ultimately the Commissioner stated a case to this Court for determination of whether the family was joint or separated in law. The Court heard argument (including submissions by Mr. Jayaswal for the assessee) and delivered the opinion below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and materials before the Income-tax Officer and the Commissioner, the family of Lachhiram should be regarded as a joint Hindu family or as separated/partitioned in law.
  2. Whether the Income-tax Officer was justified in treating the partnership deed and related documents as not proving a genuine partnership so as to substitute assessment of a partnership firm instead of the joint Hindu family (i.e., whether the applicant had discharged the burden imposed by Section 26-A of the Income-tax Act).
  3. Relatedly, whether, in the absence of an application and decision under Section 25-A (which deals with recording a partition of joint family property), the Income-tax Officer could properly investigate and conclude that the joint family property had not been partitioned.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Assessee (represented by Mr. Jayaswal)

  • Contended that the apparent state of facts (the partnership deed and related documents) should be taken as real in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
  • Argued there was no evidence upon which the Income-tax Officer (and ultimately the Assistant Commissioner and the Commissioner) could decide against the application to be registered as a firm under Section 26-A.
  • Maintained it was unnecessary to make an application under Section 25-A; implied that the partnership deed, a deed of relinquishment and accounts (and declarations of separation) sufficed to demonstrate that the joint family property had been divided and that the partnership was genuine.

Revenue / Income-tax Officer (as reported in the opinion)

  • Found the partnership to be fictitious and not acted upon.
  • Relied on inquiries made from outsiders and on observations that members were "messing together" (i.e., continuing joint living arrangements).
  • Noted the father Lachhiram did not endorse the partnership deed (the absence of his endorsement was treated as raising suspicion, given a recital in the deed that the family had separated).
  • Observed significant delay between the partnership deed (June 1931) and declarations of separation (one declaration before the Agent of the Imperial Bank dated 1933), which suggested the partnership was not acted upon in the intervening period.
  • Concluded, in the absence of evidence of partitioned joint family property (as would be relevant under Section 25-A), that the partnership transaction was not genuine.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
4 ITC 365(1) That a partnership deed alone, unsupported by other evidence of genuine partnership, may be insufficient; a mere signed instrument may be a "piece of paper" without reality and not sufficient to displace previous assessment as a joint family. The Court found the present case "not unlike" the reported case where the partnership deed alone was treated as inadequate. The passage of 4 ITC 365(1) (Sir George Rankin's observation) was relied upon to support the proposition that the applicant must establish the existence of a real partnership and that the Income-tax Officer was entitled to treat the deed as insufficient if other evidence contradicted its reality.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the dispute as essentially one of fact — whether the family was joint or separated. It proceeded by identifying the legal and evidentiary framework applicable to the facts:

  1. Burden and statutory context: The applicant who applied under Section 26-A had to establish that a partnership had in fact come into existence and that the partnership firm should be assessed in substitution for the Hindu joint family. Section 25-A (which deals with recording partition of joint family property) was directed at the concrete question whether joint family property had been partitioned amongst members in definite proportions; that statutory procedure and inquiry were relevant where partition was asserted.
  2. Sufficiency of evidence: The Court held that an application under S.26-A and a partnership deed alone would not conclusively settle the matter. Given that (i) the partnership deed did not include all potential members (e.g., the father was not a partner and did not endorse the deed), (ii) there were many other family members who were not parties to the deed or whose interests suggested that either the joint family or multiple joint families remained, and (iii) no application under S.25-A had been made to show property partition, the Income-tax Officer was entitled to inquire into the reality of the asserted partnership.
  3. Evaluation of the specific documentary and testimonial evidence: The Court reviewed the evidence relied on by the assessee:
    • The deed of relinquishment (purporting to relinquish rights in favour of the father) did not purport to be a partition deed; it was not a document of title proving partition and in any event left other properties unaccounted for.
    • An account in the bahi dated 28th June, 1980 (as recorded in the opinion) showing division of accumulated profits among three members and the father was some evidence, perhaps indicating a division of profits, but the Court held it was not necessarily conclusive proof that the joint family property had been divided as required under S.25-A.
    • Declarations of separation (including one dated 1933 before the Agent of the Imperial Bank) were noted, but the Court emphasised the significance of the delay between the partnership deed (June 1931) and these declarations; this delay tended to undermine the weight of these declarations as proving partition as of 1931.
  4. Weight of evidence for fact-finder: The Court repeatedly emphasised that where there is some evidence pointing in different directions, the weight of that evidence and the credibility of inferences drawn are matters for the Income-tax Officer as fact-finder. The officer had relied on inquiries, conduct (continued joint living/“messing together”), absence of endorsement by the father where relevant and delay in declarations. The Court concluded that the officer was not bound to accept the assessee's view and was entitled to arrive at the conclusion he did.
  5. Reliance on precedent: The Court compared the facts to the case reported at 4 ITC 365(1) where a partnership deed alone was insufficient evidence of a genuine partnership; that authority supported the Court's conclusion that the Income-tax Officer could regard the partnership instrument as insufficient proof of a genuine partnership in the absence of corroborative factual material.

The Court therefore held that, on the materials before the Income-tax Officer, the conclusion that the joint family property had not been divided was permissible, and that the partnership transaction could legitimately be treated as not genuine.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling):

THE FAMILY IS TO BE CONSIDERED JOINT.

Direct consequences and disposition:

  • The application's request to be registered as a firm under Section 26-A was rejected in substance — the Income-tax Officer's conclusion that the alleged partnership was fictitious was upheld by the Court.
  • The application (reference) was dismissed with costs; the hearing fee ordered was Rupees two hundred and fifty.
  • Petition dismissed (the opinion records the dismissal and concurrence by Dhavle, J.).

Broader legal implications: The opinion does not purport to lay down a new rule of law beyond reaffirming that (1) the applicant bears the burden of proving a real partnership under Section 26-A and (2) where partition of joint family property is asserted, Section 25-A contemplates inquiry into actual division of property. The decision was driven by the facts and by application of established principles about evidentiary weight; no novel precedent beyond the reasoning given is announced in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

Wort, A.C.J:— This is a case stated by the Commissioner of Income-tax under the direction of this Court and the question submitted for consideration was “Under the circumstances of this case is the family to be considered joint or separated in law?” There is no doubt that question, that is to say whether the family can be considered joint or separate, is substantially a question of fact but it is contended shortly by Mr. Jayaswal on behalf of the assesses that in the circumstances of the case there was no-evidence upon which the Income-tax Officer, and ultimabely the Assistant Commissioner and the Commissioner could; decide against the application which was made by the assessee to be registered as a firm under Section 26-A of the Income-tax Act. The case has been very elaborately argued; bub in my judgment the matter is resolved by a very simple consideration. Shortly stated the family of Lachhiram had been assessed as a joint Hindu family up to 1931; the year of assessment in dispute is the year 1931–1932. Lachhiram's family was carrying on business as a joint Hindu family and in 1931 three members of that firm being the sons of Lachhiram, Baldeodas, Mulchand and Mahabir Prasad, executed what purported to be a deed of partnership. This was on 1st June of that year and in the month of August following they made an application to the Income-tax Officer under Section 26-A of the Income-tax Act to be registered as a firm. In the result the Income-tax Officer decided that the alleged partnership was fictitious, not being acted upon, and that the members of the family still remained a joint Hindu family.

2. Now Mr. Jayaswal contends in substance that the apparent state of facts should be taken as real in the absence of any evidence to the contrary and he contends that the inquiries which were made by the Income tax Officer and upon which he appears to have decided that the family was still joint were not evidence upon which he was entitled to come to the conclusion that this partnership deed was an unreal transaction. The Income-tax Officer relied upon inquiries made from outsiders; he also found that the parties were messing together, and also a matter which in his opinion was of considerable importance was the fact that the father Lachhiram did not execute the partnership deed to which I have already made reference. I should be more accurate in saying that the Income-tax Officer stated that the father did not endorse the partnership deed. His statement to that effect was made for obvious reasons. It is nowhere contended that Lachhiram was a partner in the new firm and therefore it would be unnecessary to execute it; but the Income-tax Officer in making a reference to this fact stated that it was recited in the partnership deed that the members of the family had separated and it is in reference to this statement that the Income-tax Officer was of the opinion that the endorsement of Lachhiram might have been or was necessary and its absence raised a suspicion, which, added to the facts of the case, and made him come to the conclusion to which I have already referred. As I have already stated, whether the partnership transaction was real or not is purely a question of fact. The matter seems to me to be concluded by what I have already described as one which was of considerable importance for consideration. Mr. Jayaswal would have this Court to hold that the effect of the Income-tax Officer's finding is a finding of fact against the assessee, and in order to come to that conclusion definite evidence is required which in this case it is contended is absent.

3. Now the points which seem to me to determine this question are very simple. The applicant applied under S. 26-A, as I have already stated, and it was for him to establish the fact that a partnership had come into existence and that partnership firm in the future was to be assessed in substitution for the Hindu joint family which heretofore had been assessed as such. Shortly stated, the Income-tax Officer was not satisfied with that transaction, and when the matter comes to be examined it seems to me that transaction is something more than a matter of suspicion. The mere application under S. 26-A and a decision even in favour of the assessee would not conclude the matter, and for this reason; Lachhiram had three sons, two of whom I have mentioned, the third was Hazarimul who is now represented in the partnership transaction by his son Mahabir Singh who was his adopted son. There was Debi Prasad who was the son of the second member of the alleged partnership, that is to say the son of Mulchand, and there were at least four sons of Baldeo Das. It will be seen that as Laohhiram and the sons of whom I have made mention were not partners under the partnership deed, that in one form or another either the joint family or several joint families remained and the mere decision of the Income-tax Officer under S. 26-A that three persons had constituted themselves a partnership firm, would not settle the question of whether there was to be in future an assessment on a joint family or more than one joint family. It is important to notice this in connexion with a matter to which I am now about to refer. Mr. Jayaswal contends that it was unnecessary for him to make an application under Section 25-A of the Income-tax Act. That section provides:

Where at the time of making an assessment it appears that there has been a separation between the members of the family who have been assessed as such, and that the joint family property has been partitioned among the various members or groups of members in definite proportions, he shall record (that is to say the Income-tax Officer shall record) an order to that effect.

4. It was never the case of the assessee either before the Income-tax Officer or the Commissioner or before this Court, although it was faintly suggested by Mr. Jayaswal, before this Court, that the partnership firm existed alongside the joint Hindu family, and as it was nowhere stated, as I have already stated in order to finally decide the question of assessment, it would have been necessary for an application to have been made and a decision to have been given under S. 25-A for the reasons which I have already indicated. In those circumstances as no application was made, and in order to test whether in future this partnership firm should be substituted for the joint Hindu family that had been heretofore assessed, it was not only possible, but it was the only course which the Income-tax Officer could take in the circumstances, to inquire whether in fact the joint Hindu family property had been divided. Under S. 25-A the Income-tax Officer does not inquire into a question of separation or disruption of the family, notional or otherwise; he has to inquire into the question of whether the joint family property has in fact been divided, and having regard to the fact to which I have already referred, that it is not suggested that the joint Hindu family firm existed alongside the new partnership firm, it is not surprising that the Income-tax Officer, in this case, in the absence of evidence that the property of the family had been divided, came to the conclusion that the partnership transaction was not a genuine one.

5. Now Mr. Jayaswal contends on the other hand that there are two items of evidence which do in fact prove that the joint family property was divided and that neither the joint family nor the joint family property hereafter existed. The evidence to which reference was made was first a deed of relinquishment entered into by Baldeo Das, Mulchand and Mahabir Prasad and various minor members of the family and Lachhiram, the father, that; purported to relinquish the rights of the parties in the property in favour of their father Laohhiram. It is difficult to know exactly what effect in law this deed would have if the family were joint. It is perfectly obvious that they could not execute such a document, at any rate a document such as this could not take effect. In any event the deed of relinquishment is not a document of title, and thirdly it is to be noticed that the mention of the properties and the relinquishment of the rights of the parties in them in favour of the father indicate, taken in conjunction with the evidence of Baldeo Das taken on oath before the Income-tax Officer, that there were properties other than those mentioned in the deed. But apart from that the deed does not purport to be a partition deed; it may relinquish some properties in favour of the father, but, as I have already indicated, there are properties which are not the subject matter of this deed and in those circumstances in my judgment it is impossible to say that evidence by itself was such that the Income-tax Officer was not entitled to come to any other conclusion than that the property had been divided as alleged.

6. The other piece of evidence is the account in the bahi dated 28th June, 1980 in which the accumulated profits are shown to be divided between the three members of the firm and the father Lachhiram. In this account Lachhiram gets a share of approximately Rs. 24,000 less than the others which it is stated is made up by moveable property which had been released under the deed of relinquishment. It was some evidence possibly that the joint family property had been divided, although it is stated by the Income-tax Officer to be a division of the accumulated profits; but it is, in my judgment, impossible to say that it was such evidence that the Income-tax Officer was bound to come to the conclusion that the fact had been proved that the joint family property had been divided. Reference has been made by Mr. Jayaswal to declarations made on different dates as to the separation of the family. They are declarations, as I understand, of separation of the family in contradistinction to the division of the property. One was made in 1933 before the Agent of the Imperial Bank, but the fact that it was so late as 1933 is in itself significant. The partnership deed was entered into in June 1931; there was a gap therefore of a year or two before the declaration was made before the Imperial Bank. The weight of this evidence is not a matter for this Court.

7. The fact that the declaration was made is stated in the report made by the Income-tax Officer, but if any criticism were necessary it is to be found in the fact that this declaration was made in 1933 whereas the partnership was entered into in June 1931. We can assume (and we must assume) that Baldeo Das who acted as the manager of the firm had up to that time operated on the account; and the necessary question which arises is what was happening between June 1931 and 1933 when the declaration was made? It rather indicates that ab any rate during that period, although the partner-ship deed was in existence, the members of the partnership did nob treat them selves as such. As I have already stated this is not a matter for this Court bub was one of the questions which influenced the mind of the Income-tax, Officer and it is impossible therefore to hold that he was nob entitled to be so influenced. Shortly stated, the matter comes to this: in the circumstances of the case the Income-tax Officer had to be satisfied that the joint family property had been divided. I say that by reason of the facts of the case which had been put forward by the assessee before him under the application under S. 26-A. That being so, although there was some evidence it was not evidence on which he was obliged to act and as he came to the conclusion that the property had nob been so divided. That being so the only conclusion which he could have arrived at on the application made under S. 26-A was that the partnership transaction was not a real one. The case is not unlike that reported in 4 ITC 365(1), in which a partnership deed alone had been adduced in evidence before the Income-tax Officer. Sir George Rankin pointed out that was the only evidence before the Income-tax Officer upon which he was asked to act. It was for the applicant to establish the fact that the partnership existed and it was, be use the words of Sir George Rankin:

Tolerably clear in the absence of some evidence to the contrary, that this piece of paper referring to the partnership deed which the parties had signed was expected to be magical talisman which would protect them from the imposition of super-tax and had no other reality at all.

8. It is contended as I have already stated that there was evidence in this case. It is true that there was evidence, but the weight of that evidence was for the Income-tax Officer as also the conclusion at which he should arrive. It is impossible to bold that in this case the Income-tax Officer was nob entitled to come to the conclusion which he did. That in my judgment is sufficient and the answer to the case submitted by the Commissioner of Income-tax, is that in the circumstances of this case the family is to be considered joint. The application is dismissed with costs: hearing fee Rupees two hundred and fifty.

9. Dhavle, J.:— I agree. When the assessee first came up to this Court his grievance substantially was that the refusal of the Income-tax authorities to register the firm was wrong and arbitrary; and he gob this Court to direct the Commissioner to state a case on the point whether in the circumstances of this case the family was to be considered joint or separate in law. Partnerships are dealt with in Section 26-A of the Act, and the question which the Income-tax Commissioner was required to state is a question that is dealt with in Section 25-A of the Act. As regards the question under S. 26-A, no appeal lay at the time the assessee's application was disposed of by the Income-tax Officer, bub there was an appeal provided by law ab the time against orders under S. 25-A. It is obvious how in the, circumstances of this case the two questions were connected together. Some of the argument before us has proceeded on the footing of what is called the notional separation of a Hindu joint family which sometimes gave rise to very difficult questions of law; and the legislature has got over the difficulty by enacting specially in Section 25-A of the Act that what the Income-tax authorities have to proceed upon is whether “the joint family property has been partitioned amongst the various members or groups of members in, definite proportions.” That is a concrete question of fact which it is fairly easy to investigate.

10. It has been contended on behalf of the assessee that in view of the deed of partnersnip and the ladavi deed and the accounts put forward on behalf of the assessee it was not open to the Income-tax authorities without any material whatsoever to treat these documents as bogus, bub it is nob a fact that the Income-tax authorities have proceeded, without any material at all. They were entitled to take the circumstances into account, particularly the delay in the declarations of separation made by the members of the family to the Imperial Bank and elsewhere, and the statement I find made in the tenth ground of the assessee's application to this Court that the petitioners never thought it necessary to make it known to the outside world that there had been a disruption in the family when their close friends and relatives knew about it.

11. Whether in the circumstances of this case there had been what the Income-tax Commissioner calls an actual separation of the family, or as Section 25-A of the Act puts it, a partition of the joint family properties amongst the various members or groups of members in definite proportions, was clearly a question of fact. I do not think that on the materials produced before the Income-tax authorities by the assessee there could in law have been a decision one way only and this, as my Lord the Chief Justice has observed, is sufficient to dispose of the reference.

V.B.B/R.K

12. Petition dismissed.