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Harbhagwan Das v. Daljit Singh .

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Apr 15, 1971
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (A.D. Koshal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant filed a criminal complaint in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hoshiarpur, alleging that the respondent (an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police) had beaten, abused and illegally confined him, and charged the respondent under sections 323 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code. Preliminary evidence was recorded and a summons was issued for 28 October 1967; the respondent failed to appear and the matter was adjourned to 9 November 1967. On 9 November neither party appeared and it was adjourned to 15 November 1967, when the Magistrate dismissed the complaint for failure of the complainant (the appellant) to appear.

On 21 November 1967 the appellant filed a fresh complaint in the same Court alleging offences under sections 323, 504 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code arising from the same occurrence. The appellant explained the earlier absence by stating he had been ill at Kangra and remained ill for a week. The Magistrate obtained the earlier file and on 4 January 1968 passed an order which, on the Magistrate's recital, noted that the accused had been acquitted in the earlier case under section 342 IPC and concluded that the accused could not be tried again for the same offence; the Magistrate dismissed the new complaint.

The present appeal by leave granted challenges that order of 4 January 1968 dismissing the new complaint.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an acquittal under section 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (acquittal for complainant's default in a summons case) amounts to an "acquittal after trial" within the meaning of sub-section (1) of section 403 of the Code, thereby barring a second complaint for the same offence.
  2. Whether the Magistrate had jurisdiction to dismiss the fresh complaint in respect of offences under sections 323 and 504 IPC when the previous proceedings resulted in an acquittal recorded (at least on the Magistrate's recital) only for an offence under section 342 IPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that an acquittal under section 247 (where the accused is acquitted because the complainant did not appear) is not an acquittal "after trial" and therefore is not covered by sub-section (1) of section 403 CrPC; consequently, a second complaint arising from the same occurrence could be entertained.
  • The appellant relied on Bezwada Kotayya v. Konathalapalli Venkayya (A.I.R. 1918 Mad 212) for the proposition that dismissal for default before particulars are stated under section 242 means the accused has not been "tried" under section 403(1).

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent relied on the Magistrate's recital that there had been an acquittal under section 342 IPC in the earlier proceedings and argued that the acquittal barred retrial for offences arising from the same facts (including, as contended by the respondent, offences under section 504 IPC and possibly section 323 IPC), i.e., that the dismissal of the prior complaint was an acquittal after trial and thus prevented entertaining the fresh complaint.
  • It was also contended on the respondent's behalf (as stated in the opinion) that the previous complaint had alleged all the facts constituting the offence under section 504 IPC, and therefore a second trial was barred.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bezwada Kotayya v. Konathalapalli Venkayya, A.I.R. 1918 Mad 212 Held that in a summons case the trial does not begin until particulars are stated under s.242, and that dismissal for default before that point does not amount to a trial within s.403(1). The court considered this authority but rejected its view, noting that an "overwhelming mass of authority" takes the contrary view. The court declined to adopt Bezwada Kotayya's proposition and held that an acquittal under s.247 is to be regarded as an acquittal after trial for the purposes of s.403(1).
The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kokkiliaguda Meeraya, 1969 Cr. A.R. 40 (S.C.) Expounded rules from s.403 CrPC, including that distinct offences for which separate charges could have been made but were not may later be tried (rule (2) in the Court's summary). The court relied on the rules distilled from this decision (especially rule (2)) to hold that section 403 did not bar the fresh complaint insofar as it alleged the offence under s.504 IPC (and potentially s.323 IPC if no prior acquittal for that count was recorded), because a distinct offence not charged earlier could be subsequently tried.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a stepwise legal analysis grounded in the Code of Criminal Procedure and the cited authorities:

  1. The court first identified the key statutory provision at issue: sub-section (1) of section 403 CrPC, which bars retrial for an offence once a person has been acquitted or convicted by a competent court while that acquittal or conviction remains in force.
  2. It noted that the acquittal in the earlier proceedings had been recorded under section 247 CrPC (which prescribes acquittal where a complainant fails to appear on the day fixed for the accused's appearance in a summons case, subject to the Magistrate's discretion to adjourn). The text of section 247 was quoted to show the statutory mechanism by which the earlier acquittal arose.
  3. The appellant's argument (supported by Bezwada Kotayya) that an acquittal under s.247 is not an acquittal after trial was considered. The court rejected that argument, observing that although Bezwada Kotayya took that view, there was an "overwhelming mass of authority" to the contrary (including references in authoritative commentary). The court therefore adopted the view that an acquittal under s.247 is to be treated as an acquittal after trial for the purposes of s.403(1).
  4. The court then analyzed whether the earlier acquittal (as recorded) covered the offences charged in the fresh complaint (s.323, s.504 and s.342 IPC). The Magistrate's recital stated the prior acquittal was in respect of an offence under s.342 IPC only. If that recital was correct, then the acquittal would not operate to bar trial for offences under s.323 or s.504 IPC because no conviction or acquittal in force had been recorded in respect of those offences within the meaning of s.403(1).
  5. The court observed, however, that the final order in the previous complaint was not on the record before this Court and that the respondent contended (by recital in the memorandum of appeal) that the earlier complaint had alleged s.323 and s.342 IPC; if indeed an acquittal in the earlier order had covered s.323 as well, retrial on that count would be barred. The court remitted that factual question to the trial Court to decide.
  6. As to the offence under s.504 IPC, the court concluded that no acquittal of the respondent in respect of that offence had been recorded before the fresh complaint was filed. Even if facts amounting to s.504 had been alleged earlier, if no separate charge was framed and no acquittal recorded, s.403 would not bar the fresh complaint. The court applied the principles set out in The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kokkiliaguda Meeraya, particularly rule (2), which permits subsequent trial for a distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made in the earlier trial but was not.
  7. On the basis of the above analysis the court concluded that section 403 did not preclude entertaining the fresh complaint in respect of s.504 IPC (and in respect of s.323 IPC if it were found that no prior acquittal for that count had been recorded). However, the court confirmed the acquittal already recorded in respect of s.342 IPC.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEAL ALLOWED; THE IMPUGNED ORDER OF 4 JANUARY 1968 IS SET ASIDE IN SO FAR AS IT DISMISSED THE NEW COMPLAINT.

Direct consequences ordered by the Court:

  • The learned Magistrate is directed to entertain the fresh complaint in respect of the offence under section 504 IPC.
  • If, upon examination of the earlier proceedings, it is found that no acquittal was recorded in respect of the offence under section 323 IPC in the previous proceedings, the learned Magistrate shall also entertain the complaint in respect of the offence under section 323 IPC.
  • The acquittal of the respondent in respect of the offence under section 342 IPC is confirmed.

Broader implications and precedent impact:

  • The court rejected the narrower view (as taken in Bezwada Kotayya) that an acquittal under section 247 is not an acquittal after trial, endorsing the mainstream view that a s.247 acquittal is an acquittal for the purposes of s.403(1). Thus, where an acquittal under s.247 has in fact been recorded for a particular offence, s.403(1) will generally bar a subsequent prosecution for that same offence.
  • At the same time the court applied the established rule (drawn from the Kokkiliaguda Meeraya decision) that distinct offences arising from the same transaction, for which separate charges could have been made but were not, may be the subject of a subsequent trial; therefore acquittal on one count does not automatically bar trial on distinct counts not previously tried or acquitted.
  • The decision's effect is essentially remedial and procedural in relation to the parties: it remands the matter to the Magistrate for further action consistent with the findings above. The opinion does not present a novel legal principle beyond applying existing authorities and does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond its factual disposition.

Disposition: Appeal allowed; impugned order set aside in part; matter remitted to the Magistrate to entertain the complaint for s.504 IPC and, if appropriate on scrutiny of earlier records, for s.323 IPC; s.342 IPC acquittal confirmed.

Show all summary ...

A.D Koshal, J.:— This is an appeal by leave granted under the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) against the order dated the 4th of January, 1968, of Shri Mohinder Singh, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hoshiarpur, dismissing a complaint filed in his Court by the appellant in respect of offences under sections 323, 504 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code alleged to have been committed by the respondent who is employed as an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police in Hoshiarpur District.

2. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be briefly stated. Alleging that the appellant had been beaten, abused and illegally confined by the respondent, he (the appellant) filed a complaint against the respondent in respect of offences under sections 323 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hoshiarpur, who after recording preliminary evidence, issued a summons against the respondent for the 28th of October, 1967, on which date, however, the respondent did not appear in Court and the case was adjourned to the 9th of November, 1967. On the date last mentioned neither of the parties appeared in Court and the case was adjourned to the 15th of November, 1967, when the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate dismissed the complaint for failure of the complainant-appellant to appear. On the 21st of November, 1967, the appellant filed a fresh complaint against the respondent in the same Court but in respect of offences under sections 323, 504 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code although they were alleged to have arisen from the same occurrence which was the subject-matter of the previous complaint. In the new complaint the appellant mentioned that he had fallen ill at Kangra on the date of hearing fixed in the previous case (presumably the 9th of November, 1967) and had remaired ill for a week. The learned Magistrate sent for the file of that case and passed the following order on the 4th of January, 1968:—

“Complainant is present. The accused was acquitted in case under section 342 I.P.C which is a summons case. Hence the accused cannot be tried again for the same offence. Complaint is dismissed and be filed.”

3. It is this order that is impugned in the present appeal.

4. Learned counsel for the parties are agreed before us that the impugned order would be liable to be set aside unless it could be justified with reference to the provisions of section 403 of the Code, the relevant portion of which is quoted below:

“403. (1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, white such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under section 236, or for which he might have been convicted under section 237.

“(2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him on the former trial under section 235, sub-section (1)

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5. The acquittal of the respondent in the previous case was in accordance with the provisions of section 247 of the Code which states—

“247. If the summons has been issued on complaint, and upon the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day:

Provided that where the Magistrate is of opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dispense with his attendance, and proceed with the case.”

6. According to learned counsel for the appellant, an acquittal under section 247 of the Code is not an acquittal after trial and, therefore, not covered by sub-section (1) of section 403 of the Code. His contention, therefore, is that in spite of the acquittal of the respondent in the previous complaint, the learned Magistrate was bound to proceed with the second complaint in respect of all the offences which it disclosed. With this contention we do not find ourselves in agreement, although it does receive support from Bezwada Kotayya v. Konathalapalli Venkayya . A.I.R 1918 Mad 212., relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant. In that case it was held that the trial of a summons case cannot be said to begin until the particulars of the offence are stated to the accused under section 242 of the Code and that if a complaint giving rise to such a case was dismissed for default before such particulars were so stated, the accused could not be said to have been “tried” within the meaning of sub-section (1) of section 403 of the Code so that a second complaint for the offence of which he was earlier acquitted would lie. There is, however, an overwhelming muss of authority against the view expressed in Bezwada Katayya v. Konathalapalli Venkayya, supra (see footnotes 3 and 4 appearing at page 2654 under Note 7 to section 403 in A.I.R Commentaries on “the Code of Criminal Procedure” by Chitaley and Rao, 1965 Edition). According to the view which thus holds the field, any acquittal under section 247 of the Code would be an acquittal after trial…..a proposition to which, we also subscribe. The contention above mentioned, therefore, must be repelled.

7. The next contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that in so far as the new complaint was dismissed in respect of offences under sections 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, the impugned order was without jurisdiction. Now if the recital in that order about the acquittal in the previous case being only one in relation to an offence under section 342 of the Indian Penal Code is correct, the contention is unassailable because in that event it cannot be said that there is any conviction or acquittal in force with regard to the offences under sections 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code within the meaning of the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 403 of the Code. The final order in the previous complaint, however, is not on the file and it may be as is contended on behalf of the respondent on the basis of a recital in the memorandum of appeal presented to this Court to the effect that the previous complaint alleged the commission of offences under sections 323 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code by the respondent, that order directed an acquittal of the respondent not only in respect of an offence under section 342 of the Indian Penal Code but also of one under section 323 thereof. If that be so, the fresh complaint will not be liable to be entertained in respect of the offence last mentioned also. That is a matter, however, which we leave to be finally decided by the trial Court to which this case is being remanded. With regard to the offence under section 504 of the Indian Penal Code, it is quite clear that the respondent's acquittal thereof was never recorded by any Magistrate before the new complaint was filed. Besides, even if it could he said that the previous complaint was one disclosing inter alia an offence under that section, the Magistrate could only order a discharge of the respondent on failure of the appellant to appear in court on any date of hearing before the charge was framed. Section 403 of the Code, therefore, does not come into play with regard to the offence under section 504 of the Indian Penal Code. This proposition is sought to be controverted on behalf of the respondent on the plea tint in the previous complaint all the facts constituting this offence were alleged and that the dismissal of the previous complaint being one after trial, a second trial was barred. The provisions of section 403 of the Code, however, dearly point to the contrary. As laid down in The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kokkiliaguda Meeraya . 1969 Cr. A.R 40 SC., the following important rules emerge from the terms of section 403 of the Code.

“(1) An order of conviction or acquittal in respect of any offence constituted by any act against or in favour of a person does not prohibit a trial for any other offence constituted by the same act which he may have committed, if the Court trying the first offence was in-competent to try that other offence.

(2) If in the course of a transaction several offences are committed for which separate charges could have been mace, but if a person is tried in respect of some of those charges, and not all, and if acquitted or convicted, he may be tried for any distinct offence for which at the former trial a separate charge may have been, but was not, made.

(3) If a person is convicted of any offence constituted by any act, and that act together with the consequences which resulted therefrom constitute a different offence, he may again be tried for that different offence arising out of the consequences, if the consequences had not happened or were not known to the Court to have happened, at the time when he was convicted.

(4) A person who has once been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and has been either convicted or acquitted shall not be tried for the same offence or for any other offence arising out of the same facts, for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made or for which he might have been convicted under the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

8. Rule (2) above enunciated is fully applicable to the facts of the present case and we hold that section 403 of the Code did not stand in the way of the entertainment of the complaint in respect of an offence under section 504 of the Indian Penal Code (and also of one under section 323 thereof if no acquittal was recorded in respect thereof in the earlier proceedings).

9. For the reasons stated, we accept the appeal and set aside the impugned order in so far it dismisses the new complaint in, toto. The learned Magistrate shall entertain the complaint in respect of the offence under section 504 of the Indian Penal Code and if it turns out that in the previous proceedings no acquittal was recorded for an offence under section 323 of the Indian Penal Code, also in respect of that offence. The acquittal of the respondent in respect of the offence under section 342 of the Indian Penal Code is confirmed.

10. Appeal allowed.