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Kiron Chandra Bose v. Kalidas Chatterjee Opposite Party.
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This Rule challenges an order made by the District Judge of Rungpur under paragraph 12 of the Bengal House-Rent Control Order, 1942. The Petitioner asserted that he was a permanent resident of Mymensingh who, because of wartime exigencies, evacuated with his family to Rungpur in the summer of 1942 and hired a house in Rangpur owned by the Opposite Party at a rent of Rs. 44 per month. The Petitioner alleged the premises were in poor repair, that one room was unusable because it was occupied by the owner's goods, and that the normal rent would have been about Rs. 20 per month; he claimed the Opposite Party had compelled him to agree to Rs. 44.
The Petitioner applied to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Rungpur, appointed under the House-Rent Control Order as a Rent Controller, who inspected the premises, took evidence and fixed the rent at Rs. 30 per month by an order dated 30th July, 1942. The Opposite Party appealed that order to the District Judge of Rungpur under paragraph 12 of the House-Rent Control Order. The District Judge, without issuing notice to the Petitioner or affording him an opportunity to be heard, modified the Rent Controller’s order and directed the Petitioner to pay Rs. 37-8-0 per month plus the occupier's share of the Municipal Tax. The present Rule was obtained against that modification.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the District Judge, when exercising the powers conferred by paragraph 12 of the Bengal House-Rent Control Order, 1942, is acting as a "Court" (i.e., exercising judicial jurisdiction) or is acting in a non-judicial/personal (persona designata) or executive capacity.
- Consequently, whether the District Judge's order made under paragraph 12 is revisable by the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Position
- The Petitioner's factual claims: he hired the house under distressed wartime circumstances; the house was in poor repair and one room was unusable; the rent was excessive (Rs. 44) compared to normal (about Rs. 20); the Rent Controller fixed rent at Rs. 30; the District Judge altered that order to Rs. 37-8-0 without serving notice or hearing the Petitioner.
- The Petitioner sought relief against the District Judge's order on the ground it was made without hearing him (procedural unfairness).
Opposite Party's Arguments
- The Opposite Party raised a preliminary point that the District Judge, when exercising powers under paragraph 12 of the House-Rent Control Order, is not a "Court" and therefore his order is not revisable by the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- The Opposite Party conceded that if the District Judge's order were held to be a judicial order made by a Court, it could not be sustained because it had been made without giving the Petitioner an opportunity to be heard.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| National Telephone Company Limited v. Postmaster General | Where a statute refers to determination by "a Court" the necessary implication is that the presiding officer will determine the matters as a Court and enjoy the incidents of Court jurisdiction (including appellate rights). | Used as the leading English authority to support the proposition that the use of the word "Court" in a statute typically imports exercise of functions as a Court, not as persona designata. |
| Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeba Aiyar | Reinforces that when an Act confers jurisdiction on the "Civil Court" or "Court" the Civil Court acts as a Court of law and not as persona designata. | Cited to show an identical view was taken by the Judicial Committee: jurisdiction given to the Civil Court is to the Court and not to the individual Judge personally. |
| Balaji Sakharam Gurav v. Merwanji Nowroji Antia | Where the statute used the word "District Judge" (sec. 23, Bombay District Municipal Act), the District Judge there acted as persona designata and his orders were not revisable under the ordinary revisional provision. | Referred to as an example where the District Judge was held to act as persona designata rather than as the Court, illustrating that outcomes depend on the wording and context of the statute. |
| Gangadhar Baburao Gadre v. The Hubli Municipality | Followed the view that under the relevant municipal provision the District Judge acted as persona designata. | Used to illustrate a later Bombay High Court decision taking the same view as Balaji Sakharam Gurav. |
| Nam Narayan Mondal v. Aghore Chandra Ganguli | Under secs. 36–44 of the Bengal Municipal Act the District Judge was not persona designata but the Court of the District Judge (i.e., exercise of jurisdiction as a Court), partly because sec. 37(1) allowed transfer to subordinate judicial officers. | Cited to show that where the statute contemplates the ordinary judicial hierarchy and transfer to subordinate judicial officers, the District Judge is to be seen as exercising Court jurisdiction rather than acting personally. |
| Kokku Parthasaradhi Naidu Garu v. Chintalachervu Koteswara Rao Garu | Full Bench (Madras) reached the same conclusion as Nam Narayan Mondal: the District Judge in that statutory context acted as the Court. | Referred to as supporting authority for the position that statutory context may require treatment of the District Judge as Court rather than persona designata. |
| Municipal Corporation of Rangoon v. M.A. Shakur | Where the Act singled out the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court rather than the Court as a whole, the Chief Judge acted as persona designata; thus the Act created jurisdiction to be exercised personally by that judge. | Referred to as an instance in which the statutory scheme resulted in the officer being persona designata because the Act did not vest jurisdiction in the Court generally but specifically in an individual judge. |
| O.A.O.K. Lakshmanan Chettiar v. J.S. Kannappar | The Madras High Court followed the Rangoon decision, treating the statutory provision as vesting authority in an individual judge (persona designata). | Cited as an example of a court following the Rangoon reasoning on persona designata where the statute singled out an individual judge. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the central preliminary question: whether the District Judge, when exercising the powers under paragraph 12 of the Bengal House-Rent Control Order, 1942, acts as a Court (exercising judicial jurisdiction) or acts in a non-judicial/personal (persona designata) or executive capacity. The Court observed that authorities on the Court-versus-persona-designata point are not uniform, and it surveyed relevant authorities to extract guiding principles.
The Court distilled the general proposition from the cited authorities that when a statute provides that a matter shall be determined by "a Court," the presiding officer must be treated as exercising jurisdiction as a Court; conversely, where the statute singles out an individual judge or uses different language, that may point to persona designata. The Court examined the language of paragraph 12 of the House-Rent Control Order, which contemplates an appeal in writing to the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court (in Calcutta) or to the District Judge of the district, and prescribes that the Chief Judge or District Judge "shall then send for the record ... and, after perusing such record and after making such further enquiry as he thinks fit, shall decide the appeal," with the decision being final.
The Court concluded that paragraph 12 does not contain the indicia present in other statutes (for example, sec. 37(1) of the Bengal Municipal Act) that would show the District Judge to be exercising authority as the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction. The Court placed weight on the source and character of the Bengal House-Rent Control Order: it was made by the Governor under Rule 81(2)(bb) of the Defence of India Rules framed under Section 2 of the Defence of India Act. The Court characterized that Order as an executive act (an order with statutory authority deriving from defence legislation), not a legislative act that would constitute or invest a Judge with new judicial authority outside his ordinary jurisdiction.
The Court further analysed the Order's machinery and procedure: the rent-control framework established by the Order sets up executive officers as Rent Controllers to determine reasonable rent under paragraph 7; the appeal provision in paragraph 12 allows the Chief Judge or District Judge to peruse records and make further enquiries but does not require them to hear the parties. The Court emphasized that the House-Rent Control machinery is essentially executive in character, the procedure is not judicial, and the decision-making under paragraph 12 is geared to economic determinations of what rent is "reasonable" rather than to classical judicial fact-finding and application of law.
On this analysis, and applying the legal principles derived from the precedents surveyed, the Court held that the District Judge, when exercising the powers under paragraph 12 of the Order, did not act as a Court. Accordingly, the District Judge’s order was not a judicial order revisable by the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Rule is discharged.
Implications:
- The Court held that the District Judge, insofar as he was exercising powers under paragraph 12 of the Bengal House-Rent Control Order, 1942, was not acting as a Court vested with judicial jurisdiction for purposes of High Court revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- As a direct consequence in this case, the Rule challenging the District Judge's order was discharged, and the Court made no order as to costs.
- The opinion limits its holding to the statutory and factual context considered: it explains the institutional character (executive versus judicial) of the rent-control machinery created by the House-Rent Control Order and applies that conclusion to the revisional competence under Section 115. The opinion does not purport to lay down a general rule beyond applying the statutory construction and the authorities discussed to the particular provisions under review.
Note: This summary strictly follows the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add information beyond the text.
1. The Court.— This Rule is directed against an order made by the District Judge of Rungpur under paragraph 12 of the Bengal House-Rent Control Order of 1942. The Petitioner's case is that he is a permanent resident of the town of Mymensingh and, owing to war exigencies, had to evacuate with his family to Rungpur during the summer months of 1942. He hired a house at Rangpur belonging to the Opposite Party at a rental of Rs. 44 per month. The Petitioner states that the house was in a bad state of repairs and he was not allowed to use one of its rooms which was packed with things belonging to the owner; and although in normal times the house could not fetch more than Rs. 20 a month as rent, the Opposite Party with a view to make unreasonable profits compelled him to agree to pay Rs. 44 a month. The Petitioner filed an application before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Rungpur who is a Rent Controller appointed by Government under the House-Rent Control Order and the latter on inspection of the premises and taking evidence, fixed the rent at Rs. 30 per month. This order was made on 30th July, 1942. The Opposite Party thereupon presented a petition of appeal against this order to the District Judge of Rungpur under the provisions of paragraph 12 of the House-Rent Control Order, Bengal, and the District Judge without issuing any notice to the Petitioner or giving him an opportunity to say what he had to say on the matter, modified the order of the Rent-Controller and directed the Petitioner to pay Rs. 37-8-0 as rent per month in addition to the occupier's share of the Municipal Tax. It is against this order that the present Rule has been obtained.
2. The learned Advocate appearing for the Opposite Party has raised a preliminary point and his contention is that the District Judge exercising powers under paragraph 12 of the House-Rent Control Order, Bengal, is not a Court and consequently his order could not be revised by us under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This is the only point for our consideration in this case, for it is conceded on behalf of the Opposite Party that if the order of the District Judge be taken to be a judicial order made by a Court, it could not possibly be supported as it was made behind the back of the Petitioner and without giving him a hearing.
3. When a Judicial Officer is given the right to determine certain matters of a judicial or quasi-judicial character unconnected with the ordinary jurisdiction which he exercises under law, the question frequently arises whether in determining such matters he acts as a Court or as persona designata. The authorities on this point cannot be said to be uniform, but it seems to be established that when a statute provides that a particular matter shall be determined by “a Court” and not by an individual Judge, the officer presiding over the Court must be deemed to exercise his jurisdiction as “Court” and not as persona designata. The case of National Telephone Company Limited v. Postmaster General(1) is the leading English authority on this point. There the question arose as to whether the Railway and Canal Commission which was constituted a Court of Record acted as “Court” or as arbitrators in certain matters. Lord Parker of Waddington said: “Where by a statute matters are referred to the determination of a Court of record without any further provision, the necessary implication is, I think, that the Court will determine the matters, as a Court. Its jurisdiction is enlarged, but all the incidents of jurisdiction, including the right of appeal from its decision, remain the same”. The identical view was expressed by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeba Aiyar(2). In this case the order challenged was one made under sec. 10 of the Religious Endowments Act which authorised the Civil Court to fill up a vacancy in the temple committee. The words “Civil Court” and “Court” are defined in the Act itself, so their Lordships observed, to mean the principal Court of Original Civil Jurisdiction in the district in which the mosque, temple or religious establishment is situate, and it was pointed out by their Lordships that it is to the Civil Court and not to the individual Judge who may preside in or constitute the Civil Court that jurisdiction is given. “It appears to their Lordships,” so runs the judgment, “to be clear that in all these matters the Civil Court exercises its powers as a Court of Law, not merely as persona designata. . . .”. Difficulties do arise, however, when the expression used is not “Court” but “judge” and in such cases one has got to look to the entire provision for the purpose of determining whether the matter is to be heard by the Judicial Officer as a Court or in his own personal capacity. In the the case of Balaji Sakharam Gurav v. Merwanji Nowroji Antia(3) the question arose under sec. 23 of the Bombay District Municipal Act and it was held that the District Judge referred to in that section, when he decided an election dispute acted not as a Court but as persona designata and his orders were not revisable by the High Court under sec. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The same view was taken in a later decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Gangadhar Baburao Gadre v. The Hubli Municipality(4). On the other hand this Court in the case of Nam Narayan Mondal v. Aghore Chandra Ganguli(5), took the view that the District Judge, referred to in and contemplated by secs. 36 to 44 of the Bengal Municipal Act, was not persona designata but the Court of the District Judge over which the High Court had powers of superintendence under sec. 107 of the Government of India Act. In coming to this decision the learned Judges laid much stress on the fact that under sec. 37(1) of the Bengal Municipal Act the District Judge was given the power of transferring the election petition for decision by any other judicial officer subordinate to him and not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge. This shows that the Act recognises the ordinary judicial hierarchy of a District with the District Judge at the head and the election petition is to be heard in the Court of the District Judge and not by the District Judge personally, for, as persona designata the District Judge could not have any judicial officer subordinate to him. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Kokku Parthasaradhi Naidu Garu v. Chintalachervu Koteswara Rao Garu(6), took the same view. In a Full Bench case of the Rangoon High Court, viz., the case of the Municipal Corporation of Rangoon v. M.A Shakur(7), the question arose as to whether the Chief Judge of the Rangoon Small Cause Court, exercising powers under the provisions of the Rangoon Municipal Act, acted as a Court or as persona designata. It was held that he was a mere persona designata and one of the reasons given was that the Rangoon Small Cause Court consisted of a plurality of Judges and the Rangoon Municipal Act instead of vesting jurisdiction in the Court of Small Causes as a whole, singled out the Chief Judge of that Court as the authority who was to exercise the jurisdiction created by that Act. This decision was followed by the Madras High Court in the Full Bench case of O.A.O.K. Lakshmanan Chettiar v. J.S. Kannappar(8).
4. Paragraph 12 of the House-rent Control Order, Bengal, 1942 provides as follows:
“(1) Any person aggrieved toy an order of the Controller may, within fifteen days from the date on which the order is communicated to him, in respect of houses in the presidency town of Calcutta present an appeal in writing to the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes of Calcutta and, in respect of houses elsewhere, to the District Judge of the district: (2) The Chief Judge or the District Judge, as the case may toe, shall then send for the record of the case from the Controller and, after perusing such record and after making such further enquiry as he thinks fit, shall decide the appeal:
(3) The decision of the Chief Judge or the District Judge, as the case may be, and subject only to such decision, an order of the Controller, shall be final.”
5. It will be seen from the above provisions that the paragraph contemplates only an appeal in writing to the Chief Judge of the Presidency Small Cause Court, Calcutta or to the District Judge of the district, as the case may be, against an order of the Rent Controller. There is no indication in this paragraph, unlike sec. 37(1) of the Bengal Municipal Act, that the District Judge is to exercise his authority as the principal Court of Original Civil jurisdiction in the district. Quite apart from this, it seems to us that there are other reasons of a weightier kind which incline us to hold that the District Judge was not and could not have been invested with the authority of a Court by the provisions referred to above. It is only a legislative enactment or a rule having statutory authority that can constitute a Court or invest a Judge with authority to determine matters outside his ordinary jurisdiction. The Bengal House-Rent Cnotrol Order of 1942 is an order made by the Governor in the exercise of his powers under Rule 81(2)(bb) of the Defence of India Rules. It is not a case of the exercise of legislative powers by the Governor, as are contemplated by secs. 88 to 90 of the Government of India Act, 1935: It is an instance of an executive act, pure and simple. Sec. 2(1) of the Defence of India Act authorises the Central Government to make such rules as appear to it to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order or the efficient prosecution of war or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. Sub-sec. 2 of this section lays down that without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-sec. 1, the rules may provide for or may empower any authority to make orders providing for certain matters which are enumerated under this sub-section. Under sub-sec. 4 of this section the power or duty which by a rule under sub-sec. 1 is conferred or imposed upon the Central Government may be delegated to the Provincial Government or other authorities specified in it.
6. The Defence of India Rules are framed under sec. 2 of the Defence of India Act and under rule 81(2)(bb), the Central Government or the Provincial Government may by an order provide for regulating the letting and sub-letting in any urban area, of residential accommodation, whether furnished or unfurnished and whether with or without board, and in particular (1) for controlling the rents for such accommodation . . . The Defence of India Rules undoubtedly possess statutory authority but the rule mentioned above under which the Bengal House-Rent Control Order, 1942, was passed does not contemplate or authorise the creation of a tribunal for regulating house-rent in any urban area or investing any judicial officer with additional authority for that purpose. As the provisions of the order show, the machinery that is set up for controlling house-rent is a purely executive machinery, acting under the control of the Governor or the executive authority. The procedure that is laid down in the order is not a judicial procedure at all. Certain executive officers are given the authority to act as Rent Controllers and they are to fix the rent in the way laid down in paragraph 7 of the Order. Paragraph 12 which has been set out above shows that the District Judge or the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court before whom a petition of appeal can be presented acts merely in the capacity of a superior executive officer. He has got to go through the papers and may make further enquiry if he considers proper, but he is not bound to hear the parties even if they appear and pray to be heard. He does not really find facts and apply the law; the basis of his decision is not legal but economic and he has to determine what is reasonable rent and not what is the legal rent, in all circumstances.
7. We cannot hold that the District Judge, in exercising these powers, acts as a Court and consequently his orders are not revisable by us under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
8. The result therefore is that the Rule is discharged.
9. We make no order as to costs.
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