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Amjad Ali v. Ali Hussain Johar And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff commenced an action for ejectment on 18 February 1910, alleging that a lease granted on 31 December 1906 to the first and second Defendants (for a three-year term with a covenant prohibiting assignment or subletting) had been transferred to the third Defendant in breach of covenant, and that on expiration of the term the Defendants remained in possession without renewal. The Plaintiff claimed possession of the premises including all structures, fixtures and moveables, and sought an injunction to prevent removal of structures or machinery.
The Defendants filed a written statement on 31 March 1910. Meanwhile, on 11 March 1910 the Plaintiff applied under Order 39, Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for inspection of the disputed premises and for preparation of an inventory of structures, fixtures and moveables, alleging that Defendants had already removed some moveables and were about to remove machinery and demolish structures. Defendants admitted removal of some moveables and contended they were entitled to do so; they also asserted that inventory preparation would interfere with their cigarette manufacturing business and that some removals might be for necessary repairs.
The Subordinate Judge considered the application on 29 March and dismissed it, primarily on the presumption that the Plaintiff, as a prudent person, would have kept an inventory at the time the lease was granted. The Plaintiff sought to set aside that dismissal and to secure directions for inspection and preparation of an inventory.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an order for inspection under Order 39, Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 may include a direction for preparation of an inventory of structures, fixtures and moveables on the disputed premises.
- Whether this Court should interfere with the interlocutory order of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the Plaintiff's application for inspection and inventory, i.e., whether interference is justified in the exercise of appellate/court supervisory jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The Plaintiff sought inspection and an inventory to prevent removal or further removal of moveables and machinery and to preserve evidence of the condition and contents of the premises at the time of determination of the lease.
- It was argued that without an inventory, if the Plaintiff ultimately succeeded, there would be serious difficulties and a protracted inquiry (mainly on oral evidence) to determine what structures, fixtures and moveables were on the premises when the lease ended and which had been removed.
Defendants' Arguments
- The Defendants contended the Court could not properly direct preparation of an inventory under Order 39, Rule 7 of the Code.
- They argued the Court should not be interfered with in its exercise of judicial discretion (i.e., appellate/supervisory jurisdiction should not displace the Subordinate Judge's interlocutory order).
- They admitted some moveables had been removed but asserted entitlement to act as they had; they also said removals of parts of machinery might be necessary for repairs and that making an inventory would interfere with and cause inconvenience or injury to their cigarette manufacturing business.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kynaston v. East India Company | Establishes the right of a plaintiff to inspect, survey and take measurements of disputed property where necessary to ascertain rights; foundational authority for inspection orders. | Relied upon as primary authority that inspection (including survey and measurement) is justified where rights cannot be measured without inspection; supports power to order inventory as ancillary to inspection. |
| East India Company v. Kynaston (House of Lords) | Affirmation by the House of Lords of the principle that inspection orders could be made from early times; historical legitimacy of inspection remedies. | Used to show long-standing recognition and affirmation of inspection powers by the highest appellate authority. |
| Marsden v. Poushall | One of the early cases cited as examples where inspection-type orders were made. | Invoked to show historical precedent for inspection orders being made from early times. |
| Lonsdale v. Curwen | Another early authority recognizing inspection orders. | Shown as part of the historical line of cases endorsing inspection remedies. |
| Walker v. Fletcher | Early authority cited for the proposition that inspection orders have long been recognized. | Referenced to support the historical basis for ordering inspections and related measures. |
| Attorney-General v. Chambers | Example where inspection was granted in actions concerning mines and disputes about unlawful working — demonstrating application in specialized property disputes. | Presented to illustrate that inspection has been frequently granted in suits for recovery of possession of mines and enforcement of claims for unlawful working. |
| ??? v. Morris | Listed among cases where inspection was granted in mining/workings disputes (text preserves the incomplete citation). | Referred to as part of the chain of authorities showing inspection orders in suits concerning mines and related claims. |
| Bennett v. Whitehouse | An instance where inspection (and ancillary measures) was allowed in actions related to mines or similar disputes. | Used to show that inspection powers have been applied to allow surveys, measurements and plans to prevent later controversy. |
| Bennett v. Griffihs | Another case cited among mining/possession disputes authorizing inspection and ancillary actions. | Invoked to reinforce that inspection powers have been exercised to avoid future controversy about condition of premises. |
| Ennor v. Barwell | Illustrates that courts have sometimes authorised removal of obstructions to inspection and, in extreme cases, cutting trenches to ascertain subsurface conditions. | Cited as an example of the breadth of remedial measures courts may authorise for inspection where necessary to determine rights. |
| Heinge v. District Court | Recent instance (in the jurisdictional context cited) of the exercise of inspection power, analogous to inherent or statutory powers elsewhere. | Used to show comparable modern examples where courts have exercised inspection powers in furtherance of justice. |
| Boston Copper Mine Company v. District Court | Another recent example of courts authorising inspection and related measures in disputes over mining or property. | Relied upon as a contemporary illustration of the exercise of inspection powers to obtain full information or evidence. |
| Govinda Mohun Das v. Kunja Behary Das | Authority of this Court that the right to inspect documents ordinarily includes the right to take notes and, upon application, to obtain copies; used analogically for inventories. | Applied to support the proposition that inspection rights include taking notes and preparing an inventory as ancillary to effective inspection and evidence preservation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court structured its reasoning in two connected parts corresponding to the Defendants' two principal objections.
1. Jurisdiction under Order 39, Rule 7
- The Court examined Order 39, Rule 7 and extracted the operative jurisdictional provisions permitting a court, on application, to order inspection of property that is the subject-matter of a suit or about which a question arises, to authorise entry into land or buildings, and to permit observations necessary for obtaining full information or evidence.
- Relying on Kynaston v. East India Company and its affirmation by the House of Lords, the Court held that inspection powers historically and properly include actions ancillary to inspection (surveying, measuring, preparing plans) where necessary to ascertain rights that cannot be measured without inspection.
- The Court reasoned that if inspection is intended to produce reliable evidence about the condition of property, the power must extend to preparing an inventory when the Court is satisfied that such an inventory is essential for a proper decision; otherwise, the object of inspection could be defeated.
- Analogies were drawn to cases permitting removal of obstructions to inspection and extreme measures (e.g., trenches to ascertain geological formation) to emphasize the breadth of remedies historically recognised where necessary for justice.
- The Court also relied on its prior ruling in Govinda Mohun Das v. Kunja Behary Das to show that inspection of documents includes taking notes and obtaining copies, supporting the view that an inventory is an appropriate ancillary measure.
- Conclusion: there is no legal objection to directing preparation of an inventory under Or. 39, r. 7 where the Court is satisfied it is essential to a proper decision.
2. Whether appellate/supervisory interference was appropriate
- The Court acknowledged that it should not lightly interfere with the exercise of judicial discretion by the Subordinate Judge, but observed that interference is warranted where a failure to act would cause irreparable injury to a litigant.
- Applying the test noted in Govinda Mohun, the Court evaluated the facts: the Defendants admitted removal of some moveables and also indicated possible further removal of machinery; there was substantial matter in controversy as to what structures, fixtures and moveables existed when the lease terminated.
- The Court found that without an inventory and contemporaneous inspection, the Plaintiff—if ultimately successful—would face grave complications and a protracted, unsatisfactory oral inquiry to establish what had existed and what had been improperly removed.
- The Court considered, but did not ultimately adopt as preferable, alternate remedies suggested by the Defendants (appointment of a Receiver or injunction). It observed that appointment of a Receiver of a going concern would be disfavoured and that an injunction would impose onerous, continuous enforcement burdens on the Plaintiff; these considerations made inspection and inventory the most suitable, least intrusive remedy to preserve evidence.
- The Court accepted the Defendants' legitimate concern about inconvenience or disturbance to their business and expressly required that any inspection and inventory be carried out so as to minimize inconvenience and protect the Defendants' commercial operations.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The rule nisi was made absolute; the order of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the Plaintiff's application was discharged and the Court directed that an inspection and preparation of an inventory be effected under the following terms:
- The Defendants are directed to prepare a true and faithful statement of the structures, fixtures and moveables on the premises and to file it in Court within fifteen days, accompanied by an affidavit sworn by a responsible officer swearing to its accuracy.
- Following filing of that statement and affidavit, the Plaintiff will be permitted to inspect the premises in the presence of a Court officer appointed by the Subordinate Judge; that officer, together with the Plaintiff and his pleader, will test the statement and ascertain accuracy of the entries.
- The inspection and enquiry must be conducted so as to cause the minimum inconvenience to the Defendants and the least disturbance to their business.
- If the statement as filed is found to be untrue in any material particular, it will be open to the Court to take suitable action.
- No order was made as to costs.
Implications: The decision enforces the availability of inspection under Or. 39, r. 7 to include preparation of an inventory where essential to the administration of justice and where failure to preserve contemporaneous evidence would cause irreparable prejudice. The practical effect in this case is the preservation of contemporaneous evidence for the Plaintiff while providing procedural safeguards to minimize inconvenience to the Defendants. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel broad precedent beyond these principles but applies established authorities to the facts before the Court.
Rule made absolute.
We are invited in this rule to set aside an order by which the Court below has dismissed an application by the Petitioner under Or. 39, r. 7 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908, for inspection of the disputed properly, and for the preparation of an inventory of the structures, fixtures and moveables on the premises. The circumstances under which the application was made are not open to dispute. On the 18th February 1910, the Plaintiff commenced an action for ejectment of the Defendants. His allegation was that by a lease granted on the 31st December 1906, the disputed premises were let out to the first and second Defendants for a term of three years with a covenant neither to assign the lease nor sublet the premises; that in contravention of this covenant, they transferred the leasehold interest to the third Defendant, and that although the term of the tenancy has expired, the Defendants have neither obtained a renewal of the lease, nor vacated the premises. He further alleged that in the events which have happened, he was entitled to a decree for ejectment against the Defendants as trespassers, and was entitled to possession of the premises with all the structures, fixtures and moveables thereon. He further prayed for an injunction to restrain the Defendants from removing the structures or any portion of the machinery on the premises. The Defendants filed their written statement on the 31st March 1910; meanwhile, on the 11th March, the Plaintiff had applied to the Court below for inspection of the premises and for an inventory of the structures, fixtures and moveables thereon. In this application it was alleged that the Defendants had already removed some of the moveables and were about to remove portions of the machinery and to demolish parts of the structures. The Defendants, in answer to this application admitted that some of the moveables had been removed; but they contended that they were entiled to act as they had done and that the claim of the Plaintiff thereto was wholly unfounded, they further admitted that removal of the portions of the machinery for purposes of repairs and for other like reasons might be necessary, and they suggested that the preparation of an inventory would mean interference with their business as a Cigarette Manufacturing Company. The Subordinate Judge took the matter into consideration on the 29th March, and dismissed the application of the Plaintiff. He discussed the relative positions of the parties, and mainly on the presumption that the Plaintiff as a man of ordinary prudence might be assumed to have kept an inventory of all structures, fixtures and moveables on the premises at the time the lease was granted, refused the application. We are now invited by the Plaintiff to discharge this order, and to give directions for the inspection of the premises, and for the preparation of an inventory. In support of the rule, it is pointed out that if an inventory is not prepared at the stage, in the event of the ultimate success of the Plaintiff, serious difficulties may arise, and a protracted inquiry, mainly upon oral evidence, may be rendered necessary with a view to determine what structures, fixtures and moveables are on the premises at the time of the determination of the lease, possession whereof is claimed by the Plaintiff under the contact. On behalf of the Defendants, on the other hand, we are invited to discharge the rule on two grounds, namely, first, that the order which the Plaintiff seeks cannot be made under Or. 39, r. 7, of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908, and, secondly, that this Court ought not to interfere with an interlocutory order made by the Court below in the exercise of its judicial discretion.
In so far as the first of these objections is concerned, there is, in our opinion, no foundation for it. Under Or. 39, r. 7, we quote only as much of the rule as is applicable to the case before us, the Court may, on the application of any party to a suit and on such terms as it thinks fit, make an Order for the inspection of any property which is the subject-matter of such a suit or as to which any question may arise therein. The Court may also, for such purpose, authorise entry upon or into any land or building in the possession of any other party to the suit, and may, further, authorise any observation to be made which may seem necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence. It has been suggested on behalf of the Defendants ??? although under this rule, it may be competent to the Court to allow inspection of the disputed premises, it is not open to the Court to direct the preparation of an inventory of the structures, fixtures and moveables on the premises which are claimed by the Plaintiff. In our opinion, there is no room for controversy that the Court may not only allow inspection, but may also direct the preparation of an inventory. The principles applicable to cases of this descriptor, when an application has been made for inspection of the properly in dispute in a suit, were elaborately discussed in Kynaston v. East India Company(1), in which Lord Eldon upheld the right claimed by the Plaintiff to inspect, survey and take measurement of the disputed properly, and his decision was subsequently affirmed by the House of Lords [East India Company v. Kynaston(2)]. The principle upon which the right of inspection is justified is that wherever in respect of the property of one individual, a right acrues to another which cannot be measured without inspection of the subject or property, the Court is compel the to compel the proprietor to permit that inspection as indispensable for administering the justice of the case. Such inspection is no invasion of his right is but a legal consequence of the obligations affecting the property and the proprietor. No doubt, the Court will take care to impose as little inconvenience as possible on those on whom the order is made, though the Court will not hestitate to make the order if it is satisfied that without inspection the justice of the case cannot be attained and the proceedings are likely to miscarry. This principle was affirmed when the case was taken to the House of Lords, where Lord Redesdale pointed out that similar orders had been made from very early times; Marsden v. Poushall(3), Lonsdale v. Curwen(4) and Walker v. Fletcher(5) Since the decision of the House of Lords, inspection has been frequently granted in the case of actions for recovery of possession of mines and enforcement of a claim for damages for unlawful working therein. [Attorney-General v. Chambers(6), ??? v. Morris(7), Bennett v. Whitehouse(8) and Bennett v. Griffihs(9)]. In some of these cases, not only was inspection allowed but the Plaintiff was permitted to survey the property, to take measurements and to prepare plans, so as to make controversy subsequently impossible, as to the then condition of the premises. It has even been suggested that the Court might authorise the removal, where necessary, of obs ructions to inspection and, as an extreme case, allow trenches to be cut to ascertain the geological formation [Ennor v. Barwell(10)]. The same rule has been adopted in the American Courts, and the power has been exercised, in some cases as inherent in the Court, to adopt a procedure needed for the administration of justice and in other casts upon statutory provisions closely similar to Or. 50, r. 3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court in England. As recent instances of the exercise of such power may be mentioned, the cases of Heinge v. District Court(11) and Boston Copper Mine Company v. District Court(12). See also Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. III, sec. 1862, and Daniel on Chancery Practice, 7th Ed. Vol. II, 1532. We must consequently hold that the right to grant an inspection implies a right to make an inventory, if the Court is satisfied that the preparation of the inventory is essential for a proper decision of the case. I may be pointed out, as ruled by this Court in Govinda Mohun Das v. Kunja Behary Das(13), that the right to inspect documents ordinarily includes the right to take notes of their contents and also, upon application to the Court, to have copies of them. In fact, if a right of inspection were not construed to include a right to prepare an inventory as ancillary thereto, the very object of an inspection might be completely defeated. We must hold, therefore, that the Court had jurisdiction to make an order for preparation of an inventory under Or. 39, r. 7 of the Code of 1908.
As regards the second point, namely, whether this Court ought to interfere with an interlocutory order made by the original Court in the exercise of its discretion, it cannot be disputed that if a proper case is made out for interference, this Court is not powerless. It is sufficient to refer to the case of Govinda Mohun v. Kunja Behary, where it was pointed out that the test to be applied is, whether irreparable injury would be caused to one of the litigants, if matters were not set right. In the case before us, it appears to us to be absolutely clear that an order for inspection and preparation of an inventory ought to be made. The Defendants admit that they have already removed some of the moveables claimed by the Plaintiff. They further indicate plainly that removal of portion of the machinery may be needed. It is not necessary for us to prejudge the suit and to determine bow far the claim by the Plaintiff to the structures, fixtures and moveable is sustainable; it is sufficient to say that there is substantial matter in controversy between the parties. Under these circumstances, if an inventory is not prepared and the Plaintiff ultimately succeeds, grave complications will obviously follow. The Court will have to determine upon oral evidence of a more or less unsatisfactory character what objects were on the premises and have been improperly removed by the Defendants. A dispute of this character may be completely avoided if an inventory is, made at this stage. It is suggested on behalf of the Defendants that the proper remedy of the Plaintiff is to apply for the appointment of a Receiver or to obtain an injunction against the Defendants. It is needless for us to discuss whether the Plaintiff might have adopted either of these courses. It is fairly clear, however, that the Court would hestitate to appoint a Receiver of a going concern, and, as the Plaintiff does not lay any claim to the business itself, it is difficult to appreciate on what ground he could ask for the appointment of a Receiver in respect of the business. It may also be observed that the grant of an injunction, if it is to be operative, must involve constant watch on the part of the Plaintiff to ensure that the Defendants did dot remove the structures, fixtures and moveables in violation of the injunction. The most convenient course obviously is to grant an inspection and to direct the preparation of an inventory.
The Defendants suggest, and in our opinion very reasonably, that such inspection and preparation of inventory ought to be done so as to cause the least inconvenience to them. They explain that their opposition to the application is based on the ground that the order, when carried out, may cause them indignity and injure their business; but it is quite practicable to guard against any such contingency and the order we shall make will afford adequate protection to the Defendants from this point of view.
The result is that this rule is made absolute, and the order of the Court below is discharged. We direct the Defendants to prepare a true and faithful statement of the structures, fixtures and moveables on the premises, and to file it in Court within fifteen days from this date with an affidavit by one of their responsible officers that the statement is accurate in every particular. When such statement and affidavit have been filed, the Plaintiff will have inspection of the premises accompanied by an officer of the Court selected by the Subordinate Judge. Such officer in the presence of the Plaintiff and his pleader will test the statement and ascertain whether the entries are accurate or not. The enquiry must be so conducted as to cause the minimum of inconvenience to the Defendants, and the least disturbance to their business. If upon this enquiry the statement as filed by the Defendants is found to be untrue in any material particular, it will be open to the Court to take suitable action. The rule is made absolute to this extent. We make no order as to costs.
Rule made absolute.
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