Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Sumit Bose Sumit Ranjan Bose & Ors. v. The State Of Bihar & Anr. Opp. Parties.

Patna High Court
Jun 27, 2002
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Three petitioners are accused in Complaint Case No. 456/2001 lodged by opposite party no. 2 and pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Purnia. By the impugned order dated 8.3.2002 the learned Magistrate rejected the petitioners' prayer to recall warrants of arrest issued against them and to dispense with their personal appearance under section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code).

The complaint (filed in May 2001) alleges that petitioners No. 1 and 2 were employees (Area Manager at Patna and Regional Manager at Kolkata respectively) of ESPN Software India Limited and petitioner No. 3 was shown as the company's representative at New Delhi. The complainant, a cable operator at Purnia, alleged that under a company "Super Saver" scheme he sent a draft for Rs. 93,124 dated 8.1.2001 to the company's Patna office. The draft could not be encashed because of instructions to the bank that the draft was lost; it was alleged the draft was returned to the complainant but subsequently lost at Patna and thereafter came into the custody of the accused, which the company admitted. The company allegedly stopped supply of two television channels from February 2001 after the draft could not be encashed.

Cognizance was taken under section 420 IPC on 31.7.2001. Initially the Magistrate issued summons (summons were shown to have been served on petitioners No. 1 and 2); there is no material showing service on petitioner No. 3 (resident of New Delhi). On 22.9.2001 the Magistrate noted receipt of summons by petitioners No. 1 and 2 and passed an order for issuance of a bailable warrant (issued on 23.11.2001). Before the bailable warrant could be served, on 15.12.2001 non-bailable warrants were ordered against all three accused and subsequently issued on 21.12.2001. The petitioners appeared in the Magistrate's court on 7.2.2002 by vakalatnama and prayed for recall of the warrants and exemption from personal appearance under section 205 of the Code.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order of the Magistrate rejecting a prayer under section 205 of the Code is an "interlocutory order" within the meaning of section 397(2) of the Code such that criminal revision to the High Court is barred.
  2. Whether, on the facts of this case (employees/representative of a corporate body residing away from the trial court, and no alleged receipt of money in their individual capacity), the petitioners should be granted the privilege under section 205 of the Code (exemption from personal attendance and recall of warrants).
  3. Whether the Magistrate committed error in issuing warrants (particularly as to petitioner No. 3) when summons had not been served, and in holding that the allegations are "serious" and that the identity of the petitioners was disputed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners are employees and/or a representative of a corporate body and reside at places distant from Purnia; the case is of a petty nature where no money has been taken by the petitioners in their individual capacity and the company has not received money individually attributable to them.
  • They are therefore entitled to the privilege of section 205 of the Code (dispensing with personal attendance and recall of warrants), which the Magistrate wrongly refused.
  • The Magistrate ignored that summons were never served on petitioner No. 3 and wrongly held the allegation to be serious and that the petitioners' identity was disputed.
  • Reliance was placed on authorities said to support that an order rejecting section 205 relief is not an interlocutory order (e.g., Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pandey v. Uttam (SC, 1999), Jai Ram Singh v. State of Rajasthan (Rajasthan HC full Bench, 1992), and Akram v. State of MP (MP HC, 2000)).

Opposite Party No. 2 (Complainant) Arguments

  • A preliminary objection: the impugned order is interlocutory in nature and therefore criminal revision is not maintainable before the High Court under section 397(2) of the Code.
  • On merits, once a warrant has been issued by the Magistrate, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to grant the petitioners' prayer under section 205 of the Code.
  • Reliance was placed upon decisions including N.L. Poddar v. State (1979 BBCJ 132), Ravi Singh v. State (1979 BBCJ 437), and Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. Bhiwani Denim ((2001) 7 SCC 401) in support of the objection based on section 397(2) of the Code.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
N.L. Poddar v. State (1979 BBCJ 132) Held that an order under section 205 of the Code is interlocutory; Magistrate's power is discretionary and such order cannot be set aside in exercise of revisional power; also held it cannot be set aside under section 482. The Court observed that N.L. Poddar is "no longer a good case law" and declined to follow its strict proposition that s.205 orders are purely interlocutory and immune from revision; the Court distinguished and overruled this aspect.
Ravi Singh v. State (1979 BBCJ 437) Rejected the view that inherent power under section 482 could not be exercised to set aside an order under s.205; discussed that s.205 covers cases where summons ought to have issued but warrant issued by mistake and the benefit of s.205 should be liberally extended in trivial/technical cases and for vulnerable categories. The Court relied on Ravi Singh to illustrate principles on the exercise of discretion under s.205 and to support a liberal approach to s.205, particularly where warrants were issued by mistake or where the accused come within vulnerable categories or face trivial charges.
Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. Bhiwani Denim ((2001) 7 SCC 401) Declined to decide whether an order under s.205 is interlocutory; quoted K.K. Patel and observed that the feasible test is whether upholding objections would culminate the proceedings (i.e., whether the order touches important rights/liabilities). The Court leaned on Bhaskar Industries for the proposition that the "feasible test" is whether upholding objections would culminate the proceedings. The Court also followed Bhaskar Industries in directing that certain precautions/undertakings be taken when granting s.205 relief.
Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pandey v. Uttam (1999 (2) PLJR 5 (SC)) The expression "interlocutory order" in s.397(2) is to be used in a restricted sense and does not include orders that touch important rights or liabilities of the parties. The Court relied substantially on the principles in this decision to hold that an order under s.205 can be intermediate or quasi-final (not purely interlocutory) if it affects important rights, and therefore may be subject to revision.
Madhu Limay v. State of Maharashtra ((1977) 4 SCC 551 : AIR 1978 SC 47) Supreme Court authority relied upon in assessing the scope of inherent powers (section 482) and revisional remedies in relation to orders like those under s.205. The Court noted that Ravi Singh's rejection of N.L. Poddar's view on s.482 was in view of Madhu Limay; Madhu Limay thus served as a touchstone in weighing the correctness of limiting inherent jurisdiction.
K.K. Patel v. State of Gujarat (2000) 6 SCC 195 Contains paragraph (para 11) relied upon to say that the interim stage of the case is not the sole test to decide whether an order is interlocutory; applicable test is whether upholding objections would culminate proceedings. The Court relied on K.K. Patel (as quoted in Bhaskar Industries) for the "feasible test" and applied that test to conclude s.205 orders may not be merely interlocutory where important rights/liabilities are affected.
V.C. Shukla v. State (1980 (2) SCR 380) Held that the term "interlocutory order" should be given a liberal construction in favour of the accused so as to ensure fairness of trial and to allow revisional power where the order is intermediate or quasi-final. The Court cited V.C. Shukla to support a liberal construction in favour of the accused and to justify treating certain s.205 orders as attracting revisional jurisdiction when they affect important rights.
Ram Harsh Das v. State of Bihar (1998 (1) PLJR 502) Deals with how the discretionary power under section 205 should be exercised (detailed discussion of the manner of exercise of discretion). The Court referred to Ram Harsh Das as an authority that discussed the manner of exercising the Magistrate's discretion under s.205 and relied on it to explain that exercise of discretion does not render an order purely interlocutory.
Jai Ram Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1992 CrLJ 810, Rajasthan HC Full Bench) Cited by petitioners as authority supporting that order rejecting section 205 relief is not an interlocutory order. The Court noted this authority among those relied upon by the petitioners in arguing that an order under s.205 may not be interlocutory; the Court's ultimate conclusion was consistent with the petitioners' reliance on such decisions.
Akram v. State of MP (2000 (106) CrLJ, MP High Court) Cited by petitioners to support the proposition that an order rejecting relief under s.205 is not an interlocutory order. The Court recorded reliance upon this decision by the petitioners and treated it as part of the body of authorities supporting a non-restricted meaning of "interlocutory order" for the purposes of s.397(2).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a detailed analysis at the admission stage and disposed of the revision finally. Its reasoning followed these principal steps:

  1. Identified the legal tension: whether an order rejecting a prayer under section 205 CrPC is an "interlocutory order" barred from revision under section 397(2) CrPC, or whether it affects important rights such that revision is maintainable.
  2. Examined relevant authority and tests: the Court relied on the Supreme Court's approach (notably K.K. Patel and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pandey) that the timing/stage of the order is not the sole test; rather the feasible test is whether upholding the party's objections would result in culminating the proceedings (i.e., whether the order touches important rights or liabilities).
  3. Applied that test to orders under section 205: the Court found that orders under s.205 can affect important rights of the accused — for example, the right to be represented through counsel on routine dates, and the liability to be bound by actions of counsel in the accused's absence — and therefore such orders may be intermediate or quasi-final rather than merely interlocutory.
  4. Considered exercise of discretion: the Court noted that grant of s.205 relief is discretionary and previous decisions (Ravi Singh, Ram Harsh Das) have elucidated how discretion is to be exercised; but the mere exercise of discretion does not render the resultant order purely interlocutory.
  5. Evaluated the facts: the Court found specific errors in the Magistrate's approach — failure to discuss various judgments cited, a wrong conclusion that allegations were "serious in nature," and a mistaken finding that the petitioners' identity was disputed. It also noted that at least for petitioner No. 3 a warrant had been wrongly issued where summons had not been served.
  6. Reached a factual-consequential conclusion: given that petitioners 1 and 2 are residents of distant places and petitioners (including No. 3) are being prosecuted due to association with a corporate body rather than for personal action, the Court concluded they deserved the benefit of section 205.
  7. Prescribed safeguards: while setting aside the impugned order, the Court allowed the lower court to require undertakings (that the petitioners will not dispute identity, that counsel will appear on fixed dates, and that they will not object to evidence being taken in their absence) as precautionary measures; it relied on Bhaskar Industries to say such precautions are routine.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision application was allowed; the impugned order of the Magistrate dated 8.3.2002 rejecting the petitioners' prayer under section 205 CrPC was set aside, and the court below was directed to allow the benefit of section 205 of the Code to the petitioners subject to reasonable safeguards.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The petitioners are to be granted the benefit of section 205 (dispensing with personal attendance/recall of warrants) subject to any undertaking the Magistrate may lawfully require (such as non-dispute of identity, counsel attendance on dates, and consent to taking of evidence in their absence).
  • The learned Magistrate's factual observations on seriousness of allegations and disputed identity were found to be erroneous; the lower court was directed not to be prejudiced by observations in the impugned or present order in subsequent proceedings.
  • The Court explicitly held that the earlier decision in N.L. Poddar v. State is no longer good law to the extent it held s.205 orders to be purely interlocutory and immune from revisional scrutiny; the Court therefore permitted revision in appropriate cases where s.205 orders affect important rights or liabilities.
  • The decision directs that magistrates should consider authorities and exercise discretion under s.205 in accordance with the principles summarized; it also authorizes magistrates to insist upon safeguards when granting s.205 relief.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

1. Because of nature of the order under challenge and the stage of criminal proceeding, this revision application has been heard in detail at the stage of admission itself and is being disposed of finally. All the three petitioners are accused in complaint case no. 456/2001 lodged by opposite party no. 2 and pending before Judicial Magistrate, Purnia. By the impugned order dated 8.3.2002 the learned Magistrate rejected the prayer of the petitioners to recall warrants of arrest issued against them and to dispense with personal appearance of the petitioners under section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’).

2. Before taking note of main issues and the submission of rival parties the essential facts may be noticed in brief. In May 2001 O.R No. 2, the complainant filed the complaint in question before the CJM, Purnia The complaint alleges that petitioners no. 1 and 2 are respectively the Area Manager at Patna and the Regional Manager at Kolkata of ESPN Software India Limited. Petitioner no. 3, Manu Sahni has been shown as representative of the aforesaid company located at New Delhi without giving details as to how he is the representative. It further appears from the complaint that two television channels belonging to the company were being operated by the complainant, a cable operator at Purnia. Allegedly, under a saving scheme launched by the company the complainant sent a draft of Rs. 93124/- dated 8.1.2001 to the company's Patna office. It further appears that allegedly the company wanted to adjust the draft amount towards certain old dues of the complainant but the draft could not be encashed due to complainant's instructions to his Bank to the effect that the draft was lost. In the complaint petition it has been further alleged that the draft was returned to the complainant but got lost at Patna and has somehow gone back in the custody of the accused and the company has admitted possession of the draft with them. Allegedly the company stopped supply of the two television channels from February 2001 after the draft could not be encashed. After due enquiry cognizance was taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate under section 420 IPC on 31.7.2001 for alleged deception by the three petitioners in obtaining the draft of Rs. 93124/- under company's Super Saver Scheme. It is not in dispute that the draft has not been encashed as yet. Initially, learned Magistrate chose to issue only summons against the petitioners which is permissible under law although section 420 of the IPC is a non-bailable offence punishable with more than two years of imprisonment and hence requires to be tried by a Magistrate as a warrant trial. It further appears that summons were served on petitioners no. 1 and 2, the two employees of the company at Patna and Kolkata respectively but there is no material on record to show service of summons on the representative of the company, petitioner no. 3 who admittedly resides at New Delhi. On 22.9.2001 the learned Magistrate noticed receipt of summons by petitioner nos. 1 and 2 and on that very date order was passed for issuance of bailable warrant of arrest which was actually issued on 23.11.2001 and before its service report could be received, on 15.12.2001 non-bailable warrant was ordered to be issued against all the three accused. The non-bailable warrants were actually issued on 21.12.2001 and the petitioners appeared in the court of learned Magistrate on 7.2.2002 by filing Vakalatnama and prayed for recall of the warrant of arrest and for being exempted from personal appearance.

3. On behalf of the petitioners it was submitted that since the petitioners are admittedly employees and representative of a corporate body and are residents of different places away from Purnea and since the case is actually of a petty nature in which no money has been taken by the petitioners in their individual capacity and nothing has been received by the Company also, the privilege of Section 205 of the Code should have been given to the petitioners and such privilege has been refused by the learned Magistrate by the impugned order by ignoring the fact that summons were never served upon representative of the Company, petitioner no. 3 and by wrongly holding in the impugned order that the allegation in the complaint petition is serious in nature and by wrongly mentioning that identity of the petitioners is disputed.

4. On behalf of opposite party no. 2, the complainant a preliminary objection was raised that the impugned order is interlocutory in nature and hence criminal revision is not maintainable before this Court in view of bar created by section 397(2) of the Code. On merits, it was submitted that once warrant was issued by the Magistrate there was no jurisdiction in the Magistrate to allow petitioner's prayer under Section 205 of the Code. In support of objection on the ground for bar in Section 397(2) of the Code, learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 placed reliance upon—1. 1979 BBCJ 132 (N.L Poddar v. State), 2. 1979 BBCJ 437 (Ravi Singh v. State) and 3. (2001) 7 SCC 401 (Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. Bhiwani Denim). On the other hand learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon—1, 1999 (2) PLJR 5 (SC) (Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pandey v. Uttam), 2. 1992 CrLJ 810 (a full Bench judgment of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Jai Ram Singh v. State of Rajasthan) and 3. 2000 (106) CrLJ (a judgment, of MP High Court in the case of Akram v. State of MP), to submit that although an order rejecting a prayer under section 205 of the Code is not a final order in the sense that it does not dispose of the proceeding finally but yet it is not an interlocutory order so as to attract the bar of section 397(2) of the Code. In the case of N.L Poddar (supra) this Court held that an order under section 205 of the Code is interlocutory in nature. It was further held that power of Magistrate is discretionary and hence, such order cannot be set aside in exercise of revisional power. The learned single Judge further proceeded to hold that such order cannot be set aside even in exercise of power under section 482 of the Code. The latter observation relating to inherent power under section 482 of the Code was not accepted by another learned Single Judge in the case of Ravi Singh (supra) in view of decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limay v. State of Maharastra ((1977) 4 SCC 551 : AIR 1978 SC 47). In this case several judgments of different courts were noticed to hold that section 205 covers those kinds of cases where summons ought to have been issued in the first instance but warrant has been issued by mistake and that benefit of section 205 should be liberally extended, particularly in all trivial and technical cases, to such accused persons, who are ladies, old and sick persons, workers in factories, daily earners, other labourers and busy business people or industrialists. The Supreme Court in the case of Bhaskar Industries Limited (supra) declined to decide whether an order under section 205 of the Code is interlocutory order or not. However, the court referred to judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K.K Patel v. State of Gujarat (2000) 6 SCC 195 and quoted with approval para 11 of the said report in which several other judgments of the Apex Court were referred, to come to a conclusion that the interim stage of the case at which an order under challenge has been passed is not the sole test to decide whether the order is interlocutory or not. It was further observed—“The feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, it would result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in section 397(2) of the Code.”

5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioners emphasized discussions made in paragraph 6 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of (Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pandey v. Uttam), to submit that as per law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment the expression—“interlocutory order” in section 397(2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in a broad or artistic sense and merely denotes orders of purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties. A perusal of the relevant discussion in the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court supports the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners that any order which touches or affects important right of the parties cannot be said to be an “interlocutory order”. In the case of V.C Shukla v. State, 1980 (2) SCR 380 also the Apex Court held that the term interlocutory order used in the Code has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial. This would also ensure that the revisional power of the High Court or the Sessions Judge could be attracted in case the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi final.

6. Although discussions in the case of Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pandey (supra) were in the context of an order of the Magistrate directing issues of process, it is for the principles for deciding the nature of an order whether it is interlocutory or not that strong reliance was placed upon the aforesaid judgment. On the touchstone of aforesaid principles decided by the Apex Court an order under section 205 of the Code has to be held to be an intermediate or quasi final order and not purely interlocutory in nature. This inference appears to be unavoidable after going through the provisions of the Code which confer certain rights and liabilities upon the accused which are consequent upon the outcome of a prayer under section 205 of the Code. An accused does not have a vested right that he must get the benefit of section 205 and grant of such benefit is a matter of discretion to be exercised by the Magistrate after properly considering several relevant aspects which may vary from case to case. How such discretionary power has to be exercised has been dealt with by two decisions of this Court in a detailed and lucid manner for which reference may be made to 1979 BBCJ 437 (Ravi Singh v. The State of Bihar) and 1998 (1) PLJR 502 (Ram Harsh Das v. State of Bihar). However, exercise of discretion by itself will not render the resultant order as purely interlocutory. The effect of the order has to be examined to find out whether the order decides or touches the important rights or liabilities of the parties or not. In a case under section 205 of the Code the right of the accused to be represented through counsel on routine dates when the court does not require his presence and his liability to be bound by the action of his counsel are certainly dependent upon the nature of the order passed and hence, such an order cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to attract the bar of section 397(2) of the Code.

7. In view of aforesaid discussion and finding which is based upon judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K.K Patel v. State of Gujarat (supra) and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pandey (supra) and V.C Shukla v. State (supra) this Court is compelled to observe that the judgment of this Court in the case of N.L Poddar is no longer a good case law.

8. There is no legal bar in exercise of power under section 205 of the Code when initially only summons were issued and petitioners were not taken into custody under the process of execution of warrant. At least in the case of petitioner no. 3 warrant had been wrongly issued when summons had not been served. Facts of the case and interest of justice require that petitioners 1 and 2 should get the same treatment under section 205 of the Code as petitioner no. 3.

9. Coming to the merits of the case, this Court finds that the learned Magistrate failed to discuss various judgments cited before him and it came to a wrong conclusion that the allegation in the complaint petition is serious in nature. At this stage this Court is not inclined to make any further comments on this aspect of the matter. As a precaution it is observed that during subsequent stage of the criminal proceeding the court below shall not to be prejudiced by any observation in the impugned order or in the present order of this Court relating to seriousness of allegations. The learned Magistrate also erred in holding that identity of the petitioners is disputed. The accused persons have not disputed their identity and the complainant has merely raised a controversy regarding the residential address of petitioner no. 3. On a careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds that the petitioners, who are residents of distant places away from Purnia and are facing criminal prosecution not on account of any personal action but on account of their association with a corporate body, deserve to be granted the benefit of section 205 of the Code. This conclusion has been arrived at after careful consideration of the nature of allegation in the complaint petition. Hence, the interest of justice also requires interference with the impugned order.

10. For the aforesaid reasons, this application is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the court below is directed to allow the benefit of section 205 of the Code to the petitioners. However, for the said purpose the court below will be at liberty to further direct the petitioners to give an undertaking to the satisfaction of the Court that they would not dispute their identity, and that a counsel on their behalf would be present in court on dates fixed and that they have no objection in taking of evidence in their absence. Even as per judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Bhaskar Industries Limited (supra) the aforesaid precautions are required to be taken by the Magistrate as a matter of course.