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Ananda Priya Baishnavi Decree-Holder v. Bijoy Krishna Ray Judgment Debtor .

Calcutta High Court
Jul 20, 1925
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Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Graham, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from execution proceedings of a decree. The judgment-debtor, Bejoy Krishna Ray, brought Title Suit No. 1004 of 1917 against the decree-holder, Sreemutty Ananda Priya Baishnavi, in the Subordinate Judge's Court at Comilla; that suit was dismissed. An appeal to the High Court was decreed on 14 December 1921. On 14 March 1922 Bejoy Krishna applied for leave to appeal to the Privy Council and leave was granted on 10 April 1922. Subsequently, on 21 July 1922 the appeal was allowed to be withdrawn on representation that a compromise was likely. Meanwhile, on 31 March 1922 the decree-holder applied for execution of the decree for Rs. 4,237-5-6 and execution proceedings ensued.

During execution, on 31 July 1922 the judgment-debtor filed an objection under Order 21, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) asking the Court to record an amicable adjustment alleged to have occurred on 29 June 1922, under which the decree-holder allegedly relinquished costs on condition that the judgment-debtor withdraw his appeal to the Privy Council. The decree-holder denied any such adjustment by petition dated 28 October 1922. The trial Court heard evidence and allowed the judgment-debtor's objection, recording that an adjustment had been made. The present appeal challenges that order of the First Subordinate Judge of Tippera.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the alleged adjustment (compromise) falls within Order 21, Rule 2 of the CPC (i.e., whether it is an "adjustment" under that provision).
  2. Whether an oral agreement in substitution of a decree can be proved despite Section 92 of the Evidence Act (argument that a decree is a matter required by law to be reduced to a document and hence cannot be varied by oral evidence).
  3. Whether, on the evidence and all facts and circumstances, the Court below ought to have held that the alleged adjustment had not been proved.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • It was contended that the alleged adjustment did not come within Order 21, Rule 2 of the CPC, and thus could not be the basis for the objection allowing execution to be stayed or modified.
  • It was further argued that, in any view, an oral agreement in substitution of the decree could not be proved in view of Section 92 of the Evidence Act: the contention being that a decree is a "matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document" and that a new oral agreement would contradict or vary the terms of the decree, hence inadmissible under Section 92.
  • Finally, the appellant argued that, on the evidence and considering all facts and circumstances, the Court below should have found that the alleged adjustment was not proved.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent (judgment-debtor) relied on oral evidence to establish the adjustment; the learned advocate for the respondent conceded that the only material witnesses were the judgment-debtor himself, his brother Probodh Chandra Ray, and the execution mohurrir Sarat Chandra Chaudhury.
  • The respondent drew attention to authority (Bombay Cotton Manufacturing Co. v. Motilal Shivlal) stressing the rule that appellate courts should generally not disturb trial judges' findings on credibility and demeanour of witnesses, arguing that the Subordinate Judge's acceptance of those witnesses should stand.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lachhmi Das v. Ram Nath One judge (Walsh, J.) held that Section 92 of the Evidence Act applies to a decree (i.e., a decree is a matter required by law to be reduced to a document). The Court noted that the point was not necessary for determination in that case and that this Court is not bound by that decision; the Court declined to accept that a decree falls within Section 92 and interpreted Sections 91–92 as referring to "dispositive documents" rather than decrees.
Bombay Cotton Manufacturing Co. v. Motilal Shivlal Authority of the Privy Council that appellate courts should generally not interfere with trial judges' findings on credibility where the trial judge saw and heard witnesses and noted their demeanour. The Court acknowledged the doctrine and the respect due to trial judges' assessments of demeanour, but warned that it must not become a "fetish" and that appellate courts may intervene where appropriate.
Palchur Sankarareddi v. Palchur Mahalakshmama Privy Council authority that where the question depends on inference from facts rather than testimony about demeanour, the appellate Court is as good a judge of fact as the trial Court. The Court applied this principle to characterize the present dispute as one depending on inference from facts; hence it concluded the appellate Court could re-evaluate the facts and reach its own conclusion.
Sarat Kumari Dasi v. Amulyadhan Kundu The principle that those relying on deeds/powers executed by a pardanashin lady must satisfy the Court that the instrument was explained to and understood by her; this principle applies to agreements to compromise litigation and may require evidence that the general result was understood and that disinterested competent persons advised her. The Court applied this principle to hold that because the decree-holder was a pardanashin lady aged 70, unable to read or write, with no one present to advise or explain the compromise, the alleged adjustment could not be defended on this ground.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in logical steps addressing the appellant's contentions:

  1. Scope of Order 21, Rule 2 CPC: The Court held that the phrase "otherwise adjusted" in Rule 2(1) of Order 21 is broad enough to encompass the sort of adjustment alleged in this case; accordingly, the objection procedure under that rule could in principle be invoked.
  2. Applicability of Section 92 of the Evidence Act: The appellant's contention that Section 92 precluded proof of an oral agreement substituting a decree was considered and rejected. The Court examined the language of Sections 91 and 92 and the principle underlying them, concluding that those provisions refer to "dispositive documents" and should not be read to include decrees. The Court observed that the Lachhmi Das decision did not bind it and that no decision of this Court had held that a decree fell within Section 92.
  3. Evaluation of the evidence and credibility findings: The Court recognised the well-established doctrine (cited from Bombay Cotton) that appellate courts should be cautious about overturning trial judges' credibility findings based on demeanour. However, the Court emphasised that where the real issue turns on inference from facts rather than demeanour, the appellate court is equally well-placed to judge (citing Palchur Sankarareddi).
  4. Application to the present evidence: The Court observed that the trial judge accepted testimony from the judgment-debtor, his brother, and the mohurrir, and commented on their respectability and demeanour. Nevertheless, Graham, J. concluded that the appellate Court could demonstrate that the trial judge's estimate of reliability was erroneous. The Court identified additional facts and circumstances (not all set out in the Subordinate Judge's judgment) which suggested no adjustment ever took place and that the alleged story was concocted to deprive the decree-holder of costs. The judge found the evidence on behalf of the judgment-debtor weak and unsatisfactory, concluding the alleged adjustment was a fabrication except for some vague talk of compromise.
  5. Special protection for pardanashin lady parties: Independently, the Court held that even if the above did not dispose of the appeal, another ground was fatal to the respondent's case. Relying on Sarat Kumari Dasi, the Court applied the principle protecting pardanashin ladies: because the decree-holder was a 70-year-old pardanashin who could only sign her name and could not read or write, and because no one was present to advise or explain the consequences of the alleged compromise to her, the purported agreement could not be upheld. The Court found that the judgment-debtor had the burden to ensure she had competent legal advice or at least a person to explain the transaction, which had not been done.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge. The appeal was allowed with costs in this Court and in the Court below. The hearing-fee was assessed at 5 gold mohurs. Newbould, J. agreed and the formal result recorded is: "Appeal allowed."

Implications: The direct consequence is that the Subordinate Judge's order recording and giving effect to the alleged adjustment was overturned and execution may proceed subject to the decree as enforced. The opinion applies established principles concerning (a) the interpretation of Sections 91–92 of the Evidence Act as relating to dispositive documents rather than decrees; (b) the limited deference appellate courts should give to trial judges' assessments of demeanour (and their authority to reconsider matters that turn on inference from facts); and (c) the protective rule requiring explanation/understanding and competent advice where pardanashin ladies are concerned in dispositional or compromise transactions. The opinion does not state that it establishes any novel precedent beyond applying those principles to the facts of this case; the ruling's immediate effect is the reversal of the trial Court's order and assessment of costs and hearing-fee as stated above.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add, infer, or interpret facts or law beyond what is contained in that text.

Show all summary ...

Graham, J.:— This appeal is directed against an order of the First Subordinate Judge of Tippera, and arises out of certain proceedings in execution of a decree. The facts which have led up to it are shortly these:

2. The judgment-debtor respondent Bejoy Krisima Ray brought a title Suit (No. 1004 of 1917) against the decree-holder appellant Sreemutty Ananda Priya Baishnavi in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Comilla, which was dismissed.

3. There was an appeal to the High Court which was decreed on the 14th December 1921. On the 14th March 1922 Bejoy Krishna filed an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council which was granted on the usual terms on the 10th April 1922. On the 21st July 1922 the appeal was allowed to be withdrawn it having been represented to the, Court on the 14th July that a compromise was likely to be effected. In the meanwhile, on the 31st March 1922 the decree-holder had applied for execution of the decree amounting in all to Rs. 4,237-5-6. Execution proceedings followed and in the course of these the judgment-debtor on the 31st July 1922 filed an objection under O. 21, R. 2 of the CPC praying the Court to record an amicable adjustment of the decree alleged to have been arrived at between the parties on the 29th June 1922 whereby the decree holder relinquished her claim to costs in both the Courts on condition that the judgment-debtor withdrew his appeal to the Privy Council. To this the decree-holder replied by a petition filed on the 28th October 1922 denying that there had been any adjustment of the decree. The Court then went into evidence and allowed the objection of the judgment-debtor as stated above.

4. On behalf of the appellant two points only have been urged before us. It is first contended that the alleged adjustment does not come under O. 21, R. 2 of the CPC, and that in any view of the matter an oral agreement in substitution of the decree could not be proved having regard to the provisions of Section 92 of the Evidence Act. Secondly, it is urged that upon the evidence and regard being had to all the facts and circumstances of the case the Court below ought to have held that the adjustment had not been proved.

5. In my opinion the first of these contentions is without substance. The words “otherwise adjusted” in R. 2(1) of O. 21, appear to be wide enough to cover such an adjustment as is stated to have taken place in this instance.

6. As regards Section 92 of the Evidence Act the portion of that section which is relied on is the portion containing the following words: “or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document,” the argument being that a decree is a matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, and that a new agreement is clearly a matter contradicting or varying the terms of the decree. In support of this contention reference has been made to the case of Lachhmi Das v. Ram Nath(1) where one of the learned Judges, Walsh, J., held that Section 92 of the Evidence Act applies to a decree. The point, however, was not, it appears, necessary for the determination of the appeal. Nor are we bound by that decision. No case of this Court has been brought to our notice in which it has been held that a decree comes within the purview of Section 92 of the Evidence Act; and looking to the language of that section and S. 91 which; precedes it, and to the principle which underlies them, it appears to me that they refer only to what are known as “dispositive documents,” and that the words or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document,” must be read in that sense.

7. It remains to deal with the second contention that the Court below ought, on the evidence, and upon all the facts and circumstances to have held that the adjustment had not been proved. The decision of this matter was dependent to a great extent upon the view taken of the oral evidence, and the learned advocate for the respondent has conceded that the only material witnesses were the judgment-debtor himself, his brother Probodh Chandra Ray, and the execution mohurrir Sarat Chandra Chaudhury. The Subordinate Judge has accepted the evidence of these witnesses as proof of the fact of adjustment and has observed that the two former belong to a respectable family and that he was impressed by their demeanour in the witness-box. In this connexion the learned advocate for the respondent has drawn our attentton to the case of Bombay Cotton Manufacturing Co. v. Motilal Shivlal(2), where it was held by the Privy Council that, generally speaking it is undesirable for an appellate Court to interfere with the findings of the trial Judge who sees and hears the witnesses and has an opportunity of noting their demeanour, and that the view of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses should not be put aside on a mere calculation of probabilities by the appellate Court. This is a doctrine which is well recognized in every system of law and is certainly entitled to be treated with respect. It must not, however, be allowed to become a fetish, and as was pointed out in a more recent case of the Privy Council, Palchur Sankarareddi v. Palchur Mahalakshmama(3), where the question does not depend upon witnesses' demeanour and manner in the box, but upon inference from facts the appellate Court is as good a Judge of fact as the trial Court. Now it appears to me that the present case is a case of that description, and further that the estimate which has been formed by the Court below as regards the reliability of the witnesses, can be demonstrated to be erroneous. Apart too from this there are facts and circumstances in the case, not referred to by the learned Subordinate Judge in his judgment, which go to show that no adjustment ever took place and that the story of the adjustment has been concocted in order to deprive the decree-holder of her costs in the litigation. (His Lordship then discussed the evidence about the adjustment and proceeded.) In my opinion the cumulative effect of all the above facts and circumstances taken in conjunction with the weak and unsatisfactory evidence adduced on behalf of the judgment-debtor goes to show that no adjustment ever took place, and that the entire story, except for the fact that there was some vague talk of a compromise, is a concoction pure and simple designed with the object of defrauding the decree-holder.

8. But quite apart from these considerations there is another aspect of the case, which to my mind would in itself be fatal to the appellant, even if the appeal did not fail on other grounds, and it is this. It has been laid down in a recent decision of the Privy Council Sarat Kumari Dasi v. Amulyadhan Kundu(4), that the principle that those who rely upon deeds and powers executed by a pardanasbin lady should satisfy the Court that they had been explained to and were understood by her, applies to agreements to compromise litigation, though it may be, sufficient in such a case to show that the general result of the compromise, as distinct from the details, and legal technicalities involved was understood by her, and that disinterested and competent persons with a fair understanding of the whole matter advised her to execute it.

9. What are the facts here? The decree-holder is a pardanashin lady aged 70. The evidence of her grandson-in-law, which has not been contradicted, is to the effect that she can only sign her name, and is unable to read or write. The judgment-debtor himself has stated that he does “not know whether she can read and write well.” This lady is alleged to have entered into a compromise whereby she agreed to give up her claim to costs amounting to over Rs. 4,000, and to settle in rent-free right with the judgment-debtor certain lands, which had been decreed in her favour. Admittedly no one was present on her behalf to advise her, and no attempt of any kind was made to explain her the nature and consequences of the transaction into which she was entering. Such a proceeding cannot be defended, and in my judgment applying the principle laid down in the case referred to above and in numerous other cases it was incumbent upon the judgment-debtor to see that the lady had competent legal advice, or that at least some one was present who could explain the matter to her. Nothing of the kind was, however, done.

10. For the reasons stated I am of opinion that the order of the Subordinate Judge cannot be supported, and that the appeal must be allowed with costs both, in this Court and in the Court below. The hearing-fee is assessed at 5 gold mohurs.

Newbould, J.:— I agree.

11. Appeal allowed.