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Dr. Siya Ram Singh (Petitioner) v. Director Of Higher Education U.P And Others (S).

Allahabad High Court
Jul 13, 1992
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Siya Bam Singh v. Director, Higher Education, U.P. (Adhoc Appointments)

Factual and Procedural Background

A group of writ petitions were filed by teachers who had been appointed on an adhoc basis under section 16 of the U.P. Higher Education Service Commission Act, 1980. The petitioners' adhoc appointments were made between January 1984 and 30 June 1991. The central challenge in the bunch was the refusal by authorities to regularise these adhoc appointees' services.

Civil Misc Writ No. Nil of 1992 (Dr. Siya Bam Singh v. Director, Higher Education, U.P., Allahabad) was taken as the leading case and the bunch was directed to be disposed of by a common judgment. The learned standing counsel for the State was granted one week to obtain instructions but was unable to do so; as there was no factual dispute, the Court proceeded to decide the matter finally on questions of law.

The petitions required interpretation of section 16 of the Act and of the U.P. Higher Education Service Commission (Amendment) Ordinance, 1991 (U.P. Ordinance 43 of 1991) — in particular, whether the petitioners were entitled to regularisation under section 31-C (inserted by the Ordinance) and what date should be taken for assessing minimum qualifications.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the services of petitioners appointed on adhoc basis under section 16 of the U.P. Higher Education Service Commission Act, 1980 (between 3-1-1984 and 30-6-1991) could be regularised.
  2. Whether section 16 (adhoc appointment provision) is mandatory or directory in nature, and the consequences of that characterization for the validity of adhoc appointments made in alleged procedural irregularity.
  3. How section 31-C of the 1991 Ordinance is to be interpreted, specifically which date governs assessment of minimum qualifications (date of appointment vs. date of commencement of the Ordinance).
  4. Whether procedural irregularities, absence of reasons in administrative orders (non-speaking orders), lack of prior opportunity to explain, or change in statutory qualifications after appointment prevent regularisation; and whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies to bar belated objections by authorities.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Anil Kumar Pandey v. Vice Chancellor, Rohilkhand University, 1990 (2) UP LB EC 1228 Interpretation of sub-section (2) of section 16: appointment ends when the candidate recommended by the Commission joins the post. Relied upon to interpret s.16(2) as terminating adhoc appointment only upon the recommended candidate joining.
Km. Madhu Chanhan v. District Inspector of Schools, 1988 UP LB EC 397 Vice Chancellor's approval is not required under the Act for adhoc appointments. Cited to show that although Vice Chancellor approval was in practice obtained, the approval was not statutorily required and that such approvals nonetheless evidenced bona fides and scrutiny.
State of U.P v. Man Mohan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 Principle: Whether a provision is mandatory or directory depends on legislative intention and consequences, not merely language. One of the authorities cited for the method of determining whether statutory provisions are mandatory or directory; used in construing s.16.
State of U.P v. Babu Ram Uradhyay, AIR 1961 SC 751 Same general principle about construction to ascertain legislative intent for mandatory/directory classification. Cited as supporting authority for the analytical approach to determine the nature of s.16.
State of Mysore v. B.K. Kangan, (1976) 2 SCC 895 : AIR 1975 SC 2190 Same general principle relating to legislative intent and purposive construction. Included in the group of authorities relied upon to decide whether s.16 is directory or mandatory.
Garesh Prasad Rah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta, (1985) 3 SCC 53 : AIR 1985 SC 964 Same principle on construing statutory requirements as mandatory or directory depending on intent and consequences. Used as part of the body of precedent guiding the Court's directory construction of s.16.
B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick, (1987) 2 SCC 407 : AIR 1987 SC 1010 Same interpretive principle for mandatory/directory classification. Cited among authorities to support the view that s.16 should be treated as directory.
Owners and Parties interested in M.V. "Wall Pero" v. Fernandes Lopaz, (1989) 4 SCC 671 : AIR 1989 SC 2206 Same general interpretive rule about legislative intention and consequences. Cited in the Court's review of authorities on mandatory vs. directory provisions.
Sharifuddin v. Abdul Gsai Loni, (1980) 1 SCC 403 : AIR 1980 SC 303 Same interpretive principle (determining whether statutory provisions are mandatory or directory). Included in the precedential group used in construing s.16.
Raza Boland Sugar Co. Ltd. Rampur v. The Municipal Board Rampur, AIR 1965 SC 895 Where holding a provision mandatory would cause serious general inconvenience or frustrate the object of the enactment, it may be construed as directory. Applied as an authority supporting a directory construction of s.16 to avoid defeating the Act's object.
Dr. Mrs. Sumati P. Shere v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 1432 On adhoc appointees: natural justice has a limited role; an adhoc appointee can be discontinued without formal enquiry though fair communication is desirable in some circumstances. Referred to explain that while opportunity to be heard is not universally mandatory for adhoc terminations, here the Court considered that enquiry ought to have been held before cancelling appointments that stigmatise petitioners.
Shri Krishna v. Kurukshetra University, (1976) 1 SCC 311 : AIR 1976 SC 376 Doctrine of promissory estoppel against authorities — equitable principle that can prevent authorities from going back on representations/actions in certain circumstances. Invoked to hold that respondents cannot belatedly raise procedural defects after many years of salary payment and apparent acceptance of the appointments.
State of Bihar v. Usba Martin Industries Ltd., 1987 (65) STC 430 Promissory estoppel is equitable and may yield where larger public interest requires. Cited to acknowledge the limits of promissory estoppel and to apply it appropriately in the case at hand.
Assistant Commissioner Commercial Taxes v. Dharmendra Trading Co., 1988 (3) SCR 946 Further exposition that promissory estoppel is equitable and subject to public interest considerations. Used to frame the equitable scope of enforcing estoppel against authorities in this context.
S.N. Mukherji v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594 : AIR 1990 SC 1984 Administrative orders must be supported by reasons; reasons reduce arbitrariness. Applied to hold that the cyclostyled non-speaking orders refusing regularisation lacked application of mind and were therefore vulnerable.
Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager, U.P. Finance Corporation, 1992 (2) JT 325 Administrative orders must satisfy requirements of fairness and reasonableness. Relied upon to conclude that impugned orders did not meet the fairness/reasonableness test and should be struck down.
Munish Kumar Sharma v. District Inspector of Schools, Dehradun, 1990 (1) UP LB EC 223 Support for the view that procedural irregularities should not unduly prejudice employees when justice and substantive fairness favour regularisation. Cited with other authorities to support the proposition that technical procedural defects should not be permitted to defeat regularisation after long service.
Bhagwan Swaroop v. Mool Candra, (1983) 2 SCC 132 : AIR 1983 SC 355 Used in the context of preventing procedural technicalities from defeating substantive rights of employees. Applied as precedent to support protection of long-standing adhoc appointees from belated procedural challenges.
Rafiq v. Munshi Lal, (1981) 2 SCC 788 : AIR 1981 SC 1400 Similar principle that technicalities should not defeat substantive justice to employees in appropriate cases. Used in the cluster of cases cited to support regularisation despite procedural irregularities.
Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation, (1990) 1 SCC 361 : AIR 1990 SC 371 Subsequent changes in statute do not affect the validity of an appointment which was valid on its date. Applied to hold that minimum qualifications must be judged as on the date of appointment, not a later date when statute changes.
Smt. Phoola Devi v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini, Allahabad, 1990 (2) AWC 890 Court followed the view that validity of appointment is judged by the law as it stood at the date of appointment. Cited as a local decision consistent with Bhagwati Prasad and used to reinforce the date-of-appointment rule for qualifications.
Karnataka State Private College Stop-Gap Lecturers Association v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 2 SCC 29 : AIR 1992 SC 677 The Supreme Court disapproved the system of adhoc stop-gap appointments and directed regularisation of temporary teachers in that matter. The Court followed this recent Supreme Court disapproval of adhocism and used it to justify issuing directions for regularisation in the present bunch.
Bhullar Nath Yadav v. Mayo Hall Complex, 1990 (61) FIR 68 Illustrative authority where a court issued directions for regularisation of temporary appointees. Referred to as an example of the Court issuing directions rather than remitting the matter, supporting the Court's decision to direct regularisation here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in a sequence of statute-focused interpretation, application of established principles, equitable considerations, and administrative law norms:

  1. Statutory framework and object: The Act established a Commission for teacher selection and contemplated regular appointments through the Commission. Section 16 was an emergency (stop-gap) provision allowing managements to make adhoc appointments where the Commission failed to recommend within three months.
  2. Character of section 16: The Court examined whether s.16 is mandatory or directory. Relying on established authorities about legislative intent (considering phraseology, object, design and consequences), and noting absence of prohibitive language, the Court concluded s.16 is directory. The provision was conceived as an emergency measure to avoid disruption of teaching; substantial compliance was sufficient and procedural irregularities would not automatically invalidate appointments.
  3. Vice Chancellor approvals and bona fides: Even though Vice Chancellor approval was not required by statute, the fact that in most cases approvals were obtained and there was scrutiny was taken as evidence that appointments were bona fide and that petitioners either possessed requisite qualifications or had received exemptions.
  4. Interpretation of s.16(2): The Court accepted the view (from Anil Kumar Pandey) that an adhoc appointment under s.16 continues until the recommended candidate joins the post — construing the protective scope of the provision.
  5. Natural justice: The Court acknowledged the Supreme Court's teaching that termination of adhoc appointees may not always require formal opportunity (Sumati Shere) but considered the facts: here the orders refusing regularisation effectively cancelled adhoc appointments and cast stigma (saying petitioners lacked qualifications). The Court held that before passing such orders the Director should have given petitioners an opportunity to explain, and therefore, due enquiry ought to have been made.
  6. Promissory estoppel and delay: The State had been paying salaries and approvals were given; the Court found there was reason to believe petitioners were led to accept appointments as valid. The equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel was invoked to prevent authorities from raising objections after seven or more years. The Court noted that estoppel is equitable and can yield to greater public interest, but on the facts and because s.16 was considered directory, estoppel applied.
  7. Non-speaking orders and requirement of reason: The orders refusing regularisation were described as cyclostyled and non-speaking, demonstrating lack of application of mind. Relying on authorities requiring administrative decisions to be reasoned, the Court held such orders were invalid for want of reasons and for failing tests of fairness and reasonableness.
  8. Effect of procedural irregularity and change in qualifications: The Court held that the relevant date to assess minimum qualifications is the date of appointment, not a later date (e.g., commencement of the Ordinance). Procedural irregularities by management (e.g., defective notification) should not be used to penalise petitioners who joined service in good faith and served for years.
  9. Interpretation of section 31-C of the Ordinance: The Court found an apparent inconsistency within s.31-C (subsections referring to appointment period and to possession of qualifications on commencement date). To avoid injustice, the Court read the provision in a manner consistent with the legislative intent to regularise persons appointed between 3-1-1984 and 30-6-1991 who possessed requisite qualifications on their date of appointment.
  10. Relief-oriented analysis: Considering the hardship to petitioners and precedents where courts issued directions for regularisation (including a recent Supreme Court decision disapproving adhocism), the Court concluded that issuing directions to regularise was appropriate rather than remitting the matter back to authorities.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions were allowed. The Court's core ruling can be stated as:

The writ petitions are allowed — the respondents are directed to regularise the services of the petitioners.

Direct orders and immediate consequences (as stated by the Court):

  • The respondents are directed to regularise the services of the petitioners within one month from the filing of a certified copy of the order before them.
  • Artificial breaks given on 30-6-1992 are to be ignored; petitioners will be deemed to have been in continuous service.
  • Petitioners are entitled to their salary (the Court stated they will be entitled to salary as well).
  • Costs were awarded in favour of each petitioner in the sum of Rs. 1,000/-.

Broader implications and policy observations:

  • The Court strongly criticised the malady of "adhocism" — describing it as an emergency device that has become abused and harmful to the educational system — and reiterated the need to discourage adhoc stop-gap appointments as a policy matter, following the recent Supreme Court disapproval.
  • The decision emphasises that procedural irregularities should not automatically defeat the legitimate expectations of long-serving adhoc appointees, especially where authorities have acquiesced for many years, salary has been paid, and approvals or scrutiny have occurred.
  • The Court applied established principles (mandatory vs. directory construction, promissory estoppel, duty to record reasons, limits of natural justice for adhoc appointees) to reach a remedial result; the ruling implements existing precedents rather than announcing a novel legal doctrine.

Petition allowed.

Show all summary ...

M.P Singh, J.:— Adhocism is nothing but a sophisticated espression for the arbitrary policy of-Hiring and Firing.” It was Introduced as an emergency measure. Due to misuse of power it has grown into a cancer. In the Interest of educational, institutions it has to be removed as soon as possible.

2. Poor teachers who constitute bulk of educated unemployed are compelled to accept adhoc appointments with miserable conditions of service. Sometime they are paid less than a daily wager. The danger of tetmination remains handing over their heads. The Government appears to be exploiting Ihe helplessness of these teachers In Iarge number of cases it has come to the notice of this Court that tbe appointments are made for a short periods ranging from 3 to 6 months. Then there is an artificial break of a day or so. They are again re-appointed. Why so? They are being treated as seasonal workers. What contribution can the society expect from them under these circumstances?.

3. In no way adhocism can be said to be a sound policy of our welfare State. Is it not going to have serious repurcussion on the educational system and ultimately affecting students studying in the institutions?. The consistent view of the Supreme Court and this Court had been to dis-courage tbe same.

4. This bunch of cases can be disposed of by a common judgment. Point involved in all the cases is whether tee services of the petitioners, who are adhoc appointees, could be regularised or not.

5. Civil Misc Writ No. Nil of 1992 Dr. Siya Bam Singh v. Director, Higher Education, U.P Allahabad is being taken up as a leading case.

6. The learned standing counsel was granted a week's time and no more to seek instructions from the Government, as tbe fate of hundreds of teachers were involved in this bunch. Sri M.G Dwivedi, learned standing counsel, has stated today that he has not been able to get any instruction inspite of due information to the authorities. Since there is no factual dispute, the counter affidavit is not actually needed. Accordingly, the entire bunch is being disposed of finally purely on the question of law.

7. Tbe facts of individual cases need not be discussed. Suffice it to say that all the petitioners have been appointed as adhoc teachers under section 16 of U.P Higher Education Service Commission Act, 1980 (in short “the Act') between January 1984 and 30-6-91. Their regularisation is dependant upon the interpretation of certain provisions of the Act and U.P Higher Education Service Commission (Amendment) Ordinance, 1991 (U.P Ordinance 43 of 1991) promulgated on 22-11-1991.

8. The U.P Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 was enacted to improve the working of the affiliated colleges. The object of the Act was to establish a service commission for selection of teachers for ap-pointment to the colleges affiliated to or recognised by the University and for matters connected there with or incidental thereto.

9. The main functions of the Commission so established are-(1) to prepare guidelines on matters relating to the method of recruitment of teachers, (2) to conduct examination and hold interviews for selection (3) to select and invite experts and appointing examiners, and (4) to make re-commendation to the management for appointment of selected candidates.

10. Before proceeding further, the relevant statutory provisions of the Act are to be looked Into.

Statutory Frame work

11. Section 12 provides that after tbe Commission is established under section 3 (1), all the appointments of teachers of degree colleges shall be made only in accordance with the Act. The application of U.P State Universities Act, 1973 or Statutes framed thereunder has been excluded.

12. In order to make the appointments, the management shall first notify the vacancy to the Commission. The manner of selection is deter-mined by Regulations known as U.P Higher Education Service Commission (Procedure and conduct of business) Regulations, 1983. Regulations 4, 5 and 6 deal with the procedure to be adopted by the Commission.

13. After the vacancy is notified by the Committee of Management to the Commission, with a view to inviting talented persons, the Commission gives wide publicity in the State to the vacancies thus notified.

14. According to section 13 of the Act, the Commission shall as soon as after the notification of the vacancy under sub-section (2) of section 12, hold interview, with or without examination, of the candidates and recom-mend their names, not more than three candidates, for appointment to every post of teacher. This recommendation remains valid for the period of one year.

15. Section 14 of the Act makes it obligatory on the part of the management to issue appointment letters within one month from the date of receipt of the recommendation. In case, if the management does not issue appointment letter to the candidate so recommended by the Commission, then tbe Director can intervene and make enquiries and may require the management to appoint the applicant as a teacher forthwith and to pay him salary from the date specified in the order

16. Now comes the most notorious provision of the Act, giving rise to this bunch of cases. It is section 16 of the Act. It runs as follows:—

“16. Appointment of adhoc teachers. (1) Where the management has notified a vacancy to the Commission in accordance with sub-section (2) of section 12, and the Commission fails to recommend the names of suitable candidate in accordance with sub-section (1) of that section within three months from the date of such notification, the management may appoint a teacher on purely adhoc basis from amongst the persons holding qualification prescribed therefor

(2) Every appointment of an anhoc teacher under sub-section (1) shall cease with effect from the earliest of the following dates, namely

(a) when the candidate recommended by the Commission joins the post.

(b) where the period of two months from the date of receipt of the recommendation of the Commission under sub-section (1) of section 12 expires,

(c) thirtieth day of June following the date of such adhoc appoint-ment.”

17. A fair reading of this section shows that after the management has notified the vacancy to the Commission but the Commission failed to recommend the names of suitable candidates in accordance with the provi-sions of section 12 the management gets a right to make adhoc appointments amongst persons holding the minimum requisite qualifications.

18. The provision of sub-section 2 has received attention of this Court In a case Anil Kumar Pandey v. Vice Chancellor, Rohhkhund University, 1990 (2) UP LB EC 1228, in which it was held that this appointment will come to an end only when the candidate recommended by the Commission joins tbe post and not otherwise.

19. All the petitioners have been given adhoc appointment under section 16 of the Act. In some cases the appointments have been made by the Committee of Management after notifying the vacancy, whereas in some cases the vacancy were notified subsequent to the appointment. Before the appointment orders were issued the application form of each petitioner was thorouehly examined particularly with regard to the minimum requisite qualifications. in some cases the appointment orders were issued after granting relaxation in accordance with the Statutes ‘of the relevant Uni-versity.

Approval of Vice Chancellor not required

20. Practically in every case adhoc appointment made by the Com-mittee of Management has been approved by the Vice Chancellor after carefully scrutinising the record; though the Vice Chancellor has no role to play under the Act. No approval is required. Km. Madhu Chanhan v. District Inspector of Schools, 1988 UP LB EC 397 and Anil Kumar Pandey v. Vice Chancellor, Rohilkhund University, 1990 (2) UP LB EC 1228.

21. The action of the Committee of Management in obtaining appro-val shows that the adhoc appointments so made were all bonafide and in accordance with the relevant University Statutes. They did not suffer from any legal or procedural infirmity because the Vice Chancellor has also applied his mind in each case and granted approval. This further proves that the petitioners did possess the minimum requisite qualification on the date of the appointment or were granted exemption in accordance with the Statute. Thus in every case there was scrutiny about the minimum requisite quali-fication of the candidates at two stages, one at the time of making the adhoc appointment by the committes of management and second, by the Vice Chancellor when he granted the approval.

22. The petitioners continued in service for severals years as adhoo appointees with a hope of being regularised.

Provision for Regularisation

23. When U.P Act No. 16 of 1980 was; enacted, it made a provisioa for adhoc appointment under section 16 of the Act but there was no pro-vision of their regularisation. For that purpose U.P Higher Education Service Commission (Amendment) Act, 1985 was enacted by means of which section 31-B was inserted in the Statute. But it had a limited scope.

24. According to section 31-B every teacher other than the Principal, directly appointed on or before January 3, 1984 on adhoc basis against subs-tantive vacancy in accordance with the provisions of the U.P Higher Education Service Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1982 or subsequent similir Order of 1983, who possessed the prescribed qualifications, or was exempted from such qualification in accordance with the provisions of the concerned Statute, could be appointed in a substantive capacity after the enforcement of the said Act. Though this Amending Act of 1985 came into force on 22-6-1985 but there was no provision for the reicularisation of the adhoc appointees appointed after 3-1-1984. Their ‘future remained un-certain, though the adhoc appointments were continuously being made even thereafter.

25. The State Government though it proper to make suitable laws for their regularisation too. For this purpose U.P Higher Education Service Commission (Amendment) Ordinance, 1991 (U.P Ordinance 43 of 1991) was promulgated on 22-11-1991. It has two salient features (1) section 16 of the Principal Act, which provided for adhoc appointment, has been omitted, and (2; has inserted section 31-C in the Statute. It covers the cases of adhoc appointment made after January 3, 1984 but not later than 30-6-1991. Only those persons who were appointed between 3-1-1984 and 30-6-1991 would be entitled for the benefit of this provision.

26. Before coming to the conclusion wheter the petitioners are entitled to be regalarised under section 31-C, the following relevsnt points are to be considered

Provision for adhoc appointment whether mandatory or directory

27. The consistent view of the Supreme Court has been that this depends upon the intention of the Legislature and not upon the langurge in which the intent is clothed. Tbe intention of the Legislature is to be ascer-tained not only from the phraseology or the provision but also by considering Its nature, its design and consequences which would follow from corsiriuing it one way or the other. State of U.P v. Man Mohan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912, Stale of U.P v. Babu Ram Uradhyay, AIR 1961 SC 751, State of Mysore v. B.K Kangan, (1976) 2 SCC 895 : AIR 1975 SC 2190, Garesh Prasad Rah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta, (1985) 3 SCC 53 : AIR 1985 SC 964, B.P Khemka Pvt Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmlck, (1987) 2 SCC 407 : AIR 1987 SC 1010 and Owners and Parties interested in M.V “Wall Pero” v. Fernandes Lopaz, (1989) 4 SCC 671 : AIR 1989 SC 2206, and Sharifuddin v. Abdul Gsai Loni, (1980) 1 SCC 403 : AIR 1980 SC 303.

Gani Loni.

28. If by holding it mandatory serious general inconvenience will be caused to innocent persons the object of the enactment is frustrated, tbe same should be construed as directory. Raza Boland Sugar Co. Ltd Ram pur v. The Mnicipal Board Rampur, AIR 1965 SC 895.

29. The directory requirements fall under two heads (1) those which should be substantially complied with to make the act valid; and (2) these which even not complied with have no effect on the Act.

30. Section 16 of the Act does not use prohibitive or negative words which is a salient feature of a madatory provision. The use of the word “shall” normally raises a presumption that a particular provision is imparative but this prima facie inference may be rebutted by other considerations such as object and scope of the ennctment and the coasequeaces flowing from such construction.

31. The aim and object of the Act was that the regular appointment should be made by the U.P Higher Education Service Commission but in certain contingency the power has been granted to the management to make adhoc appointment, in case the Commission has not been able to make the regular appointment expeditiously. The object of seotion 16 was that the teaching of the college may not suffer. So immediate appointment could be made having consideration of the minimum requisite qualification. It was sort of emergency provision.

32. In those cases where the appointments have been made before the vacancy was notified and the Commission did not raise any objection about the procedure so adopted, the irregularity, if any, will be deemed to be cured in the eyes of law. The management did so, as there was urgency.

33. Since I find no prohibitive words in section 16 there is no difficulty in my way in holding that the provisions are directory and not mandatory. According to the aims and object of the Act there should be a substantial compliance. So procedural regularity will not make the appointment invalid.

Principle of Natural Justice

34. The law is well settled that in the case of adhoc appointees before passing an order of termination no opportunity is needed. The principle of natural justice has got no role to play, tn the case Dr. Mrs. Sumati P. Shere v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 1432, adhoc appointee was removed, as the employer was not satisfied with his performance. The court took the view:—

“In the relationship of master and servant there is a moral obligation to act fairly. An informal, if cot formal, give-and-take, on the assessment of work of the employee should be there. The employee should be made aware of the defects in his work and the deficiency in his performance. Defects or deficiencies; indifference or indiscreption may be with the employee by Inadvertence and not by incapacity to work. Timely communication of the assessment of work in such cases may put the employee on the right track. Without any such communication, it would be arbitrary to give a movement order to the employee on the ground of unsuitability.”

35. But In paragraph 7 of the judgment it has been made clear that—

“We are not laying down the rule that there should be regular enquiry in this case. All that we wish to state in this case is that if she is to be discontinued it is proper and necessary that she should be told in advance that her work and performance are not upto the mark”

36. Thus the Supreme Court has not laid down any law that opport-unity in such matter is a must. That case was decided on its own facts.

37. In the instant bunch of cases tbe regularisation has been refused on the ground either the petitioner did not possess the requisite minimum quali-fication on the date of the appointment or the exemptions had wrongly been granted or the vacancy was not notified by the management before the appointment was made. In substance such orders amount to cancelling the adhoc appointment on the grounds mentioned therein.

38. If petitioners were given opportunity to explain whether they did possess the minimum requisite qualification or whether there was any relaxation or whether the committee of management has notified the vacancy or not, probably the result might have been otherwise.

39. So in this group of oases I am of the view that due enquiry should have been made by giving opportunity to petitioners by the Director before parsing the impugned orders. They cast stigma on the petitioaers that they were not qualified to be appointed as lecturers. They did not possess the requisite qualification and the appointments were illegally obtained by them without any “notification of vacancy by the management.

40. This observation of mine may not be misunderstood as laying down a law that in the case of adhoc appointees the opportunity of hearing is a must. Simple order of termination can always be passed.

Promissory Estoppel

41. There is reason to belive that while making the adhoo appointment by the committee of management, the application forms and tbe requisite qualification must have been thoroughly examined. If there was some lacuna, relaxation has also been granted. It was approved by the Vice Chancellor even

42. Section 15 of the Act gives power to the Director to make enqui-ries in rase the management does not act in the accordance with law. He has impliclt power to make enquiries whether the appointment was in accor-dance with law or not. The State Government has been paying salary to the petitioners for the last so many years without raising any objection about the validity of the appointment. There is good reason to believe that the petiti-oners were led to believe that their appointment was valid.

43. The principle of promissory estoppel will come into play. The authorities cannot be permitted to raise any objection with regard to the defect in tbe procedure or want of minimum requisite qualification after seven years or more. The principle of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case Shri Krishna v. Kurukshetra University, (1976) 1 SCC 311 : AIR 1976 SC 376, becomes applicable in the Instant case.

44. The doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable dootrine, it must yield place to the equity if the larger public interest so requires. This doctrine has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the rase State of Bihar v. Usba Martin Industries Ltd., 1987 (65) STC 430, and Assistant Commissioner Commercial Taxes v. Dharmendra Trading Co., 1988 (3) SCR 946. The rule of promissory estoppel is not founded upon any right, statutory or con-tractual but it is founded upon the equity Since I am of the view that the provisions are only directory and not mandatory, the proposition of law that there is no estoppel against Statute, is not attracted.

Non-Speaking Orders

45. The orders passed against the petitioners are all cyclostyled. A reading of the same indicates that there was no application of mind. Indivi-dual cases were not examined. They are non-speaking orders. The Director should have given some reasons. In the case S.N Mukherji v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594 : AIR 1990 SC 1984, it has been held that even administrative orders must be supported by reasons. The recording of reasons by administrative authorities serves a good purpose, namely, it excludes the chance of arbitrariness.

46. Fairness in public dealings is the core of our jurisprudence. It is a substantive principle the breach or violation of which furnishes cause of action to the aggrieved.

47. Procrastlnation or delay on the part of those who under rules were obliged to take action could not recoil on the petitioner. No action have been taken for years together.

48. In the case Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager, U.P Financs Corporation, 1992 (2) JT 325, it has been held that even the administrative orders most satisfy the test of fairness and reasonableness The impugned orders do not meet the requirement as indicated in the judgment and, there-fore, liable to be struck down.

Effect of Prodncedural Irregularity

49. Even if there was some procedural Irregularity in notifying the vacancy and the order of appointment was made by the Committee of Management under section 16 and the petitioners possessed minimum requisite qualification or there was an exemption granted, can they be refused regula— risatlon on this ground after so many years. Why should the petitioner suffer for the wrong or omission on the part of the Committee of Management. Petitioners joined service several years back believing their appointments to be valid. They continued in Service with a hope to be regularised It is not open to the respondents now to refuse regularisation. If technicalities in procedural matter are permitted to have an upper hand it may frustrate the object of the Act. This will amount to grave injustice to petitioners. Munish Kumar Sharma v. District Inspector of Schools, Dehradun, 1990 (1) UP LB EC 223, Bhagwan Swaroop v. Mool Candra, (1983) 2 SCC 132 : AIR 1983 SC 355 and Rafiq v. Munshi Lal, (1981) 2 SCC 788 : AIR 1981 SC 1400.

50. This leads to a logical conclusion that the minimum educational qualifications are required to be looked into at the time of initial appoint-ment. Subsequent changes in the Statute will not affect the appointment so made as held by Supreme Court in the case Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation, (1990) 1 SCC 361 : AIR 1990 SC 371. This Court followed the same view in the case Smt. Phoola Devi v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini, Allahabad, 1990 (2) AWC 890.

Malady of Adhocism

51. The Supreme Court in a recent judgment Karnataka State Private College Stop-Gap Lecturers Association v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 2 SCC 29 : AIR 1992 SC 677, has disapproved the system of adhoc appointment by saying 1.

“Adhoc appointments, a convenient way of entry usually from backdoor at time even in disregard of rules and regulations, are comperatively recent innovations to the service jurisprudence. They are Individual problem to begin with, become a family problem with passage of time and end with human problem in court of law. It is unjutt and unfair to those who are lesser fortunate in society with little or no approaoh even though better qualified more meritorious and well deserving. The infection is widespread in Government or semi-Covernment departments or State financed institutions. It arises either because the appointing authority resorts to it deliberately as a favour or to accommodate some one or for any extraneous person ignoring the regular procedure provided for recruitment as a pretext under emergency measure or to avoid less of work etc. Or the rules or circulars issued by the department itself empower the authority to do so as a stop gap arrange-ment. The former is an abuse of power. It is unpardonable. Even if it is found to have been resorted to as a genuine emergency measure the courts should be reluctant to grant “indulgence. Latter gives rise to equities which have bothered courts ever now and then. Malady appears to be widespread in educational institutions as provisions for temporary or adhoc appointments have been exploited by the managements of private aided college to their advanage by filling it. on one hand, with persons of own choice, at times without following the procedure, and keeping the teachers exposed to threat of temlnation, on the other, with all evil consequences flowing out of it.”

52. This very view has been followed in other oases by this Court as well, They need not be cited as an authority.

Anomaly in section 31-C of the Ordiance

53. The opening words of this section are “any teacher, other than a Principal, who was appointed on adhoo basis after January 3, 1984 but not later than 30-6-1991, may be given substantive appointment by the manage-ment of the college If any substantive vacancy of the same cadre and grade is available.”

54. This shows that the framer of the Ordinance was alive to the situation that the appointments made only during this period will be taken into consideration for regularisation. In some cases of this bunch it has been stated that after their appointment and before the Promulgation of the Ordinance there have been some change In required minimum educational qualification. But it is wholly irrelevant for considering it for requalrisation of those persons who possessed the minimum required qualification on the date of their appointment. As held, ealier the relevant date for possessing the minimum requisite qualification is only the date of appointment and no other date.

55. Sub-section (o) of section 31-C provides that these teachers must possess the qualification required for regular appointment to the post on the date of the commencement of the Ordinance. Thus sub-section (a) and (o) do not see eye to eye. They are self-contradictory.

56. There is difference between an Act and an Ordinance. The Act is a legislation which after having been passed by the Parliament of other competent legislative body which has received the assent of the Constitutional Head. The Ordinance is a legislation made by the constitutional head himself.

57. A reading of sub-section (a) and (c) at the first blush would Indicate that the pharaseology are wholly inconsistent. A closer examination would, however, reveal that the words “commencement of the Ordinance” may be read as “date of appointment.” Courts have to interprete the Act or the Ordinance in order to make it workable and to avaid injustice. The intention in the instant case was to regularise all those persons who have been appointed between 3-1-1984 to 30-6-1991 if they possessed the requisite minimum qualification on the date of their appointment

58. Thus I am of the view that while considering the questlon of regularisation of adhoo appointees, they should have possessed tbe minimum requisite qualification on the date of their appointment and not on the date of commencement of the Ordinance.

Direction for Regularisation

59. Since I am holding that the impugned orders refusing regularisation are bad in law and suffer from errors apparent on the face of the record and they are wholly arbitrary, the next question which comes for consider-ation is whether this Court should issue direction to the respondents to pass an order of regularisation or leave it open to be considered by the authority concerned.

60. In normal course I would have left it open to be decided by the appropriate authority but since the petitioners have been dragged to this Court for no fault of theirs and each one of them must have spent atleast two cr three months salary during these hard days, no useful purpose would be served by sending them again to the respondents.

61. In the case Bbagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation, 1989 (4) IT 541, the Supreme Court has issued direction for regularisation of 40 seniormost workmen with immediate effect. This Court in the case Bhullar Nath Yadav v. Mayo Hall Complex, 1990 (61) FIR 68 bas irsued similar direction.

62. In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court Karanataka State Private College Stop-Gap Lecturers Association v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 2 SCC 29 : AIR 1992 SC 677 a ditection was issued for regularising the temporary appointed teachers. The policy of making adhoo appointment has also not been approved. So in this bunch also direction should be issued.

63. For the reasons given, I am of the view that all the writ petitions must succeed. The writ petitions are allowed with costs, which I assess as Rs. 1000/- to be paid to each petitioner. The respondents are directed to regularise the services of the petitioners within a period of one month from the date of filling of a certified copy of this order before them. Artificial breaks given to them on 30-6-1992 will be ignored and they will be deemed to have been in continuous, service. They will be entitled for their salary as well.

64. Petition allowed.