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Ramanath Karmakar Opposite Party, v. Sheikh Asanulla Petitioner, .

Calcutta High Court
Feb 11, 1930
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Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant, as plaintiff, obtained an ex parte decree in a mortgage suit and in execution of that decree purchased the mortgaged property and obtained delivery of possession on 20 October 1918. The Respondent instituted a separate suit for declaration of title attacking the ex parte mortgage decree as vitiated by fraud, obtained an ex parte decree in that suit and recovered possession of the property in May 1926. The original mortgage suit was restored, retried and again decreed on contest on 1 March 1928. During the retrial the Respondent prayed for an account of profits earned by the Appellant during his possession from 20 October 1918 to May 1926. The trial Court left the question of profits open with a remark that it might be determined on an application under section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code. On 30 March 1928 the Respondent applied under section 144, CPC for the award of those profits (the application preceding the final decree dated 31 March 1929). The Munsif dismissed the application as not maintainable; the Additional Subordinate Judge held the application could be entertained and remanded the matter to the Court of first instance to be dealt with on the merits. The Appellant appealed from that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application under section 144, Civil Procedure Code (for restitution/account of profits) is maintainable where the decree sought to be varied or set aside was superseded by a decree obtained in a separate suit (i.e., whether section 144 applies only when a decree is reversed or varied by a superior court in appeal or revision, or also when supersession occurs by other means).
  2. Whether, alternatively, the Court's inherent power under section 151, Civil Procedure Code (or general jurisdiction) permits an order for restitution when a prior decree has been varied, reversed or superseded by another decree, even if that variation/supersession did not occur by appeal or revision.
  3. Whether the Appellant can challenge the maintainability of the Respondent's application under section 144 when the Appellant's earlier decree expressly reserved the question of profits to be determined on an application under that section.
  4. Whether the Appellant was or was not awarded interest on account of his possession of the property (a factual question on which the Courts below differed and which affects the merits of the restitution claim).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Appellant contended that the Respondent's application did not fall within the scope of section 144, Civil Procedure Code, and that the Respondent's only remedy, if any, was by a separate suit.
  • The Appellant emphasised that if section 144 were held inapplicable, then a suit for recovery of profits might be barred (statute of limitations), and part of the claim would be time-barred even if the application were treated as a plaint for limitation purposes.

Respondent's Position

  • The Respondent applied under section 144, Civil Procedure Code for an account and award of profits earned by the Appellant during the period of possession (20 October 1918 to May 1926).
  • The Respondent relied on the procedural pathway indicated by the trial Court (that the question might be determined on an application under section 144) and sought relief accordingly.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chintaman Singh v. Chuni Sahu Cited as authority for the view that section 144 does not apply unless the decree is varied or reversed by a superior Court (i.e., confined to reversal/variation on appeal or revision). The opinion records this case as exemplifying one side of a divergence of judicial opinion; the Court noted it as supporting the limited view of section 144 (mentioned by Mukerji, J.).
Ashutosh Nandi v. Kundal Kamini Dasi Cited for the proposition that section 144 refers only to cases where a decree of the Court of first instance was reversed on appeal or revision (i.e., limiting the section's applicability). The judgment of Ashutosh Nandi was relied upon by the Appellant; Mukerji, J. expressed inability to accept a particular aspect of its later interpretation, while Guha, J. discussed it and took a broader view of section 144 in contrast to the restrictive reading of that case.
Subbarayudu v. Yeeram Setti Cited as authority for the contrary view that section 144 applies in all cases where a decree is varied, reversed or superseded however and by whatever Court, including by separate suit. The opinion cites this case as representing the broader view of the section's scope; the Court recorded the divergence and considered this view in its analysis (Guha, J. favouring a broader interpretation).
Shivbai v. Yesoo Also cited in support of the view that section 144 applies broadly where a decree is varied, reversed or superseded however and by whatever Court. The Court noted it among authorities representing the broader view; it figures in the discussion of conflicting judicial authorities about the section's scope.
Bindeswari Prasad v. Badal Singh Named as an instance where doubts have been expressed about which view regarding section 144's scope is correct. Referred to as part of the body of authority showing divergence; the Court did not adopt it as decisive but recorded that doubts exist in the case law.
Swami Rao v. Valentine Also cited as a case expressing doubts as to which of the two views about section 144's scope is correct. Mentioned to illustrate that jurisprudence is not uniform; the Court acknowledged these doubts without using the case as a definitive guide.
Rai Churn Bhuiya v. Debt Prosad Bhakat Referenced for the proposition that section 144 does not define the full measure of the Court's power to order restitution and may be taken as a guide in doing complete justice between parties. The Court relied on the observation (via Mookerjee, J.'s judgment) to support the proposition that restitution must be ordered to the fullest extent even if section 144's terms do not in themselves cover every situation.
Jai Barham v. Kedar Nath Marwari Cited for the Judicial Committee's observation that the duty or jurisdiction to order restitution is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court and does not arise merely under section 144. The opinion cites this authority to support the view that the Court's power to order restitution is not confined to the express terms of section 144 but is inherent in its general jurisdiction.
Jogesh Chunder Dutt v. Kali Churn Dutt Quoted (observations of Sir Richard Garth, C.J.) in relation to the proper procedure in cases where a previous decree was superseded by one in another suit (including a remark that review might be the most complete remedy in some cases). The judgment and its approval in later authority (Bommadevara...) were discussed; Guha, J. observed that those remarks were made in particular factual circumstances and did not preclude a broader interpretation of section 144.
Bommadevara Naganna Naidu v. Ravi Venkatappayya Cited as the case in which observations from Jogesh Chunder Dutt were approved by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The opinion refers to this approval when analyzing the limits of the Jogesh Chunder Dutt observations and their relevance to the present case; the Court concluded those observations do not prevent the broader reading of section 144.
Marriot v. Hampton (English rule) Referenced for the English rule applicable to cases where decrees and judgments remained in force (i.e., situations where a subsequent decree did not ipso facto annul the previous one). The English rule was noted as relevant background to the discussion of whether a prior decree remained in force and how that informs the applicability of section 144; the Court considered these principles in contrasting the factual situations where review might be appropriate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains two concurring judgments (Mukerji, J. and Guha, J.) which reached the same final result but approached issues of section 144's scope differently. Both judges, however, agreed that the Respondent's application should be entertained and investigated on the merits (either under section 144 or under the Court's inherent jurisdiction/section 151), and that the appeal should be dismissed.

Mukerji, J. — Key steps in reasoning

  • Mukerji, J. began by recounting the procedural history and noted that the trial Court had explicitly left the question of profits to be determined on an application under section 144, CPC.
  • He accepted the Appellant's contention that section 144's applicability had been argued, but rejected the Appellant's challenge to the maintainability of the application on the short ground that the Appellant had earlier taken benefit of a decree which expressly reserved determination of profits under section 144 and therefore could not now challenge the maintainability of the application.
  • On the general question of section 144's scope, Mukerji, J. acknowledged a divergence of judicial opinion. He expressed an inclination to a limited view: that the phrase "Court of first instance" in section 144 points to an intention to confine the section to cases where the variation or reversal has been made by a superior Court. He did not fully endorse the broader view (that the section applies regardless of the manner of variation/reversal).
  • Even under his limited view of section 144, Mukerji, J. held that the Court had an obligation to provide complete restitution under its inherent powers (section 151, CPC) and that relief in the form of restitution should be afforded; thus the order of the Court below remanding the matter for investigation on the merits was correct and should not be interfered with.
  • He identified a specific factual issue on which he was dissatisfied with the lower court's finding — whether the Appellant had been awarded interest on account of possession — and observed that this requires further investigation when the application is heard on merits.
  • Mukerji, J. concluded the appeal should be dismissed and indicated he would make no order as to costs.

Guha, J. — Key steps in reasoning

  • Guha, J. agreed the appeal should be dismissed and addressed the core legal question whether section 144 applies where a decree has been set aside not by appeal or revision but by the decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction in another suit (i.e., whether the prior decree remained in force).
  • He was inclined to a broader interpretation of section 144: that it contemplates all cases of reversal or variation and is not confined to reversal or variation on appeal or revision only. The appropriate test, he explained, is whether the earlier decree remained in force or was annulled (whether by appeal/revision or by a decree in another suit).
  • Guha, J. reviewed the authorities relied upon by the parties (including Jogesh Chunder Dutt and its approval in Bommadevara...) and concluded that the observations underpinning a restrictive approach did not preclude the broader interpretation he favoured.
  • He further observed that, even if section 144 were not applicable, the Court had an inherent power under section 151 which could be exercised to order restitution so as to do complete justice between the parties; section 144 does not purport to define the entirety of the Court's restitution power.
  • Guha, J. therefore held the application for restitution to be maintainable and that the claim and counterclaim should be investigated on their merits. He also noted the unresolved factual question concerning whether Ramanath (the Appellant) had been awarded any interest on account of possession and that the answer would materially affect the restitution claim.

Holding and Implications

Final Disposition: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The order of the Additional Subordinate Judge remanding the matter to the Court of first instance to be dealt with on the merits is upheld; the Respondent's application for an account of profits must be investigated on its merits.
  • The Court held that relief in the form of restitution should be available — either under section 144, Civil Procedure Code (as interpreted by the Court, particularly by Guha, J.), or under the Court's inherent jurisdiction/section 151, Civil Procedure Code. Thus, in the circumstances of this case, the Respondent's route for restitution is maintainable and should not be defeated by the Appellant's contention concerning section 144's scope.
  • The Court did not finally resolve every doctrinal question about the precise limits of section 144 in all circumstances: Mukerji, J. expressed an inclination to a limited view, while Guha, J. favoured a broader view. Both, however, agreed that restitution must be available and the present application be heard on the merits.
  • The Courts below must further investigate a factual question (whether the Appellant was awarded interest for his possession), because that factual finding will materially affect the calculation and advisability of restitution.
  • Mukerji, J. specifically ordered that there be no order as to costs in the appeal; the opinion records the appeal's dismissal without an award of costs by that Judge.
  • No unequivocal new precedent pronouncing a single, definitive rule on the entire scope of section 144 was laid down: the opinion discusses and distinguishes authorities, indicates the existence of divergent lines of authority, and affirms that restitution can be ordered to effect complete justice (either under section 144 where applicable or under inherent power/section 151).

This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond what the opinion contains.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

Mukerji, J.:— The Appellant as Plaintiff sued the Respondent as Defendant on a mortgage and having obtained a decree ex parte, purchased the mortgaged property in execution thereof, and upon confirmation of the sale, obtained delivery of possession on the 20th October 1918. The Respondent then instituted a suit for declaration of title to the property so purchased, assailing the ex parte mortgage decree as vitiated by fraud. He obtained an ex parte decree and recovered possession of the property in May 1926. The ex parte mortgage decree which the Appellant had obtained having thus been set aside, the original mortgage suit was restored and retried and was again decreed, this time on contest, on the 1st March 1928. In the course of this retrial the Respondent prayed for an account being taken of the profits enjoyed by the Appellant during his possession of the property from the 20th October 1918 to the date in May 1926 when the Respondent had regained possession. The Court left the question of the profits aforesaid open with the remark that the question might be determined on an application under sec. 144, Civil Procedure Code. On that and before the final decree was passed in the suit on the 31st March 1929, the Respondent, on the 30th March 1928, made the present application under sec. 144, Civil Procedure Code for being awarded the said profits. Thereafter in execution of the decree which the Appellant had obtained, the Appellant purchased the mortgaged property.

The application under sec. 144, Civil Procedure Code was dismissed by the Munsif as not maintainable, but the Additional Subordinate Judge holding otherwise has remanded the case to the Court of first instance to be dealt with on the merits. Hence this appeal.

The contention of the Appellant is that the application of the Respondent does not come within the purview of sec. 144, Civil Procedure Code and that his only remedy, if any, is by a suit. What the Appellant gains if this contention succeeds is obvious, because a suit for recovery of profits is now barred and a part of the claim would be barred even if his application under sec. 144, Civil Procedure Code be treated as a plaint for the purpose. I am prepared to overrule this contention upon the short ground that the Appellant having taken the decree in the mortgage suit with the reservation that the question of profits for the period of his possession would be determined on an application under sec. 144, Civil Procedure Code and having reaped the benefit of that decree by execution, cannot be permitted to turn round now and challenge the maintainability of that very application when it has been made.

On the question as to whether sec. 144, Civil Procedure Code is wide enough to cover the present application a good deal of argument has been addressed to us. In the view that I take of the maintainability of the Appellant's contention and which I have already expressed, it is hardly necessary for me to pronounce any opinion on this argument. It is well-known that on this question there is a divergence of judicial opinion. According to one view the section does not apply unless the decree is varied or reversed by a Court superior to the one that passed it [Chintaman Singh v. Chuni Sahu (1) and Ashutosh Nandi v. Kundal Kamini Dasi ]. According to the other, the section applies in all cases where the decree is varied, reversed or superseded, however and by whatever Court, and even though by a separate suit [Subbarayudu v. Yeeram Setti (3) and Shivbai v. Yesoo (4)]. Cases may be cited in which doubts have been expressed as to which of the two views is correct [e.g, Bindeswari Prasad v. Badal Singh (5) and Swami Rao v. Valentine (6)]. At the same time it cannot be and has never been disputed that on a variation, reversal or supersession of a decree, even if sec. 144, Civil Procedure Code is not in its terms applicable, restitution must be ordered and that to the fullest extent and that it is the duty of the Court to see that it is so effected. That sec. 144 of the Code does not define the full measure of the power of the Court to make an order for restitution, but may be taken as a guide for doing complete justice between the parties concerned under similar circumstances has been over and over again laid down in a long series of cases many of which are referred to in the judgment of Mookerjee, J., in the case of Rai Churn Bhuiya v. Debt Prosad Bhakat (7) and their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Jai Barham v. Kedar Nath Marwari have pointed out that the duty or jurisdiction of the Court in this respect does not arise merely under the said section but is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court. As at present advised I am inclined to take the view that the words “Court of first instance” in sec. 144 sufficiently point to the intention on the part of the legislature to confine the applicability of the section to cases where the variation or reversal has been made, or is a consequence of an order passed, by a superior Court. I am however unable to assent to the view, if that was meant to be expressed, in the case of Ashutosh Nandi v. Kundal Kamini Dasi , that the applicability of the section may depend upon the character of the question—simple or complicated—that may arise for consideration. If the case comes within the purview of the section, no matter whether the question is simple or complicated, it will have to be determined on an application made under it, and a separate suit would be barred. But the Appellant can gain nothing even on the limited view that I am inclined to take of the scope of sec. 144, Civil Procedure Code, because it was clearly the duty of the Court to proceed under sec. 151, Civil Procedure Code and give the Respondent the most complete relief in the shape of restitution. Whether under the one section or under the other, the right order has now been passed by the Court of appeal below, and there is no reason why it should be interfered with.

The only point on which I am not satisfied with the order appealed from is the finding on the question whether the Appellant was or was not awarded interest on account of the fact that he was in possession. On this point the two Courts below have expressed different views. This is a matter that will have to be further investigated when the Respondent's application will be, as it must be, dealt with on the merits, and the decision of this question will affect the merits of the application.

In my judgment the appeal should be dismissed but I would make no order as to costs.

Guha, J.:— I agree with my learned brother in holding that the appeal should be dismissed. The substantial question of law raised in this appeal is that sec. 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to the case out of which it had arisen, inasmuch as the decree in favour of the Appellant passed on the 27th March 1916, was not set aside in appeal: There is a further question raised as to whether, regard being had to the complicated nature of the claim and counter claim involved in the present case, an application for restitution was the proper form by which the rights of parties could be settled. The questions thus raised are of general importance, and reliance has been placed by the learned Advocate for the Appellant on the recent decision of this Court in Ashutosh Nandi v. Kundal Kamini Dasi in which it has been held that sec. 144 referred only to a case where a decree of the Court of first instance was reversed on appeal or revision, and further that sec. 144 did not apply to a case where the Court had to decide questions of conflicting rights under different decrees. I am inclined to think that sec. 144 which embodies the rule to be followed in cases where restitution is sought, after reversal or variation of decrees, contemplates all cases of reversal or variation and is not confined to reversal or variation on appeal or revision only. The reversal or variation as mentioned in sec. 144, may be on appeal or revision; it may also be by decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction in another suit, in which the decree is impeached and sought to be set aside: the test being whether the decree previously made remained in force or not: was the decree annulled, be it by a decree passed on appeal or revision in the same suit, or by a decree passed in another suit brought for the purpose of setting aside the decree previously made? The reference to the Court of first instance in sec. 144 with the object of determining the forum by which restitution is to be granted, does not, to my mind, militate against this interpretation being given to the section; and I am unable to find sufficient justification for reading some words into the section which are not there. The observations of Sir Richard Garth, C.J, in Jogesh Chunder Dutt v. Kali Churn Dutt approved by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Bommadevara Naganna Naidu v. Ravi Venkatappayya upon which the decision of the learned Judges in Ashutosh Nandi v. Kundal Kamini Dasi , is based, were made in a case in which the decree previously passed was not directly superseded by a subsequent decree, but was superseded by the operation of a decree passed in another suit,—a case in which the subsequent decree had not “the legal effect of annulling or altering ipso facto” the previous decree, and pointed reference was therefore made to the English rule as laid down in Marriot v. Hampton (11) applicable to cases where decrees and judgments remained in force. In one part of his judgment the Chief Justice Garth remarked that in the case before him, a review of judgment would not only have been the most complete and the most appropriate and unobjectionable remedy, thus indicating the proper procedure in a case where the previous decree had not been annulled but remained in force. The observations of Garth, C.J referred to above, do not in my opinion stand in the way of the interpretation I am inclined to give to sec. 144. If sec. 144 applied to the case before us, as in my opinion, it did, the necessity for determination of the question of claim and counter claim, complicated or simple, should not stand in the way of the application of the Respondent before us, being investigated on its merits. As the learned Additional Subordinate Judge who heard the appeal in the Lower Court has said, the enquiry on the application could not be avoided on that ground.

Apart however from the question of applicability of sec. 144 which has been discussed above, the present case on appeal before us, may very well be disposed of, as one coming under sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There can be no doubt that it is open to a Court, in the exercise of its inherent power, to make an order for restitution for the purpose of doing justice between the parties concerned, even in a case which may not come within the terms of sec. 144. As has been observed by Mookerjee, J. in Rai Churn Bhakat v. Debi Prasad Bhakat the difficulty in the exercise of the inherent power of the Court when there is an express provision to the contrary in the Code itself, cannot possibly arise, inasmuch as sec. 144 does not purport to define the power of the Court, so far as restitution is concerned. There is nothing contained in sec. 144 which puts any restriction on the power of the Court to do justice between parties, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case before it.

In the above view of the matter and seeing that a separate suit might mean the relinquishment of a part of the claim covered by the application for restitution now before the Court, the application of Sheikh Ashanulla for restitution should be held to be maintainable, and investigation should therefore be made of the claim made by the aforesaid Applicant on the one hand, and the counter claim by Ramanath Karmakar on the other. One question on which the Courts below have differed from each other as to the real state of facts, namely, whether Ramanath has or has not been awarded any Interest on account of his possession of the property to which the present dispute between the parties relates—requires further and fuller consideration, in the light of materials before the Court; and the finding arrived at on this question would materially affect the claim for restitution.

P.C