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Dr. B.R Dullar v. Dr. C.P Sethi .

Punjab & Haryana High Court

Feb 21, 1989

Judgment

Subsequent
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CaseIQ

Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (J.V. Gupta, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition challenges an order of the Rent Controller dismissing the landlord's ejectment application filed under Section 13-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (as amended). The landlord, Dr. B.R. Dullar, retired from the service of Civil Surgeon effective 31.10.1984. Section 13-A was introduced by the Amendment Act, 1985, which came into force on 16.11.1985. Dr. Dullar filed the ejectment application on 22.01.1986 alleging that he was a "specified landlord," that the tenant occupied the demised premises at a monthly rent of Rs. 425 (payable in advance) plus house-tax, and that rent was in arrears since January 1982.

The landlord stated he had a wife and two sons: one son (Brij Deepak) was married and living in rented premises due to insufficient accommodation; the other son (Rajiv Dullar) was of marriageable age. The landlord asserted a family arrangement that the tenanted premises would be used by him for personal occupation after retirement because he did not own or possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area and that the accommodation presently occupied by him would be reallocated to both sons in two separate portions.

The tenant was granted leave to contest, filed a written statement claiming that the upper portion was his residence while the ground floor ran a clinic, that rent had been paid regularly till January 1986, and that the landlord's sons already resided in a residential building at Munshian Street, Nabha. The tenant alleged mala fides in the landlord's filing. The landlord denied these averments in replication. Seven issues were ultimately framed before the Rent Controller.

The Rent Controller dismissed the ejectment application, concluding the application was mala fide because the landlord had retired in 1984 but filed only in 1986, and further found that the landlord owned a residential building at Munshian Street which was sufficient for 2–3 families; hence the plea of personal necessity was not bona fide.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether an ejectment application by a "specified landlord" under Section 13-A is maintainable when Section 13-A came into force after the landlord's retirement and the application was filed shortly after the amendment?
Whether the landlord "owns and possesses any other suitable accommodation in the local area" within the meaning of Section 13-A (i.e., the legal test of "suitability" under Section 13-A)?
Whether the Rent Controller properly treated the landlord's application as mala fide because of the delay in filing?
Whether the Rent Controller followed the statutory procedure prescribed by Section 18-A when dealing with an ejectment application under Section 13-A?

Arguments of the Parties

Landlord's (Petitioner) Arguments

The Rent Controller's approach was wrong, illegal and improper, and the statutory provisions of Section 13-A (recently introduced) were not adhered to.
Under Section 13-A the correct criterion is "suitability" of alternative accommodation (a subjective assessment for the landlord), not "sufficiency" or numerical capacity; it was not for the Rent Controller to assess suitability rigidly.
The application could not be characterized as mala fide; enquiries into bonafide or mala fides were unnecessary under Section 13-A.
The tenant's written statement was vague; where the landlord's application was supported by affidavit it should have been allowed.
Referenced authorities: Dr. Dina Nath v. Smt. Santokh Kaur and Surjit Singh v. Harbans Singh to support propositions about "suitability" and the inadmissibility of vague denials.

Tenant's (Respondent) Arguments

The landlord did not plead that his present accommodation was unsuitable; therefore the Rent Controller rightly held that the accommodation occupied by the landlord was suitable and that he was not entitled to eject the tenant.
The application was not bona fide; no family partition evidence was produced; the landlord owned other suitable accommodation in the local area and hence was not entitled to eviction under Section 13-A.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Dr. Dina Nath v. Smt. Santokh Kaur, etc., 1987-1 91 PLR 171	Interpreting the language in Section 13-A: the phrase "He does not own and possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area and intends to reside" has a different connotation and must not be equated with the words in Section 13(3)(a)(i) dealing with occupation of any other residential building in the urban area.	The Court relied on this decision to hold that "suitability" under Section 13-A is a distinct concept and that sufficiency/occupation elsewhere (as under section 13(3)(a)(i)) is not the same test; thus the landlord's subjective choice between two premises was a crucial consideration.
Surjit Singh v. Harbans Singh, etc., 1989-1 95 PLR 6	Vague, bald or general denials/averments by a tenant are insufficient; the tenant must be clear and positive in their pleas to rebut landlord's claim under Section 13-A.	The Court applied this principle to disregard the tenant's vague denials about other properties and to hold that mere disputation without particulars did not disentitle the landlord to relief.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a step-by-step analysis that can be summarized as follows:

Procedure: The Rent Controller did not follow the procedure prescribed under Section 18-A for dealing with ejectment applications under Section 13-A. That omission was noted as a procedural defect.
Timing and mala fides: The Court rejected the Rent Controller's finding of mala fides. Section 13-A was introduced in November 1985; the landlord, who retired on 31.10.1984, filed the application on 22.01.1986 — shortly after the new provision came into force — and the Court observed that an earlier application under Section 13-A could not have been filed because the provision did not exist prior to the Amendment Act. Thus delay, insofar as it depended on the absence of the statutory remedy earlier, did not establish mala fide intent.
Applicability of Section 13-A: Section 13-A enabled a "specified landlord" to seek ejectment of a tenant from a residential or scheduled building. The Court emphasized that under Section 13-A the relevant test is whether the landlord "does not own and possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area in which he intends to reside."
"Suitability" versus "sufficiency": Relying on Dr. Dina Nath, the Court explained that the statutory word "suitable" must not be equated with "sufficient" or with the test under Section 13(3)(a)(i). The landlord is entitled to choose which of two premises is more suitable for his purposes after retirement; thus subjective suitability matters.
Evidence on possession of other accommodation: The landlord averred in the ejectment application and by affidavit (dated 20.01.1986) that he did not own or possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area. He gave evidence as AW1 and produced his son as AW2. The landlord and his son explained that apart from the building at Munshian Street (where the family lived), there was no other building in their possession; the second son was then living in rented premises and would move into Munshian Street after the family reallocation.
Tenant's denials insufficient: The Court applied the principle from Surjit Singh that vague and bald allegations by the tenant — such as an unsupported assertion that the landlord already owned suitable accommodation — were insufficient to defeat the landlord's claim. The tenant had not disclosed particulars of any other building owned by the landlord.
Conclusion on entitlement: On the record, the Court found the landlord had proved that he did not own or possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area and therefore established entitlement to recovery of possession under Section 13-A.
Statutory safeguard (amendment to Section 19): The Court noted that by the amending Act Section 19 was also amended to provide penal consequences if a specified landlord, after obtaining an eviction order under Section 13-A, does not occupy the premises for a continuous period of three months from the date of eviction or lets the building or any part thereof. This was mentioned as a legislative check against misuse.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition was allowed, the impugned order of the Rent Controller was set aside, and an eviction order was passed against the tenant (with costs).

Immediate consequences for the parties:

The tenant was permitted three months' time to vacate the premises subject to conditions: all arrears of rent, if any, together with advance rent for three months must be deposited with the Rent Controller within one month, and the tenant must provide a written undertaking that vacant possession will be delivered after the expiry of the three-month period.
The landlord must take possession and occupy the premises; otherwise, under the amended Section 19, failure to occupy continuously for three months or letting out the property after eviction may attract penal consequences (imprisonment up to six months and/or fine up to Rs. 1,000).

Broader implications: The Court's decision reaffirmed the distinction between "suitability" (the Section 13-A test) and notions of "sufficiency" or occupation relevant under other sections; it emphasized that tenants must make clear, positive averments when disputing a landlord's claim. The opinion did not purport to set a new, sweeping precedent beyond its application of existing authorities and statutory interpretation.

Disposition: Revision petition allowed. (H.L.S.)

Show all summary ...

J.V Gupta, J.:— This petition is directed against the order of the Rent Controller whereby the ejectment application filed by the landlord under Section 13-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, as amended, was dismissed.

2. Dr. B.R Dullar, the landlord retired from the service of Civil Surgeon with effect from 31.10.1984 Section 13-A was introduced by way of Amendment Act, 1985 which came into force with effect from 16.11.1985 The landlord filed the present ejectment application under Section 13-A of the Act on 22.1.1986 alleging that he was a specified landlord and the tenant was occupying the demised premises on a monthly rent of Rs. 425/- payable in advance besides house-tax. He was in arrears of rent with effect from January, 1982. He has got two sons and a wife. One of his sons namely Brij Deepak is married and is living in rented premises due to insufficient accommodation. The other son Rajiv Dullar is of marriageable age. In a family arrangement, it has been mutually decided that the tenanted premises would be occupied by the petitioner for his personal use and occupation as he does not own and possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area nor he has vacated any such building in the urban area. The accommodation where the petitioner landlord and his family members are living would be occupied by both the sons in two separate portions. The tenant moved an application for leave to contest the ejectment application which was allowed, and filed his written statement in which it was pleaded that he was using the upper portion for his residence whereas ground floor was used for running of clinic. According to him, he paid rent regularly in advance till January, 1986. He further pleaded that all the sons of the petitioner reside in the residential building situated at Munshian Street, Nabha. The ejectment application has been filed with malafide intention and the landlord does not require the same for his personal use and occupation. In the replication, the landlord reiterated the plea taken in the ejectment application and he controverted the plea taken by the tenant. On the pleadings of the parties, seven issues were framed.

3. It appears that neither the counsel for’ the parties nor the learned Rent Controller were aware of the provisions of Section 13-A as such as the same was introduced only two months prior to the filing of the present application. If the same had been kept in view, the question of framing those issues could not arise. According to the findings of the learned Rent Controller, the application was malafide because the landlord retired on 31.10.1984 whereas the present ejectment application was filed on 22.1.1986 In case he required the demised premises for his use and occupation after his retirement, he should have made the application immediately thereafter. He further found that eviction on the ground of personal necessity would be ordered only if the landlord strictly proved his bonafide of personal necessity and if he is not occupying any other residential building in the urban area concerned. Since the landlord is owning land a residential building which is sufficient for occupation by 2-3 families, the plea of personal necessity could not be held to be bonafide. On this finding, the ejectment application was dismissed.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the whole approach of the learned Rent Controller was wrong, illegal and improper. According to the learned counsel, the provisions of Section 13-A which was recently introduced were not adhered to. Under Section 13-A, sufficiency or insufficiency was not the criterion to be taken into consideration. What was required was suitability which was subjective to be seen by the landlord himself and it was not for the Rent Controller to go into the question of suitability. Moreover, argued the learned counsel, the application could not be said to be malafide in any manner nor the question of bonafide or malafide required to be gone into under Section 13-A as such. The written statement filed by the tenant was quite vague and, therefore, the application filed under Section 13-A which was duly supported by the affidavit, should have been allowed. In support of this contention, he referred to Dr. Dina Nath v. Smt. Santokh Kaur, etc. . 1987-1 91 PLR 171.. He also referred to Surjit Singh… v. Harbans Singh…. . 1989-1 95 PLR 6., to contend that the tenant has to be clear and not vague, positive and not negative in his pleas in the written statement. According to the learned counsel, the plea was too vague and, therefore, the same could not be taken into consideration under Section 13-A of the Act.

5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent-tenant submitted that neither in the ejectment application nor in the statement, it has been stated by the landlord that the present accommodation was not suitable. That being so, argued the learned counsel, it has been rightly held by the Rent Controller that the present accommodation in occupation of the landlord was suitable and, therefore, he was not entitled to eject the tenant. According to the learned counsel, the application was not bonafide nor any family partition, as alleged by the landlord, has been produced on record. Thus, argued the learned counsel, the landlord was not entitled to any eviction under Section 13-A as he owned and possessed the other suitable accommodation in the local area concerned.

6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also-gone through the relevant evidence on the record. As observed earlier, the Rent Controller did not follow the procedure as prescribed under Section 18-A for dealing with, the ejectment application filed under Section 13-A of the Act. The ejectment application could not be held to be malafide in any manner. The landlord retired on 31.10.1984 whereas Section 13-A was introduced in November, 1985 and the present application was filed immediately after two months thereafter on 22.1.1986 Apart from that ejectment application could not be filed earlier under Section 13-A on the ground of personal requirement as the building was a schedule one. It was only under Section 13-A that a specified landlord could seek ejectment of his tenant from the residential building or scheduled building. In these circumstances, the finding, of the learned Rent Controller in this behalf was wholly misconceived, illegal and improper.

7. The only other requirement under Section 13-A is that the landlord does not own and possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area in which he intends to reside to recover possession of his residential or scheduled building. Averment to this effect was made in the ejectment application in para 2 and it was duly supported by the affidavit dated 20.1.1986 in which it was stated that “I do not own and possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area in which the tenanted premises is situated where I intend to reside.” In support of this averment, the landlord also appeared in the witness-box as AW 1 and he produced his son Brij Deepak as AW 2. The only other satisfaction of Section 13-A is that the landlord does not own and possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area concerned. According to the Rent Controller, the building in Munshian Street in which the landlord is residing at present was sufficient and suitable for his occupation whereas according to the landlord the said accommodation was neither sufficient nor suitable for him and is to be occupied by his two sons according to the family arrangement and the demised premises are much bigger than the one occupied by him and therefore, the same were most suitable for his purpose particularly when he is to run his clinic after his retirement.

8. The question of suitability came up for consideration before this Court in Dr. Dina Nath's case (supra) wherein it was held that the words “He does not own and possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area and intends to reside” in Section 13-A have different connotation and are not be equated with words “he is not occupying any other residential building in the urban area concerned and requires it for his own occupation” occuring in Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act.

9. Thus on the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be successfully argued on behalf of the tenant that the present accommodation was sufficient and suitable for the landlord. It was for the landlord to see after his retirement as to which, out of the two premises, that is one presently occupied by him, and the other demised premises, one is more suitable for him. Sufficiency or insufficiency is not the criterion to be gone into under Section 13-A of the Act. Apart from that the tenant did not disclose any fact as to which other buildings are owned and possessed by the landlord. The allegations were too vague and merely disputing the claim made by the landlord would not be sufficient to enable the tenant to the grant of relief. Such averments would be regarded as vague and bald allegations and these could not be regarded as facts so as to disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession as held by this Court in Surjit Singh's case (supra). Moreover, it has been explained by the landlord and his son as AW 2 that there is no other building which is in their possession except the building in Munshian Street where they are residing at present. The second son, even according to the Rent Controller, is living in a rented premises and after the tenant is evicted from the demised premises, he will shift to the building in Munshian Street as per family arrangement.

10. Thus on the facts and in the circircumstances of the case, the landlord has proved on record that he does not owe and possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area concerned and, therefore, he was entitled to the eviction of his tenant under Section 13-A of the Act.

11. It will not be out of place to mention here that by virtue of the amending Act Section 19 of the Principal Act was also amended. Now it has been provided that if the specified landlord does not occupy the building after getting an order of ejectment under Section 13-A for a continuous period of three months from the date of such eviction or lets out the same or any such part of the building to any person, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extent to six months or with a fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000/- or both. It has been so stated that in case the landlord fails to occupy the premises, he will incur the said liability. Consequently, this petition succeeds, the impugned order of the Rent Controller is set aside, and eviction order is passed against the tenant with costs.

12. However, the tenant is allowed three months' time to vacate the premises provided all the arrears of rent, if any, along with advance rent for three months is deposited with the Rent Controller within one month with a further undertaking in writing that after the expiry of the said period, vacant possession will be handed over to the landlord.

H.L.S

Revision petition allowed.