1. This revision under S. 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, is directed against the trial Court's judgment dated 4-3-1982, decreeing the plaintiffs suit for ejectment of the defendant from the accommodation in dispute. Feeling aggrieved, the tenant has come up in the instant revision and in support thereof, I have heard Sri S.N Agrawal, learned counsel for the applicant in revision.

2. Learned counsel raised several contentions before me. Firstly, it was contended that the Court below was wrong in holding that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. According to the learned counsel issue 6, which was as follows, was wrongly decided by the trial Court.

“Whether the house in dispute was constructed over Bhumidhari land? If so, have the rights of the plaintiff in the disputed house, if any, been extinguished under the provisions of KUZA Act?”

3. Learned counsel contended that the house in question stood on such land as had become the Sirdari of his client when Kumaun & Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960 came into force. In the judgment of the trial Court it is stated that the said Act was enforced in the area, where the house in dispute is situated, with effect from 1st July, 1969. Before the said Act was enforced, Tehri Garhwal Bhumi Sampati Adhikar Niyam was applicable to the area in question. The trial Court has emphasized that the site over which a house was situated was not included in the definition of land in the earlier enactment and therefore, the Kumaun & Uttarkhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960 was not applicable to the land over which the house in question stood. The finding of the trial Court is that the house existed prior to 1-7-1969 when the new Act came into force in the area in question. Learned counsel has attacked this finding on the ground that the plaintiff in the witness box admitted that while some portion of the house in dispute was let out in 1959, the remaining portion was let out sometime in 1972. In my view, this attack is not merited. The defendant never stated that the remaining part of the house was constructed after 1st July, 1969. The burden was upon him to establish the said fact. Apart from that, it should be seen that the house is a compact one and even if some new construction was made adjacent to the old structures, it could well be shown to be done on the appurtenant land which was adjacent to the old structure. In that view, it will still be a part of the site of the old house. So far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned, in my view, the applicant in the revision has failed to show that by the trial in the civil Court, there has been any failure of justice. Section 331(1A) of the U.P Act No. 1 of 1951 clearly lays down that no objection to the lack of jurisdiction of a Court would be entertained unless, apart from other requirements mentioned in the said provision, it was also shown that there had been a consequent failure of justice, i.e failure of justice in consequence of the trial having taken place in the Court which lacked jurisdiction. Now the learned counsel contended that in the instant case it should be held that there was such failure of justice by the trial having taken place in the court of Small Causes, because from a decree passed by such a Court, no appeal lay. Only a revision under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act would lie, whereas if the suit had been tried in the revenue Court then a party could have an opportunity of having a full fledged right of first appeal and thereafter a second appeal would also lie on the question of law. In my view, this contention, even though attractive, is not tenable. Learned counsel further contended that the trial ill a Small Cause Court is a special trial to which many of the provisions of the Civil P.C are not applicable. He placed reliance on S. 7, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and O. 50 of the Civil P.C It should be seen that there is no question of the applicability of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. I have to decide as a pure question of law whether in every case where a trial takes place in a Small Cause Court it must necessarily and as a matter of law be held that such a trial results in a failure of justice because instead of an appeal a right of revision has been given to the aggrieved party. In my view, there can be no such presumption in law that such a trial necessarily results in the failure of justice. It is true that the aim of the trial of the Small Cause Court is to expedite the hearing and not to allow the decree to be questioned in a wide manner in which a decree can be questioned in a regular first appeal. However, this aspect of the matter cannot lead to the inference that such trial should be held to be a case of failure of justice. If this argument were to be accepted, it would mean that the intention of the Legislature in directing that certain suits shall be cognizable by the Small Cause Court alone was consciously to perpetuate injustice. According to the contention of the learned counsel for the tenant, the trial by a Small Cause Court is equivalent to an unjust trial. The Legislature very often lays down in what circumstances the party will have the right of revision, the right of appeal, the right to have a second appeal etc., and it would be dangerous to construe a provision contained in the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act as a provision perpetuating a failure of justice. This view further gets strengthened from the fact that in the earlier part of S. 331(1A) of the U.P.Z.A & L.R Act, the Legislature has used both the expressions appellate or revisional Court while laying down that no objection to the jurisdiction shall be entertained by any of these Courts. In other words, the Legislature has laid down that such an objection shall not be entertained even by a revisional Court or by the appellate Court. If the view were that in cases where revisions are provided for it must necessarily be held that the trial in the trial Court has resulted in a consequent failure of justice, then the Legislature would not have laid down that such an objection could not be raised before the revisional Court. Even as it could not be raised before the appellate-Court. In other words, the Legislative view is that both the appellate Court and the revisional court have to be satisfied that by the trial in the wrong Court consequent failure of justice was caused in the facts of the case and the controversy was not to be decided on the basis of a priori assumption. Accordingly, the first contention made by Sri Agarawal is rejected.

4. As a second limb of the same argument, the learned counsel contended that the rights of the plaintiff in the land became extinguished and for this purpose he placed reliance on Ss. 189 and 190 of the U.P.Z.A & L.R Act. In my view, both these sections are not applicable because the clear finding is that when the Kumaun and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960, was enforced the site of the house was no more land in which rights could accrue under the said enactment.

5. Learned counsel's next contention is based on S. 7 of the Kumaun and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960. The said section lays down as under:—

7. Private wells, trees in abadi and buildings to be settled with the existing owners or occupiers thereof — All wells, trees in abadi, and all buildings situate on any khaikari land in the notified area hereinbefore acquired belonging to or held by a hissedar, Khaikar or any other person, whether residing in the village or not, shall continue to belong to or be held by such hissedar, Khaikar or person, as the case may be, and the site of the well or the buildings with the area appurtenant thereto shall be deemed to be settled with him by the State Government on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.

Explanation — For the purposes of this section, the same treatment shall be given to the words “baoli”.

“Chhal”, “Naula”, “Nauli”, and similar expression as to the word “Well”.

6. It will be seen that this section is analogous to S. 9 of the U.P Act, 1 of 1951. Apart from the question as to whether S. 7 aforesaid would be said to be applicable to the site of the house in question, it has to be seen that there can be little doubt that the house and the site belonged to the plaintiff-opposite party when the said Act was enforced on 1-7-1969. The applicant in the revision, namely the tenant, derived his rights from the plaintiff-landlord. In a situation of this kind, in my view, the site of the house would not stand settled with the tenant. This will be so whether S. 9 of the U.P Act 1 of 1951 or S. 7 be held to be applicable. Learned counsel emphasized that the expression ‘held’ used in these sections should be interpreted as applicable to a tenant. In a situation of this kind a landlord who owns a building should be deemed to hold the same through his tenant. However, I wish to emphasize that the tenant in the instant case did not raise such a specific objection or plea and it has not been discussed in the judgment of the trial Court as to whether the provisions of the said section were attracted to the instant case. Such a plea cannot be allowed to be raised in the revision under S. 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.

7. Lastly, the learned counsel contended that there were co-landlords and the suit was bad for non-impleadment of necessary parties. This contention is again without merit. The trial Court under issue 1 clearly found that the letting was done by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant and throughout the rent was paid by the tenant to the plaintiff alone. It was held that the plaintiff alone was the landlord of the defendant.

8. It is well known that it is possible that there may be co-owners of a property but only one co-owner may be the sole landlord with reference to a particular tenant inducted by him.

9. Accordingly this revision is dismissed in limine. Learned counsel for the applicant prays that some time be granted to the applicant in revision to vacate the house in question and hand over its vacant possession. Three months' time is granted to the applicant in revision for the said purpose and the decree for ejectment shall not be executed for a period of three months.

10. Revision dismissed.