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State Of Gujarat And Another v. Gyanaba Dilavarsinh Jadega .

Supreme Court Of India
Apr 17, 2012
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Supreme Court of India — Case Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

A draft statement under Section 8(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (“the 1976 Act”) was issued to the respondent on 4-11-1982, followed by a notice under Section 8(3). A final statement under Section 9 was issued on 5-3-1986, and a notification under Section 10(1) was published in the Gazette on 8-10-1987, declaring the respondent’s excess land as vested in the State.

The respondent sought an exemption under Section 20 of the 1976 Act, which was rejected on 15-12-1983. Litigation ensued:

  • 26-3-1984: The High Court remanded the exemption application to the State Government, which again rejected it on 23-8-1984.
  • The respondent’s second writ petition challenging both the rejection and the Section 8(4) notification was dismissed on 28-4-1994.
  • Letters Patent Appeal (LPA No. 225/1994) was allowed on 17-6-2008, remanding the matter to the competent authority.
  • A review petition by the State was dismissed on 19-12-2008.

Meanwhile, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (“the 1999 Repeal Act”) came into force in Gujarat on 31-3-1999, repealing the 1976 Act but saving certain completed actions under Section 3 of the Repeal Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court ought to have considered the respondent’s plea that the possession allegedly taken on 27-6-1989 was by an unauthorised officer and amounted only to “paper possession”.
  2. Whether, after the 1999 Repeal Act, the High Court was justified in directing the competent authority to examine the respondent’s case in light of the State Notification dated 6-10-1997.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • Invoked Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the 1976 Act to claim the land was agricultural, giving him a pre-existing right preserved by the Notification dated 6-10-1997.
  • Contended that the alleged possession on 27-6-1989 was taken by an officer without authority and was merely on paper; hence actual possession never vested in the State.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellants’ legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Issue 2 – Effect of the 1999 Repeal Act and the 1997 Notification. The Court held that Section 3 of the 1999 Repeal Act saves only three categories of actions: (i) vesting with possession taken, (ii) validity of exemption orders under Section 20, and (iii) payments made for such exemptions. The respondent’s reliance on the 6-10-1997 Notification was characterised as a prospective claim to acquire a right, not an accrued or vested right; therefore, it is not protected by Section 3. The High Court’s direction to examine the respondent’s claim under the Notification was consequently erroneous.

Issue 1 – Nature of Possession on 27-6-1989. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court failed to address the respondent’s explicit plea that only paper possession was taken by an unauthorised officer. This question is “vital” because:

  • If actual possession by a competent officer was not taken, proceedings under the 1976 Act would automatically abate under the 1999 Repeal Act.
  • If actual possession was duly taken, the vesting stands concluded and the respondent has no further right.

Given this omission, the matter was remanded to the Division Bench for determination of the factual issue of possession.

Holding and Implications

Appeals ALLOWED IN PART.

  • The High Court’s direction requiring the competent authority to consider the respondent’s case under the Notification dated 6-10-1997 is set aside.
  • The Letters Patent Appeal is restored solely for the High Court to determine whether the possession allegedly taken on 27-6-1989 constitutes actual possession under Section 3(1)(a) of the 1999 Repeal Act.
  • No order as to costs.

Implications: The judgment clarifies that post-repeal, only accrued rights specifically saved by Section 3 of the 1999 Repeal Act survive; aspirational or inchoate claims under later notifications do not. The decision does not establish a new precedent but reinforces the limited scope of savings under the Repeal Act and directs a factual inquiry that could determine whether proceedings abate or stand concluded.

Show all summary ...

Order

1. Delay condoned. Leave granted.

2. Two questions arise for our consideration, namely:

(1) whether the High Court ought to have considered the respondent's plea that the possession allegedly taken on 27-6-1989 was by an officer who was not authorised and only a paper possession was taken, and
(2) whether the High Court was justified in directing the competent authority to examine the case of the respondent in the light of the Notification dated 6-10-1997 in view of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (for short “the 1999 Repeal Act”).

3. It is not necessary to refer to the facts in detail. Suffice it to say that on 4-11-1982 a draft statement of land held by the respondent in excess of ceiling limit was prepared under Section 8(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short “the 1976 Act”) and notice under Section 8(3) was issued. Final statement under Section 9 was issued by the competent authority on 5-3-1986 and ultimately on 23-9-1987 Notification under Section 10(1) was issued which was published in the Government Gazette on 8-10-1987.

4. In the meanwhile, the respondent made an application for exemption under Section 20 of the 1976 Act which came to be rejected on 15-12-1983. The respondent challenged the rejection of the application made under Section 20 by filing special civil application before the High Court. On 26-3-1984 the Single Judge of the High Court remanded the matter to the State Government to decide afresh the respondent's application under Section 20. Thereafter, the State Government heard the respondent and rejected the application on 23-8-1984.

5. The respondent filed another special civil application challenging the order of the State Government dated 23-8-1984 and the notification issued under Section 8(4) of the 1976 Act. The learned Single Judge dismissed the said special civil application on 28-4-1994.

6. The respondent filed a letters patent appeal which was disposed of on 17-6-2008 LPA No. 225 of 1994 whereby the order of the Single Judge was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the competent authority as indicated above.

7. The appellants filed a review application seeking review of the order dated 17-6-2008 LPA No. 225 of 1994 which was dismissed on 19-12-2008.

8. Coming to the second question first, it may be immediately noticed that the 1976 Act came to be repealed by the 1999 Repeal Act. The 1999 Repeal Act came into effect on 31-3-1999 in the State of Gujarat. Section 3 of the 1999 Repeal Act saves certain actions taken under the 1976 Act.

9. Section 3 reads as follows:

“3. Savings.—(1) The repeal of the principal Act shall not affect—
(a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of Section 10, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority.
(b) the validity of any order granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20 or any action taken thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the contrary;
(c) any payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20.
(2) Where—
(a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; and
(b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land,
then, such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the State Government.”

10. Section 4 provides that all proceedings relating to the 1976 Act pending immediately before the commencement of the 1999 Repeal Act shall abate. Proviso that follows Section 4 provides that the abatement of legal proceedings which is provided in the main section shall not apply to the proceedings relating to Sections 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the 1976 Act insofar as such proceedings are relatable to the land, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority.

11. While deciding second question what we have to decide is, whether the respondent has any legal right to have his claim under Notification dated 6-10-1997 examined by the competent authority despite the repeal of the 1976 Act by the 1999 Repeal Act?

12. Mr Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, urged that the respondent has pre-existing right by virtue of Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the 1976 Act as he is claiming his right in respect of the land which is agricultural land and that right is saved by Notification dated 6-10-1997. We are unable to accept the submission of Mr Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent.

13. On repeal of the 1976 Act by the 1999 Repeal Act, the only actions which have been saved are the actions as set out in Sections 3(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the 1999 Repeal Act. The claim of the respondent under the Notification dated 6-10-1997 is, at best, a claim of acquiring a right; it is not an enforcement of accrued right. Such claim of acquiring a right under the Notification dated 6-10-1997 is not saved under Section 3 at all. In this view of the matter, the High Court was clearly in error in directing the competent authority to examine the case of the respondent in the light of the Notification dated 6-10-1997. No such proceedings can take place on repeal of the 1976 Act. The direction given by the High Court cannot be sustained and has to be set aside.

14. Insofar as first question is concerned, it does transpire from the impugned order LPA No. 225 of 1994 and the record that the respondent expressly set up the case that the possession allegedly taken over on 27-6-1989 was not by a competent officer and it was only a paper possession. Unfortunately, the High Court has not adverted to this aspect at all. In our opinion, the above plea raised by the respondent is quite vital. If the actual possession has not been taken over by the competent authority, then by virtue of the 1999 Repeal Act, the proceedings under the 1976 Act would abate automatically. On the other hand, if the actual possession has been taken over by the competent officer, the proceedings under the 1976 Act would stand concluded and the respondent would have no right whatsoever. Having regard to this aspect, we are satisfied that on this limited issue the matter should go back to the Division Bench of the High Court.

15. Consequently, the appeals are allowed in part. The direction given by the High Court to the competent authority to examine the case of the respondent in the light of the Notification dated 6-10-1997 is set aside. Letters patent appeal is restored to the extent noted above. The Division Bench shall examine the question as to whether the possession on 27-6-1989 alleged to have been taken over by the appellants tantamounts to actual possession contemplated under Section 3(1)(a) of the 1999 Repeal Act. No costs.