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Committee Of Managem... v. Deputy Director Of E...

Allahabad High Court
Sep 7, 1992
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Summary of Opinion by Sudhir Narain, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal is against the learned Single Judge's decision dated 17-8-1992 dismissing a writ petition which challenged an order of the Deputy Director of Education concerning entitlement to vote and participate in elections to the Committee of Management of Shri Radha Krishna Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya. The institution (a registered society that runs a degree college affiliated to Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya, Varanasi) had an ongoing dispute about Committee of Management elections since 1988. Elections were repeatedly held and challenged by various parties.

Key procedural milestones recorded in the opinion (as stated in the text):

  • On a reference to the Chancellor under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973, the Chancellor referred the matter to the Deputy Director of Education.
  • By order dated 21-6-1989 the Deputy Director of Education directed that fresh elections be held.
  • The Deputy Director's decision was the subject of a representation to the Vice-Chancellor (rejected on 1-8-1990), and that order was challenged before the Chancellor under Section 68; the Chancellor set aside the Vice-Chancellor's order by order dated 23-2-1991.
  • Respondent No. 3 filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6515 of 1991; this Court passed an interim order later modified on 15-11-1991 directing the Deputy Director of Education to hold fresh elections and empowering him to decide who were entitled to vote.
  • Thereafter the Deputy Director of Education passed an order (the opinion refers to an order dated 17-8-1992 and, earlier in the opinion, refers to an order dated 28th July 1992) deciding who were entitled to participate in the election. The appellants challenged that order on the ground that 33 members of the society entitled to participate were wrongly excluded.
  • The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition (relying upon an earlier decision in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 25472 of 1991, Hridaya Narain Rai v. Dy. Director of Education), taking the view that the High Court should not exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of an election process at its intermediate stage.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with an electoral process once that process has commenced, particularly when the challenge involves disputed questions of fact (for example, disputes as to who are entitled to vote or to submit nomination papers).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellants (through learned counsel) contended that the Court is not precluded from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 even after the election process has commenced.
  • They urged that certain members were being deprived of vital rights — the right to vote or to file nomination papers — and that in such circumstances those persons have a right to approach the High Court under Article 226 for protection of those rights.
  • The appellants relied upon a number of precedents in support of their submission that exceptional circumstances may warrant intervention in an ongoing election process.

Respondents' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, AIR 1952 SC 64 Principle that election law does not contemplate two attacks on matters connected with election proceedings — one by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 while elections are in progress and another after their completion by an election petition. The Court relied on this principle to support the general rule that courts should normally not interfere with an election process at its intermediate stage.
Nanhoo Mal v. Hira Mal, (1976) 3 SCC 211 : AIR 1975 SC 2140 Reiteration of the principle that controversial matters arising out of elections should ordinarily be postponed until after elections so that the process is not unduly retarded; irregularities that would vitiate an election should be raised by election petition before a special tribunal and not during the election process. Quoted with approval and used to reinforce the view that courts should avoid interim interference with ongoing election proceedings.
Gujarat University v. N.U. Rajguru, 1987 Supp SCC 512 : AIR 1988 SC 66 High Court erred in entertaining a writ petition to interfere with elections to University authorities; disputes about constitution of university authorities should be addressed under the statutory remedy (Section 58 of the Gujarat University Act) rather than by writ during the election process. Applied as an example of inappropriate interference by the High Court with elections that should have been addressed via statutory procedures.
S.T. Muthuswami v. K. Natrajan, (1988) 1 SCC 572 : AIR 1988 SC 616 It was not appropriate for the High Court to interfere with an election process at an intermediate stage (here, an Errata Notification concerning allotment of symbol) even if there was an error by the election authority or Returning Officer. Relied upon to show that High Court interference in mid-process even for procedural errors was generally inappropriate.
Chief Commissioner, Ajmer v. Radhey Shyam, AIR 1957 SC 304 Case where electoral roll was found not to conform with statutory provision (section 30(2) of the Ajmer Merwara Municipalities Regulation); writ relief was sustained on those facts. Distinguished on facts: the question whether the Judicial Commissioner should have exercised Article 226 did not arise; the Court noted that on the facts the electoral roll did not conform with statutory provision.
State of Karnataka v. G. Nagappa, (1976) 1 SCC 204 : AIR 1975 SC 1708 Affirmation of the principle that the list of voters and calendar of events are part of the election process and that the High Court should be cautious in interfering with the process once it has commenced; Ponnuswami cited with approval. The Court observed this case does not support the petitioner's contention for interference; it was cited to reinforce the non-interference rule.
B.K. Garad v. Nasik Merchants Co-op. Bank Ltd., (1984) 2 SCC 50 : AIR 1984 SC 192 Challenge to election litigated after an election petition was filed; this decision related to post-election contest and involved Article 227 in the High Court challenge. Distinguished because the challenge there was not made at an intermediate stage; used to contrast situations where interference occurs after completion of the process.
Bar Council of Delhi v. Surjeet Singh, (1980) 4 SCC 211 : AIR 1980 SC 1612 Where electoral roll is prepared on the basis of void and ultra vires rules (here proviso to rule 3(j) of Bar Council of Delhi Election Rules), the writ petition was entertained despite alternative remedies; writ relief available when the electoral framework itself is vitiated. Referred to as an exception where the Court entertained writ jurisdiction because the electoral roll was based on ultra vires rule-making.
Vishwabandhu Gupta v. Returning Officer, Bulandshahar, 1988 UP LB EC 776 High Court is not precluded from exercising Article 226 where nomination was rejected by the Returning Officer under section 7-A of the Town Area Act for a manifestly erroneous reason; courts can exercise writ power in relation to elections in exceptional cases. Quoted as persuasive authority within the State to demonstrate that exceptional circumstances (manifest error) may justify interference.
Sungram Singh v. Election Tribunal, AIR 1955 SC 425 Observation that, notwithstanding constitutional powers, it is sound discretion to bear in mind legislative policy to have disputes about special rights decided speedily; writ petitions in such cases should not be lightly entertained. Quoted approvingly to justify judicial restraint during the election process.
Hridaya Narain Rai v. Dy. Director of Education (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 25472 of 1991) Earlier decision relied upon by the learned Single Judge to support non-interference with the election process under Article 226. The learned Single Judge relied on this earlier decision when dismissing the writ petition; the present Court upheld the Judge's approach.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the central question as whether the High Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 where an electoral process is challenged, particularly when disputed questions of fact are involved. The reasoning proceeded by reference to a line of Supreme Court authorities and to local authority, which collectively embody a general principle of judicial restraint in the context of ongoing elections.

Step-by-step analysis as presented in the opinion:

  1. The court observed established authority (beginning with N.P. Ponnuswami and followed in subsequent decisions) stating that elections should be concluded according to schedule and that disputes likely to vitiate an election are ordinarily to be raised before the appropriate special forum (e.g., by way of election petition) rather than by invoking Article 226 during the course of the election.
  2. The court reviewed specific Supreme Court decisions (Nanhoo Mal, Gujarat University, S.T. Muthuswami, State of Karnataka) that reinforced the principle that the High Court should not interfere with the electoral process at an intermediate stage, including where procedural irregularities or errors by election authorities are alleged.
  3. The opinion acknowledged that exceptions exist where the electoral framework is vitiated (for example, where rules used to prepare an electoral roll are ultra vires — Bar Council of Delhi) or where electoral authorities act for manifestly erroneous reasons (Vishwabandhu Gupta). The court recognized that such extraordinary and exceptional circumstances must be decided case by case.
  4. The court considered practical consequences in the context of many educational institutions whose functioning depends on time-limited Committees of Management. Interference mid-process can delay elections and the running of institutions; moreover, disputed factual questions about membership and voting entitlement are not easily resolved in writ jurisdiction and appropriate remedies lie under statute, rules, regulations or by suit in a competent court.
  5. Applying these principles to the facts — notably that the Deputy Director of Education had been empowered by prior order to determine who could vote and had given both parties an opportunity of hearing before deciding — the court concluded that the learned Single Judge rightly declined to exercise Article 226 jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED. The special appeal was dismissed in limine.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The writ petition challenging the Deputy Director of Education's determination regarding entitlement to vote (which, as pleaded, resulted in exclusion of 33 members) was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, and that dismissal was upheld on appeal.
  • As a direct effect, the Deputy Director of Education's order determining entitlement to participate in the election stands (subject to any remedies not addressed in this opinion).

Broader implications: The opinion applies and reaffirms established principles of judicial restraint in relation to interference under Article 226 with an ongoing election process. The court emphasized that disputed factual questions about membership and voting entitlement are generally unsuitable for resolution in writ jurisdiction and that statutory or specialized remedies should be pursued. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent but applies existing authorities and the salutary principle that only in extraordinary circumstances should writ jurisdiction be invoked to interrupt an electoral process.

Decision rendered: Appeal dismissed.

Show all summary ...

Sudhir Narain, J.:— This special appeal has been filed against the decision of the learned Judge dated 17-8-1992 dismissing the writ petition filed challenging the order of the Dy. Director of Education dated 28th July 1992 by which he had decided as to who were entitled to voce and participate in the election of the Committee of Management of Shri Radha Krishna Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya.

2. The facts briefly stated are that Shri Radha Krishna Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya, Laxmi Niwas Bagh, Deoria, is a registered society which runs a degree college under the name of Sri Radha Krishna Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya (hereinafter called the college) in distriet Deoria. It is affiliated to the Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya, Varanasi. The college is run and managed by a Committee of Management wh'ch is to be elected in accor-dance with the bye-laws of the society of the college. The dispute regarding the election of the member. of the Committee of Management is going on since the year 1988. The electious were held several times and such election was challenged either by the appellant or by the respondents. On a reference being made to the Chancellor under Section 68 of the U.P State Universities Act, 1973, the Chancellor referred the matter for decision to the Dy. Director of Education and on 21-6-1989 the order was passed by the Dy. Director of Education directing to hold fresh elections. His decision was challenged by way of representation by the appellant No. 2 before the Vice Chancellor which was rejected by him on 1-8-1990. The appellant No. 2 challenged the said order before the Chancellor under section 68 of the U.P State Universities Act, 1973. The Chancellor set aside the said order of the Vice Chancellor by order dated 23-2-1991. The respondent no. 3 filed Civil Misc. writ petition No. 6515 of 1991. This Court passed an interim order which was modified on 15-11-1991 and a direction was given to the Dy. Director of Education to hold fresh election of the Committee of Management and the Dy. Director of Education was further empowered to decide about the persons who were entitled to vote in the election of the members of the Committee of Management. In accordance with the said direction the Dy. Director of Education by an order dated 17-8-1992 decided the persons who were entitled to participate in the election, The order was passed after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. The appellants filed the writ petition challenging the order of the Dy. Director of Education on the basis that the findings recorded by the Dy. Director of Education was erroneous and he wrongly and illegally excluded 33 members of the society who were entitled to participate in the election of the Committee of Management. The learned Single Judge relying upon his earlier decision in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 25472 of 1991 Hridaya Narain Rai v. Dy. Director of Education dismissed the writ petition taking the view that the Court should not exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution regarding an election process at its inter-mediate stage.

3. The main question involved in this appeal is as to whether the High Court should exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India where the electoral process is challenged particularly when it involves disputed questions of facts. The matter came up for consideration before the Supreme Court and in various cases it was held that once the election process has started normally the High Court should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In N.P Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, AIR 1952 SC 64, the Supreme Court took the view that law of elections in India does not contemplate that there should be two attacks on matters connected with election proceedings, one while they are going on by invoking the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and another after they have been completed by means of an election petition.

4. In Nanhoo Mal v. Hira Mal, (1976) 3 SCC 211 : AIR 1975 SC 2140, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court holding that the High Court was mistaken in setting aside the order of the District Magistrate issuing notice to the members of the Board informing that the nomination papers should be filed. It quoted with approval observation of the Supreme Court in Ponnuswami's case (supra)—

“(1) Having regard to the important functions which the legislatures have to perform in democratic countries, it has always been recognised to be a matter of first importance that elections should be concluded as early as possible according to time schedule and all controversial matters and disputes arising out of elections should be postponed till after the elections are over so that the election proceedings may not be unduly retarded or protracted.

(2) In conformity with this principle, the scheme of the election law in this country as well as in England is that no significances should be attached to anything which does not affect the “election”, and if any irregularities are committed while it is in progress and they belong to the category or class which, under the law by which elections are governed, would have the effect of vitiating the “election” and enable the person affected to call it in question, they shou'd be brought up before a special tribunal by means of an election petition and not be made the subject of a dispute before any court while the election is in progress.”

5. This view was reaffirmed in Gujarat University v. N.U Rajguru, 1987 Supp SCC 512 : AIR 1988 SC 66. The teachers of Gujarat University challenged the holding of the election of certain members to the ‘Court’ of the University by means of a writ petition before the High Court, tha High Court accepted the contentions of the petitioners and set aside the election. The Supreme Court took the view that the High Court committed an error in entertaining Ihe writ petition and interfering with the election when the dispute with regard to the Constitution of any of the authorities of the University should have been referred to the State Government under Section 58 of the Gujarat Univer-sity Act.

6. In S.T Muthuswami v. K. Natrajan, (1988) 1 SCC 572 : AIR 1988 SC 616, where the election was challenged on the ground that there was an error in the matter of allotment of symbol to the candidates contesting such election. The High Court in its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution set aside the issuing Errata Notification, the Supreme Court held that it was not appropriate for the High Court to interfere with an election process at an intermediate stage after the commencement of the election process and before the declaration of the results for the purpose of filling up the vacancy in the office of the Chairman of Panchayat Union even if there is any mistake committed either by an election authority or by the Returning Officer in the allotment of symbol to a party.

7. The learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance upon certain decisions in support of the contention that the court is not precluded from exercising it jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution even if once election process has commenced. He urged that the members who are entitled to participate in the election will be deprieved of their vital rights either in exercising votes or to submit nomination papers to stand as a candi-date in the election and in such a situation such persons have a right to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

8. He placed reliance upon the decision in Chief Commissioner, Ajmer v. Radhey Shyam, AIR 1957 SC 304. In this case the learned Judicial Commissioner, Ajmer had restrained the District Magistrate, Ajmer from holding election of the Ajmer Municipal Committee on the ground that rule 7 of the Election Rules was not in consonance with and was in contradiction to section 30(2) of the Ajmer Merwara Muuicipalities Regulation. The Supreme Court upheld the said decision of the learned Judicial Commissioner. The appeal was heard ex-parte as fhe respondent had communicated to the Court that he did not desire to contest the appeal. The question whether the learned Judicial Commissioaer should have exercised power under Article 226 of the Contitution did not arise in this case. On the facts, the Supreme Court found that the electoral roll published by the Chief Commissioner was not in conformity with the provisions of section 30(2) of the Regulation.

9. In State of Karanataka v. G. Nagappa, (1976) 1 SCC 204 : AIR 1975 SC 1708, the State Government by an order cancelled the calendar of events published by the Returning Officer and directed him to issue fresh calender of events after getting the voters lists completed strictly as per the division notified. The writ petition was filed in the High Court questioning the validity of that order. The High Court set aside the said order taking the veiw that the State Government had no power to cancel the calendar of events validly fixed by the Returning Officer and State in the election process which had already commenced. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the High Court and quoted with approvel Ponnuswami's case (Supra).

“The list of voters is to be prepared for the election and ‘election’ means the entire process consisting of several stages and embracing several steps by which an elected member is returned. Whether or not it is found necessary to take a poll.

10. This case does not support the contention of the petitioner.

11. The petitioner further relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in B.K Garad v. Nasik Merchants Co-Op. Bank Ltd., (1984) 2 SCC 50 : AIR 1984 SC 192. In this case the election of the members of the Committee of Nasik Merchants Co-Op. Bank Ltd. was challenged after the election petition was filed before the Additional Commissioner, Nasik who set aside the election petition hold-ing that mandatory provision of Maharashtra Co-op. Societies Act were not followed and that materially affected the election. The said decision was challenged in the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The challenge to the election was not made at the intermediate stage.

12. The learned counsel for the appellant laid much emphasis on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bar Council of Delhii v. Surjeet Singh, (1980) 4 SCC 211 : AIR 1980 SC 1612. The Bar Council of Delhi prepared electoral roll in accordance with the proviso to rule 3(j) of Bar Council of Delhi Election Rules, the effect of which was that out of 5000 advocates the names of about 2000 advocates were excluded from the electoral roll prepared by Delhi Bar Council. The proviso to rule 3(j) of the Election Rules of the Bar Council of Delhi was held ultra vires The Supreme Court repelled the argument that the writ petition cannot be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of alternative remedy when the electoral roll is prepared on the basis of void and ultra vires rules relating to preparation of electoral roll.

13. Similarly, in Vishwabandhu Gupta v. Returning Officer, Bulandshahar, 1988 UP LB EC 776, this court took the view that the High Court is not precluded from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution where the nomination of the candidate for the office of Chairman of the Municipal Board, was rejected by the Returning Officer under section 7-A of the Town Area Act for manifestly erroneous reason. The Court can exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution in relation to the elections. It quoted with approval the observations of the Supreme Court in Sungram Singh v. Election Tribunal, AIR 1955 SC 425—

“though no legislature can impose limitations on these consti-tutional powers it is a sound exercise of discretion to bear in mind the policy of the legislature to have disputes about these special rights decided as speed-ily as may be. Therefore, writ petition should not be lightly entertained in this class of cases.”

14. The above view was taken as a satutory Principle and the Court in S.T Muthusami's case (supra) made an observation that “we are inclined to accept this view which lays down a salutary principle. What are the extra ordinary and exceptional circumstances has to be decided in each case.”

15. In this State there are large number of educational institutions and the functioning of such institutions are controlled and managed by a Committee of Management. Such Committee is constituted under the rules, regulations or certain Administrative Schemes. The term of such Committee of Management is limited by time. The election process inter alia involves the determination of the members who can vote and participate in the election, nomination, preparation and publication of programme, scrutiny and declaration of result. In case, at the intermediate stage of the election process the High Court entertains petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution it will further delay the election process. Secondly, the disputed question of fact as to who are the members and other related matters cannot be decided in the writ jurisdiction. A person who has any grievance can take recourse to the remedy provided under the Statute, Rules or Regulations or by filing suit in the competent court of law. the learned Judge from the facts and circum-stances of the case rightly declined to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the result the special appeal is dismissed in limine.

16. Appeal dismissed.