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Abdullah Mian v. Jodha Raut And Others

Patna High Court
Aug 10, 1976
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Hari Lal Agrawal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two writ applications by the same petitioner challenge a common order dated 10 April 1973 (Annexure 4) of the Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, which set aside earlier subordinate orders and remanded two pre-emption proceedings to the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Motihari, with a direction to treat the petitioner as a party and decide afresh.

Relevant facts: On 27.9.1967 Bidneshwari Prasad and Balram Prasad sold two parcels to Lallan Prasad (respondent no. 2). Lallan Prasad, on 21.11.1967, executed a sale to the petitioner (registered 16.1.1968). Pre-emptor Jodha Raut (respondent no. 1) filed applications under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act on 8.3.1968 claiming a right of pre-emption as an adjoining raiyat; in those applications he mentioned the transfer to the petitioner but did not make the petitioner a party.

The Land Reforms Deputy Collector dismissed Jodha Raut's applications on 29.7.1969 for non-maintainability in the absence of the subsequent transferee (the petitioner). On appeal, the appellate authority allowed the appeals on 23.6.1970 and granted pre-emption. Subsequent administrative revisions and transfers of the file led the Collector to restore the Deputy Collector's order on 1.5.1972. The Board of Revenue, however, added the petitioner as a party and remanded the matter to the Deputy Collector for fresh decision after notice to the petitioner (impugned order dated 10.4.1973). The petitioner challenged that remand in these writ petitions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Board of Revenue erred in remanding the Section 16(3) pre-emption proceedings to the Land Reforms Deputy Collector for fresh hearing after adding the petitioner as a party.
  2. Whether the addition of the petitioner at the Board of Revenue stage was barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (residuary article) or otherwise legally impermissible.
  3. Whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to Revenue Courts or to proceedings not governed by the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., whether the residuary article is confined in its application to matters under the Code of Civil Procedure).
  4. Whether, given that the transfer to the petitioner was complete and known to the pre-emptor before the pre-emption application, the pre-emptor's remedy lay against the original transferee or against the subsequent transferee (the petitioner).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. Thakur Prasad)

  • The addition of the petitioner at the Board of Revenue stage was barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (a residuary three-year period) because the petitioner's transfer was complete and the revision was filed in 1972 though the petitioner's transfer had been registered on 16.1.1968.
  • Relying on a Bench decision in Ram Chandra Yadav v. Anutha Yadav (1971 B.L.J.R. 994), he argued that when the sale to a subsequent purchaser is complete (including registration) before the pre-emption application is filed, the application against the original purchaser is incompetent and the remedy, if any, lies against the subsequent purchaser within the statutory period (three months under Section 16(3)). Therefore the Board's order remanding for notice to the petitioner after expiry of limitation was illegal.

Respondent No.1's Arguments (Mr. J.C. Sinha)

  • First, limitation was not pressed before the Board of Revenue, so the point should not be entertained by the Court now.
  • Second, Article 137 of the Limitation Act has no application to Revenue Courts because such courts are not governed by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure (i.e., residuary Article is confined to applications under the CPC).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Wazir Chand Mahajan v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 990 Held (under the old Limitation Act) that Article 181's general language is to be read as implicitly confined to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court noted this authority as supporting the proposition that residuary limitation articles should be confined to matters under the CPC; it treated the point as significant for discussion of whether Article 137 applies to revenue proceedings.
Town Municipal Council v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1335 Observed that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, should be confined in its application as Article 181 of the old Act was confined — i.e., not to be read as applying to matters outside the CPC; held that no period of limitation was prescribed for application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Court treated this as reinforcing the Wazir Chand view that Article 137 does not apply to non-CPC applications; it relied on this line of authority when considering the applicability of Article 137 to the present revenue matter.
Nityanand M. Joshi v. The Life Insurance Corporation of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 209 Affirmed the reasoning in Town Municipal Council regarding the limited scope of the residuary article in relation to non-CPC matters (noting, however, that the scope of Article 137 might warrant serious consideration). The Court recorded this as further authority supporting the restricted application of Article 137; the trio of Supreme Court decisions formed the backdrop for discussion of limitation in revenue proceedings.
Ram Chandra Yadav v. Anutha Yadav, 1971 B.L.J.R. 994 (Bench decision of this Court) Stated that if a purchaser transfers the land to another person before filing of the pre-emption application and the sale is complete (including registration) before filing, an application filed against the original purchaser ignoring the subsequent purchaser will be of no effect; the proper party is the subsequent transferee. The Board of Revenue relied on this decision to add the petitioner and remand for notice. The Court in the present opinion examined and distinguished that decision on grounds of limitation and factual differences (e.g., absence here of allegations like ante-dating or farzi sale). The Court therefore did not follow the remedial approach of that Bench decision in the present circumstances.
Babu Lakshmi Narain Singh v. Satya Narain Singh, (1973 Bihar Bar Council Journal 136) Held, in an application for substitution in an application for certificate to appeal (involving Order 45, Rule 2 CPC), that residuary Article 137 applied and the application for substitution was barred. The Court found that the facts directly attracted the application of Article 137 in that case (because it concerned CPC provisions). The present Court regarded the decision as distinguishable and its contrary observations as obiter in the context of revenue proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court divided the analysis into two linked strands: (A) the question whether residuary Article 137 applies to revenue proceedings and (B) the substantive consequence of the fact that the transfer to the petitioner was complete and known when the pre-emption application was made.

(A) Applicability of Article 137 to Revenue Proceedings and Limitation Point)

  • The Court rejected the procedural objection that limitation was not pressed below as determinative: under Section 3 of the Limitation Act the Court has a duty to dismiss proceedings instituted after the prescribed period even if limitation has not been set up as a defence.
  • The Court reviewed Supreme Court authorities (Wazir Chand Mahajan, Town Municipal Council, Nityanand Joshi) which support the proposition that the residuary article (Article 181 of the old Act or Article 137 of the 1963 Act) has traditionally been confined to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, i.e., applications not under the CPC should not automatically fall within the scope of the residuary article.
  • The Court observed that a contrary view taken in Babu Lakshmi Narain Singh was distinguishable because that case concerned applications under CPC provisions (Order 45, Rule 2) and thus attracted Article 137 directly; the Court treated contrary observations in that case as not decisive for revenue matters (in effect calling them obiter as applied to the present facts).

(B) Substantive Pre-emption Law and Effect of Completed Transfer)

  • The Court explained the object of Section 16(3) (right of pre-emption): to prevent introduction of strangers and avoid fragmentation of agricultural holdings by permitting a pre-emptive co-sharer or adjoining raiyat to purchase within a statutory period (three months) after registration.
  • Where transfer attracting Section 16(3) has been completed and registered before the pre-emption application is filed, the proper remedy lies against the person who actually holds the land (the subsequent transferee), because any order directing reconveyance would have to be framed against the transferee who currently holds title and can be directed to execute and register a transfer; the Collector's order must therefore be directed at the transferee.
  • In the present case the petitioner’s transfer had been completed and was known to Jodha Raut, who nonetheless pursued the application against Lallan Prasad without impleading the petitioner. The Court concluded that, as a result, the application against Lallan Prasad was incompetent and that, if a remedy were to be pursued, it lay only against the petitioner and within the applicable time (three months), which had long expired.
  • The Court considered the Board of Revenue's reliance on Ram Chandra Yadav. That earlier Bench had remanded to permit impleading a subsequent transferee where there was uncertainty or allegations of ante-dating/farzi sale; but the present Court distinguished Ram Chandra Yadav because (i) limitation was not an issue in that earlier case and (ii) in that case there were specific allegations (ante-dating or farzi deed) which materially changed the analysis by raising lis pendens or precariousness; such allegations are absent here.
  • Because the pre-emptor in this case did not make allegations of an ante-dated or fraudulent (farzi) sale and the petitioner's registered transfer was completed prior to the application, the Court concluded that remanding for notice to the petitioner (at the expense of the petitioner) would unfairly expose the petitioner to a pre-emption risk after the statutory period had expired.

On this basis the Court concluded that the Member, Board of Revenue committed an apparent error of law in remanding the proceedings for notice to the petitioner and thereby exposing the petitioner to a remedy that, in substance, was time-barred or improperly directed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: These writ applications are allowed; the impugned order dated 10th April, 1973 (Annexure 4) of the Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, is set aside.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The remand by the Board of Revenue directing the Land Reforms Deputy Collector to give notice to the petitioner and decide afresh is quashed.
  • An appropriate writ is to issue in favour of the petitioner (the opinion states that it will issue accordingly).
  • The parties are directed to bear their own costs.

Broader precedent or doctrinal implication: The Court relied on existing Supreme Court authority regarding the confined application of the residuary Article (Article 137/old Article 181) to CPC matters and distinguished a contrary Bench decision of this Court (Babu Lakshmi Narain Singh) as being factually governed by CPC provisions. The decision is confined to the facts before the Court (pre-emption proceedings where a subsequent transferee's registered title was complete and known) and the Court set aside the remand as an error of law; the opinion does not purport to establish a new, sweeping precedent beyond its factual ratio.

Disposition: Application allowed. (S.K. Choudhuri, J. concurred.)

Show all summary ...

Hari Lal Agrawal, J.:— Both these writ applications have been filed by the same petitioner and arise out of a common Order dated 10th April, 1973 (Annexure 4) passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna (Respondent no. 5) disposing of two proceedings initiated by respondent no. 1 under the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (Bihar Act 12 of 1962)—to be referred hereinafter only as the ‘Act’—setting aside the previous orders of the authorities subordinate to him and remanding the two cases to the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Motihari, for a fresh decision by treating the petitioner as a party to the proceedings. All the parties are common in both the cases, and so are the facts and, accordingly, they are being disposed of by this judgment.

2. The short facts relevant for appreciation of the question raised before us are these; Respondent No. 1 Jodha Raut filed two applications under Section 16(3) of the Act on 8.3.1968 before the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Motihari, claiming a right of preemption in respect of the lands transferred by Bidneshwari Prasad (respondent no. 3) and Balram Prasad (respondent no. 4—since dead) to Lallan Prasad (respondent no. 2) under two sale deeds dated 27.9.1967; one in respect of 6 kathas 7 dhurs of survey plot No. 1164, under khata No. 281 for Rs. 1270/- and another in respect of 7 kathas 15 dhurs of survey plot No. 1135, under khata No. 112 of village Pataura Tola Lalla for Rs. 1500/- on the ground that he was a raiyat adjoining both the plots in question and, therefore, entitled for the transfer of the same in accordance with the above provision of law. Both the sale deeds were registered on 18.12.1967, but even before that, Lallan Prasad transferred the plot to the petitioner for a total consideration of Rs. 8,000/- by a sale deed executed on 21.11.1967 and registered on 16.1.1968

3. Jodha Raut was aware of this fact and in his applications for preemption, he had mentioned about the transfer of the lands in question by Lallan Prasad to the petitioner, but still the petitioner was not made a party by him. Lallan Prasad in his show cause had also stated that he had already parted with the land in question, had no longer any concern with the same and the petitioner was a necessary party to the applications. It may, however, be mentioned that Jodha Raut had alleged in his applications that the transfer in favour of the petitioner was mala fide.

4. The Land Reforms Deputy Collector dismissed both the applications by order dated 29.7.1969 (Annexure 1) on the ground that in the absence of the subsequent transferee, namely, the petitioner, the applications were not maintainable, and on that account, the deposit made by Jodha Raut, as required by the proviso to Section 16(3) of the Act also fell short. On appeal by Jodha Raut against the orders of the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, the appellate authority taking a view that it was not necessary to add subsequent transferee as a party, allowed the appeals by order dated 23.6.1970 and held that Jodha Raut was entitled to preemption. The appellate order has been made Annexure 2. Lallan Prasad then filed two revisions before the Commissioner, Tirhut Division, as directed by the Board of Revenue. The Commissioner, in his turn, transferred the cases to the Collector of Champaran, who by his order dated 1.5.1972 (Annexure 3), relying upon a Bench decision of this Court, restored the order of the Land Reforms Deputy Collector. Then Jodha Raut, the pre-emptor, came to the Board of Revenue, and the Member, Board of Revenue, on his own accord, added the petitioner as apposite party No. 4 for the first time. In view of a Bench decision of this Court in (1) Ram Chandra Yadav v. Anutha Yadav (1971 B.L.J.R 994), also referred to by the Collector, Motihari, the Member, Board of Revenue, took the view that in absence of the subsequent purchaser, namely, the petitioner, the applications for preemption were not maintainable. But instead of dismissing the applications for this reason, he remanded them to the Land Reforms Deputy Collector to issue notice to the petitioner and then to decide the matter afresh. It is this order that is under challenge in these applications.

5. Mr. Thakur Prasad appearing for the petitioner in this Court challenged the impugned order of the Board of Revenue remanding the proceedings to the Court of the first instance for fresh hearing after notice to the petitioner on the ground that his addition in the proceedings was barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - the residuary Article under the Third Division of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a period of three years for making such applications for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere. He contended that inasmuch as the transfer in favour of the petitioner was already complete. On 16.1.1968, his addition for the first time in the revisional applications before the Board of Revenue, which were filed in the year 1972, was apparently barred by limitation.

6. Mr. J.C Sinha appearing for respondent no. 1, however, refuted the above argument on two grounds; firstly that the question of limitation was not pressed before the Board of Revenue and, secondly, that Article 137 of the Limitation Act (Corresponding to Article 181 of the old Limitation Act) had no application to Revenue Courts because it was neither a court governed by the Code of Civil Procedure nor by the Code of Criminal Procedure.

7. The first contention of Mb. J.C Sinha does not merit much consideration as Mr. Thakur Prasad, who also appeared before the Board of Revenue, but the same has not been noticed in the impugned order. Be that as it may, it is well settled that there is no estoppel against a statute and under Section 3 of the Limitation Act a duty is cast upon the Court itself to dismiss any proceeding instituted after the prescribed period of limitation, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. The second argument of Mr. J.C Sinha, however, seems to be substantial supported by high authorities and requires a detailed discussion.

8. In the case of (2) Wazir Chand Mahajan v. The Union of India (A.I.R 1967 S.C 990), which was a case under the old Limitation Act, a question arose as to whether an application filed under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act was governed by Article 181. It was held there that although the terms of Article 181 were general and apparently not restricted to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, the expression “under the Code of Civil Procedure” occurring in the preceding Article, must be deemed to be necessarily implicit in this Article as well.

9. The Supreme Court again in case of (3) Town Municipal Council v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (A.I.R 1969 SC 1335) was considering Article 137 of the new Limitation Act in relation to an application made under Section 33C(2) of the industrial Disputes Act and it was very clearly observed that although the new Article was placed into a separate Part, namely. Part II of the Third Division to the Schedule, in view of a long catena of decisions to the effect that the parallel Article 181 of the old Act should be confined in its application only to such applications, which were under the Code of Civil Procedure, there was no reason to hold that amendment of Articles 158 and 178 of that Act had the effect of altering that long acquired meaning of Article 181 and it was declared that “that view expressed by the Court must be held to be applicable even when considering the scope and applicability of Article 137 in the new Limitation Act of 1963” and on this view it was held that no period of limitation was prescribed for application under Section 33C(2) of the industrial Disputes Act. This view was again affirmed by that Court in (4) Nityanand M. Joshi v. The Life Insurance Corporation of India (A.I.R 1970 SC 209), although it was observed in this case that the observation made in the case of Town Municipal Council that inspite of the changes made in the Limitation Act, 1963, drastic charge was intended in the scope of Article 137, might require serious consideration. The Supreme Court, however, did not proceed to consider that matter.

10. Encouraged by the above observations of the Supreme Court, Mr. Thakur Prasad learned counsel relied (Sic) heavily upon a Bench decision of this Court in (5) Babu Lakshmi Narain Singh v. Satya Narain Singh (1973 Bihar Bar Council Journal 136) where, in an application for certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court, on the death of one of the applicants, an application for substitution was made after three years. It was held that the residuary Article 137 applied and the application for substitution was barred. From the facts stated in this case, it is evident that the application for certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court of an appellate decree of the High Court passed in an appeal arising out of a decree in a suit. That application was an application under Order 45, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, the facts of the case directly attracted the application of Article 137. However, an observation has been made in this case that Article 137 has now been put in Part II of the Third Division of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act and…. “the main reason given in all those decisions for taking the view that the residuary article applies to an application only under the Code has vanished.”

11. All the three authorities of the Supreme Court which were cited by Mr. J.C Sinha before us, as already noticed above, were not noticed in the above case where a view different from the view expressed in the above decisions by the Supreme Court has been taken. It is not necessary for me to dilate any further on this question as the matter can be rested by holding the observations in the nature of merely obiter dicta in as much as the application for consideration in that case was covered under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

12. Realising this difficulty of application of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, Mr. Thakur Prasad then adopted a different argument, and, in my opinion, more substantial. He contended that in view of the Bench decision of this Court In Ram Chandar Yadav's case (1971 B.L.J.R 994), also referred to by the Board of Revenue in the impugned order, that “if a purchaser of the land would have transferred it to another person before the filing of the application under Section 16(3) of the Act and if the sale was complete in ill senses, not only by execution of the sale deed but by completion of the registration, before filing of the application surely the application filed against the original purchaser, ignoring the subsequent purchaser, will be of no effect, and no order to reconvey the property to the preemptor can be made in such a case”, the application of Jodha Raut for preemption against the first transferee, namely, Lallan Prasad was incompetent, and if at all, the same could lie only against the petitioner; and in as much as such an application under Section 16(3) of the Act could be made only within a period of three months of the date of registration of the document of transfer, the Collector having no power to extend the said period, the order of remand passed by the Board of Revenue directing the Land Reforms Deputy Collector to re-consider the matter, after notice to the petitioner, was illegal as the petitioner had acquired a right to hold the property, unimpaired by the risk of being preempted by a co-sharer or raiyat of adjoining land, after the period of limitation of three months had expired long before.

13. The right of pre-emption, in the event of a sale, to purchase the property upon certain terms, has been brought in under the provisions of the Act with an object to prevent introduction of strangers as co-sharers or adjoining raiyats avoid fragmentation of agricultural holdings of the pre-emptive co-sharers or raiyats under the provisions of Section 16(3) of the Act and a preemptive co-sharer or a raiyat on the boundary may exercise this right whenever any transfer of land is made. After the period of three months for exercising such a right has elapsed, the right of pre-emption comes to an end by efflux, of time and the transferee becomes free from the danger of being preempted. Each transfer attracting the conditions embodied in Section 16(3) will provide an opportunity to the pre-emptive co-sharer or a raiyat on the boundaries. The transfer in favour of the petitioner, as already stated earlier, was well known to Jodha Raut, so much so that he had stated this fact in the very applications themselves. In my judgment, therefore, his remedy did not lie against Lallan Prasad, the original transferee, but lay against the petitioner as on the grant of the application, the Collector has to make an order directing the transferee to reconvey the land in favour of the applicant by executing and registering a document of transfer within a period to be specified in the order, and if the transferee neglects or refuses to comply with the direction, to follow the procedure prescribed under Order 21, Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

14. In order to ward off this inescapable conclusion flowing from the provisions and the scheme of the Act, learned counsel for Jodha Raut (respondent No. 1) sought to take and from Ramchander Yadav's case (1971 B.L.J.R 994). This Court in Ramchander Yadav's case, where the subsequent transferee was impleaded for this first time as a respondent in the writ application, remanded back the case to the first authority for a retrial after giving an opportunity to the applicant of that case of impleading the subsequent transferee (Chhathi Yadav) as an opposite party in his application filed under Section 16(3) and stating such further facts in a supplementary petition as he might be advised to do, however after giving notice to Chhathi Yadav. It was observed by this Court in that case for granting this indulgence that “the position of law being uncertain, we do not feel persuaded to deny an opportunity to the petitioner to substantiate his allegation in regard to the sale deed executed by Anuthi in favour of Chhathi.”

15. I, however, find myself unable to follow the same principle and procedure in the present case, at the cost of the petitioner. Firstly, because, in that case the question of limitation was not raised and the attention of this Court was perhaps not invited to this aspect of the matter that the subsequent transferee had acquired a status in the meantime which, in my opinion, is a fundamental question staring in the face of the pre-emptor.

16. The other important point of distinction that appears to me for not following the same procedure in the present case is that in that case the pleas of pre-emptor against the subsequent transferee inter alia were that the transfer was made by an ante-dated sale deed and that the sale deed was farzi. In either of the two circumstances, the question of limitation lost much of its weight in as much as if the subsequent sale deed was ante-dated, it was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens and the transfer in favour of Chhathi Yadav became precarious. If he was a mere farzidar of the first transferee, then that question also could not be decided in his absence, and once that was decided against him, he would be bound by the order of pre-emption passed against the real owner alone.

17. I have taken care to scrutinise the applications filed by Jodha Raut under Section 16(3) of the Act which was read out to us and do not find any such statement made therein. The allegations are only of the nature that Lallan Prasad had executed the sale deed in favour of the petitioner to defeat his claim of pre-emption, perhaps under an erroneous impression that the pre-emptive co-sharer lost his right of pre-emption, if the transferee had already parted with the property in question. From the facts enumerated earlier, it is also apparent that, the transfer in favour of the petitioner was also complete before the applications under Section 16(3) were made and, therefore, the same cannot be hit by the principles of lis pendens either.

18. For the reasons discussed above, I hold that the learned Member, Board of Revenue, has committed an apparent error of law. I would, accordingly, allow these applications and in exercis of the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, set aside the impugned order dated 10th April, 1973, contained in Attnexure 4. Let an appropriate writ issue accordingly. In the circumstances, however, I shall direct the parties to bear their own costs.

19. S.K Choudhuri, J.:— I agree.

Application allowed.