Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Umarannessa Nnessa Bibi v. Jamirannessa Bibi And Anr.

Calcutta High Court
May 23, 1922
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit filed by the plaintiff seeking a declaration that a conveyance executed by her on 18th February 1916 was void and inoperative. The plaintiff contended that she was misled into believing the document was a deed of mortgage and signed it under that representation, only to later discover it was actually a conveyance. She further alleged that despite the execution and delivery of the deed to the defendant, she remained in possession of the property. At the trial court, a preliminary question was raised regarding whether the suit qualified as one for a declaratory decree and whether the correct court-fee of Rs. 10 had been paid. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on this question but dismissed the suit on merits. On appeal, the District Judge did not address the merits but dismissed the suit on the ground of inadequate stamping of the plaint. The present appeal challenges this dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a document executed under a misrepresentation as to its nature is void ab initio and not merely voidable.
  2. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff qualifies as a suit for a declaratory decree attracting a court-fee of Rs. 10.
  3. Whether the plaintiff is obliged to seek consequential relief under the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and thereby pay court-fees ad valorem.
  4. Whether the dismissal of the suit on the ground of inadequate stamping was legally sustainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The plaintiff was misled into signing a document she believed to be a mortgage deed, but which was in fact a conveyance, rendering the document void ab initio.
  • Despite execution and delivery of the deed, the plaintiff remained in possession, supporting her claim for declaration.
  • The suit is properly a suit for a declaratory decree and the court-fee of Rs. 10 was correctly paid.
  • The dismissal of the suit by the District Judge on the ground of inadequate stamping was incorrect and the appeal should be decided on merits.

Respondent's Arguments

  • If the suit is treated as one for declaratory decree, the plaintiff must seek consequential relief under the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.
  • Seeking consequential relief would require payment of court-fees ad valorem, which the plaintiff did not pay.
  • Therefore, the plaint was inadequately stamped, justifying dismissal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thoroughgood's case (1582) 2 Co. Rep. 9a at p. 9b : 76 E.R. 408 A deed falsely represented to an illiterate person is not his deed and is void. Illustrated the principle that a document executed under misrepresentation is void ab initio.
Foster v. Mackinnon (1869) 4 C.P. 704 : 3 L.J. C.P. 310 : 20 L.T. 887 : 17 W.R. 1105 The doctrine applies irrespective of literacy; deception as to the deed’s contents renders it void. Supported the principle that misrepresentation voids the deed; also extended to other written contracts.
Edwards v. Brown (1831) 1 C. & J. 307 at p. 312 : 1 Tvr. 182 : 9 L.J. (O.S.) Ex. 84 : 148 E.R. 1436 : 3 Y & J. 423 : 35 R.R. 720 Deception as to the contents of a deed prevents it from binding the grantor. Further reinforced the principle of voidness due to misrepresentation.
Swan v. North British Australasian Company (1863) 2 H. & C. 175 : 32 L.J. Ex. 273 : 10 Jur. (N.S.) 102 : 11 W.R. 862 : 159 E.R 73 : 126 R.R. 617 Similar principle of invalidity of deeds induced by misrepresentation. Confirmed the principle’s applicability.
Barnku Behari Shaha v. Krishto Gobindo Joardar 30 C. 433; Chooramani Dasi v. Baidya Nath Naik 33 C. 473; Sunni Bibi v. Siddik Hossain 49 Ind. Cas. 76 : 29 C.L.J. 53 : 23 C.W.N. 93 Recognition and application of the principle that misrepresentation voids deeds. Indian case law supporting the principle was cited to reinforce the court’s stance.
Aisa Siddika v. Bidhu Sekkar Banerjee 13 Ind. Cas. 633 : 17 C.L.J. 3; Baktawar Singh v. Bhuban Singh 20 Ind. Cas. 322 : 17 C.L.J. 468 Whether consequential relief is necessary depends on case circumstances; a declaratory decree may suffice. Used to reject the respondent’s argument that consequential relief was mandatory in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first affirmed the principle that a document executed under a misrepresentation as to its nature is void ab initio, not merely voidable. This principle was supported by established English and Indian precedents illustrating that a grantor deceived about the contents of a deed is not bound by it. The court rejected the respondent’s contention that the plaintiff was required to seek consequential relief under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and pay court-fees ad valorem, holding that the necessity of consequential relief depends on the circumstances of each case. Since the plaintiff alleged continued possession and only sought a declaration that the deed was not hers, the court found the court-fee paid to be sufficient. Consequently, the dismissal of the suit on the ground of inadequate stamping was held to be unsupportable. The court directed that the appeal be allowed, the lower court’s decree set aside, and the case remanded for consideration on merits.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed. The decree of the lower appellate court dismissing the suit on the ground of inadequate stamping is set aside. The case is remanded for decision on the merits. The appellant is entitled to costs of the appeal. Additionally, under Section 13 of the Court-Fees Act, the court-fee paid on the Memorandum of Appeal is to be refunded to the appellant.

The decision directly affects the parties by permitting the substantive issues of the suit to be heard and does not establish any new precedent beyond reaffirming established principles regarding misrepresentation and court-fee requirements in declaratory suits.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff in a suit for declaration that a conveyance executed by her on the 18th February 1916 was void and inoperative. The case for the plaintiff is that it had been represented to her that the document was a deed of mortgage and that on the faith of this representation she affixed her signature thereto. She has since discovered that the document is in reality a conveyance. She further alleges that, notwithstanding the execution of the document and the delivery of the deed to the defendant, she is still in possession. In the Court of first instance, a Question was raised, whether a suit of this description could be regarded as a suit for a declaratory decree and whether Rs. 10 was the proper Court-fee payable on the plaint. The Trial Court answered this question in favour of the plaintiff, but on the merits dismissed the suit. Upon appeal, the District Judge has not considered the merits of the case, but has dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaint Was inadequately stamped. We are of opinion that this view cannot be supported.

2. There can be no room for controversy that if the allegation of the plaintiff is well founded, the document cannot be treated in law as her deed, and was not merely voidable but void ab initio. This view is based on the principle that, where a person is induced to execute a document other than what he had undertaken to execute, the document is void and need not be cancelled. Illustrations of this principle will be found in Thoroughgoad's case (1582) 2 Co. Rep. 9a at. p. 9b : 76 : E.R. 408, and Foster v. Macklnnon (1869) 4 C.P. 704 : 3 L.J. C.P. 310 : 20 L.T. 887 : 17 W.R. 1105. In Thoroughgood's case (1582) 2 Co. Rep. 9a at. p. 9b : 76 : E.R. 408, it was held that if an illiterate man have a deed falsely read over to him and he then seals and drivers the parchment, that parchment is nevertheless not his deed. In Foster v. Mackinnon (1869) 4 C.P. 704 : 3 L.J.C.P. 310 : 20 L.T. 887 : 17 W.R. 1105, Byles, J pointed out that this doctrine was not confined to the condition of an illiterate grantor and that it made no difference whether the grantors were lettered or unlettered. The essential position is that if a grantor or covenantor be deceived or misled as to the actual contents of the deed, the deed does not bind him Edwards v. Brown (1831) 1 C. & J. 307 at. p. 312 : 1 Tvr. 182 : 9 L.J. (O.S.) Ex. 84 : 148 E.R. 1436 : 3 Y & J. 423 : 35 R.R. 720, Swan v. North British Australasian Company (1863) 2 H. & C. 175 : 32 L.J. Ex. 273 10 Jur. (N.S.) 102 : 11 W.R. 862 : 159 E.R 73 : 126 R.R. 617. In Foster v. Mackinnon (1869) 4 C.P. 704 : 3 L.J.C.P. 310 : 20 L.T. 887 : 17 W.R. 1105, it was further pointed out that this principle is not limited in its application to deeds,but that the doctrine is equally applicable to other written contracts. In the Case, a person had been induced to put his name upon he back of a Bill 0 Exchange by the fraudulent representation of the acceptor that he was signing a guarantee. It was ruled that such a signature was not operative in law. The defendant never intended to sign that contract or any such contract. He never intended to put his name to any instrument that then was or thereafter might become negotiable. He was deceived not merely as to the legal effect but also as to the actual contents of the instrument, This principle has been repeatedly recognised and applied, Barnku Behari Shaha v. Krishto Gobindo Joardar 30 C. 433, Chooramani Dasi v. Baidya Nath Naik 33 C. 473. Sunni Bibi v. Siddik Hossain 49 Ind. Cas. 76 : 29 C.L.J. 53 : 23 : C.W.N. 93.

3. On behalf of the respondent it has been urged, however, that if this be treated as a suit for a declaratory decree the plaintiff is bound to ask for consequential relief under the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, and that if she asks for such consequential relief she is bound to pay Court-fees advalorem on the plaint. There is no foundation for this contention It was pointed out in Aisa Siddika v. Bidhu Sekkar Banerjee 13 Ind. Cas. 633 : 17 C.L.J. 3. Baktawar Singh v. Bhuban Singh 20 Ind. Cas. 322 : 17 C.L.J. 468, that the answer to the question whether it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to ask for consequential relief, must depend upon the circumstances of each case. It is plain that there may be cases in which a declaration may be sufficient for his protection In such an event, the plaintiff cannot be compelled to seek a consequential relief. In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that she is still in possession of the property and all that she requires at the present moment is a declaration that the deed which is in the hands of the defendant is not her deed. We are of opinion accordingly that the Court-fees payable on the plaint is sufficient and that the appeal should have been considered on the merits.

4. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the decree of the Court of Appeal below set aside and the case remanded for decision of the appeal on the merits. The appellant is entitled to the costs of the appeal.

5. We direct under Section 13 of the Court-Fees Act that the Court-fee paid upon the Memorandum of Appeal to this Court be returned to the appellant.