Sabhahit, J.:— This appeal by the claimant is directed against the judgment and award dated 3.12.1982 made by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-I, Bangalore City in MVC. No. 313 of 1981 on its file, dismissing the claim petition for compensation.

2. The relevant facts, giving rise to this appeal, briefly stated, are these:

On 18.8.1980, at about 9.30 A.M, the claimant was going in the V Cross and V Main Road, Malleshwaram, when a car bearing registration No. MEB 732 belonging, according to the claimant, to the first respondent in the petition and driven by respondent No. 2 in the petition in a rash and negligent manner, came and dashed against him and he sustained fracture of the neck of the femur. He was treated in the hospital and ultimately he is left with some disability. On these averments, he claimed compensation of Rs. 52,000/- from respondents.

3. Respondent No. 2 remained absent. Respondent No. 1 resisted the claim. He contended that he used to park the car on the road nearby the house of Krishnamurthy, his friend and on 18.8.1980, when he went to the spot to clean the car in the morning, he found that the car was missing. He told it to his friend Krishnamurthy and they together went round in search of the car and ultimately they found the car near Lal Bagh and since the car was in good condition, being halted by the road side, according to him, he brought back the car. He was not aware of any accident till he received notice from the Court. Thus he denied his liability for any accident and he denied his liability for any compensation. The tribunal raised the following issues as arising for its consideration:

1. Whether the claim petition is in time?

2. Does the claimant show that the accident that happened on 18.8.1980 at about 9.30 a.m, at 5th cross, 5th main road, Mohammadan Block, Malleswaram, in which the car bearing registration No. MED — 732 belonging to N.S Ashok Kumar, respondent No. 1 and driven by S.A Maqubool, respondent No. 2, was involved and in which he suffered injuries, happened due to the rash and negligent driving of the Car by respondent No. 2, as alleged?

3. Does respondent No. 1 prove that he is not liable to answer the claim for the reasons stated in his statement of objections?

4. Whether the claimant is entitled to compensation, if so, in what quantum and from whom?

5. What judgment and award?

4. It may be stated in this context that there was a specific issue for condonation of delay, because the claim petition was presented on 23.4.1981, though the accident occured on 18.8.1980 An application was filed to condone the delay and it is in that context that issue No. 1 was raised.

5. During hearing, the claimant examined himself as P.W 1 and he got marked Exhibits P. 1 to P. 4. As against that, the owner of the car - respondent No. 1 examined himself as R.W 1 and examined his friend Krishnamurthy as R.W 2. The tribunal, appreciating the evidence on record, held that the claimant was not able to explain the delay by advancing sufficient reasons and in that view the claim petition was liable to be dismissed. The tribunal further held on merits that the owner was not liable to pay the compensation by way of vicarious liability. In that view the tribunal dismissed the petition of the claimant. Aggrieved by the said judgment and award, the claimant has instituted the above appeal before this Court.

6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant claimant urged before us that the Tribunal was not justified in not condoning the delay of 65 days as there was sufficient ground to condone the delay. He further submitted that the evidence on record was sufficient to establish the vicarious liability of the owner and he submitted that the tribunal was not justified in not awarding liability against the owner of the vehicle as also against the driver. In that view, he submitted that the appeal is entitled to succeed.

7. As against that, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent owner argued supporting the judgment and award of the tribunal. The points, therefore, that arise for our consideration in this appeal are—

1. Whether the tribunal was justified in not condoning the delay of 65 days in presenting the claim petition?

2. Whether the tribunal was justified in not awarding any compensation in favour of the claimant against the owner and driver?

3. If not, what is the quantum of compensation the claimant is entitled to and from whom?

8. It is a settled principle of law that the term ‘sufficient cause’ in considering the condonation of delay, should be liberally construed so as to advance the case rather than hamper it. In the instant case, the claimant has specifically averred that as a result of the accident his femur was fractured and he was in the hospital for nearly one month and thereafter he was put in plaster cast. He has further stated that he was not able to move about and that was the reason for the delay in approaching the lawyer. As against that, the owner has pleaded ignorance of all these things. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, however, invited our attention to the cross-examination of the claimant. In the chief-examination held on 11.8.1982, the claimant has stated in para 18 of his deposition thus:—

9. In para 22, further he has stated—

10. It is obvious by reading para 18 of the deposition in juxta-position with para 22 of the deposition that what the claimant means to say is that he met the lawyer after the period of limitation was barred, after two months and five days. He was confused to put it in proper terms and he has used the words instead of saying, because two months and five days constitute 65 days, which is the period of delay in presenting the application and that is what he has stated in para 18 of his deposition. That being so, reading paras 18 and 22 together, we are satisfied that what the witness means to say is that he went to the lawyer after 65 days after the period of limitation was over. Hence, there is nothing to condemn the witness or hold that he has given the wrong admission. In the cross-examination, he has stated that he was admitted to hospital as an inpatient and he was treated in the hospital. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that there was delay of 65 days in presenting the application. Because of the injuries suffered by the claimant, he was to be treated in the hospital, his leg was put in plaster, cast and in the normal course of events by the time he approached the lawyer, there was already delay of 65 days. The reason so advanced is sufficient to condone the delay. The Tribunal was not at all justified in holding that the reason was not sufficient to condone the delay. The tribunal has ignored the realities of life. Hence, we set aside that finding of the tribunal and hold that the claimant has sufficiently explained the delay and we condone the delay and allow the I.A, given in that behalf. That leads us to the merits of the case.

11. The learned counsel appearing for the claimant submitted that the material on record is enough to establish that it was the car bearing No. MEB - 732, which caused the accident and that it was driven by respondent No. 2 in the petition. For that he relied upon Exhibit P. 2. Exhibit P. 2 contains all the proceedings in C.C No. 357 of 1981 before the Metropolitan Magistrate, II Court, Bangalore City. The second respondent namely Muqbool was charge-sheeted in that case for having caused the accident on 18.8.1980 at about 9.30 a.m The court explained the charge to the accused and while doing so, it stated thus—

“name and address of the accused person sent up for trial:—

Maqubool S.A, s/o Kasim Sab, aged 29 years, R/at. 38/2, 13th Cross, Padarayanapura, Bangalore. Driver of Car MEB - 732.”

and when the charge was put to the accused, it is put to him thus—

“That on 18.8.1980 at 9.30 A.M at about that time along 5th cross 5th Main Road, Mohammaddan Block in the limits of Malleshwaram Police Station the accused noted in Col. No. 4 drove the car No. MEB 732 drove the same direction East to West in a rash and negligent manner so as to endanger human life and dashed against a pedestrain CW II who was going in the same direction on the left side of the road, as a result of which CW II fell down and sustained simple injuries on his person. Further the accused failed to give medical aid to the injured and failed to report the matter to the police about the accident. Further the accused failed to produce insurance certificate”.

12. The accused namely Muqbool respondent No. 2 in the claim petition, pleaded guilty to the charge and on his own plea of guilty he was convicted and sentensed. That being so, it is clear that the car bearing No. MEB 732 was driven by respondent No. 2 in the petition in a rash and negligent manner, resulting in the accident, causing injuries to the claimant.

13. The next point that arises for our consideration is whether at the time of accident the car was driven by the second respondent for and on behalf of the owner of the car N.S Ashok Kumar. It may be stated in this context that there is an initial presumption that whoever drives the car drives it for and on behalf of the owner. In the instant case, there is no dispute that respondent No. 1 N.S Ashok Kumar is the owner of the car. It is further on record established that Muqbool was driving the car at the time of accident. Therefore, the Court would presume that Muqbool caused the accident driving the car for and on behalf of the owner N.S Ashok Kumar, which resulted in the injuries to the claimant. That way, the owner becomes vicariously liable and the driver becomes primarily liable.

14. The owner, however, attempted to escape his liability by submitting that he had parked his car by the side of the house of Krishnamurthy on the road and that when he went the next morning to clean the car, it was not found there. The owner has further stated in his deposition that he and his friend Krishnamurthy went in search of the car and ultimately they found the car at about 10 A.M on Lal Bagh road. All parts of the car were in tact. The car was halted there without petrol in the tank. They arranged to put petrol and brought back the car. That is the version of the owner of the car. The point that arises for our consideration is whether this version of the owner should be believed. The tribunal was, no doubt, inclined to believe that version.

15. It is needless for us to point out that evidence has to be appreciated with the light of probabilities. Proof consists of preponderance of probabilities. If we were to believe that the car was stolen, as spoken by the owner examined as R.W 1, we have to see to his conduct. He used to park the car by the side of the house of Krishnamurthy and that when he went in the morning of 18.8.1980 for cleaning the car, it was not there. It was not to be seen near about also. What should be the normal conduct of a person, who has lost his car? Normally, he should have rushed to the nearest police station to give complaint and request the police to search for his car. Instead of doing so, these people — himself and his friend Kirshnamurthy, as if by intuition, came on Lalbagh road and picked up the car. That version appears to be improbable, artifical and unbelievable. Sri Krishnamurthy in his evidence has stated that they went by the side of the police station. Inspite of it, the fact remains that they did not inform the police. That conduct is highly improbable. Normally that will not be the conduct of a person who has lost the car. The conduct of the owner, therefore, probabilises the version of the claimant that the car was not at all stolen, but that it was given to Muqbool, who, it is suggested, is a friend of the owner studying law in the same College.

16. It may also be observed that Ashok Kumar in his evidence has stated that when he found the car no part of the car was damaged. Every part of it was in tact. If the car was really stolen, it is obvious that first of all the lock must be removed. Secondly in order to start a car, the ignition key has to be operated. Therefore, in order to get into the car, the door must have been broken and in order to start the car, the ignition key hold must be damaged. The owner in his evidence has clearly stated that all parts were intact and there was no damage to the car. That, further probabilises that it was a case where the owner himself gave the key of the car to the driver and allowed him to go instead of the, driver stealing the car. Thus, judging the evidence on record on the touch stone of broad probability, we are satisfied that there is no truth in the version of the owner that the car was stolen. We accordingly reject the theory of the owner that the car was stolen by Muqbool taking it away without his knowledge. We hold that the car was given by Ashok Kumar to his friend Muqbool to drive and when driving the car rashly and negligently, Muqbool caused the accident, resulting in injuries to the claimant.

17. That takes us to the question of quantum of compensation, to which the respondents are liable. The wound certificate Exhibit P. 1 shows that in addition to the minor injuries, the claimant suffered fracture of the neck of femur. It is common knowledge that there will be dislocation of bone and it is necessary that it should be reduced in the hospital. The wound certificate probabilises that the injured claimant went to the hospital and the casualty doctor examined him. The other probability is that the he was admitted into the hospital and was treated for the injury. That is what the claimant has stated on oath. We have to believe his version. On the facts of this case, the claimant was in the hospital for nearly one month and he was in plaster cast for nearly four months and the claimant has deposed that he finds it difficult to walk properly even after the treatment. Therefore, compensation has to be awarded for the injury namely fracture of the neck of the femur, the pain and suffering undergone by the claimant and which he is likely to undergo in future and the slight disability, which must have resulted as a result of the fracture. The tribunal has suggested Rs. 7,000/- as general damages. We accept it and award Rs. 7,000/- towards general damages, to the injured claimant. The claimant has stated that he had to attend hospital and the distance from his house to Victoria Hospital is about three miles and that he had to engage a rickshaw. He has also deposed that he purchased some medicine. For all these he has claimed Rs. 2,000/-. Making allowance for some exaggeration, we grant Rs. 1,000/- towards sundry expenses including conveyance charges. Together, therefore, the claimant is entitled to Rs. 8,000/- towards compensation. Respondent No. 1, the person who actually caused the accident, has pleaded guilty to the charge. He is primarily liable to pay the compensation. Respondent No. 2 is vicariously liable to pay the compensation, for the reasons discussed above. It is on record that the vehicle had no insurance on the date of accident. Therefore, respondents 1 and 2 are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation awarded.

18. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and award of the trial are set aside, and the petition of the claimant is allowed. He is awarded compensation of Rs. 8,000/- alongwith interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of petition till payment. He shall recover this amount from respondents 1 and 2 jointly and severaly alongwith his costs throughout.