Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Sornammal v. Official Assignee, Madras .

Madras High Court
Apr 2, 1914
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judicial Opinion Summary — White, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The South Indian Export Company (referred to in the opinion as "the Company") applied under Section 108 of the Insolvency Act for an order that the estate of Muruga Pillai (deceased) should be administered in insolvency. The Company alleged that the deceased owed them about Rs. 50,000. By three agreements the deceased had hypothecated skins and other items and had deposited title-deeds of certain properties with the Company to secure repayment, but the Company was informed that the value of the security did not exceed Rs. 30,000 and therefore claimed to be unsecured creditors for the balance. An administration order was made under Section 109.

Shortly afterwards the Official Assignee issued a notice of motion (dated 4 December 1912, returnable 9 December 1912), served on the deceased's widow and on the widow's brother. The Official Assignee sought an order declaring that certain properties were purchased benami in the widow's name and were in reality the property of the deceased and therefore vested in the Official Assignee. The notice stated that the motion would be based on the Official Assignee's report and oral testimony. The report was dated 14 December; the motion was actually heard in February.

The learned Judge made a finding that the widow (Sornammall) held the property benami for the insolvent and made an order effectively delivering possession to the Official Assignee. The central controversy on appeal was whether the learned Judge had jurisdiction to make that order under the statutory provisions relied on (notably Section 36 and Section 7 of the Act), and whether the procedure adopted was proper.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Does Section 7 of the Insolvency Act apply to administration proceedings under Section 108 (i.e., to proceedings for administering the estate of a deceased insolvent)?
  2. If Section 7 applies, is there power to determine questions between the Official Assignee and a third party (a stranger) on a notice of motion where the Official Assignee asserts no greater right than the insolvent had?
  3. Was there jurisdiction to make the particular order in this case under Section 36 (and, relatedly, was the learned Judge correct to treat Section 36 as authorising a summary order determining title and delivering possession)?

Arguments of the Parties

Argument by Counsel Supporting the Learned Judge's Order (Mr. Chamier)

  • Contended that the application (and the Official Assignee's motion) was made on behalf of and in the interest of the general body of creditors; the general body of creditors had an interest in upholding the Company's security because that would affect the distribution to unsecured creditors.

Official Assignee's Argument (Mr. Shenai)

  • Contended that the learned Judge had jurisdiction to make the order under Section 7 of the Act (Section 7 being taken word for word from Section 102 of the English Act).
  • The notice of motion was said to be based on the Official Assignee's report and oral testimony of witnesses (as stated on the notice).

Widow's Argument (Mr. Grant)

  • Did not argue the case on the merits as to title; objected to jurisdiction and contended that there was no jurisdiction to make the order sought by the Official Assignee.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Hewitt; Ex parte Hannah and Walter Hewitt Held that provisions corresponding to Section 27 of the English Act do not apply to administration of the estate of a deceased insolvent; only provisions of Part 3 (so far as applicable) are to be imported into the administration provisions. The Court relied on its ratio to support the view that provisions not forming part of the relevant Part (Part 3) are generally not applicable to administration proceedings; this authority was applied when considering whether Section 7 (and other non-Part-3 provisions) should be applied to administration under Section 109.
Ex parte Official Receiver, In re Gould Held that Section 47 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 (avoiding certain voluntary settlements) does not apply to administration of the estate of a deceased insolvent by the Court of Bankruptcy. The Court cited this decision to show that English authorities treat the absence of a provision from Part 3 as indicative that it should not be applied to administration proceedings; this was used to inform the construction of corresponding Indian provisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the statutory scheme and prior English authorities to determine whether the learned Judge had jurisdiction to decide title and order delivery of possession in the summary manner employed.

1. Nature of Section 36: The Court treated Section 36 as a discovery provision. It allows the Official Assignee to obtain orders helpful in discovering property of the insolvent or to acquire information enabling the Official Assignee, by following appropriate procedure, to ask the Court for orders that property which prima facie belongs to someone else forms part of the insolvent's estate. It does not authorise the Court to determine questions of title between the Official Assignee and third parties where the third party sets up a prima facie title. On that basis the Court held that the learned Judge did not have power under Section 36 to determine title and deliver possession.

2. Alternative reliance on Section 7: The Official Assignee and his counsel urged that Section 7 (taken from Section 102 of the English Act) confers broad powers to decide all questions of law or fact arising in any case of insolvency. The Court posed three sub-questions (whether S.7 applies to administration proceedings; whether it authorises summary determination of disputes between Official Assignee and strangers on motion; and whether, even if applicable, it supported the particular order made).

3. Applicability of Part 3 and governing authorities: The Court examined the correspondence between Indian sections (Sections 108 and 109) and English Section 125 and relied on English decisions (In re Hewitt; In re Gould) to explain the ordinary rule that only provisions of the relevant Part (Part 3) are incorporated into administration under Section 125 (and its Indian counterparts). The Court observed the English judges' reasoning that the phrase that administration is "according to the law of bankruptcy" refers to mode of administration, not an extension of subject matter to include third-party property unless clearly stated by the legislature.

4. On the general powers under Section 7: Noting the wide language of Section 7 and English authorities that have construed Section 102 as intended to permit the High Court to exercise jurisdiction between trustees and strangers (where appropriate), the Court said it would have been disposed to hold that the question raised could be determined on notice of motion as between the Official Assignee and a stranger — i.e., it was not strictly necessary to bring a separate suit to resolve such a dispute.

5. Final resolution on the actual basis of the order: Despite the possible applicability of Section 7, the decisive point was that the learned Judge purported to make the order under Section 36 (a discovery provision). Because, in the Court's view, Section 36 does not empower the Court to decide title between the Official Assignee and a stranger where the stranger has prima facie title, the order as made was beyond jurisdiction. Accordingly the order (insofar as it related to specified properties) was set aside.

6. Procedural observations and alternatives: The Court noted that the Company might properly have proceeded under Section 12 (by giving an estimate of the value of their security and proving for the balance and then realising their security) rather than seeking a summary order in insolvency proceedings; the widow could have contested the mortgage on grounds such as fraud, but the Company did not follow that course.

Holding and Implications

ORDER PARTLY SET ASIDE.

Holding (direct effect): The order made by the learned Judge, insofar as it related to the properties described as items 1 and 2 in the schedule attached to the notice of motion, is set aside for want of jurisdiction. Costs are awarded: costs here and before Mr. Justice Bakewell are to be paid, and to be taxed on the original side scale. The costs of Mr. Grant's client and of the Official Assignee may be paid out of the estate.

Implications:

  • The immediate consequence is that the judicial order claiming delivery of possession and determining title in favour of the Official Assignee (as to items 1 and 2) is vacated.
  • The Court refrained from expressing a definitive final opinion on the broader question whether Section 7 applies to administration proceedings; while the Court indicated it would have been disposed to hold that certain disputes could be resolved on motion under Section 7, it did not lay down a conclusive precedent on that larger question in this decision.
  • No new broad precedent was authoritatively established on the permissibility of deciding title on a Section 36 basis; instead, the decision emphasises statutory limitation of Section 36 as a discovery provision and the need to rely on proper substantive provisions or procedures when seeking to determine title or rights of third parties in administration proceedings.

Additional notes recorded in the opinion: Oldfield, J. agreed with the result. The short appellate disposition is recorded as "Order partly set aside." (S.N/R.K appears as case-note initials in the text.)

Show all summary ...

White, C.J:— In this case the South Indian Export Company—I will refer to them hereafter as the Company—applied to the Court for an order under Section 108 of the Insolvency Act, that the estate of one Muruga Pillai deceased should be administered in insolvency. The application states that the deceased at the time of his death was indebted to the Company in the sum of about Rupees 50,000. It also states that by three agreements the deceased had hypothecated skins and other things and also deposited with the Company the title-deeds of certain properties to secure the repayment of the amount due to the Company, but that the Company were informed that the value of the security held by them did not exceed Rs. 30,000 and they claimed to be unsecured creditors for the balance. Au order was made on this application. The order was under S. 109. S. 109, sub-S. (1), provides:

“Upon an order being made for the administration of a deceased debtor's estate under S. 108, the property of the debtor shall vest in the Official Assignee of the Court, and he shall forthwith proceed to realize and distribute the same in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” Sub-S. (2), provides: “With the modification hereinafter mentioned all the provisions of Part 3, relating to the administration of the property of an insolvent, shall so far as the same are applicable apply to the case of such administration order in like manner as to an order of adjudication under this Act.” Shortly after the making of this order a notice of motion was taken out by the Official Assignee. It was served on two parties. One of them is the widow of the deceased; the other is said to be the brother of the widow. We are not concerned to-day with the transaction in which the brother of the widow is said to have taken part. We are not concerned with the widow. The notice of motion is dated 4th December 1912, and it asks for an order as against the widow declaring that certain properties were purchased by the deceased benami in her name and were in reality the property of the deceased and as such were vested in the Official Assignee. The notice of motion was made returnable on 9th December 1912. There is appended to the notice of motion this note: “This notice of motion was taken out by the Official Assignee and will be based on his report and oral testimony of witnesses.” I do not propose to say anything with regard to the question as to how far the report of the Official Assignee is evidence. We have discussed this question in another case. It may however be pointed out that the notice of motion is returnable on 9th December and the report is dated the 14th. If the motion had come on for hearing on the day on which it was returnable it is difficult to see how the widow could have had an opportunity of meeting the report. However we are told that, as a matter of fact, the notice of motion did not come on for hearing until February.

2. Mr. Chamier, who appeared in support of the learned Judge's order, contended before us that the application was made on behalf of and in the interest of the general body of creditors. The general body of creditors are no doubt interested in seeing that the Company's security is upheld because if the security is upheld the amount which the Company would be entitled to prove against the estate would be so much the less and the balance available to the general body of creditors if there are any assets at all would be so much the more. That is the only interest so far as I can see which the general body of creditors had in the success of the application made by the Official Assignee. On the other hand, it is obvious that the Company had a very substantial interest in the order which the Official Assignee asked for being made because their security was in jeopardy and the order made by the learned Judge was in effect an order that their security was good. The actual finding of the Judge in regard to this matter was: “I am of opinion that the evidence establishes that Sornammall (that is the widow) held the property benami for the insolvent.” Therefore one cannot help thinking—we have no information one way or the other—that this application at any rate in the first instance was not conceived as being, as Mr. Chamier suggests it was, in the interest of the creditors, but was made for the purpose of establishing by an order of the Court in insolvency that the security which the Company hold over the property of the deceased was a good security on which they could realize.

3. The state of things as I understand it when the notice of motion was launched, was this: the Company held a mortgage over the property which constituted them as they contended secured creditors. The house property referred to in the notice of motion is included in the mortgage and the mortgage was executed by the deceased and by his widow. The title-deeds stand in the name of the widow. In that state of things I confess I do not understand why the Company did not proceed under S. 12 of the Act and if they were not willing to relinquish their security, give an estimate of the value of their security and prove for the balance, and having done so, proceed to realize their security. The widow being a party to the mortgage the fact that the title-deeds stood in her name would not have been, as I understand the case, an obstacle in the way of the Company when they sought to realize the security. If the Company had sought to realize their security it would no doubt have been open to the widow to set up a case that her signature to the mortgage was obtained by fraud; but until she was able to substantiate that, the Company were in the position of ordinary secured creditors and were entitled to realize their security. However that course was not taken. When the motion came on for hearing, Mr. Grant, who appeared for the widow, did not argue the case on the merits; but he said there was no jurisdiction to make this order. So far as the notice of motion goes, it does not appear under what section of the Act the jurisdiction of the Court was invoked. But I do not think it is contended that, as a matter of fact, the Court was asked to make the order under any other section than S. 36. The learned Judge in his judgment refers to that section. He says that “under S. 36 the Official Assignee can apply to the Court in a summary manner for an order that the property may be delivered to him.” Then the learned Judge goes on to refer to S. 7. As regards S. 36, our view of that section, as we have had occasion before to observe, is that it is a discovery section. It enables the Official Assignee to get an order which will help him in discovering the existence of property which belongs to the insolvent, or which will unable him to acquire information on which, on adopting the appropriate procedure he may be in a position to ask the Court for an order that property, which prima facie belongs to somebody else, forms part of the estate of the insolvent. In my view the section does not authorize the Court to make an order determining any question of title as between the insolvent and a third party where a third party sets up a title which Official Assignee desires to call in question. Other sections of the Act provide for the procedure whereby these questions of title are to be determined. We have specific sections such as the voluntary settlement section and the fraudulent preference section, and in addition there is the general power of the Court to set aside a transaction, if a proper application is made in that behalf, on the ground that it is fraudulent, or against the policy of the Insolvency Act. That being my view of the construction of the section—and I think that is the construction which has been placed upon the corresponding English section, namely, Section 27 of the English Act of 1883—the learned Judge, in my opinion, had no power to make the order under S. 36.

4. Then Mr. Shenai has contended on behalf of the Official Assignee that the learned Judge had jurisdiction to make the order under S. 7. Now S. 7 is taken word for word from Section 102 of the English Act. As regards S. 7 it seems to me that three questions arise: first, does S. 7 apply to administration proceedings at all? Secondly, if it does, the general question: Is there power to deal with a question arising between the Official Assignee and a stranger, where the Official Assignee sets up no larger right than the insolvent had, on motion in the insolvency? Thirdly, if S. 7 applies the specific question, was there jurisdiction to make teis particular order in view of the circumstances in which it was made?

5. Now as regards the first question does S. 7 apply to administration proceedings at all? The provisions of Section 125 of the English Act are reproduced in Section 108, and 109 of the Indian Act. Sub-Sections (1) and (2), Section 109 of the Indian Act correspond to sub-Ss. (5) and (6), Section 125 of the English Act. In the case of In re Hewitt; Ex parta Hannah and Walter Hewitt(1) the question arose as to whether the provisions of Section 27 of the English Act of 1883, which corresponds to S. 36 of our Act, applied to the administration of the estate of a person dying insolvent and it was held that they did not. The ratio decidendi of that case was that as S. 27 was not one of the provisions of Part 3 of the English Act that particular section was not applicable in the administration of the estate of a deceased insolvent. Cave, J. puts it thus: “This question depends primarily on the language of S. 125. Sub-S. 6 of that section” (that is sub-S. (2), S. 109 of our Act) “applies with the modifications after-mentioned all the provisions of Part 3 of the Act relating to the administration of the property of a bankrupt so far as the same are applicable. There is, therefore, an express enactment that the provisions of Part 3 with certain modifications shall apply;to the administration in bankruptcy of the estate of a person dying insolvent. The terms of sub-S. 5” (that is Sub-S. (1) of our S. 109) “cannot, as it seems to me, be relied upon as extending the provisions of sub-S. 6.” Wills, J. says: “By sub-S. 6, S. 125, the legislature has specifically pointed out certain sections of the Bankruptcy, Act which are to be applied to the administration of the estates of persons dying insolvent. According to the ordinary rules of interpretation, unless there are strong reasons to the contrary, when they provide that the provisions of Part 3 shall be applicable, they must be considered to mean that other parts of the Act shall not be applicable.” The learned Judge also observes: “There is no reason afforded by the use of the language referred to why any other provisions than those of Part 3 should be applicable to the administration of estates under S. 125.” If we apply the ratio decidendi of that decision to the question before us, there can only be one answer to the question. There is another authority which throws light on the question and that is Ex-parte Official Receiver, In re Gould(2). There it was held that Section 47 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1883, which avoids certain voluntary settlements executed by a bankrupt, does not apply to the administration of the estate of a deceased insolvent by the Court of Bankruptcy. According to the English decisions, the fact, that the provision which is sought to be applied to administration proceedings does not form part of Part 3, is conclusive on the question as to whether that provision is applicable. On the other hand the fact that it does form part of Part 3 is not conclusive. The judgment of Fry, L.J, is instructive, because he traces the history of the jurisdiction. There he makes this observation: “It is argued that the use of the words ‘administration according to the law of bankruptcy,’ in sub-S. 1, show that the estate of the deceased debtor is to include the property of third persons. In my judgment those words apply only to the mode of administration, and not to the subject-matter which is to be administered. In my opinion, if it had been intended to arm the Court with the power of administering the property of third persons as part of the estate of a deceased insolvent-debtor—a power which had never been possessed by the Court of Chancery—the legislature would have expressed their intention in clear and unambiguous language.” Again “What is an administration order? It is an order for the administration of the deceased debtor's estate, and of nothing else. So many, therefore, of the provisions of Part 3 as are applicable to such an administration are imported into S. 125, and no others.” I do not think there is any case (at any rate our attention has not been called to any case), in which it has been held that on a motion in proceedings for the administration of the estate of a deceased insolvent, the Court has power to hold that property which prima facie belongs to somebody else forms part of the estate of the insolvent. For the purposes of the case before, us to-day, I do not think it necessary for us to express any final opinion in this matter. But I find it difficult to suggest any grounds for holding that the decision in In Re Hewitt does not govern the question.

6. Assuming for the purposes of this judgment that S. 7 applies to administration proceedings there is the further question, the general question: Is there power to deal with this class of cases. On notice of motion? That, of course, depands upon the construction of S. 7, which is taken word for word from Section 102 of the English Act. No doubt the words are very wide. “Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Court shall have full power to decide all questions of priorities, and all other questions whatsoever, whether, of law or fact, which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of the Court, or which the Court may deem it expedient or necessary be decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case”, that is to say, in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of the Court.

7. The effect of Section 102 of the English Act has been the subject of a great many decisions which I do not propose to discuss now. But the effect of the decisions is thus stated by Vaughan Williams, L.J, in his book on Bankruptcy, 9th Edn. p. 342. He points out various considerations and then goes on: “All” (that is all these considerations) “seem to point to an intention by the legislature that the High Court in bankruptcy should now exercise that jurisdiction between the trustee and strangers which the cases under the old Act decided that the Court of Bankruptcy, as then constituted, could nob, or ought nob, to exercise.” Applying that summary of the law I should have been disposed to hold, although I do not think it necessary to give a final decision on the question, that the question which was raised in this notice of motion was a question which could be determined as between the Official Assignee and the stranger on a notice of motion, and that it was not necessary that the Official Assignee should bring a suit for the purpose of having the question determined.

8. That brings me to the last question, the specific question: In view of the fact that the learned Judge purported to make the order under S. 36, can we say that he had jurisdiction to make the order? The learned Judge says: “Under S. 36 the Official Assignee can apply to the Court in a summary manner for an order that the property may be delivered to him.” He refers to S. 7 as giving him power to decide all questions arising in a case of insolvency. I understand that the learned Judge decided the question of title and ordered delivery of possession in exercise of the powers which he considered he possessed under S. 36. As I have already, said, in my opinion the jurisdiction given by S. 36 does not include a power to determine questions of title as between the Official Assignee and a stranger to the insolvency, where prima facie, and until the contrary is proved (and this is the footing on which this case was argued), the title is in the stranger. I think we must hold that this order was made without jurisdiction. The order, in so far as it relates to the properties described as items 1 and 2 in the schedule attached to the notice of motion is set aside with costs here and before Mr. Justice Bakewell, the costs to be taxed on the original side scale. The costs of Mr. Grant's client and of the Official Assignee may be paid out of he estate.

Oldfield, J.:— I agree.

S.N/R.K

9. Order partly set aside.