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N.D Ramanujam v. Collector Of Madras,...

Madras High Court
Apr 28, 1994
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — Abdul Hadi, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Two writ petitions were heard together as they raise common questions. W.P. No. 10420 of 1985 (petitioner: N.D. Ramanujam) challenged land acquisition proceedings relating to land of "2 ground and 1602 sq. ft." in T.S. No. 3/1 (Mambalam Village, Madras). W.P. No. 4836 of 1987 (petitioner: Oxford English School, a registered society) challenged acquisition proceedings relating to adjacent land in T.S. No. 3/4 (same village).

In both matters the same Section 4(1) notification was relied on: G.O.Ms. No. 1297 (dated 24.8.1982, published 8.9.1982). A Section 6 declaration (G.O.Ms No. 1888 dated 19.12.1983, published 15.2.1984) was also common to both.

Key factual allegations by the petitioners included that the Madras Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (M.M.W.S.S. Board) proposed laying a water main and that trenching was undertaken or threatened; petitioners asserted defects in notices, lack of compliance with procedural rules (including Rule 3(b) under the State rules) and alleged changes of purpose and mala fides. The petitioners each relied on statutory time-limits (Section 11A) and on non-compliance with mandatory procedural requirements (Section 5A inquiries and Rule 3(b)).

The Collector and other respondents filed a counter-affidavit in W.P. No. 10420 of 1985 setting out that the acquisition followed a requisition by the Corporation of Madras, that Section 5A proceedings were conducted and objections considered, and that a declaration under Section 6 was published; the Government later vacated a stay. No counter-affidavit was filed by respondents in W.P. No. 4836 of 1987, although relevant files were shown to the Court.

Procedural interlocutory orders included stays and interim injunctions in related proceedings: for example, a stay of dispossession was granted in W.M.P. No. 15788 of 1985 (in W.P. No. 10420 of 1985) on 7.10.1985; an interim injunction in W.P. No. 4836 of 1987 was granted 12.5.1987 and made absolute (with reference to dispossession alone) on 18.8.1987.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed for non-passing of an award within the period prescribed by Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act (as amended 24.9.1984), taking into account the Explanation to Section 11A concerning exclusion of periods during which any action or proceeding pursuant to the declaration is stayed by a court order.
  2. Whether the mandatory procedural requirements relating to Section 5A inquiries and to Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu rules (requiring forwarding of objections to the requisitioning authority, receipt of its remarks, communication of those remarks to the objector, and a subsequent hearing) were complied with.
  3. Whether the acquisition was mala fide or not genuinely for public purpose (including the question whether variation of purpose or initial involvement of the Water Board made the acquisition invalid).
  4. Whether any alleged consent by the landowner to certain works (e.g., laying a water-main) or statements of willingness to accept acquisition would preclude the requirement of a Section 5A inquiry or bar the writ petitions.
  5. Whether delay in filing the writ petitions required dismissal on grounds of laches or procedural delay.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (summarised)

  • The acquisition proceedings are invalid and should be quashed for multiple reasons, including alleged mala fides, change of stated purpose, and initiation at the instigation of local residents rather than for genuine public purpose.
  • The award has not been passed within the two-year period under Section 11A (as amended), so the proceedings have lapsed; the Explanation to Section 11A does not assist the respondents in this case (petitioners asserted they had not obtained stays pursuant to the declaration).
  • Mandatory procedural requirements under Rule 3(b) (and related provisions) were not complied with — in particular, remarks of the requisitioning body were not forwarded to or communicated to the petitioner and no fresh Section 5A hearing was held after such remarks.
  • In W.P. No. 4836 of 1987 the petitioner asserted that there was no Section 5A inquiry and that remarks of the Corporation and M.M.W.S.S. Board were not sent to or communicated to the petitioner.
  • The petitioners relied on authorities (e.g., Kadirvelu Mudaliar) supporting the proposition that failure to comply with Rule 3(b) vitiates continuation of acquisition after Section 4(1) notification.

Respondents' Arguments (summarised)

  • The acquisition was initiated on requisition of the Corporation of Madras; formation of a link road and provision of water and drainage are bona fide public purposes.
  • All mandatory formalities (including Section 5A proceedings) were complied with: objections were received, considered and sent to the Commissioner, Corporation of Madras for remarks; the petitioner's objections were overruled and draft declaration sent to Government.
  • The period during which court orders (stays/injunctions) operated should be excluded in computing the two-year period under Section 11A (relying on the Explanation), and the petitioners cannot claim lapse.
  • In W.P. No. 4836 of 1987 the respondents contended that the petitioner had given consent for certain works and therefore there was no necessity for enquiry under Section 5A (though counsel could not point to explicit proof of consent during argument).
  • The 3rd respondent/Association relied on a precedent (Mohd. Habibullah) to argue dismissal for delay; the respondents urged that writ petitions were not maintainable in view of delay in challenging the acquisition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India (AIR 1987 Delhi 239) Full Bench interpretation of the Explanation to Section 11A: the word "any" gives the Explanation wide scope to exclude periods of stay (even partial stays) from computation. The Court expressly agreed with this view and applied it to hold that periods during which court orders operated could be excluded for computing the two-year period under Section 11A.
Sachidahand Lal v. State (AIR 1989 Patna 181) Supportive authority following the broad interpretation of the Explanation to Section 11A. The Court noted this decision as further support for applying the Explanation to exclude periods of stay when computing the two-year limit.
Division Bench order in W.A. Nos. 178 & 179 of 1987 (this Court, order dated 2.8.1990) Held that periods of stay covered by interim orders in other writ petitions can be excluded in computing the two-year period for making an award. The Court approved that approach and applied it to the facts (stays in related proceedings relevant to computing the Section 11A period).
Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1991 S.C. 2153) Supreme Court held the Explanation is in the widest terms; benefit of the two-year rule is intended for land-holders who do not obtain court orders themselves; the Explanation covers only cases where the land-holder has not obtained orders delaying proceedings. The Court cited this decision to explain the scope of the Explanation and to conclude that petitioners who themselves secured orders may not be entitled to the Explanation's benefit; the authorities were used purposively in the analysis of Section 11A.
T.K. Singaram v. Urban Land Ceiling Tribunal Chepauk (AIR 1992 Madras 180 = 1991-1-L.W. 56 D.B.) Case where no stay was made by the Court staying actions pursuant to Section 6 declaration. The Court observed that T.K. Singaram has no application to the present proceedings because that case involved no stay at all.
Raghunath v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1988 S.C. 1615) Authority on the effect of later notifications and whether earlier notifications lapse when a subsequent notification covers the same property. The Court held Raghunath inapplicable because the petitioner had not proved that the property in the earlier notification was identical to the property in the later notification.
Mohd. Habibullah v. Spl. Dy. Collector (AIR 1967 Madras 118 = 79 L.W. 469) Authority relied on to argue dismissal for delay where writ petitions were filed after award and Section 18 reference. The Court held this decision inapplicable since, in the present cases, the writ petitions were not filed after an award or after a Section 18 reference; hence the delay principle relied upon there did not apply.
Mutakki Sesharathanam v. Sub-Collector, Land Acquisition, Vijayawada (AIR 1992 S.C. 131) Principle that a landowner's statement of willingness to accept acquisition (e.g., for a lump-sum) is an offer, not a contract; an offer withdrawn before acceptance does not bar challenge to acquisition. The Court applied this principle to reject respondents' contention that any prior consent/statement by the petitioner obviated the need for a Section 5A inquiry or barred the writ petition.
Kadirvelu Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu (1987 Writ L.R. 182) Interpreted Rule 3(b): if objections are received, the Collector must forward them to the requisitioning authority, obtain its remarks, communicate those remarks to the objector and then hold a further enquiry under Section 5A. The Court relied on this authority to find that the mandate of Rule 3(b) had not been fully complied with in the present cases because the record did not show when remarks were obtained, whether they were communicated, or whether a fresh enquiry was held thereafter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by dealing with the principal legal points raised by the petitioners and respondents in a stepwise manner, applying the authorities cited and the statutory provisions:

  1. Section 11A (as amended effective 24.9.1984) prescribes that the Collector must make the award within two years of publication of the declaration, with an Explanation excluding from computation any period during which any action or proceeding pursuant to the declaration is stayed by a Court order. The Court accepted the broad construction of the Explanation as laid down by the Delhi Full Bench (Balak Ram Gupta) and followed by other High Courts and explained in the Supreme Court decision (Yusufbhai). That construction allows exclusion of periods of stay (including partial stays or stays operating in related proceedings) when computing the two-year period. Applying that principle to the present facts, and having regard to the interlocutory orders in related matters (e.g., stay of dispossession granted on 7.10.1985 and interim injunctions in the other petition), the Court held the petitioners cannot successfully contend that the proceedings have lapsed under Section 11A.
  2. The Court examined the mala fide/public-purpose contention and the contention that the acquisition's purpose had been changed. The respondents' averment that the acquisition followed a requisition from the Corporation of Madras for provision of a link road and basic amenities (water and drainage) led the Court to conclude there was no substance in the mala fides contention on the material before it; the requisitioning authority was the Corporation (not the Water Board), and provision of roads and basic amenities are legitimate public purposes.
  3. The Court addressed the contention that the petitioners had given consent such that no Section 5A enquiry was necessary. The Court relied on the Supreme Court authority (Mutakki Sesharathanam) to note that an expression of willingness to accept acquisition (or an offer) does not amount to a binding acceptance that eliminates procedural safeguards; therefore the contention that consent negated Section 5A could not succeed on the present record.
  4. The central procedural deficiency which determined the outcome was non-compliance with Rule 3(b) (framed under Section 55(1) by the State). The Court analysed the counter-affidavit material and found that, although the respondents alleged that objections were sent to the Commissioner, Corporation of Madras and a reply obtained, the counter-affidavit did not specify when the objections were sent or when the remarks were received, whether those remarks were communicated to the petitioners, and whether a fresh Section 5A enquiry was held after receipt of the requisitioning authority's remarks. Citing Kadirvelu Mudaliar, the Court reiterated that once remarks of the requisitioning body are obtained they should be communicated to the objector and there should be a further enquiry under Section 5A to consider the objections in light of those remarks. The absence of proof in the record that these steps were taken led the Court to hold that Rule 3(b) was not fully complied with in both petitions.
  5. Since the procedural mandate in Rule 3(b) was violated, continuation of the acquisition process beyond the Section 4(1) notification stage could not be sustained. The Court therefore quashed the acquisition proceedings after Section 4(1) notification and directed a fresh Section 5A enquiry in accordance with law.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court quashed the entire acquisition proceedings after the stage of the Section 4(1) notification and allowed the two writ petitions in part.

Directed consequences and practical implications (as ordered by the Court):

  • A fresh enquiry under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act shall be conducted in accordance with law.
  • Because the matter is old, the Court imposed timelines: the fresh enquiry shall be completed, and if the Government decides to proceed with acquisition, the declaration shall be issued within six months from the date of the order; the award shall be passed within four months thereafter.
  • There was no order as to costs.

Note: The summary above is based exclusively on the contents of the provided opinion. No facts, dates or conclusions beyond those expressly contained in the opinion have been added.

Show all summary ...

Abdul Hadi, J.

These two writ petitions were heard together since common questions are involved in both W.P No. 10420 of 1985 seeks for a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to quash the land acquisition proceedings relating to the land of an extent of 2 ground and 1602 sq. ft. in T.S No. 3/1.part. Block No. 31, Mambalam, Village, Madras, owned by the petitioner N.D Ramanujam. W.P No. 4836 of 1987 also seeks Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to quash the land acquisition proceedings relating to the land adjacent to the abovesaid land bearing T.S No. 3/4 of the same Mambalam Village, Madras, owned by the petitioner, Oxford English School a registered society.

2. In both, the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) is the same, viz., G.O.Ms No. 1297, Rural Development and Local Administration, dated 24.8.1982, published in the Gazette on 8.9.1982 Likewise S. 6 declaration under the Act is also same, viz., G.O.Ms No. 1888 dated 19.12.1983 published in the Gazette on 15.2.1984

3. In the light of the submissions made before us, the allegations in the affidavit in support of W.P No. 10420 of 1985 may be summarised as follows: The Madras Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board informed by letter dated 27.1.1982 of it proposal to lays water main through the aforesaid petitioner's property to provide water supply to the residents of the locality. By the said letter, the Board said that it would excavate a trench, execute all necessary works, the trench would be refilled and the land would be restored to its original condition. The petitioner requested for a joint inspection by his letter dated 8.2.1992, so that as inconvenience was caused to his schemes of project therein. The Board agreed for a joint inspection and fixed it 21st April, 1982. However, subsequently the petitioner requested for an adjournment of the said date. However, the Board without any further notification or joint inspection, trespassed into the petitioner's property and unauthorisedly proceeded with its work. The petitioner protested by his letter dated 9.5.1982 and requested the Board to stop the work and drop the proceedings. Thereafter the petitioner did not hear anything from the Board. But, on 14.10.1982, a notice issued by the 2nd respondent, Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition work, Madras City was served on the petitioner, which informed differently that an extent of land Gr. 1.2095 sq. ft. of the petitioner is needed for improvement and provision of water and drainage arrangement in South Kothandaraswamy Koil Street. By the said notice, the petitioner was required to lodge his objection, if any. It also stated that the objections would be inquired on 30.10.1982 The said notice is an act of reprisal against the petitioner for questioning the authority of the Board to enter into the petitioner's property and dig trenches therein without permission. It is not a bona fide act of acquiring land for public purpose, but a mala fide one. The petitioner replied by his letter dated 28.10.1992, stating that the abovesaid notice was defective and had no effect for want of particulars like furnishing a plan etc. The said reply also stated that Section 4(1) Notification in this regard was illegal and that there was no compliance with the Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Rules. The said reply also mentioned that the arrangements had been made by the petitioner to out up a building in the said property, for which, the plans had been already submitted to the Corporation of Madras. In the hearing on 30.10.1982, the petitioner reiterated the abovesaid contentions. The matter was adjourned to 10.12.1982 Two years thereafter, the petitioner was surprised to receive on 12.9.1984 a notice under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act from the 2nd respondent, informing the proposal of acquisition, varying the extent of the land to be acquired from Gr. 1.2093 sq. ft. to Gr. 1.1602 sq. ft. and also varying the purpose of acquisition for formation of road to connect South Kothandaramaswamy Koil Street, and Reddikuppam road. The said notice requested the petitioner to appear before the 2nd respondent on 29.9.1984 However, the said date of enquiry was subsequently adjourned to 15.10.1984 In the mean time on 8.10.1984, the petitioner appealed to the Minister for Local Administration and obtained stay of further proceedings. However, to the petitioner's utter dismay, he received on 8.8.1985 a letter dated 2.8.1985 from the 3rd respondent, the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, stating that the petitioner's request for dropping the land acquisition proceeding could not be complied with. Inter alias, the petitioner also contended that the abovesaid land acquisition proceeding has been intittated at the instigation of the residents of the locality. According to the petitioner, the alleged purpose of equation was not a public purpose and the said purpose also had been changed every now and then. The petitioner also inter alis contended that the mandatory requirements as provided under Section 54 of the Act and Rule 3(b) and (c) have not been complied with.

4. The counter affidavit of the 1st respondent-Collector of Madras and the other respondents may be summarised as follows:— A request was received from the Corporation of Madras by letter dated 13.3.1982 (based on the resolution of the Special Officer-Council dated 23.2.1982) is acquire an extent of land measuring 2 grounds and 1596 sq. ft. in the abovesaid T.S No. 3/1 and 3/4 to form a link road to connect South Kothandramaswamy Koil Street and Reddikuppam road and to provide water and sewerage connection in the above area. Accordingly the lands were inspected and necessary proposals were sent to Government. On the approval of the said proposals, the above referred to Ss. 4(1) Notification was published. Thereafter, a notice under Section 4(1), 5A and 55(1) of the Act was issued to the owners of the land. The said notice was served on the petitioner for his appearance for enquiry on 30.10.1982 Accordingly the petitioner appeared on 30.10.1982 and also filed certain objections by his letter dated 8.11.1982 The contention of the petitioner that the present proceeding is a measure of reprisal is baseless, in view of the fact that the provision of a link read to the local residents and to provide water and drainage facilities are one of the essential and basic amentities to be provided by the local body. The entire land acquisition proceedings were initiated on the requisition of the Corporation of Madras. The Water Supply and Sewerage Board has not one in the picture at all. In the present case, the Commissioner of Corporation of Madras has viewed that the objections raised by the petitioner are not justificable on the ground that the alternative suggestion made by him is not suitable to from a link road. The acquisition is legal. Section 5A enquiry posted on 30.10.1982 was adjourned to 10.11.1982, but the writ petitioner did not appear for enquiry on 10.11.1982 He sent his objections by the above referred to letter dated 8.11.1982, which was sent to the Commissioner of Corporation of Madras for remarks and the reply obtained. The advocate for the petitioner, who appeared for enquiry on 30.10.1982 had already perused all the documents, including the sketch, notification, etc. and gave a written statement to that effect. Hence, the contention of the petitioner that the information sought for by him was not furnished to him, is incorrect. After observing all formalities, a declaration under Section 6 was approved by the Government and published. Though the Government granted stray originally, after perusing all the relevant records, the Government have vacated the stay on 2.8.1985 The acquisition is only for a public purpose and not at the instigation of the local residents. The Corporation has decided to provide basic amenities of providing a link road, and water and drainage facilities. The petitioner will not in any way be affected if a piece of land is acquired for providing road and other facilities to the residents. The remaining pertion of his land would also get road access. All the mandatory requirements of Section 4(1) have been followed. Section 5A enquiry was properly intimated. Objections of the petitioner before 5A enquiry, were examined and the opinion of the Commisioner, Corporation of Madras was also obtained. The objections were overruled as per the proceedings of the 1st respondent in K1.1114/82, dated 8.2.1983 and then only further action was taken to send draft declaration to the Government. The land acquisition proceeding is at the stage of passing of award and taking possession of the properties. At this stage, stay was granted by the High Court in W.M.P No. 15788 of 1985 by order dated 7.10.1985

5. The allegations made in the affidavit in support of W.P No. 4836 of 1987 may be summarised as follows:— During 1981-1982, the Corporation of Madras and the Madras Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board approached the petitioner for consent to lay a water main through the petitioner's abovesaid land by excavating a trench, executing the necessary work refilling the trench and restoring the land to the original condition. To the said proposal, the petitioner expressed its consent as there was no deprivation of the land. On 24.8.1982, the 1st respondent, the Government of Tamil Nadu is sued a notice under Section 4(1) of the Act to the effect that an extent of 2364 sq. ft., forming part of the abovesaid T.S No. 3/4, is needed or road purpose and for provision of water drainage arrangement in South Kothandaramasamy Koil Street. The 2nd respondent-Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition Works, also served a notice on 12.10.1982 to that effect. The petitioner sent a reply dated 27.10.1982 to the 2nd respondent stating that the said land is required for locating the school, but that however, the petitioner has no objection for connecting the water mains at K.R Koil Street with Reddikuppam road. By letter dated 23.10.1982 also the petitioner raised objections. The 2nd respondent did not held enquiry under Section 5A of the Act, nor had sent the remarks of M.M.E.S.S Board and the Corporation of Madras to the objections raised by the petitioner. The 1st respondent issued a declaration under Section 6 of the Act on 19.12.1983 The petitioner was served with a notice under Ss. 9(3) and 10 of the Act, dated 13.8.1994, calling upon him to put forth his claim for compensation. The petitioner submitted a claim and followed it with a letter dated 9.10.1984 Though more than two years have passed nothing had been heard from the respondents, nor an award was passed or communicated by the 2nd respondent. As the entire extent of land is required for the purpose of the petitioner's school, the petitioner is challenging the said acquisition as illegal. If the Collector fails to make the award within two years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984 (24.9.84), the entire land acquisition proceedings shall lapse as per Section 11A of the Act. The Explanation to Section 11A has no application to the petitioner's case as the petitioner has neither applied for nor secured orders of stay pursuant to the declaration issued by the respondents. Stay, if any, secured by third parties, is of no consequence. Without prejudice to the abovesaid contention, inter alia, the petitioner states that the mandatory requirements of Rule 3(b) of the Act has not been followed in the present case since on the objections raised by the petitioner, the remarks offered either by the Corporation of Madras or by M.M.W.S.S Board have not been communicated to the petitioner, nor an enquiry has been conducted, giving the opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner.

6. No counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents to the abovesaid affidavit of the petitioner, though some relevant files were shown to us.

7. The first submission of both learned Counsel appearing for the respective petitioners in the two writ petitions is based on S. 114 of the Act, which runs as follows:—

“11-A. Period within which an award shall be made.— The Collector shall make on award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:

Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from Such commencement.

Explanation:— In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.”

The abovesaid Section 11A was introduced by an amendment which come into force on 24.9.1984 So, as per the abovesaid proviso, the award in the present case should have been passed on or before 24.9.1986 Admittedly in the present case, the award has not yet been passed. But, learned Counsel for the respondents relies on the above referred to Explanation appearing under Section 11A of the Act. In this connection, he particularly relies on a Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Balak Ram Gupta… v. Union Of India…. (AIR 1987 Delhi 239). While interpreting the said Explanation, the said Full Bench observed as follows:—

“The use of the word “any” in the explanation considerably amplifies its scope and shows clearly that the explanation can be invoked in any case if some action or proceeding is stayed. It may be a complete stay of the operation of the entire notification or may even be a partial stay-partial in degree or in regard to persons or lands in respect of whom it will operate. The words used in the explanation are of the widest amplitude and there is no justification whatever to confine its terms and operation only to the cases in which the stay order is actually obtained.”

7-A. We are in agreement with the abovesaid view taken by the Full Bench of Delhi High Court. We also find that the said view has been followed by a Division Bench of Patna High Court in Sachidahand Lal v. State (AIR 1989 Patna 181). Further, by order dated 2.8.1990, a Division Bench of this Court also in W.A Nos. 178 and 179 of 1987 has held thus:—

“We have no difficulty in accepting the submission of the learned Government Pleade that the period of stay covered by the interim orders obtained in the other writ petitions will enure to the help of the respondents to exclude such period of stay in computing the period of two years for passing an award in respect of the lands of the appellants also.”

The abovesaid Division Bench also expressly approved the abovesaid view taken by the Full Bench of the Delhi High court. Further, in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1991 S.C 2153) the Supreme Court also has held as follows in relation to the abovesaid Explanation:—

“The said Explanation is in the widest possible terms, and in our opinion, there is no warrant for limiting the action or proceedings referred to in the Explanation to actions or proceedings proceeding the making of the award under Section 11 of the said Act. In the first place, as holds by the learned Single Judge himself where the case is converted by S. 17, the possession can be taken before an award is made and we see no reason why aforesaid expression in the Explanation should be given a different meaning depending upon whether the case is covered by Section 17 or otherwise. On the other hand, it appears to as that the Explanation in intended to confer a benefit on a land-holder whose land is acquired after the declaration under Section 6, is made in cases covered by the Explanation. The benefit is that the award must be made within a period of two years of the declaration, failing which the acquisition proceedings would lapse and the land would revert to the landholder. In order to get the benefit of the said provision what is required, is that the land-holder who seeks the benefit must not have obtained any order from a Court restraining any action or proceeding in pursuance of the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act so that the Explanation covers only the cases of those land-holders who do not obtain any order from a Court which would delay or prevent the making of the award or taking possession of the land acquired. In our opinion, the Gujarat High Court was right in taking a similar view in the impugned judgment”.

(Emphasis supplied).

In this connection, we may also incidentally add that the decision in T.K Singaram v. Urbah Land Ceiling Tribunal Chepauk (AIR 1992 Madras 180 = 1991-1-L.W. 56 (D.B) relied on by learned Counsel for the petitioner in W.P No. 4836 of 1987 has no application to the present case since that is a case where no order of stay at all was made by the Court staying any action pursuant to Section 6 declaration.

7.B. In the present case in W.P No. 10420 of 1985, the petitioner obtained in W.M.P No. 15788 of 1985 in W.P No. 10420 of 1985, On 7.10.1985, stay of dispossession alone. Likewise, in W.M.P No. 7050 of 1987 in W.P No. 4836 of 1987, interim injunction restraining all further proceedings was originally granted on 12.5.1987 and on 18.8.1987 the said interim injunction was made absolute with reference to dispossession alone. In the light of the abovesaid legal position based on the aforesaid Explanation there is no doubt that the petitioners in these writ petitions cannot invoke Section 114 of the Act to contend that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed. The result is there is no merit in the abovesaid first submission.

8. Another submission, which was made by learned Counsel for the petitioner in W.P No. 10420 of 1985 is that the abovesaid acquisition was a mala fide one since as stated in the affidavit in support of the said writ petition, originally M.M.W.S.S Board only sought to lay water main without actually acquiring the land, but thereafter only changed the said purpose to provide water and drainage facilities and for making road and sought to acquire the land for the said purpose. But, we do not think that there is any substance in this contention, particularly in view of the averment in the counter affidavit that the provision of a link road to the local residents and water and drainage facilities are one of the essential basic amenities to be provided by the local body and also by the Government and that the entire land acquisition proceedings were initiated based on the requisition of the Corporation of Madras and not the Water Supply and Sewerage Board.

8-A. It was also contended by the said learned Counsel for petitioner in W.P No. 10420 of 1985 that there was no requisition from M.M.W.S.S Board. But, as already noted, it is only the Corporation of Madras that is the requisitioning body and not M.M.W.S.S Board. Hence, there is no necessity to get the view of the abovesaid Board. It is also contended by the said Counsel that the same extent of property covered under W.P No. 10420 of 1985 was also the subject matter of another Notification under Section 4(1) dated 30.7.1987 On this ground the said learned Counsel contends that the earlier Notification lapsed, and he relies on the decision in Raghunath v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1988 S.C 1615) in this regard. But the said decision has no application to the present case since the petitioner has not proved that the property which is the subject matter in W.P No. 10420 of 1985 is same as the property which is the subject matter of the abovesaid Notification dated 30.7.1987 We are also told that against the said Notification dated 30.7.1987, W.P No. 5376 of 1990 is pending in this Court.

9. We may also add that learned Counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent-Association in W.P No. 4836 of 1987, no doubt relies on Mohd. Habibullah v. Spl. Dy. Collector (AIR 1967 Madras 118 = 79 L.W 469 to contend that these writ petitions have to be dismissed on the ground of delay in filing them. But, there, the writ petitions were filed after the Award was passed and after the petitioners even made a reference under Section 18 of the Act. So, the said decision has no application to the present case.

10. One contention by learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 in W.P No. 4836 of 1987 is that the petitioner has given consent for the acquisition and hence, there is no necessity for enquiry under Section 5A. But, the said learned Counsel could not specifically point out that there was any such consent. No doubt, learned Counsel for the petitioner in this said W.P could not also definitely assert that there was no such consent. At any rate, the decision in Mutakki Sesharathanam v. Sub-Collector, Land Acquisition, Vijayawada (AIR 1992 S.C 131), the Supreme Court has held thus:—

“In our view, the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh were, respect, clearly in error in dismissing the respective writ petition and the appeal filed by the appellant on the ground that the appellant had stated that he was willing to accept the acquisition provided a lump-sum compensation was awarded to him. The statement of the appellant amounted in law to no more than an offer in terms of the Contract Act. The said offer was never accepted by the Land Acquisition Officer is whom it was made. Leave, alone, making the award of lump-sum compensation, no award at all was made by the said officer awarding compensation to the appellant till Nov. 9, 1979, when the aforesaid offer was withdrawn by the appellant or even till the writ petition was filed. Till the offer was accepted there was no contract between the parties and the appellant was entitled to withdraw his offer. There was nothing inequitable or improper in withdrawing the offer, as the appellant was in no way bound to keep the offer open indefinitely. The writ petition, therefore, ought not to have been dismissed on the ground of the appellant having made a statement or consented as aforesaid before the Land Acquisition Officer.”

Therefore, the above referred to contention of learned Counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 should necessarily fail.

11. One other submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioners in both the writ petitions is that the mandatory requirements of Rule 3(b) framed by the Government of Tamil Nadu under Section 55(1) of the Act, have not been complied with. In this regard, both the Counsel rely on Kadirvelu Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu (1987 Writ L.R 182). The said Rule 3(6) provides as follows:—

“If any objections are received from a person interested in the land and within the time prescribed in sub-section (1) of Section 5-A the Collector shall fix a date of hearing the objections and give notice thereof to the objector as well as to the department or company requiring the land, where such department is not the Revenue Department. Copies of the objections shall also be forwarded to such department or company. The department or company may file on or before the date fixed by the Collector a statement by way of answer to the objections and may also depute a representative to attend the enquiry.”

The said decision of this court also held, following earlier decisions, as follows:—

“Coming to the facts of the present case, an the date when the enquiry under S. 5A was held, namely, 12th December, 1975, the remarks of the requisitioning body were not obtained, much less furnished to the petitioner to afford him an opportunity to make his representation over the same and the remarks of the requisitioning body were obtained on 25th March, 1978 long after the enquiry under S. 5A and even though these remarks were communicated to the petitioner, there was no fresh enquiry held to find out the tenability or otherwise of the prosecution of the acquisition proceedings of the basis and consideration of the objections of the petitioner, the remarks of the requisitioning body and the further representations of the petitioner over the remarks. Hence, it has got to be held that the mandate of the rule stood violated. This obliges this Court to discountenance the prosecution of the acquisition proceedings after the stage of notifications under S. 4(1)”

In the present case, in the counter that has been filed in W.P No. 10420 of 1985 it has been averred as follows:

“Regarding paras 6 and 7 of the affidavit it is submitted that the 5A enquiry which was posed to 30.10.82 was adjourned to 10.11.82 on the request of the advocate for the Writ Petitioner. No representative or the Writ Petitioner has appeared for enquiry on 10.11.82 as contended in the petition. But the writ petitioner has sent his adjections in writing by a letter dated 8.11.82 which was sent to the Commissioner, Corporation of Madras for remarks and the reply obtained.”

It has also been averred subsequently in paragraph 22 thus:—

“Regarding ground (1) it is submitted that the objections of the Writ Petitioner during 5A enquiry were examined and the opinion of the Commissioner Corporation of Madras was also obtained. The objections were overruled vide this office Proceedings KJ. 1114/82, dated 8.2.83 and then only further action taken to send Draft Declaration to Government.”

From this, what can be gathered is only that the objections of the petitioner in W.P No. 10420 of 1985 by his letter dated 8.11.1982 were sent to the Commissioner of Corporation of Madras for remarks and that reply was obtained from the Commissioner. But, it is not mentioned in the counter affidavit when actually the said objections were sent to the Commissioner of Corporation of Madras and when actually the abovesaid reply was obtained. That apart it is also not averred whether the said reply was communicated to the petitioner and whether there was continuation of Section 5A enquiry pursuant to the abovesaid reply received from the Commissioner. The only allegation is that after the enquiry on 30.10.1982 when the matter was adjourned to 10.11.1982, the petitioner did not appear for enquiry on 10.11.1982 There is no record to show that the reply of the requesting authority was communicated to the petitioners. That there was no Section 5A enquiry after the abovesaid reply was received from the Commissioner of Corporation of Madras. Therefore, it is clear that the requirements of Rule 3(b) have not been fully complied with.

11-A. This finding applies to W.P No. 4836 of 1987 also. As already noted, there also, in the affidavit in support of the said writ petition, the petitioner raised specifically the contention thus:—

“The mantory requirement of Rule 3(b) has not been followed in that on the objections raised by the petitioner, the remarks offered either by the Corporation or by M.M.W.S.S Board has not been communicated to the petitioner nor an enquiry has been conducted giving an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner.”

In this, and in fact to the other factual contention raised in the said supprting affidavit, there is no counter affidavit at all filed by the respondents, nor learned Counsel for the respondents could demonstrate to us through the relevant files that the abovesaid requirements have been strictly followed as stated above. As noted already, this court has repeatedly observed that after the remarks of the requistioning body were obtained, they should be communicated, to the petitioner and there should, thereafter, be an enquiry under Section 5A to find out the tenability or otherwise of prosecution of acquisition proceedings on the basis of the consideration of the objections of the petitioner, the remarks of the requisitioning body and further representations of the petitioner over the remarks. Therefore, we have necessarily to hold that the mandate of the abovesaid rule stood violated in the present case also.

12. Therefore, in both the writ petition the entire acquisition proceedings after the stage of Section 4(1) Notification is quashed and accordingly these two writ petitions are allowed in part. There tall be a fresh enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act in accordance with law. In view of the fact that the matter is very old, the enquiry shall be completed, and, if the Government decides to proceed with the acquisition, the declaration shall be issued, within six months from this date and the award shall be passed within four months thereafter. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

RR/KA/VCS.