- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Koragalva v. Jakri Beary
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff sued for possession of property demised under a Mulgeni lease and for arrears of rent, relying on the alleged forfeiture of the Mulgeni chit (Ex. A). Both Lower Courts dismissed the plaintiff's suit for possession, and the plaintiff appealed to this Court in a second appeal.
The lease (Mulgeni chit, Ex. A) included an express clause against alienation which provided that the lessees were "not entitled to alienate the said land to any one else by mortgage, arwar, sale, gift, mulgeni, owdigeni, kayamgeni or by injunction, attachment, auction in any decree that may be passed against us in any Court or in any other manner whatever."
The Mulgeni lease was in favour of three lessees. The opinion records two particular alienations for adjudication:
- On 28 May 1919 one Mulgenidar alienated his share under Ex. I in favour of another co-lessee; on 27 April 1920 the interest was reconveyed under Ex. III.
- On 10 June 1924 (as recorded in the text) one Mulgenidar conveyed his right under Ex. II to his daughter; the daughter reconveyed the interest to her father on 19 July 1921 by Ex. A (dates as recorded in the opinion).
Two principal questions were raised about these transactions and the operation of the clause against alienation in Ex. A, and the District Judge had held that neither alienation attracted forfeiture. The appeal requires the Court to determine whether those alienations amounted to forfeiture under Ex. A and whether the plaintiff, by claiming rent in the plaint, had waived a right of forfeiture.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the alienation by one lessee to a co-lessee (i.e., transfer of a lessee's interest in the lease to another person who is already a joint lessee) falls within the meaning of the clause against alienation in Ex. A and thereby causes forfeiture of the lease.
- Whether the alienation by a lessee in favour of his daughter (an heir under Muhammadan law, as described in the opinion) is an alienation within the meaning of the clause against alienation in Ex. A and thereby causes forfeiture of the lease.
- Whether the plaintiff's claim for rent in the plaint operates as a waiver of the right to re-enter or of the forfeiture ground relied upon for ejectment.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Farley v. Coppard (1872) 7 Com Pleas 505 | Held (per Willes, J.) that an assignment by one partner of his undivided moiety to the other worked a forfeiture of the lease under a covenant against assignment. | The Court considered this authority and noted Willes, J.'s view that such an assignment works forfeiture, but contrasted it with later authorities; the case was examined as part of the survey of English decisions on assignment between co-lessees. |
| Corporation of Bristol v. Westcott (1879) 12 Ch D 461 | Concluded that where a demise is to several persons, a covenant not to "part with the possession ... to any person or persons" should be fairly construed as referring to "any other person or persons" (i.e., not to require consent for one co-lessee to continue possession or acquire the other's interest), and held no breach occurred where one partner remained in sole possession. | The Court relied on the reasoning in this case to support the proposition that it would be an unfair construction to hold that an existing tenant must obtain the landlord's consent to acquire the interest of another tenant; this authority weighed against a strict rule of forfeiture for transfer between co-lessees. |
| McEacharan v. Colton (1902) AC 104 | The Privy Council held that a covenant by a lessee not to assign without lessor's consent runs with the land and applies to reassignment to the original lessee; Lord Macnaghten described the covenant as plain and applicable to the person who "for the time being stands in that relation to the lessor." | The Court observed that Indian High Courts are not strictly bound by this Privy Council pronouncement when it did not arise from an Indian appeal and stated a preference (with respect) to follow the American view instead. The Court declined to apply McEacharan's strict rule to Indian conditions in this matter. |
| Angamuthu Chetti v. Varatharajulu Chetti (1919) 37 MLJ 384 (FB) | Held that the alienation by a lessee of her right in favour of her son worked a forfeiture where she had undertaken not to alienate the property; the judgment followed McEacharan v. Colton, Varley v. Coppard and Corporation of Bristol v. Westcott. | The Court treated this decision as directly controlling the question of alienation in favour of an heir: it concluded that the sale to the daughter was an alienation within Ex. A and, following this authority, worked a forfeiture. |
| Varley v. Coppard (1872) 7 Com Pleas 505 | Similar strand of authority (cited alongside Farley v. Coppard) concerning assignment and forfeiture under covenants against assignment. | Referenced as one of the cases followed in Angamuthu Chetti and considered in the Court's survey of authorities affecting the interpretation of the clause in Ex. A. |
| Ramanna Prabhit v. Srinivasa Gadiyara (1899) 9 MLJ 11 | In that case the learned Judges held that certain alienations did not work forfeiture, relying on delay by the plaintiff and the absence of injury to the grantor's rights (the property reverted to grantees or one of them); the opinion notes no authority was cited for that position. | The respondent relied upon this decision. The Court rejected its persuasive value in the face of the authorities it had surveyed and held that the decision could not be regarded as good law for present purposes. |
| Padbanabhayya v. Ranga (1910) ILR 34 Mad 161: 20 MLJ 930 | Held that a claim for rent in a suit for ejectment will not amount to a waiver of the forfeiture; the election to forfeit becomes complete and irrevocable when suit for ejectment is instituted. | The Court relied on this authority to hold that the plaintiff's claim for rent in the ejectment suit did not constitute a waiver of forfeiture. |
| Toleman v. Portbury (1871) L R 6 Q B 245; affirmed (1874) L R 7 Q B 344 | Held that acceptance or tender of rent into Court, or refusal by landlord, did not amount to waiver of forfeiture; the landlord remains entitled to the money as either rent or mesne profits. | The Court cited these authorities to support its conclusion that a landlord's claim for rent in the ejectment proceedings does not amount to a waiver of his right to re-enter for forfeiture. |
| S.A.No. 1598 of 1916 and S.A.No. 347 of 1917 | Recorded in the opinion as having laid down the same principle as other authorities (that alienation in favour of heirs could result in forfeiture). | Referenced as additional authorities consistent with the principle applied in Angamuthu Chetti and relied upon by the Court in reaching its conclusion about alienation in favour of heirs. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed the issues in sequence and grounded its conclusions in an examination of English and colonial authorities, as recorded in the opinion.
-
Alienation by one lessee in favour of a co-lessee.
The Court reviewed the English authorities beginning with Farley v. Coppard, where Willes, J. held that assignment by one partner to the other could work a forfeiture, and then Corporation of Bristol v. Westcott, where the Court of Appeal construed a covenant against "parting with possession ... to any person or persons" as meaning effectively "any other person or persons"—and held that allowing one joint lessee to remain in sole possession did not amount to a breach.
The Court also considered McEacharan v. Colton (Privy Council), which applied a strict rule that a covenant not to assign without consent runs with the land and applies even to re-assignment to the original lessee. The Court noted, however, that Indian High Courts are not bound by a Privy Council decision where the appeal did not come from India, and stated a preference to follow the American view rather than introduce what the Court described as the "rigour of the English law" into Indian landlord-tenant relations.
On this basis the Court concluded that an alienation in favour of a co-lessee by another lessee is not an alienation which will work a forfeiture unless the lease deed itself expressly prohibits such a transfer. In short, the Court adopted a purposive and less rigid construction so as not to require the landlord's consent where one existing tenant acquires the interest of another co-lessee.
-
Alienation by a lessee in favour of his daughter (an heir).
For the question whether the conveyance to the daughter fell within the clause against alienation, the Court relied on the decision in Angamuthu Chetti v. Varatharajulu Chetti (1919) 37 MLJ 384 (FB), which held that a lessee's alienation to her son worked a forfeiture where she had undertaken not to alienate. That case followed McEacharan v. Colton, Varley/ Farley v. Coppard and Corporation of Bristol v. Westcott; the opinion also referred to S.A. Nos. 1598 of 1916 and 347 of 1917 as laying down the same principle.
The Court rejected the contrary authority relied upon by the respondent (Ramanna Prabhit v. Srinivasa Gadiyara), observing that the latter decision rested on delay and absence of injury and did not cite authoritative support. Applying the authorities it regarded as controlling, the Court held that the sale to the daughter was an alienation within the meaning of Ex. A and that it worked a forfeiture.
-
Whether the plaintiff's claim for rent amounted to a waiver of forfeiture.
The District Judge had held that because the plaintiff claimed rent in his plaint he should be deemed to have waived any cause of forfeiture existing up to the end of the period for which he claimed rent. The Court rejected that view. It reasoned that when a landlord is entitled to re-enter for forfeiture he is also entitled to claim rent or mesne profits up to the date of obtaining possession; claiming those sums as incidental relief does not operate as a waiver of the right to re-enter.
The Court relied on Padbanabhayya v. Ranga (1910) ILR 34 Mad 161: 20 MLJ 930 for the proposition that a claim for rent in an ejectment suit will not amount to waiver, and on Toleman v. Portbury to show that the landlord remains entitled to money either as rent or as mesne profits. The Court concluded that the plaintiff's institution of the ejectment suit was an irrevocable election to insist on forfeiture and that claiming rent did not amount to a waiver.
Holding and Implications
Final Rulings:
- The appeal is allowed.
- The conveyance to the daughter is an alienation within the meaning of the clause in Ex. A and has worked a forfeiture.
- An alienation by one lessee in favour of a co-lessee does not, by itself, work a forfeiture unless the lease deed expressly prohibits such a transfer.
- The plaintiff's claim for rent in the ejectment suit does not amount to a waiver of the forfeiture.
Consequent relief: The Court directed that the plaintiff "will have a decree for possession of the plaint property and he will have his costs here and the Court below with future mesne profits." The opinion does not assert the creation of a new broad legal precedent beyond these holdings; rather, it applies and distinguishes existing authorities to the facts at hand and determines the immediate rights and remedies between the parties.
1. The plaintiff's suit is for possession of property demised under a Mulgeni lease and for arrears of rent on account of the forfeiture of the Mulgeni chit. Both the Lower Courts have dismissed the plaintiff's suit for possession of the plaint property. The plaintiff has preferred this second appeal. The clause against alienation in the Mulgeni chit, Ex. A, is as follows:
If we find that we do not require this mulgeni we should obtain from you only the consideration for the improvements that may justly be effected by us and surrender the said land to you and we are not entitled to alienate the said land to any one else by mortgage, arwar, sale, gift, mulgeni, owdigeni, kayamgeni or by injunction, attachment, auction in any decree that may be passed against us in any Court or in any other manner whatever.
2. The Mulgeni lease was in favour of three persons. One of the Mulgenidars alienated his share on 28th May, 1919 under Ex. I in favour of another Mulgenidar, that is his co-lessee. On 27th April, 1920, the Mulgenidar reconveyed the same interest to the former Mulgenidar under Ex. III. On 10th June, 1924, one of the Mulgenidars convened his right under Ex. II to his daughter. The daughter reconveyed the interest conveyed to her to her father on 19th July, 1921, by Ex. A.
3. Two questions arise for consideration with regard to these two alienations. First, whether the alienation by one lessee to another lessee of his interest in the lease is an alienation within the meaning of the clause, and second, whether the alienation in favour of the daughter though an heir under Muhammadan Law is an alienation within the meaning of the clause against alienation in Ex. A. The learned District Judge held that both the alienations did not come within the clause against alienations in Ex. A. As regards the question whether the alienation by a lessee of his right in favour of a joint lessee works a forfeiture or not is not covered by clear authority. In Farley v. Coppard (1872) 7 Com Pleas 505. the facts were as follows:
A and B, partners in trade, were assignees of a lease which contained a covenant by the lessee, for himself and his assigns, that he would not, neither should his executors, administrators, etc., assign the demised premises without the consent in writing of the lessor. On the dissolution of the partnership, A assigned all his interest in the premises to B.
4. Willes, J., held that the, assignment worked forfeiture of the lease. He observed at page 507 that, if two assigned, one his undivided moiety to A and the other his undivided moiety to B, there would be a breach of the covenant; but that, if each assigned his undivided moiety to B, there would be no breach. That, as it seems to me, would be frittering away the covenant and making it worthless.
5. This case was considered in Corporation of Bristol v. Westcott (1879) 12 CHD 461. The facts of the case were as follows:
A lease was granted to two partners B and H as joint tenants. The lessees covenanted that they, their executors, administrators or assigns or any or either of them, would not, during the term, assign, underlet or part with the possession of the demised property to any person or persons without the written consent of the lessor; and there was a proviso for re-entry on the breach of any of the covenants. The partners dissolved partnership and agreed that the partnership property should be made over to B, and that the leasehold property should be assigned to him with the consent of the lessor, if such consent could be obtained, and recited, as the fact was, that A had given up sole possession of the leasehold to B. Consent was not obtained, and no assignment of the lease hold was executed, but B, from the time of the dissolution, remained in sole possession.
6. Bacon, Vice-Chancellor, observes:
The covenant must have a rational construction put upon it. This is a lease granted by the owner of a warehouse to two gentlemen who were partners. They agreed not to part with the possession to any person, and as each partner has full possession of the whole of the demised property, it cannot mean that, in case Mr. Houghton might be smitten down by apoplexy so as not to be able actually to enter the premises, the lease should be forfeited. It cannot mean that if his commercial engagements should require his attendance in any other country he should not go away and leave his partner in sole actual possession. No such doctrine is laid down in Farley v. Coppard (1872) 7 Com Pleas 505.
7. With regard to the clause "part with the possession of the demised premises to any person or persons" Jessel, M.R., observes:
What do the words 'any person or persons' mean? Do they not mean 'any other person or persons'? Of course, if the demise had been to one person the words must have had that meaning, and the question is whether, where the demise is to several persons, the words have not the same meaning--whether, in fact, what was intended was not this, that the lessees were not to let into possession any one not previously approved of as tenant by;he lessor. Giving the words that meaning, you make the covenant sensible, and I think that is their fair meaning.
8. It was held by the Court of Appeal that there had been no breach of the covenant and that the proviso for re-entry had not come into operation. It is open to one of the joint lessees to allow the other joint lessees to enjoy the property leased. Where the execution of a deed conveyed the right of one to another is such an alienation contemplated by the clause in Ex. A? It would not be a fair construction to hold that the person who is already a tenant should obtain the consent of the landlord in order to acquire the interest of another tenant, if the clause like this ought to be strictly construed. In McEacharan v. Colton (1902) AC 104. the Privy Council held that a covenant by a lessee not to assign without the lessor's consent runs with the land and applies to a re-assignment to the original lessee. Lord Macnaghten in delivering the leading judgment of their Lordships observed:
Why should the circumstance that those persons were accepted as tenants some time ago, when they were, or were supposed to be, in a good financial position, make any difference? The covenant is quite plain. It is that the lessee, the person who for the time being stands in that relation to the lessor, shall not assign to any person without the lessor's consent. The attention of their Lordships has been called to an American decision for the purpose of shewing that the original lessee was not within the scope of such a covenant. With the utmost respect for the Court that pronounced the decision, their Lordships are unable to accept it as an authority for that proposition.
9. This case was not an appeal from India and the Indian High Courts are not bound by it. They have to pay the highest respect to the pronouncement of the Privy Council in any case but where the appeal is not from India they are at liberty to distinguish the case on the ground that the Indian conditions are different from those in the country from which the appeal arose. With due respect to the higher authority of Lord Macnaghten I prefer to follow the American view. The law of landlord and tenant in England is such that it is considered more favourable to the landlord than to the tenant. Should we introduce into the Indian system the rigour of the English law as regards the relation of landlord and tenant? My answer is 'No'. I hold that the alienation in favour of co-lessee by another lessee of his right in the lease is not an alienation which will work a forfeiture unless such is prohibited by the lease deed.
10. The next question is whether the conveyance by one of the lessors in favour of his daughter is an alienation within the meaning of the clause against alienation in Ex. A. This point is clearly covered by authority. In Angamuthu Chetti v. Varatharajulu Chetti (1919) 37 MLJ 384 (FB). it was held that the alienation by the lessee of her right in favour of her son worked a forfeiture as she had undertaken not to alienate the property. The learned Judges followed the cases McEackaran v. Colton (1902) AC 104. and Varley v. Coppard (1872) 7 Com Pleas 505 and Corporation of Bristol v. Westcott (1879) 12 Ch D.461. The same principle was laid down in S.A.No. 1598 of 1916 ahd S.A.No. 347 of 1917. Mr. Srinlvasagopalachari for respondent relies upon the decision in Ram anna Prabhit v. Srinivasa Gadiyara (1899) 9 M L J 11 as supporting his contention that the alienations in favour of the joint lessee and the daughter did not work a forfeiture. In that case the learned Judges relied upon the delay of the plaintiff in bringing the suit for possession and the fact that no injury had been done to the rights of the grantor inasmuch as the property came back to the grantees or one of them. No authority is cited for the position taken up by the learned Judges and I do not think that in the light of the authorities already noticed that decision can be said to be good law. 1 hold that the sale to the daughter is an alienation within the meaning of the clause in Ex. A, and has worked a forfeiture.
11. The next contention is that there was no waiver by the plaintiff of the forfeiture. The District Judge held that inasmuch as the plaintiff asked for rent in his plaint he should be deemed to have waived any cause of forfeiture by reason of non-payment of rent existing up to the end of the period for which he claimed rent. When a landlord is entitled to re-enter by reason of the forfeiture of the lease by the lessee he is also entitled to claim rent or mesne profits up to the date of obtaining possession and the fact that he claims in a suit rent or mesne profits till he gets possession cannot be deemed to be a waiver of the right to re-enter. The moment he filed a suit he takes an irrevocable step by asking for possession on the ground of forfeiture and his asking for incidental remedy cannot be said to amount to a waiver. It was distinctly held in Padbanabhayya v. Ranga (1910) I L R 34 Mad 161: 20 M L J 930 that a claim for rent in a suit for ejectment will not amount to waiver of the forfeiture. The election to forfeit is complete and irrevocable when the suit for ejectment is instituted. In Toleman v. Portbury (1874) L R 7 Q B 344 the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision in Toleman v. Portbury (1871) L R 6 Q B 245. In an ejectment by a landlord under a proviso for re-entry on breach of a covenant, the plaintiff under an order for particulars gave as breaches the permitting a. sale by auction on the premises, without the plaintiff's consent and the non-payment of rent accrued due since the sale. The defendant obtained the Judge's order staying the action as to the breach for the nonpayment of rent on payment of the rent to plaintiff or into Court if he refused it. The plaintiff refused the rent and it was paid into Court. It was held that there had been no waiver of the forfeiture. Kelly, Chief Baron, observed at page 352:
But it is said it is an injustice that the plaintiff should be able to maintain the forfeiture and still have the rent; but I cannot see this: the plaintiff is clearly entitled to the money, either as rent if there were no forfeiture, or as mesne profits if there was.
12. I hold that the claim for rent in. an action for ejectment by the landlord on the ground of forfeiture of the lease by the tenant is not a waiver of the forfeiture. In the result the appeal is allowed and the plaintiff will have a decree for possession of the plaint property and he will have his costs here and the Court below with future mesne profits.
Alert