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S. Massirat Hossain v. Hossain Ahmad Choudhuri
Case Summary — Appeal from Subordinate Judge's Dismissal of Suit under Section 92, Civil P.C.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs instituted a suit under Section 92, Civil P.C., seeking removal of defendant 1 from the post of mutwalli, appointment of a new mutwalli, and other reliefs. Their case was founded on a wakf created by a wakfnama dated 6th Aswin 1305, under which defendant 1 was the incumbent mutwalli. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant 1 neglected his duties, misappropriated wakf funds, and, under the influence of defendant 2, leased wakf properties to defendant 2 in exchange for Rs. 1,200 per annum which defendant 1 spent for personal benefit. Plaintiffs are three persons who claim an interest in the trust and sought reliefs (enumerated in para. 22 of the plaint) against both defendants.
Defendant 1 filed a written statement denying the allegations and asserting compliance with the wakfnama, and that the Ijara (lease) to defendant 2 was made for the benefit of the wakf. Defendant 2 admitted the Ijara but maintained he was not a trustee and was merely a bona fide lessee and therefore not a necessary party.
The Subordinate Judge first tried Issue 5 (whether defendant 2 is a necessary party) and held that defendant 2 was not necessary. On 14 May 1934 the Subordinate Judge then decided Issue 2—whether the subject matter was a public or private wakf and whether the suit was maintainable in that Court—and dismissed the suit on the ground that the wakf was substantially private or mixed and thus not maintainable under Section 92, Civil P.C. Plaintiffs appealed from that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Subordinate Judge was correct in holding (Issue 2) that the wakf in question was substantially private or mixed and therefore the suit was not maintainable under Section 92, Civil P.C.
- Whether defendant 2 is a necessary party to the suit and, more generally, whether the reliefs sought against defendant 2 can be granted in a suit under Section 92, Civil P.C.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The wakfnama dated 6th Aswin 1305 created a wakf and defendant 1 is the present mutwalli.
- Defendant 1 neglected duties, misappropriated funds, and entered into a collusive arrangement with defendant 2 by leasing wakf properties in return for Rs. 1,200 per annum, which was used for defendant 1's personal benefit.
- Plaintiffs, being interested in the trust, sought removal of defendant 1, appointment of a new mutwalli, injunctions, accounts and other reliefs as set out in the plaint.
- Plaintiffs contended defendant 2 should be included because he was in a position of manager or trustee de son tort (i.e., a wrongdoer assuming management), or otherwise a necessary party to grant effective relief.
Defendant 1's Arguments
- He denied allegations of malfeasance and misfeasance and asserted compliance with the wakfnama.
- He contended that the Ijara to defendant 2 was an arrangement that would benefit the wakf estates in accordance with the wakfnama's provisions.
Defendant 2's Arguments
- Admitted the Ijara but denied being a trustee or manager; asserted he was a bona fide lessee for consideration and therefore not a necessary party to the suit.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Verge v. Somerville (1924) AC 496 | Cited for a passage on the meaning of "public": benefit of the community or an appreciably important class; not private individuals or a fluctuating body of private individuals. | Cited to support the enquiry into whether the wakf was intended for the public (i.e., whether beneficiaries formed an appreciably important class or were merely private individuals). |
| Mohammad Shafiq Ahmad v. Mahammad Mujtaba | Cited for the proposition that the words "public trust of a charitable or religious nature" should be given their ordinary meaning. | Referred to as a guiding statement to look at ordinary meaning and substance of the trust. |
| Shabbir Hussain v. Shaikh Ashiq Husain (1929) 16 AIR (Ouah) 225 | Cited for the principle that one must look to the real substance of the trust and the primary intention of the creator. | Used to justify examining the terms of the wakfnama and the donor's primary intention to determine whether the trust was public. |
| Sathappayyar v. Periasami (1891) 14 Mad 1 | Listed as a case where examination resulted in the trust being treated as substantially private. | Cited as one among several authorities where courts found trusts to be private after examining terms. |
| Abul Hasan v. Aziz Ahmad (1914) 1 AIR All 394 | Listed as a case resulting in a finding that the trust was substantially private. | Included in the survey of decisions showing how factual terms can lead to a private-trust conclusion. |
| Gopal Lal Sett v. Purna Chandra Basak (1922) 9 AIR PC 253 | Listed as another case where the trust was held to be substantially private. | Cited in the Court's review of authorities identifying private trusts. |
| Prasad Das Pal v. Jagannath Pal | Listed among cases where a trust was held to be private on examination of terms. | Used in the review of contrasting authorities; no specific further application recorded. |
| Ali Bakh Tear v. Hazi Khundkar Altap Hossain | Listed as a case resulting in a finding of private trust. | Referred to as an example where courts found a trust to be private. |
| Dinshaw Maneckjee Petit v. Jamsetji Jijibhai (1909) 33 Bom 509 | Listed as a case where examination led to treating the trust as private. | Cited in the list of authorities supporting private-trust conclusions. |
| Jugal Kisore v. Lakshmandas Raghunathdas (1899) 23 Bom 659 | Listed among cases in which examination led to the opposite result (i.e., trust treated as public). | Cited as part of authorities where courts held the trust to be public despite private provisions. |
| Puran Atal v. Darsandas (1912) 34 All 468 | Listed as a case where examination led to finding the trust public. | Included in the survey of cases where trusts with some private provisions were nonetheless treated as public. |
| Jadab Jha v. Satdeo Jha (1929) 16 AIR Pat 723 | Listed among authorities where a trust was held public. | Cited as example of cases reaching the public-trust conclusion. |
| Sukhumal Manumal v. Uttam Chand (1937) 24 AIR Sind 230 | Listed as a decision in which the trust was held to be public. | Referred to as part of the body of authority supporting public-trust findings. |
| Vaidya Natha Ayyar v. Swaminatha Ayyar (1924) 11 AIR PC 221 | Cited as an instance where, despite provisions in favour of private individuals (2/3 to wife, 1/3 to debts and then charity), the trust was held to be a public trust. | Relied on by the Court as a precedent showing that substantial private provisions do not necessarily exclude a public trust finding. |
| Ramanadhan Chettiar v. Vava Levvai Marakayar (1916) 3 AIR PC 86 | Listed as another Judicial Committee decision where there were provisions in favour of private individuals but the trust was examined for its character. | Included in the survey of higher-court authorities considered in determining how to treat trusts with mixed provisions. |
| Abdur Rahim v. Abu Mahomed Barkat Ali (1928) 15 AIR PC 16 | Privy Council held that relief against third parties (strangers to the trust) is not within the scope of Section 92, Civil P.C. | Cited as the controlling authority for the proposition that reliefs against third parties cannot be granted in a Section 92 suit and thus such third parties are not proper parties under that provision. |
| Gholam Moulah v. Ali Hafiz (1918) 5 AIR Cal 5 | Cited for the proposition that once it is decided that a claim against a third party cannot be instituted under Section 92, that third party cannot be joined as a party in the proceedings. | Applied to support the conclusion that defendant 2 was not a necessary party and should not have been joined for reliefs not available under Section 92. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two main analytical strands corresponding to the issues on appeal.
1. Character of the wakf (public vs private) and maintainability under Section 92
- The Court examined the express terms of the wakfnama dated 6th Aswin 1305, as those terms determine the character of the trust.
- The wakfnama recited that the donor (executant Nasibannessa) had previously created a towliatnama and had executed the 1305 wakfnama to meet legal objections, dedicating properties "for the pleasure of God and in the interest of religion," appointing mutwallis, and providing for allowances to the mutwalli and naib mutwalli as the first charge.
- After those charges, net income was to be devoted to items listed in schedule Kha—four items entailing Rs. 353 annually—which the Court accepted related to public charitable or religious purposes.
- There were additional provisions: Rs. 300 to the donor's spiritual preceptor (with a fallback to the poor should that line become extinct); allowances to persons in schedule Ga described as poor and deserving; discretion to the mutwalli to reduce/discontinue allowances; and express exclusion of those beneficiaries' heirs from claiming by inheritance.
- Further provisions allocated one-fourth of savings for unforeseen risks and the remainder for the poor or for public works (excavating tanks, construction of bridges, etc.). A mosque was provided for and the Subordinate Judge's finding that it was a public mosque was not challenged.
- The Subordinate Judge had found the annual net income to be about Rs. 1,300, with Rs. 353 set aside for public purposes and a "good part" of the balance benefiting private individuals; on that basis he concluded the bulk benefited private persons and thus treated the wakf as mixed/private and not within Section 92.
- The appellate Court reviewed the authorities on approach (including Verge v. Somerville on the meaning of "public," and Shabbir Hussain on looking to the substance and primary intention) and concluded that the donor's primary intention, as revealed by the wakfnama taken as a whole, was to make dispositions in favour of the public for religious and charitable purposes.
- The Court observed that Rs. 353 out of Rs. 1,300 was not trifling and, considering the provisions collectively, they indicated an intention to benefit the public subject to necessary payments for worship and charity. On that basis the Court concluded the wakf was created for public charitable and religious purposes and therefore the suit was maintainable under Section 92, Civil P.C.
2. Whether defendant 2 is a necessary party
- The plaint alleged defendant 2 had undertaken the management and administration of the wakf estate and sought various reliefs against him (injunction, appointment of receiver, removal as manager, account as trustee de son tort).
- The Subordinate Judge's order (24 February 1934) showed no evidence was led to prove defendant 2 was a manager, and plaintiffs' counsel conceded their inability to prove that defendant 2 was a manager.
- Even if the Ijara in favour of defendant 2 were collusive, the Court noted that the specific reliefs sought against a third party (a stranger to the trust) are not available in a suit under Section 92. The Court relied on Abdur Rahim v. Abu Mahomed Barkat Ali (Privy Council) for the principle that relief against third parties is not within the scope of Section 92.
- Plaintiffs argued defendant 2 was a trustee de son tort, but the Ijara documents (Exs. 5 and 5(1)) indicated defendant 2 was merely an ijaradar (lessee) from defendant 1.
- The Court also cited Gholam Moulah v. Ali Hafiz to the effect that if a claim against a third party cannot be brought under Section 92, that party cannot properly be joined in the proceedings under that provision.
- On these bases the Court agreed with the Subordinate Judge's conclusion that defendant 2 was not a necessary party and that the plaintiffs could not obtain the desired reliefs against defendant 2 in a Section 92 suit; accordingly it was not proper to join him as a party for those reliefs.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling:
The appeal is allowed in part: the appellate Court held that the wakf was created for public charitable and religious purposes and that the suit is maintainable under Section 92, Civil P.C.; accordingly the appeal succeeds as against defendant 1 and the suit is remanded to the lower Court for determination of the other questions. The appeal fails as against defendant 2, who is not a necessary party for the reliefs sought under Section 92.
Implications and direct consequences:
- The suit, having been held maintainable under Section 92, is remitted to the Subordinate Judge for further determination of remaining issues as between the plaintiffs and defendant 1.
- Plaintiffs recover the costs of this appeal from defendant 1; defendant 2 is awarded half of his costs in this appeal to be paid by the plaintiffs; future costs "abide the result."
- The Court applied established principles (looking to the substance of the trust, donor's primary intention, and the ordinary meaning of "public") rather than creating a new legal principle. The opinion does not state that it sets any novel precedent beyond its application of existing authorities to the factual terms of the wakfnama.
Disposition
The appeal is allowed in part and dismissed in part as specified above. The case is remanded to the lower Court for further proceedings; the hearing fee of the appeal was assessed at five gold mohurs.
Opinion authored by Patterson, J.; concurrence noted.
1. This is an appeal by the plaintiffs in a suit instituted under Section 92, Civil PC., for removal of defendant 1 from the post of mutwalli, for appointment of a new mutwalli in his place, and for certain other reliefs. The plaintiffs' case is based upon the existence of a wakf which was created by a wakfnama dated 6th Aswin 1305, in accordance with the terms of which defendant 1 is the present mutwalli. Plaintiffs' case is that defendant 1 has been neglecting to look after the estates and his duties as mutwalli in breach of terms of the wakfnama and committing acts of misappropriation. Their further case is that defendant 1 has come under the evil influence of defendant 2 who has induced him to come to an arrangement by which the wakf properties have been leased to defendant 2 in return for an annual payment of Rs. 1200 which again defendant 1 has been spending for his personal benefit. Various other acts in breach of the trust are complained of. The plain-tiffs who are three in number allege that they are interested in the trust and they bring the suit praying for reliefs which are specified in para. 22 of the plaint. These reliefs are directed both against defendants 1 and 2. Defendant 1 filed a written statement denying the allegations of malfeasance and misfeasance and con. tending that he has observed all the provisions of the wakfnama and further that he has given an Ijara of the properties to defendant 2 as an arrangement which would benefit the wakf estates in accordance with the provisions of the wakf.
2. Defendant 2 filed a written statement admitting the aforesaid Ijara and contending that he is not a trustee and as such he is not a necessary party in the suit, bud that he is only a bona fide lessee for consideration and therefore he should be dismissed from the suit. On 24th February 1934 the Subordinate Judge tried first Issue 5 on the point whether defendant 2 is a necessary party. He held that defendant 2 is not a necessary party. On 14th May 1934, the Subordinate Judge took up the case for hearing and in the result he dismissed it on his finding as to Issue 2 which runs thus :
"Is the subject matter of the suit public or private wakf? Is it partly public and partly private? Whether the suit is maintainable in this Court?"The Subordinate Judge held that the subject matter of the suit is substantially a private wakf or at least partly public and partly private and that the suit is not maintainable under Section 92, Civil P.C. In that view he dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal by the plaintiffs. The first question raised in this appeal is whether the Subordinate Judge is right in determining Issue 2, namely that the suit is not liable to be brought under Section 92, Civil P.C. The answer to this will depend upon the view that is to be taken of the character of the wakfnama dated 6th Aswin 1305.
3. The document recites that the executant Nasibannessa executed a previous Towliatvnama in order to create "a perpetual wakf in the name of Allah for religious, pious and charitable purposes of all the properties" that she got from her husband excepting some which she had kept for her own personal use and that the wakf of 1305 was executed in order to meet cer-tain legal objections. The document repeats that the intention of the donor is to dedicate the properties "for the pleasure of God and in the interest of religion". She appoints herself as the first mutwalli and makes provision for the appointment of future mutwallis. The first charge on She estate is the allowance of the mutwalli and the naib mutwalli. After meeting these charges, it is provided that the net income that will be left over will be devoted to the performance of the duties specified in schedule Kha. This gives a 1st of four items entailing an expenditure of Rs. 353 annually and there is no dispute that these four items relate to public purposes of charitable or religious nature. There is a further provision that Rs. 300 is to be paid to the wakif's spiritual 'preceptor, with the proviso that, should the family of the latter become extinct, the allowance will be given to the poor or will be spent on any other item of pious acts specified in the wakfnama. After meeting all these expenses, it is provided that certain allowance will be paid to certain persons who are mentioned in schedule "Ga" "as persons who are poor and deserving of charity for their maintenance." At the same time, power is given to the mutwalli to reduce or discontinue these allowances and there is an express provision that the heirs and descendants of the beneficiaries would be debarred from claiming any right to the allowances as a matter of inheritance. Discretion is given to the mutwalli to distribute these amounts to the poor in certain circumstances. A provision is made that the donor herself will, as mutwalli, be entitled to an allowance of Rs. 30 per month and her brother as naib mutwalli to an allowance of Rs. 5 per month. At the same time there is an express provision that excluding the allowances mentioned "nothing more they will be entitled to on any account either as maintenance or any other allowance".
4. Then the document goes on to provide that after meeting all the expenses aforesaid one fourth of the savings will be set apart against unforeseen risks and the remainder will be "spent on the poor" or "for the purpose of excavating tanks, construction of bridges and similar other acts beneficial to the public". Amongst other things a mosque is provided for. The Subordinate Judge has found that it is a public mosque and this finding is not challenged. It is expressly provided further that the wakf property will not be liable to be attached or transferred for the personal debts of the mutwalli or his naib, that these officers shall not use any portion of the salami money for their personal use, and that the terms and conditions of the wakfnama will remain in force for all time, and it is noted that the donor herself had set apart separate properties to pay off her debts. These are the conditions set forth in the wakfnama. The Subordinate Judge has found that the annual income from the wakf estates will be about Rs. 1300 net, that out of this the sum of Rs. 353 as par schedule Kha has undoubtedly been set apart for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, and that a good part of the balance has been set apart for the immediate benefit of private individuals. On this calculation the Subordinate Judge has taken the view that the bulk of the net income is to enure for the benefit of private persons. Therefore the Subordinate Judge says that it is case of a mixed wakf where a substantial portion of the benefit is allotted for private purposes and in that view it cannot come under the provisions of Section 92, Civil P.C.
5. In this Court the arguments at the bar have been directed to a number of reported cases in which the Courts have examined the terms of the trust in question in those cases with different results. In each case the question has been whether the trust was created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature and this has been a matter of evidence depending upon the terms of the trust. In Verge v. Somerville (1924) AC 496 there is a passage in the judgment of Lord Wrenbury where he says referring to the term "public":
whether it is for the benefit of the community or of an appreciably important class of community. The inhabitants of a parish or town or any particular class of such inhabitants, may, for instance, be the objects of such a gift, but private individuals, or a fluctuating body of private individuals, cannot.
6. There is no hard and fast rule that merely because there are certain provisions in favour of private individuals and certain others in favour of the public, that therefore the case falls within or without the class of public trusts to which Section 92 applies. It has also been pointed out in some oases that the words "public trust of a charitable or religious nature" should be given their ordinary meaning (Mohammad Shafiq Ahmad v Mahammad Mujtaba and that we must look to the real substance of the trust and the primary intention of the creator of the trust in every case: Shabbir Hussain v. Shaikh Ashiq Husain (1929) 16 AIR Ouah 225. In a number of oases, an examination of the terms of the trust has resulted in the view that it is substantially a private trust. Cases of this type are as follows : Sathappayyar v. Periasami (1891) 14 Mad 1, Abul Hasan v. Aziz Ahmad (1914) 1 AIR All 394, Gopal Lal Sett v. Purna Chandra Basak (1922) 9 AIR PC 253, Prasad Das Pal v. Jagannath Pal , Shabbir Hussain v. Shaikh Ashiq Husain (1929) 16 AIR Ouah 225, Ali Bakh Tear v. Hazi Khundkar Altap Hossain , Dinshaw Maneckjee Petit v. Jamsetji Jijibhai (1909) 33 Bom 509. On the other hand there are oases in which again an examination of the terms has led to the opposite result. Cases of this type are Jugal Kisore v. Lakshmandas Raghunathdas (1899) 23 Bom 659, Puran Atal v. Darsandas (1912) 34 All 468, Jadab Jha v. Satdeo Jha (1929) 16 AIR Pat 723, Sukhumal Manumal v. Uttam Chand (1937) 24 AIR Sind 230, Vaidya Natha Ayyar v. Swaminatha Ayyar (1924) 11 AIR PC 221, Ramanadhan Chettiar v. Vava Levvai Mara kayar (1916) 3 AIR PC 86. No useful purposes will be served by referring in detail to all these oases. But I may mention that the last mentioned two oases which are decisions of the Judicial Committed are likewise cases of trust in which there were provisions in favour of private individuals. For instance in Vaidya Natha Ayyar v. Swaminatha Ayyar (1924) 11 AIR PC 221, the terms recite that 2/3rds income would be givers to the wife and l/3rd first given towards the discharge of certain debts and thereafter to establish 'annadhanam' for the purpose of feeding the poor. There was a further provision that after the wife's death 2/3rds of the income given to her would be given to charity and l/3rd to the members of the family. In such case their Lordships agreed with the finding of the Courts below that the chatram so established was a public trust. In the case before us we have looked carefully to the terms of the wakfnama. Having done so, I am unable to resist the conclusion that the donor intended to make dispositions in favour of the public for religious and charitable purposes. Undoubtedly there were dispositions in favour of individuals but even Section 353 out of Rs. 1300 per annum, if that be taken to be the net income, is by no means a trifling or disproportionate provision in favour of the public. The provisions taken as a whole do indicate that they were intended to benefit the public, subject to certain payments which were also necessary for worship and charity. In that view I have no difficulty in holding that the trust was created for a public purpose of a charitable and religious nature. Therefore the suit is maintainable under Section 92, Civil P.C.
7. The next question is whether the Sub-ordinate Judge is right in holding that defendant 2 is not a necessary party. The plaint alleged that defendant 2 had undertaken the management and administration' of the wakf estate. There were prayers in. the plaint to the effect that there should be an injunction against defendant 2, that a receiver should be appointed to take charge of the estate, that defendant 2 should be ordered to be removed from acting as manager of the wakf estate and to account for his dealings as a trustee de son tort. The order of the Subordinate Judge dated 24th February 1934, shows that no evidence was adduced to show that defendant 2 is a manager. On the contrary the plaintiffs' pleader conceded that his clients were not in a position to prove that defendant 2 is a manager. Even if the Ijara in favour of defendant 2 be taken to be a collusive one the prayers set forth above as against defendant 2 could not be granted in a suit tinder Section 92, Civil P.C. In Abdur Rahim v. Abu Mahomed Barkat Ali (1928) 15 AIR PC 16, the Privy Council, after pointing out that the Courts in India are not agreed as to whether in a suit for removal of a trustee for unlawful alienation of the properties, the transferee is or is not a necessary party, held that a relief against third parties, that is stranger to the trust, is not within the scope of Section 92, Civil P.C. For the plaintiffs-appellants, in this Court, it is contended that defendant 2 is in a position of trustee de son tort. But this position cannot be maintained in view of the Ijara pottas Exs. 5 and 5 (1) which show that defendant 2 is a mere Ijaradar from defendant 1. The question as to whether a person in the position of defendant 2 should be before the Court in order that the Court may make a declaration against the defendant in the position of defendant 1 has been raised before us. In Gholam Moulah v. Ali Hafiz (1918) 5 AIR Cal 5, Sanderson C. J. pointed out that once it is decided that the claim against defendant 2 cannot be instituted under Section 92, he cannot be joined as a party in the proceedings. To the same effect is the judgment of Ashutosh Mookerjee J. It is pointed out further that the lower Court did not draw up a decree of dismissal of the suit on the ground that defendant 2 had been joined as a party. It merely held that defendant 2 is not a necessary party and thereafter it appears that defendant 2 took no part in the proceedings. In any case it seems to us that the learned Subordinate Judge is right in holding that defendant 2 is not a necessary party, and as it is not possible to grant any relief as prayed for as against defendant 2, it is not proper that he should be joined as a party at all.
8. The result is that the appeal must succeed as against defendant 1 and the suit must be remanded to the lower Court for the determination of the other questions. The appeal fails as against defendant 2. Plaintiffs will get their costs of this appeal from defendant 1. Future costs do abide the result. Defendant 2 will get half of his costs in this appeal from the plaintiffs. The hearing fee of this appeal is assessed at five gold mohurs.
Patterson, J.
9. I agree.
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