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Lachhmi Kunwar v. Durga Kunwar
Judgment Summary — Piggott and Walsh, JJ.
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeals arise from disputes between two widows, Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar (appellant in both appeals) and Musammat Durga Kunwar (respondent in both appeals). Their husbands, Nathmal Das and Pem Raj respectively, were sons of Kundan Lal. Nathmal Das died in June 1913 leaving no children and leaving Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar as his widow. Pem Raj died in February 1914 leaving daughters and his widow, Musammat Durga Kunwar. There are living sons of the daughters of Pem Raj by Durga Kunwar.
On 29 July 1914 both widows presented themselves at the Sub-Registrar at Khurja and executed a registered document (printed at A-20 in the record). The document contained a recital that the two brothers had been joint in food, business and everything, and then proceeded on the basis that the widows "became the owners of the property left by our husbands in equal shares," followed by a detailed apportionment.
About a year later disputes arose in connection with succession certificates and possession. Two separate suits were instituted: each widow sued the other. Lachhmi sought a declaration affirming her right to separate possession of the property allotted to her by the 29 July 1914 deed and relied on an arbitration and the executed deed as binding. Durga contended she was not bound by that document, claimed ownership of the entire property that had belonged to the two brothers, and sought possession. Durga alleged that the document had been obtained by fraudulent means and that she lacked capacity to understand it.
The learned Subordinate Judge made findings substantially in favour of Musammat Durga Kunwar, including findings of fraud in her evidence. On appeal, the High Court considered legal issues arising from the facts and the effect of the registered deed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, as a matter of fact and law, the two brothers (Nathmal Das and Pem Raj) were members of a joint undivided Hindu family at the death of Nathmal Das, and the consequences for survivorship and ownership of the family property.
- Whether Musammat Durga Kunwar is bound by the registered partition/alienation deed of 29 July 1914 which purported to divide the estate equally between the two widows.
- Whether the deed can be set aside on grounds of fraud, deception or common mistake if the recital of joint ownership was false and one party was misled or lacked knowledge of the true position.
- Whether the deed could be treated as a bona fide settlement of a disputed right (for example, an anticipated adoption by Lachhmi Kunwar) and thus upheld.
- What effect, if any, an adoption purportedly made by Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar after the deaths of both brothers would have upon the rights of Musammat Durga Kunwar or the reversionary heirs of Pem Raj.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar)
- Asserted that she and the respondent entered into an arbitration and that the division recorded in the registered document of 29 July 1914 was made pursuant to that arbitration.
- Contended that the deed reflected a fair apportionment and was therefore binding on Musammat Durga Kunwar, supporting her claim to separate possession of the portion allotted.
- Advanced, in pleadings and some evidence, the contention that there was a bona fide dispute arising from Lachhmi's proposed adoption of a son to her deceased husband and that the partition was a settlement to avoid that dispute.
Respondent (Musammat Durga Kunwar)
- Contended that she had not executed any deed of partition knowingly and that she did not understand her legal rights; pleaded that she was pardanashin, illiterate, hard of hearing and therefore could not have appreciated the document.
- Alleged that Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar's brothers, with the help of Durga's own brother, took her to the tahsil and induced her to say "yes" and put her thumb-impression, having been told the proceedings related only to lambardarship; set up plain fraud in execution of the deed.
- Sought a declaration that she was not bound by the registered document and that she was entitled to possession of the entire estate that had belonged to Nathmal Das and Pem Raj.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Chandra bin Bhau v. Gojarabai | Authority for the proposition that an adoption purportedly made by a widow to her deceased husband, after that husband and his surviving brother were both dead, could not affect the rights of another widow who had inherited the estate. | The court relied on this authority to reject the appellant's contention that a proposed or subsequent adoption by Lachhmi Kunwar could affect Durga Kunwar's rights in the estate. |
| Adivi Suryaprakasa Rao v. Nidamarty Gangaraju | Similarly cited to show that such an adoption could not affect the rights of the widow who inherited nor the rights of the reversionary heirs. | The court used this precedent to support the conclusion that an adoption by Lachhmi (after both brothers' deaths) would not defeat Durga's ownership nor the eventual rights of the reversioners (daughters and their sons). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by first accepting the unchallenged finding of the Subordinate Judge that Nathmal Das and Pem Raj were members of a joint undivided Hindu family at the time of Nathmal Das's death. That finding was not contested on appeal, and therefore the High Court treated it as established.
From that legal-factual premise the court reasoned as follows:
- Because the brothers were joint, upon the death of Nathmal Das the whole of the joint family property vested in Pem Raj by survivorship; Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar retained no proprietary right except a right to maintenance.
- When Pem Raj later died the estate vested by inheritance in his widow, Musammat Durga Kunwar.
- The partition/alienation deed of 29 July 1914 purports to proceed on the false factual recital that the two widows "became the owners of the property left by our husbands in equal shares." That recital was incorrect as a matter of law and fact given the survivorship rule the court accepted.
- The court set out the legal bases on which such a document could be set aside:
- If Durga was deceived into executing the document by someone better acquainted with the facts, she was entitled to relief on grounds of deception or fraud.
- If both parties executed the document under a common mistaken belief about ownership, the contract was voidable on the ground of common mistake.
- As to the appellant's contention that the deed should stand as a reasonable settlement of a bona fide dispute (for example, to avoid consequences of a proposed adoption by Lachhmi), the court found that claim weak in view of the document's own recital that the brothers were joint. Moreover, the court relied on authority (the two cited precedents) to show that any adoption purportedly made by Lachhmi after both brothers were dead could not affect Durga's rights or those of the reversioners.
- The court further noted that even on the appellant's own theory the alleged alienation of one-half of the estate could not stand against a suit by the reversionary heirs of Pem Raj.
- Given these legal conclusions the court held that it was not necessary to go further into every finding of the lower court; on the law and the established facts the conclusion that Durga was not bound by the agreement and was entitled to possession of the entire property followed logically.
Holding and Implications
Both appeals are dismissed with costs.
Direct effects on the parties:
- Musammat Durga Kunwar is not bound by the registered deed of 29 July 1914 and is entitled to succeed in her claim to possession of the entire property that had belonged to Nathmal Das and Pem Raj.
- Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar's appeals fail and she is not entitled, under the deed in question, to retain the one-half interest as claimed.
- The court observed that the attempted alienation could not defeat any suit by the reversionary heirs of Pem Raj (the daughters and, ultimately, the sons of those daughters), meaning that even on other theories the alienation would be vulnerable to challenge by those heirs.
The opinion applies established legal principles and cited authorities to the facts before it; it does not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond the application of the precedents and rules discussed above.
Appeal dismissed.
Piggott and Walsh, JJ.:— The litigation leading to these two first appeals arises out of the following state of facts. One Kundan Lal had two sons, Nathmal Das and Pem Raj. Nathmal Das died in the month of June, 1913, leaving no children surviving him but a widow, Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar, who is the appellant in both the appeals now before us. Pem Raj died in the month of February, 1914. He left no son, but he left daughters, and a widow, Musammat Durga Kunwar, who is the respondent in both these appeals. It is a matter of some significance that there are now living sons of the aforesaid daughters of Pem Raj by the respondent Durga Kunwar. On the 29th of July, 1914, the two widows presented themselves outside the office of the Sub-Registrar at Khurja Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar there tendered for registration a certain document which is printed at A-20 and the following pages of our record of first appeal No. 80 of 1916. The Sub-Registrar read over this document to the two ladies, who were sitting concealed from the public gaze behind the curtains of a bullock cart. Each lady was identified by an own brother there present for that purpose. The Sub-Registrar read over the document and both ladies admitted execution. The document was then registered. It commences with a recital to the effect that the two brothers, Nathmal and Pem Raj lived jointly, which is followed up by the emphatic amplification that “they were joint in food, business, and everything.” It is then admitted that Nathmal Das died first and Pem Raj after him; but upon this admission follows the curious recital that the two executants of the document, the widows of the aforesaid brothers, “became the owners of the property left by our husbands in equal shares.” On this basis the two executants proceed to a detailed division and apportionment of the estate which originally belonged to Nathmal Das and Pem Raj between themselves. It is not denied that the apportionment is a fair one on the basis on which it proceeded, namely, on the assumption that the two executants were the owners of the property in equal shares. About a year later a dispute broke out upon applications made by both ladies for a succession certificate in respect of the collection of certain debts due to their husbands. The necessary certificate was eventually granted to Musammat Durga Kunwar, for reasons with which we are not concerned but the dispute over this matter led to the institution of two distinct suits. In each case one of the widows came into court as plaintiff and impleaded the other as defendant. Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar asked for a declaration affirming her right to separate possession and enjoyment of the property allotted to bar by the deed of the 29th of July, 1914, already referred to. In her plaint she states that on the death of each of the brothers their respective widows had entered into possession and enjoyment each of the undivided share in the family property belonging to her own Husband. She then suggests that a dispute had arisen because she, Musammat-Lachhmi Kunwar, had been authorized by her late husband to adopt a son to him and was proposing to exercise the right. Hence there was a reference to arbitration and a division of the property between the two ladies was effected by two arbitrators named in the plaint. The deed of the 29th of July, 1914, was drawn up on the basis of the division made by these arbitrators. It was duly executed by both the parties, and Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar claims that it is binding upon the widow of Pem Raj. Musammat Durga Kunwar sues for a declaration that she is in no way bound by this document, that she is in law the owner of the entire property which had formerly belonged to the two brothers, Nathmal Das and Pem Raj, and is entitled to be put and maintained in possession of the same in spite of anything contained in the partition deed already mentioned. Her case against that document is set forth in paragraphs 9 and 10 of her plaint, the essential portions of which it seems worth while to reproduce in detail.
“The plaintiff has not executed any deed of partition, not did the plaintiff understand her legal rights, nor was there any opportunity to understand them. If the defendant took unlawful advantage of the plaintiff's position improperly on the strength of her brothers and obtained any document from the plaintiff on false allegations, such proceedings cannot be binding upon the plaintiff, nor can the defendant benefit from such proceedings and documents. The plaintiff is a pardanashin lady and is illiterate and hard of hearing. She has no knowledge of zamtndari affairs and legal rights. Moreover, she did not get an opportunity to mate inquiries owing to grief.”
In the evidence which she gave in court Musammat Durga Kunwar went the whole length of setting up a case of fraud pure and simple. She said that the brothers of Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar having secured the assistance of her own brother, took her to the tahsil at Khurja, telling her that certain arrangements were being made about the lambardarship of the landed property. She was too hard of hearing to be able to understand any document from its merely being read over to her, but she had been told that she must say. “yes” in reply to any question that might be asked her and must put her thumb-impression to any paper which might be placed before her for that purpose. In this way she accounts for the execution of the deed in question. There has been a good deal of conflicting evidence in the court below, but the learned Subordinate Judge has made up his mind to go the whole way with Musammat Durga Kunwar and has substantially found in favour of her allegations of fraud as made in her evidence. In appeal we have been asked to consider rather what would be the position of Musammat Durga Kunwar in respect of this document, even assuming that she executed it after understanding its contents and its general effect as dividing the family property equally between herself and Lachhmi Kunwar. The first question which comes up for consideration in this connection is that of the joint-ness or separation of Nathmal Das and Pem Raj. There was a distinct issue upon this point in the court below and a good deal of conflicting evidence was produced; but the learned Subordinate. Judge has come to a clear finding that the brothers were members of a joint undivided Hindu family at the moment of the death of Nathmal Das. This finding is not challenged in the memorandum of appeal which Mnsammat Lachhmi Kunwar has filed in identical terms in each of the two cases. It is unnecessary therefore for us to go into the evidence upon which it rests, beyond remarking that there certainly was evidence to support it, including Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar's own admission in the disputed document of the 29th of July, 1914. We must take it therefore that when Nathmal Das died the whole of what had been the joint family property of himself and his brother passed by survivorship to Pem Raj. Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar retained nothing in law except a right to maintenance. When Pem Raj died the estate, vested by inheritance in his widow, Musammat Durga Kunwar. The question then is whether this lady is bound by a gratuitous alienation of one-half of this property, effected on the basis of as document which starts with the recital that she and Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar are the owners of the property in question in equal shares. This recital is wrong upon the facts. If Musammat Durga Kunwar was induced to believe it to be true by anyone better acquainted with the facts, she is entitled to relief against this document on the ground that she was deceived into executing if and that she executed it without such knowledge of the facts and of her true position as would be necessary in order to bind a pardanashin lady in a transaction of this sort. If, on the other hand, both the parties to the document were under a mistaken impression as to their ownership, the contract in question is liable to be set aside on the ground of common mistake; if upon no other. From this point of view the position seems clear enough. The best that could be said in behalf of Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar has been to contend that the document in question represents in some way a reasonable settlement of a bonâ fide dispute. That dispute can scarcely have been on the question whether Nathmal Das and Pem Raj were joint or separate, when the document itself recites that they were joint. In Musammat Lachhmi Kuuwar's plaint, and also in some of the evidence led by her, an attempt was made to suggest that there was a bonâ fide dispute between the parties of quite a different kind. The suggestion is that Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar was proposing to adopt a son to her deceased husband, that the effect of this adoption would be to deprive Musammat Durga Kunwar of the estate field by her as widow of Pem Raj, or at least of one-half of the estate, and that, in order to avoid a dispute upon this point and to make sure that any adoption which Lachhmi Kunwar might effect would not give the adoptive son more than one-half of the estate, she was induced to enter into the transaction in question. Whether the evidence on the record would bear out this plea, as a matter of fact, assuming that it proceeded upon correct propositions of law, is an arguable question. The plea may be disposed of upon the ground that it does not proceed upon a correct proposition of law. It is sufficient to refer to two cases, Chandra bin Bhau v. Gojarabai and Adivi Suryaprakasa Rao v. Nidamarty Gangaraju, as authority for the proposition that any adoption which Musammat Lachhmi Kunwar might make, or might purport to make, to her deceased husband, after that husband and his surviving brother were both dead, could not affect the rights of Muammad Durga Kunwar who had inherited the estate as widow of Pem Raj. Nor could such adoption affect the rights of the reversioners; that is to say, the estate would pass on the death of Durga Kunwar to the reversionary heirs of Pem Raj, and these according to the evidence on the record would probably be, first, his daughter or daughters, and eventually the sons of the said daughters. One of the points against the appellant in these cases is that, from any point of view, the alienation purporting to be effected by Musammat. Dnrga Kunwar of one-half of the estate under the agreement in dispute could not possibly stand against a suit by the reversionary heirs of Pem Raj. In the view which we take of the case and of the law applicable to the established facts, it is not necessary for us to go the whole length of the finding upon which the court below has disposed of the two suites. We think that the decision of the court below is correct; that Musammat Durga Kunwar is not bound by this agreement and is entitled to succeed in her claim to the possession of the entire property. Both these appeals therefore fail and we dismiss them with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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