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Jiawan Pandey And Another v. Mahendra Rai Opposite Party.
Factual and Procedural Background
This revision by the defendants was directed against the order dated 7 January 1981, passed by the Additional Munsif, Arrah, in Title Suit No. 159 of 1979, which held that the suit had not abated under section 4(c) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (the Act). The revision was referred to a Division Bench and placed before the court for hearing.
The plaintiff had filed the suit seeking a declaration that a deed of gift dated 6 April 1977, purportedly executed by the plaintiff, was illegal, null and void, fraudulent, fabricated, collusive and without consideration, and therefore ineffective against the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that he had developed intimacy and trust with the defendant and, as a patient of asthma, took medicines on the defendants' advice; while under the influence of such drugs he allegedly lost his full powers of understanding and the defendants obtained the deed of gift from him in that state.
During pendency of the suit the defendants filed an application under Sections 4(b) and 4(c) of the Act contending that the suit had abated because a consolidation proceeding was ongoing in village Sunderpur Barza, where the lands covered by the deed of gift are situated. The court below heard the matter and held that the suit had not abated. The defendants challenged that order by way of the present revision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit has abated under section 4(c) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956, by reason of consolidation proceedings in the village where the suit land is situate.
- Whether the deed of gift challenged in the suit is a void document (which would lead to abatement under section 4(c)) or a voidable document (which would require adjudication by the court and therefore would not result in abatement).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners / Defendants (as represented by Mr. Binod Kumar Roy)
- Contended that the court below acted illegally and with material irregularity in holding that the suit had not abated under section 4(c) of the Act.
- Argued that the present case is covered by the single Judge decision in Paras Singh v. Baikunth Singh (1979 PLJR 567), which supported the proposition that the suit abated.
Opposite Party / Plaintiff (as represented by Mr. D.N. Pandey)
- Supported the impugned order of the court below and relied upon Surajmani v. Shanti Devi (1981 B.B.C.J 411) and Chote Gope v. Kali Gope (1983 B.B.C.J 1244 : 1983 PLJR 357) to show that the suit had not abated.
- Accepted (at the Bar) that if the challenged document were found to be voidable, it would require adjudication and the suit would not have abated; contended that the deed fell into that category rather than being void ab initio.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Paras Singh v. Baikunth Singh (1979 PLJR 567) | The single Judge held that a relief framed as “declaration of title to the land on declaration that the said deed of gift was illegal, void and inoperative” is covered by section 4(c) of the Act and therefore the suit abated; the single Judge also (obiter) observed that if the executant was unconscious and had lost capacity, the deed would be void. | The court in the present opinion found the Paras Singh decision of limited assistance: its primary holding (abatement) was based on the view that the challenged declaration of invalidity was integral to declaration of title; the observation about unconsciousness rendering the deed void was characterized as obiter and not relied upon. The present court did not accept Paras Singh as overruling the Full Bench principle it preferred. |
| Surajmani v. Shanti Devi (1981 B.B.C.J 411) | The decision applied the Supreme Court's distinction (in Gorekh Nath Dubey) between documents which are wholly/partially invalid and may be disregarded and documents which must be set aside before ceasing to have legal effect; the latter are outside the scope of abatement under provisions like section 4(c). | The learned Judge in Surajmani held that the deed in question fell in the latter category (voidable and requiring setting aside) and allowed revision against an order of abatement. The present court treated Surajmani as supporting the proposition that voidable documents do not cause abatement under section 4(c). |
| Chhote Gope v. Kali Gope (1983 B.B.C.J 1244 : 1983 PLJR 357) | Followed the Supreme Court decision in Gorekh Nath Dubey and held that a deed sought to be declared invalid was not of the class that abates the suit under section 4(c) because it required adjudication/cancellation. | The present court noted that Chhote Gope upheld the trial court's order that the suit had not abated and treated it as supportive authority for the view that the deed in such cases is voidable and requires judicial determination. |
| Gorekh Nath Dubey v. Hari Narain Singh ((1973) 2 SCC 535 : A.I.R. 1973 Supreme Court 2451) | Draws a distinction between documents which are wholly or partially invalid and may be disregarded by any court or authority, and those which must be set aside/cancelled by a competent forum before they cease to have legal effect; the latter class is outside the scope of provisions relating to abatement. | Adopted as the controlling principle in the decisions relied upon by the opposite party and treated by this court as the correct legal test to decide whether a challenged document leads to abatement under section 4(c). |
| Musammat Rupia v. Bhatu Mahton (A.I.R. 1944 Patna 17) (Full Bench) | Held that certain sale-deeds, though alleged to be the product of fraud, were on their face duly executed and registered and therefore carried legal consequences (title passed) and would require cancellation before those consequences could be removed; such a document is voidable, not void, and the principle governed court-fee consequences in that case. | The present court treated the Full Bench principle as directly applicable: it concluded that the deed in the present case is of the voidable class requiring cancellation/setting aside and therefore the suit did not abate under section 4(c). |
| Ramkrit Singh v. The State of Bihar (1979 PLJR 161) (Full Bench) | In a suit of composite nature, if a relief (or reliefs) is unconnected with a declaration and determination of title to the land, that independent relief would not abate under provisions like section 4(c). | Referred to by the single Judge in Paras Singh and discussed in the opinion; the present court considered the principle when assessing whether alleged declarations in Paras Singh were independent or integral to the title relief. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court framed the dispute succinctly: the determinative question was whether the deed of gift challenged by the plaintiff is void or voidable. The legal consequence stated in the opinion was that a voidable document requires adjudication (it must be set aside/cancelled) and therefore the suit in which its validity is challenged does not abate under section 4(c) of the Act; by contrast, a truly void document would not require such adjudication and, if so, the suit would abate under section 4(c).
The court first examined the authorities relied upon by the opposite party (Surajmani and Chhote Gope) and noted that those decisions applied the Supreme Court's distinction laid down in Gorekh Nath Dubey: where a document is not void on its face but requires cancellation before it ceases to have legal effect, it falls outside the scope of abatement provisions. Both Surajmani and Chhote Gope were treated as following this line and upholding the principle that such documents are voidable and the suits challenging them do not abate.
The court then turned to the Full Bench decision in Musammat Rupia v. Bhatu Mahton (a Full Bench under the court-fees context) and reproduced the Full Bench's analysis that documents alleged to be fraudulent but which on their face are duly executed and carry legal consequences are voidable, not void; they must be cancelled before their legal consequences can be removed. The court expressly stated that the principle laid down in the Full Bench Rupia case applies with equal force to the present case.
The court next discussed the single Judge decision in Paras Singh v. Baikunth Singh (cited by the petitioners). It recited that in Paras Singh the single Judge held the relief framed as a declaration that the deed was illegal and that title be declared in the plaintiff was covered by section 4(c) and therefore the suit abated. The single Judge in Paras Singh had further observed (on an assumed separate issue) that allegations of unconsciousness could render a deed void. The present court characterized that latter observation as obiter and found the Paras Singh decision of limited assistance: even on its own reasoning the single Judge's abatement conclusion was premised upon the reliefs being inseparable (the declaration of invalidity being a necessary prelude to the declaration of title).
Balancing these authorities, the court concluded that the present case falls within the Full Bench principle (Musammat Rupia) and the line of decisions following Gorekh Nath Dubey: the deed executed by the plaintiff is to be treated as a voidable document which requires adjudication and, therefore, the suit had not abated under section 4(c) of the Act. Because the document is voidable (and not void ab initio), the trial court correctly declined to hold that the suit had abated.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED. The revision application by the defendants had no merit and was dismissed by the court.
Direct consequences and immediate effects:
- The order of the trial court (Additional Munsif, Arrah) dated 7 January 1981 holding that the suit had not abated under section 4(c) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956, is upheld.
- The revision is dismissed without costs.
- The court treated the deed in question as a voidable document which requires adjudication/cancellation before its legal consequences can be removed; accordingly, abatement under section 4(c) did not arise on the facts and pleadings before the court.
Broader implications: The opinion applies and follows the distinction in Gorekh Nath Dubey and the Full Bench principle in Musammat Rupia that documents which are not void on their face but require setting aside are voidable and do not cause abatement under section 4(c). The opinion does not announce a new legal principle beyond applying those precedents and distinguishing the single Judge decision in Paras Singh on the bases explained.
S.K Choudhuri, J.:— This revision by the defendants is directed against the order dated 7th January, 1981, passed by the Additional Munsif, Arrah, in title suit no. 159 of 1979, holding that the suit has not abated under section 4(c) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (Bihar Act 12 of 1956), (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). This revision was placed for hearing before a learned single Judge, but by order dated 20th November 1982, he referred the case to a Division Bench and that is how it has been placed before us for hearing.
2. The aforesaid suit has been filed for a declaration that the deed of gift dated 6th April 1977 purported to have been executed by the plaintiff was illegal, null and void, fraudulent, fabricated and a collusive document and was without consideration and, therefore, had not affected the plaintiff. The plaintiff's case, in short, is that the plaintiff had developed intimacy with the defendant and had full confidence upon him. It has been averred that taking advantage of the aforesaid situation, the plaintiff, who was a patient of Astahma, used to take medicine of the advice of the defendants, who helped him in his treatment. It has further been stated that, while the plaintiff used to take some drugs, on the advice of the defendants, he used to get relief of the pain of Asthama to some extent and used to develop intoxication. It is further stated that in that state of intoxication he used to loose his full senses of understanding and while he was in that state, the defendants got a deed of gift executed by him on 6th April, 1977. In substance, it is under these allegations that the plaintiff has sought for the aforesaid declaration. Thus the plaintiff who is the executant of the document wants to avoid it on the aforesaid allegations.
3. During the pendency of the suit, the defendants-petitioners filed an application in the court below under Sections 4(b) and 4(c) of the Act praying therein to hold that the suit has abated as a consolidation proceeding is going on in village Sunderpur Barza where the lands covered by the deed of gift are situate. A rejoinder was filed by the plaintiff-opposite party to the said application. The matter was heard by the court below and after hearing, the court below passed the impugned order by which it has held that the suit had not abated.
4. Mr. Binod Kumar Roy learned Counsel appearing in support of this application contended that the court below acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction in holding that the suit had not abated under section 4(c) of the Act. According to the learned Counsel, the present case is covered by a single Judge decision of this Court in the case of Paras Singh… v. Baikunth Singh…Opp. Party. 669 : 1979 PLJR 567). Learned Counsel states that the proposition of law as put forward by him is fully supported by this decision.
5. Mr. D.N Pandey, learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party, on the other hand, supported the impugned order and placed reliance upon the two decisions of this Court in the cases of Surajmani v. Shanti Devi (1981 B.B.C.J 411) and Chote Gope v. Kali Gope (1983 B.B.C.J 1244 : 1983 PLJR 357).
6. The only dispute, therefore, was as to whether the deed of gift in question which has been challenged in the suit by the plaintiff-opposite party is a void document or a voidable one. It has not been disputed at the Bar that if it is held that the document in question is a voidable one, then it requires adjudication of the court and the present suit has not abated. However, if, on the other hand, it is held that the document is a void document, then of course the suit has abated under section 4(c) of the Act. It is in support of the argument of the learned Counsel for the respective parties that they cited the aforesaid decisions.
7. It will be appropriate in the first instance to deal with the two cases cited on behalf of the opposite party. In Surajmani v. Shanti Devi's case (supra) the revision was preferred against the order of the court below holding that the suit and the appeal have abated under section 4(c) of the Act. The said suit was for declaration that the registered deed of gift dated 30th November, 1973, executed jointly by the plaintiff-petitioner and defendant no. 2 in favour of defendant no. 1, was illegal, void, fraudulent, invalid and for cancellation and also for a declaration of title after cancellation of the document. The submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner that the consolidation authority had no power to cancel the deed of gift on the ground of fraud was accepted. While referring to the case of Gorekh Nath Dubey v. Hari Narain Singh ((1973) 2 SCC 535 : A.I.R 1973 Supreme Court 2451), the learned Judge has pointed out the distinction that has been made in the Supreme Court decision between the cases where a document is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority and the one where it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. The latter class of cases were held, to be outside the scope of the provision relating to abatement of the suit. In the case under discussion the learned Judge has held that the case in question fall within the latter class of cases and as such the document is binding upon the parties unless set aside by the court. According to the learned Judge, such a document was not void, ab initio, but was a voidable document. The revision application was accordingly allowed and the order of abatement was set aside.
8. The other case cited on behalf of the opposite party is Chhote Gope v. Kali Gope (supra). It is a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in which the Supreme Court decision in Gorekh Nath Dubey's cases (supra) has been followed. In this case also, the deed of gift dated 16th January, 1980 was sought to be declared as invalid, inoperative and not acted upon. The order of the court below holding that the suit has not abated under section 4(c) of the Act was upheld.
9. It has come to our notice the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Musammat Rupia v. Bhatu Mahton* A.I.R 1944 Patna 17 FB). That was of course a case under the court fees Act. The fact of that case was that one Mt. Rupia instituted a suit for declaration that certain sale-deeds executed by her were got up and fraudulent and they were executed by her practising fraud upon her and without letting her know the contents of the documents. Her case was that defendants nos. 1, 3 and 5 brought her to Patna on pratexts and fraudulently got her to affix her thumb marks on two documents and to admit the execution of the same without letting her know the contents thereof and that the recitals in the documents-as regards the passing of the consideration and the existence of certain necessities and as to the relationship between her husband and defendants nos. 7 to 10 were wholly false. It was held in that case that the sale-deeds on their very face had been duly executed and properly registered carrying with them the necessary legal consequence, that title passed from the transferor to the transferee and, therefore, they would necessarily require to be canceled in order to get rid of the legal consequences attaching to it, and though the relief for cancellation was not asked for explicitly, the same was implicit in the relief sought for. On the allegations of the plaintiff such a document would therefore be voidable and not void and that is why it required to be cancelled before any relief could be granted to the plaintiff. In these circumstances, it was held that ad valorem court fee was payable and Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act would apply. In my view the principle laid down in the Full Bench case will apply in equal force to the present case.
10. Now it is necessary to discuss the single Judge decision cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the case of Paras Singh… v. Baikunth Singh…Opp. Party. 669 : 1979 PLJR 567) in support of his contention. It appears from the fact of that case that the plaintiff filed a suit challenging a deed of gift dated 2nd February, 1973, purported to have been executed in favour of the defendants by one Baliram Singh who, according to the plaintiff, died on 10th February, 1970. The plaintiff claimed title to the suit property under a registered deed of gift from the nearest heir of the said Baliram Singh. It was alleged that the said document under which the defendants claim was void and inoperative, on the ground that the deed of gift dated 2nd February, 1973 had never been executed by Baliram Singh and that at the time of execution Baliram Singh was not in a fit state of body and mind and was ailing since long and had lost his power of understanding. A further ground was that Baliram Singh was completely under the influence and coercion of the defendants at the time the deed is purported to have been executed and that it was not presented before the registering officer legally as the fixer was also under the influence of the defendants.
11. It will be apposite to mention here that the main relief claimed as pointed out by the learned single Judge in his decision was “for declaration of his title as absolute owner of the lands in suit on declaration that the said ‘deed of gift dated 2.2.1973’ purported to have been executed by the said Baliram Singh in favour of the defendants is illegal, void and inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff”. This relief, it has been held, is clearly covered by section 4(c) of the Act, and, therefore, the suit rightly abated. The Full Bench decision is Ramkrit Singh v. The State of Bihar (1979 Bihar Bar Council Journal 259 : 1979 PLJR 161) was referred to by the learned single Judge in this connection and he pointed out that in a suit of composite nature if the relief or reliefs sought, is unconnected with the declaration and determination of title to the land, it would not abate under section 4(c) of the Act in relation to the aforesaid independent relief or reliefs. Keeping this principle in mind the learned single Judge held that “the use of the words, ‘declaration of title to lie land on declaration that the said deed of gift was illegal, void and inoperative’ clearly indicates that the further declaration sought that the ‘said deed of gift dated 2.2.1973, is illegal, void and inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff' is in the nature of a finding which has to be recorded before the relief prayed for i.e declaration of title to the deed can be granted”. Keeping this principle in mind the learned single Judge held that the relief for declaration that the deed of gift dated 2.2.1973 was illegal, void and inoperative and not binding upon the plaintiff was not an independent and unconnected with the main relief, namely, the declaration of the plaintiff's title as absolute owner in the suit land, and, therefore, it was held in that case that the suit abated under section 4(c) of the Act.
12. The learned single Judge, however, further proceeded to discuss the law on the assumption that the two reliefs claimed in the suit were independent and separate and while deciding that question, the learned single Judge observed that the allegation of undue influence and coercion may make the deed of gift a voidable document, but the allegation that at the time the deed was executed by Baliram Singh, he was unconscious and had lost all powers of understanding if established, would make the deed void. This conclusion as already pointed out above, was based on the assumption that it was an independent relief to the principal relief claimed in the suit. However, in spite of such assumption and observation that if it is proved that Baliram Singh was unconscious and had lost all his power of understanding, then the deed of gift was a void document, the learned single Judge still upheld the decision of the trial court holding what the suit has abated as a whole. In his opinion, even if it would be a separate relief, still, the suit for this relief would also be covered by section 4(c) of the Act. I, therefore, fail to appreciate as to how this decision helps the petitioners. That apart, the aforesaid observation regarding the nature of the document by the learned single judge is obiter. As already indicated above, the present case is fully covered by the Full Bench decision in Mt. Rupia's case (supra) and, therefore, it must be held that the document under consideration viz. the deed of gift executed by the plaintiff is a voidable document. In view of the discussions made above. I am of the view that the trial court has rightly held that the suit has not abated under section 4(c) of the Act.
13. In the conclusion, there is no merit in this revision application and it is, accordingly, dismissed, but without costs.
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