Shinde, C.J:— This is an application in revision under Section 115 of the CPC, and also under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, directed against a decision of the District Judge, Indore, who with a few modifications upheld the order of the Authority appointed under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. The facts out of which this revision arises are briefly as follows:

About 45 Chowkidars of the Watch and Ward Department of the Rajkumar Mills Ltd., had their wages standardized at the rate of Rs. 26/- per month in 1947. From 15-8-1947 until July 1948 they were paid at the rate of Rs. 26/- per month. A dispute arose regarding the wages for non-working days between the Mill authorities and the Chowkidars. This dispute was under the consideration of the Labour Minister. Pending the decision of the Minister in charge of Labour, on the suggestion of Shri Ramsingh Bhai, President, Indore Majdoor Sangn, the Mill authorities began to pay Rs. 5/- extra per month as an interim arrangement.

2. The Labour Minister gave his award which was to the effect that the Chowkidars should be allowed holidays provided for under the Factories Act, and that when work was taken from them for any special reasons on stop-days they should be paid over time allowance as required by the law. The award also stated that retrospective effect be given to the award. Accordingly from September 1949 to January 1950 adjustment was made from the extra sum of Rs. 5/- that was paid to the Chowkidars. The Chowkidars complained that Rs. 5/- were given by way of permanent increment in their pay, and consequently for overtime work extra payment ought to have been made to them. On 28-2-1950 the Inspector appointed under Section 14 of the Payment of Wages Act, applied to the authority appointed under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, for a direction under sub-section (3) of Section 15 on the ground that wages of the 45 Chowkidars due in respect of wage-periods from September 1949 to January 1950 have been illegally deducted. The Authority directed the refund of the illegal deductions aggregating to a sum of Rs. 1125/-, holding that the Chowkidar's minimum basic wage was Rs. 31/- per month. This decision was upheld by the District Judge, Indore. Consequently the Rajkumar Mills Ltd., have filed this revision.

3. Mr. Chaphekar, who appears for the applicants, has raised two contentions before us. His first contention is that the Authority appointed under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, has no jurisdiction to determine a dispute regarding wages. His second contention is that a consolidated application on behalf of 45 Chowkidars is not warranted by Section 16 of the Payment of Wages Act. The first contention raised by the learned counsel has considerable force. In order to determine the scope and extent of the Payment of Wages Act, it is necessary to examine cursorily several provisions of the Act. The preamble runs as follows:

“Whereas it is expedient to regulate the payment of wages to certain classes of persons employed in industry; it is hereby enacted as follows.”

4. This does not give a clear indication as to the scope of the Act. Section 1 deals with short title, extent, commencement and application. Section 2 defines certain expressions used in the Act. Section 3 deals with the responsibility for payment of wages. Section 4 deals with the fixation of the wage periods. Section 5 deals with the time of payment of wages. Section 6 lays down that the wages must be paid in current coin or currency-notes. Section 7 enumerates the deductions which can legitimately be made by the employer. Sections 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 place restrictions on the powers of the employer to make deductions on the ground of fines, absence from duty, damage or loss, services rendered, recovery of advances and payments made to co-operative societies and insurance schemes. Section 14 provides for the appointment of an inspector for the purposes of this Act. Section 15 is the most important section in the Act; consequently it is reproduced here verbatim:

“Section 15: (1) The Provincial Government may by notification in the Official Gazette appoint any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or other Officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of the wages, of persons employed or paid in that area.

(2) Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person, or any payment of wages has been delayed such person himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector under this Act, or any other person acting with the permission of the authority appointed under sub-section (1), may apply to such authority for a direction under sub-s. (3):

Provided that every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the deduction from the wages was made or from the date on which the payment of the wages was due to be made, as the case may be:

Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.

(3) When any application under sub-section (2) is entertained, the authority shall hear the applicant and the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages under S. 3, or give them an opportunity of being heard, and, after such further inquiry (if any) as may be necessary, may, without prejudice to any other penalty to which such employer or other person is liable under this Act, direct the refund to the employed person, of the amount deducted, or the payment of the delayed wages, together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount deducted in the former case and not exceeding ten rupees in the latter:

Provided that no direction for the payment of compensation shall be made in the case of delayed wages if the authority is satisfied that the delay was due to—

(a) a bona fide error or bona fide dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person, or

(b) the occurrence of an emergency, or the existence of exceptional circumstances, such, that the person responsible for the payment of the wages was unable, though exercising reasonable diligence, to make prompt payment, or

(c) the failure of the employed person to apply for or accept payment.

(4) If the authority hearing any application under this section is satisfied that it was either malicious or vexatious, the authority may direct that a penalty not exceeding fifty rupees be paid to the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages by the person presenting the application.

(5) Any amount directed to be paid under this section may be recovered—

(a) if the authority is a Magistrate, by the authority as if it were a fine imposed by him as Magistrate, and

(b) if the authority is not a Magistrate, by any Magistrate to whom the authority makes application in this behalf, as if it were a fine imposed by such Magistrate……….”

5. Section 15, sub-section (1) makes it abundantly clear that the authority appointed under the section is appointed to hear and decide all claims arising out of deductions from the wages or delay in payment of the wages, Sub-section (2) also makes a pointed reference to these two types of claims. This sub-section makes it clear that where contrary to the provisions of this Act, any deductions have been made from the wages of an employed person or any payment of wages has been delayed then such a person himself may apply to such authority for a direction under sub-section (3). Sub-section (3) also makes a clear reference to deductions and delayed wages. It is beyond doubt, therefore, that the authority appointed under Section 15 can only decide claims regarding deductions alleged to have been made contrary to the provisions of the Act, and delay in payment, of wages. This section nowhere lays down that the authority appointed under Section 15 of the Act can also adjudicate upon any dispute in respect of wages. Sections 16, 17, 18 and 19 lay down the procedure to be followed in the determination of the claims specified in Section 15. Section 22 is again important. This section lays down that no court shall entertain any suit for the recovery of wages or for any deductions from wages in so far as the sum so claimed—

(a) forms the subject of an application under Section 15 which has been presented by the plaintiff and which is pending before the authority appointed under that section or of an appeal under S. 17 or

(b) has formed the subject of a direction under Section 15 in favour of the plaintiff or

(c) has been adjudged, in any proceeding under Section 15, not to be owed to the plaintiffs or

(d) could have been recovered by an application under S. 15.”

6. This bar of suits is definitely confined to the claims specified under Section 15 of the Act. Section 23 disallows any contract regarding relinquishment of any right conferred under the Act. Section 24 gives power to the Central Government. Section 25 makes it incumbent on the person responsible for the payment of wages to display in the factory a notice containing abstracts of the Act. Section 26 confers upon the Provincial Government rule-making powers. It is thus clear from the examination of the provisions of the Act, that the scope of the Act is confined to the claims specified in Section 15. This is further elucidated by S. 22 of the Act already quoted above. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the purpose of the Act is to provide a machinery for the adjudication of claims arising out of deductions alleged to have been made in contravention of the provisions of the Act, and also in respect of delay in payment of the wages.

7. Mr. Oza learned counsel for the opposite-party referred us to the definition of wages and contended that the definition of wages itself shows that the authority appointed under Section 15 can determine a dispute regarding wages. The definition given in Section 2(vi) of the Act is as follows:

“‘wages’ means all remuneration, capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable”.

8. All that this definition lays down is that wages means a remuneration which would be payable if the terms of the contract of employment, expressed or implied, were fulfilled. The word payable denotes that there is some table or schedule in accordance with which remuneration is to be paid for certain types of work. Section 26 of the Act throws light on this expression. Sub-section (3) of S. 26 is as follows:

“In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, rules made under sub-section (2) may—

(a)…………………….’

(b) require the display in a conspicuous place on premises where employment is carried on of notices specifying rates of wages payable to persons employed on such premises…………”

9. It is evident, therefore, that the remuneration payable is in accordance with the rates specified in the notices displayed on the premises. The contention of Mr. Oza therefore, that the word payable connotes that it is for the authority appointed under S. 15 to decide what remuneration is to be paid, cannot be accepted. It may be mentioned here that the Madhya Bharat Government has actually published rules under Section 26 of the Payment of Wages Act, and they have come into force from 5-2-1953. Rule 11 makes it obligatory for every factory owner to display a notice specifying rates of wages payable to all persons employed in that factory. There is, therefore, nothing in the definition of wages from which it could be inferred that a dispute regarding wages can be determined by the authority appointed under S. 15 of the Act.

10. Mr. Oza also contends that if Section 15 be construed in this manner it would be easy for the opponent to oust the jurisdiction of the authority by contending that there is a dispute regarding wages. This argument has very little force. As already pointed out the rules made under the Payment of Wages Act, make it obligatory for every factory owner to display a notice specifying rates of wages; consequently if the rates of wages are displayed on the premises it would be well-nigh impossible for the factory owner to contend that there is a dispute regarding wages. In any case it is not for the court to extend the scope of the Act, on the ground of convenience when the language of the law is clear beyond doubt. Reference may be made in this behalf to the case of — ‘Anand Prakash v. Narain Das Dorilal’, AIR 1931 All 162 (PB) (A). I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion, that the trial court had no jurisdiction to take evidence and hold that Rs. 31/- was the basic wage of the Chowkidars. Section 15 gives power to the authority only to determine claims regarding illegal deductions and delay in payment of the wages.

11. Mr. Oza, learned counsel for the opponent, challenges the competence of this revision petition on the authority of a decision in the case of — ‘H.C.D Mathur v. E.I Rly. Administration’, AIR 1950 All 80 (FB) (B). It may be said at once that this decision is not applicable to the present case in so far as the revision is filed against the decision of the District Court and not against the decision of the Authority appointed under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, as was the case in the Allahabad decision. What we have now to consider is, whether a revision against a decision of a District Court is competent under Section 115 of the CPC, or not. In — ‘National Telephone Co., Ltd. v. Post-master General’, 1913 AC 546 (C), Viscount Haldane L.C observes as follows:

“When a question is stated to be referred to an established court without more, it, in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decisions likewise attaches……

12. In the same case Lord Atkinson made the following observations:

“It is simply the question of extending the jurisdiction of an existing court of law, with all its incidents including a right of appeal, to a new matter closely resembling in character those matters over which it has already jurisdiction as a court of law……………

13. Lord Parker in the same case also approved of the proposition by making the following observations:

“Where by statute matters are referred to the determination of a court of record with no further provision, the necessary implication is, I think, that the court will determine the matters, as a court. Its jurisdiction is enlarged, but all the incidents of such jurisdiction, including the light of appeal from its decision, remain the same.”

14. In — ‘Secy. of State v. Chellikani Rama Rao’, AIR 1916 PC 21 (D), their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows:

“When proceedings of this character reach the District Court that court is appealed as one of the ordinary courts of the country, with regard to whose procedure, orders and decrees, the ordinary rules of the Code of Civil Procedure, apply.”

15. Again in — ‘Hem Singh v. Basant Das’, AIR 1936 PC 93 (E), their Lordships of the Privy Council held that no special jurisdiction was conferred on the High Court, and that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by S. 34 was intended to include the new subject matter as part of the ordinary appellate jurisdiction of the High Court.

16. Again in — ‘National Sewing Thread Co., Ltd. v. James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd.’, AIR 1953 SC 357 (P), their Lordships of the Supreme Court approved of the view of their Lordships taken in 1913 AC 546 (C) and observed that

“The rights created by the Trade Marks Act are civil rights for the protection of persons, carrying on trade under marks which have acquired reputation. The statute created the Registrar a tribunal for safeguarding these rights and for giving effect to the rights created by the Act, and the High Court as such without more has been given appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of this tribunal. It is not easy to understand on what grounds it can be said that the High Court while exercising this appellate jurisdiction has to exercise it in a manner different from its other appellate jurisdiction. It seems to us that this is merely an addition of a new subject-matter of appeal to the appellate jurisdiction already exercised by the High Court.”

17. It is, therefore, clear from these authorities that when an appeal is provided for under S. 17 of the Act, to the District Court, that court is appealed to as one of the ordinary courts of the country; consequently its orders and decrees will be governed by the rules of the CPC. In this view of the matter it cannot be disputed that a revision is competent against the decision of the District Court under Section 115 of the CPC. It may also be mentioned that the application isl also filed under Article 227 of the Constitution. In — ‘Waryam Singh v. Amarnath’, AIR 1954 SC 215 (G) their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows:

“This power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J in — ‘Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee Opposite Party.’, AIR 1951 Cal 193 (SB) (H), to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not correcting mere errors.”

18. In the present case the authority appointed under. Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, has assumed jurisdiction which it did not possess. Consequently this is a fit case for interference under Article 227 of the Constitution in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. On this ground too this application must be accepted.

19. The applicant's second contention that a consolidated application is not warranted by Section 16 of the Payment of Wages Act, need not be considered as his petition succeeds on the first ground raised by him. It may however be mentioned that Section 16 of the Payment of Wages Act, appears to provide for a consolidated application only in case of delay in payment of wages. A reference to the minimum amount of compensation in sub-s. (3) of S. 15 clearly indicates that the case contemplated in S. 16 is that of delay in payment of wages; because it is only in the case of delay in payment of wages that Rs. 10/- per head can be given as compensation. However, the consideration of this contention need not detain us long. The Madhya Bharat Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, have laid down the procedure for making an application. Rule 3 of these rules is as follows:

“Application under sub-s. (2) of S. 15, by or on behalf of an employed person or group of employed persons or by an Inspector, shall be made in duplicate in Form A, Form B or Form C, as the case may be, one copy of which shall bear court-fee as prescribed in R. 16.”

20. This rule makes it clear that an application both for illegal deduction of wages and for delay in payment of wages can be made by an individual or by a group. The Provincial Government has been authorised under Section 26 of the Payment of Wages Act, to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act. Consequently if the rules provide that a group can file a consolidated application, it cannot be challenged. This contention, therefore, cannot be accepted. In the result the application is allowed and the decisions of the lower courts are set aside, Parties to bear their own costs.

Nevaskar, J.:— I entirely agree.

21. Application allowed.