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The Tata Oil Mills C... v. Director, Marketing,...
Judgment Summary — N.P. Singh, J. (with concurrence by Yadunath Sharan Singh, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner filed a writ application seeking quashing of an order dated 18.5.1984 passed by the Director, Marketing, Bihar State Agricultural Marketing Board (the Board). The impugned order held that refined coconut oil is a vegetable oil and, therefore, an agricultural produce within the meaning of section 2(1)(a) of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 (the Act).
The petitioner manufactures crystal-clear refined coconut oil for use as hair oil and sells it in various Bihar markets. Since 1975 the petitioner received notices from the Board directing it to register as a trader under the Act in respect of coconut oil. The petitioner resisted, contending that coconut oil is not an agricultural produce under the (original) definition of section 2(1)(a) and that coconut cannot be treated as a "vegetable" so as to bring its oil within the item "vegetable oil" in the Schedule.
The writ challenged the Board's view; the court considered the issue in light of the original and the amended definition of "agricultural produce" (the amendment being Act 60 of 1982, effective 30.4.1982). The court ultimately dismissed the petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether refined coconut oil is a "vegetable oil" and thereby an "agricultural produce" within the meaning of section 2(1)(a) of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960.
- Whether, under the original (pre-Act 60 of 1982) definition, a processed or manufactured product such as coconut oil could be regarded as agricultural produce only if specifically mentioned in the Schedule.
- What effect the substitution of the definition of "agricultural produce" by Act 60 of 1982 has on the question whether coconut oil is an agricultural produce covered by the Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner argued that coconut oil is not an "agricultural produce" within the meaning of section 2(1)(a) as it stood before the 1982 amendment, because the Schedule did not list coconut oil and the original definition linked agricultural produce to items "specified in the Schedule."
- It was contended that coconut cannot be held to be a "vegetable" so that its oil could be included under the Schedule item "vegetable oil".
- The petitioner relied on the pre-amendment wording of section 2(1)(a) and authorities (including a Madras High Court decision) suggesting coconut was not a "fresh fruit" or "vegetable" for sales-tax exemption purposes.
- The petitioner also submitted that dictionaries and encyclopaedias should not be given undue weight where the statutory definition is clear, citing the Supreme Court decision in Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports v. K.T. Koselram as authority for the limited role of dictionaries where statutory text is clear.
Board's Arguments
- The Board contended that coconut is a fruit and, if so included in the genus "vegetable" in a generic sense, any oil derived from coconut should be regarded as "vegetable oil."
- The Board pointed to reference works (Chamber's Encyclopaedia and chemistry tables) that categorize coconut oil among vegetable fats/oils, arguing this supports treating coconut oil as vegetable oil for purposes of the Schedule.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dy. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Tiruchivapalli v. Hameed Trading Company [32 (1973) Sales Tax Cases 228] | Held that coconut was not a "fresh fruit" or a "vegetable" for the purposes of a sales-tax exemption notification; used as an authority questioning classification of coconut as a vegetable. | The petitioner relied on this decision to support the contention that coconut (and by extension coconut oil) is not a vegetable; the court discussed the decision as part of the prior controversy but did not accept it as determinative in light of subsequent treatment and the statutory amendment. |
| S.M. Narayana v. S.P.R.M. Subramanian Chettiar (AIR 1937 Madras 254) — Full Bench | Held that coconuts are fruits, coconut trees are fruit trees and coconut plantation is a fruit garden (context: Estates Lands Act). | The court cited this Full Bench decision as support for treating coconut as a fruit; the opinion used this to reason that coconut and its derivatives can fall within a generic notion of "vegetable" or be regarded as agricultural produce. |
| Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, New Delhi v. K.T. Koselram (AIR 1971 SC 1283) | Principle that dictionaries are of limited aid when the statutory meaning is clear; dictionaries may be consulted when an expression in a statute is not clearly defined. | The petitioner invoked this Supreme Court principle to argue against heavy reliance on dictionaries/encyclopaedias; the court acknowledged the principle while also noting that dictionaries and encyclopaedias had been consulted in the prior controversy about coconut's classification. |
| Motipur Zamindary Company Limited v. The State Of Bihar (AIR 1962 SC 660) | Illustrative use of dictionaries (Webster's and Oxford) by the Supreme Court when examining whether sugarcane was a "vegetable". | The court referenced this case as precedent for the permissible use of dictionaries in construing whether a product is a "vegetable" in the absence of a clear statutory definition. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court structured its analysis around two temporal frames: (1) the position after the substitution of the definition of "agricultural produce" by Act 60 of 1982 (effective 30.4.1982), and (2) the position prior to that amendment.
On the amended definition (post-30.4.1982), the court observed that the substituted definition expressly provides that "'agricultural produce' means all produce whether processed or non-processed, manufactured or not, of agriculture, horticulture, plantation, animal husbandry, forest, sericulture, pisciculture and includes livestock or poultry as specified in the schedule." The court emphasized that:
- The new definition unambiguously includes processed and manufactured products derived from the listed categories (agriculture, horticulture, plantation, etc.).
- The amendment thereby largely delinks the concept of "agricultural produce" from the Schedule: under the original definition only items "specified in the Schedule" were agricultural produce, whereas the new definition contains no such general restriction.
- Reference to the Schedule in the new definition is primarily in the context of livestock and poultry (an inclusive reference), so specification in the Schedule is no longer a prerequisite for other items to qualify as agricultural produce.
Applying this textual change, the court concluded that coconut oil, being an admitted processed or manufactured product derived from coconut (itself a product of agriculture/horticulture/plantation), falls within the amended statutory meaning of "agricultural produce." The court further noted that, because of the broadened definition, it was unnecessary to decide whether coconut oil must be categorized specifically as a "vegetable oil" under the Schedule to qualify as agricultural produce.
Turning to the pre-amendment controversy, the court reviewed the authorities and reference works cited by the parties. It observed conflicting earlier authorities: one Madras High Court decision had held coconut not to be a "fresh fruit" or "vegetable" for sales-tax exemption purposes (Dy. Commissioner v. Hameed Trading Co.), while a Full Bench of the Madras High Court (S.M. Narayana) had characterized coconuts as fruits and coconut plantations as fruit gardens. The court also noted dictionary and encyclopaedia definitions that classify coconut as a fruit and classify coconut oil among vegetable fats/oils.
The court accepted that, even under the generic sense of the word "vegetable," coconut can be included within that genus and that coconut oil can therefore be regarded as a "vegetable oil" as listed in the Schedule. Additionally, the court observed that coconut appears in item 21 of Schedule IX (in the category "Condiments, Spices and others"), and reasoned that if coconut was included in the Schedule as an agricultural produce, then processed derivatives such as coconut oil would also be treated as agricultural produce under the original definition which already referred to "all produce whether processed or non-processed of agriculture, horticulture etc."
Summarizing both strands of analysis, the court found it difficult to sustain the petitioner's objection that coconut oil could not be agricultural produce: (a) the amended definition clearly covers processed/manufactured products and thereby includes coconut oil; and (b) even under the earlier definition there were textual and schedule-based reasons to treat coconut oil as derived from a scheduled agricultural product.
The court therefore concluded that there was no scope for the petitioner's contention that coconut oil is not an agricultural produce within the meaning of the Act.
Holding and Implications
Holding: THE APPLICATION IS DISMISSED. The writ petition challenging the Board's order of 18.5.1984 was unsuccessful. The court also ordered that "there shall be no order as to costs."
Implications (direct effect on the parties):
- The Board's determination that refined coconut oil is within the scope of "agricultural produce" under section 2(1)(a) of the Act is upheld by this decision.
- As a direct consequence, the petitioner's challenge to the notice/registration requirement imposed by the Board (based on the Board's classification) failed, and the petition was dismissed without costs.
The opinion reasons from the amended statutory definition and prior authority; it does not purport to set out a novel, distinct legal principle beyond applying the amended statutory text to the facts. The court's reasoning was concurred in by Yadunath Sharan Singh, J.
N.P Singh, J.:— The petitioner has filed this writ application for quashing an order dated 18.5.1984 passed by the Director, Marketing, Bihar State Agricultural Marketing Board (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Board’) holding that the refined coconut oil is a vegetable oil, and, as such, an agricultural produce within the meaning of section 2(1)(a) of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Act’).
2. It is the case of the petitioner that it manufactures crystal clear refined coconut oil for use as a hair oil which is sold in different markets of Bihar. It has been stated that since the year 1975 the petitioner had been receiving notice from the authorities of the respondent-Board directing the petitioner to get itself registered as a trader in accordance with the provisions of the Act in respect of coconut oil. The petitioner has resisted the said claim by saying that coconut oil was not an agricultural produce within the meaning of section 2(1)(a). According to the petitioner, unless coconut oil is held to be a vegetable oil it is not covered by any of the items mentioned in the Schedule of the Act. It was submitted that coconut cannot be held to be a vegetable so that its oil can be included under the item “vegetable oil”. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the definition of ‘agricultural produce’ as it stood before the amendment introduced by Act 60 of 1982. Section 2(1)(a) was as follows:
‘agricultural produce’ includes all produce, whether processed or non-processed of agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry and forest specified in the Schedule.”
3. It was submitted that all produce whether processed or non-processed of agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry and forest as specified in the Schedule of the Act shall only be deemed to be agricultural produce. Our attention was drawn to the different items of the Schedule and it was pointed out that there was no mention of any coconut oil against any of the items of the schedule.
4. Before I express my opinion as to whether coconut oil can be held to be an agricultural produce within the meaning of the expression as originally defined, I may point out that the definition of ‘agricultural produce’ has been substituted by Act 60 of 1982, which came in force on 30.4.1982 and is as follows:—
5. The English rendering of the said new definition is as follows:—
‘agricultural produce’ means all produce whether processed or non-processed, manufactured or not, of agriculture, horticulture, plantation, animal husbandry, forest sericulture, pisciculture and includes livestock or poultry as specified in the schedule.”
6. The new definition appears to have been introduced in the background of controversies raised in different courts as to whether agricultural produce shall include even the manufactured products of agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry, etc. While saying in clear and unambiguous term that ‘agricultural produce’ shall mean not only the product of agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry, forest etc. in its original form, but also what has been processed and manufactured from such original products, the definition has to a great extent delinked “agricultural produce” from the Schedule of the Act. Under the original definition only such produce or products could be held to be agricultural produce which had been ‘specified in the Schedule’. The present definition has no such restriction. Reference to the schedule of Act is only in the context of livestock and poultry and that is also an inclusive one. In other words, now agricultural produce shall mean all produce of agriculture, horticulture, plantation, animal husbandry, forest, sericulture, pisciculture, livestocks or poultry including the processed and manufactured products of such produce. In view of the new definition of agricultural produce, in my opinion, it is very difficult on the part of the petitioner to urge that coconut oil shall not be agricultural produce because admittedly it is a processed and manufactured product either of agriculture, or horticulture or plantation. Now it need not be established that coconut oil is a vegetable oil. Even if coconut is held to be a fruit or a product of plantation, the oil derived from coconut shall be an agricultural produce to which the provisions of the Act shall be applicable. In my view, under the new definition whether a produce or product thereof has been specified in the Schedule is not of much consequence for being held as an agricultural produce. The only thing which has to be established is as to whether the item in question is a processed or non-processed or manufactured product of agriculture, horticulture, plantation, animal husbandry, forest, sericulture, pisciculture, livestock or poultry. The introduction of the words ‘and includes’ is very significant. A mere reading of the Hindi definition which has been introduced by the amendment makes it clear that now schedule is relevant to some extent only in the context with livestock and poultry. As such, after coming into force of Act 60 of 1982, there is no scope for argument that coconut oil shall not be deemed to be an agricultural produce.
7. What was the position prior to the amendment aforesaid is a matter of some controversy. On behalf of the petitioner reliance was placed on a judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of Dy. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Tiruchivapalli v. Hameed Trading Company [32 (1973) Sales Tax Cases 228] where a question had arisen as to whether coconut is a fresh fruit or vegetable for purpose of exemption under the relevant Sales Tax Act. It was held that as coconut was not a perishable article it cannot be treated as a fresh fruit. It was also pointed out that it was also not a vegetable within the meaning of the words of the notification giving exemption. However, a Full Bench of Madras High Court in the case of S.M Narayana v. S.P.R.M Subramanian Chettiar (AIR 1937 Madras 254) in context of Estates Lands Act held that Coconuts are fruits and coconut trees are fruit trees and coconut plantation is fruit garden. Even in, the aforesaid case of Dy. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Hameed Trading Company [32 (1973) Sales Tax Cases 228] it was pointed out that Oxford Illustrated Dictionary (1962) defines ‘fruits’ as “(1) vegetable products fit for food, (ii) Edible products of plant or tree, consisting of seed or its envelope, specially when this is juicy or pulpy; ripe seeds and structure surrounding them.” In the book ‘Coconut Palm’ by K.P.B Menon and K.M Pandala, coconut is generally referred to as a ‘fruit.’ In the Webster's Dictionary ‘coconut’ has been shown as “(a) fruit of the coconut palm consisting of a thick fibrous brown ovate husk under which there is thick hard shell enclosing the layer of edible white mesh”. According to Lexicon Webster's Dictionary, vol. II (printed in 1983), page 1097, ‘vegetable oil’ means “an oil derived from fruit or plant seeds, having various uses in medicine, cooking, and as a lubricant”. Even in Chamber's Encyclopaedia, Vol. Ill ‘coconut’ has been described as a fruit.
8. Learned counsel appearing for the Board submitted that once it is held that coconut is a fruit, then it shall be included in the genus of vegetable and any oil derived from such coconut shall be deemed to be vegetable oil. In support of this contention our attention was drawn to Chamber's Encyclopaedia, Vol. X at page 183 “oils and fats”. At page 184 a table has been given showing vegetable fats. In that table coconut is also mentioned. According to the learned counsel for the Board from the chemistry of different types of fats mentioned in the aforesaid Encyclopaedia it will appear that coconut oil, although oil from fruit, has been treated as vegetable oil.
9. On behalf of the petitioner it was submitted that not much importance should be attached to dictionaries or Encyclopaedias while ascertaining the meaning of vegetable oil, and in this connection reference was made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, New Delhi v. K.T Koselram (AIR 1971 SC 1283). In that case the Supreme Court observed that Dictionary is not of much aid if the meaning given in the Statute was clear. It is well known that if a particular expression has been defined in any Statute in clear and unambiguous terms then there is no necessity to refer to any Dictionary or Encyclopeadia; necessity to refer to Dictionary or Encyclopaedia arises only when an expression used in the statute has not been clearly and specifically defined or specified. In such a situation, it is always permissible to consider the real meaning of such an expression or article with the help of Dictionary or Encyclopaedia. On this point there are several cases of the Supreme Court and reference can be made to the case of Motipur Zamindary Company Limited v. The State Of Bihar (AIR 1962 SC 660) where reference was made to Webster's and Oxford’ Dictionaries while examining the question whether sugarcane was vegetable. In my opinion, coconut is a fruit and it can be included in the definition of vegetable in its generic sense. Once it is held to be a vegetable then coconut oil shall be deemed to be “vegetable oil” as specified on the Schedule.
10. The same question can be examined in another context. Admittedly, coconut has been mentioned against item 21 of Schedule IX. It might have been mentioned in the Schedule in the category of “Condiments, Spices and others” and not specifically in Schedule V-oils. Once coconut in view of Schedule IX(21) becomes an agricultural produce then any derivative through processing shall also be an agricultural produce. Even under the old definition “agricultural produce” included, all produce “whether processed or non-processed of agriculture, horticulture etc.”. Coconut oil is admitted a processed product of coconut. In such a situation there is no escape from the conclusion that coconut oil was an agricultural produce under the old definition and now there should not be, any controversy in respect thereof after introduction of the new definition of “agricultural produce” in the Act.
11. In the result, this application fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
12. Yadunath Sharan Singh, J.:— I agree.
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