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S.K Masood Alias Zafar And Others v. Wahid Ahmad Ansari And Others

Allahabad High Court
May 14, 1997
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (D.K. Seth, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion arises from a revisional application and related interlocutory applications. Opposite Party No. 2 filed an application on 12.12.1996 seeking dismissal of the revisional application on the ground of the death of Opposite Party No. 1, who had died on 6.11.1996. The defendant applicants filed an application for substitution on 4.4.1997 seeking to substitute the heirs of the deceased Opposite Party No. 1. Both the application dated 12.12.1996 (for dismissal) and the application dated 4.4.1997 (for substitution) were taken up for hearing together. The matter proceeded to consider (a) whether the substitution application was barred by limitation or required condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, (b) whether abatement of the proceedings occurred, and (c) issues relating to striking off defence under Order 15 Rule 5 (U.P. amendment) in the underlying eviction suit (Original Suit No. 22 of 1993).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the application for substitution of heirs filed on 4.4.1997 is barred by the 90-day period (Article 120) and requires an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay.
  2. Whether, in a revision before the High Court, limitation for substitution is governed by Article 137 (three years) rather than Article 120 (ninety days), following the Full Bench decision in Chandra Deo Pandey v. Sukhdeo Ram.
  3. Whether the presence on record of one heir (Opposite Party No. 2) prevents abatement of proceedings under the facts of the case (i.e., application of the ratio in Mahabir Prasad v. Jage Ram).
  4. Whether the impugned order striking off the defence under Order 15 Rule 5 (U.P. amendment) in the original eviction suit was maintainable, and to what extent striking off defence affects the defendants' ability to adduce evidence on quantum, period, right or inter-se liability.

Arguments of the Parties

Opposite Party No. 2 / Plaintiff's Counsel (Sri M.S. Heq / Mr. Haq)

  • Contended that the substitution application filed on 4.4.1997 could not be entertained because it was filed after expiry of 90 days and no application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act had been filed for condonation of delay.
  • Argued (later in the proceedings) that he had instructions to appear on behalf of all substituted heirs and represented their interests; by consent urged the matter be treated as ready for hearing on the merits.
  • Opposed the defendant petitioners' contention that Order 15 Rule 5 did not apply: argued that a sum of Rs. 60,000/- was in deposit and the Proviso and sub-rules to Rule 5 make deposit obligations mandatory; thus non-deposit warrants striking off defence.

Defendant Applicants / Petitioners' Counsel (Sri M.C. Tewari)

  • Contended that because one heir (Opposite Party No. 2) was already on record representing joint interests, there was no scope for abatement of proceedings; relied on Mahabir Prasad v. Jage Ram.
  • Argued that the 90-day limitation for substitution does not apply to revision before the High Court and that substitution is governed by Article 137 (three years) following Chandra Deo Pandey v. Sukhdeo Ram, so no application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was necessary.
  • Assailed the order dated 7.3.1995 (in Original Suit No. 22 of 1993) contending that Order 15 Rule 5 (as amended) is attracted only against a tenant; contended petitioner No.1 had denied tenancy in the written statement and so striking off defence under Rule 5 could not be justified as to him.
  • Argued that a security sum of Rs. 60,000/- was deposited with the plaintiff-opposite parties and hence there was no requirement to deposit any further amount; maintained that only admitted amounts (not disputed amounts) should be deposited.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mahabir Prasad v. Jage Ram Where a person jointly interested in a decree is on record and on his death his heirs are not brought on record, appellate jurisdiction under Order 41 Rule 4 CPC is not per se divested; if a legal representative is already on record in another capacity it is sufficient that he be described as such by appropriate application; proceedings do not abate merely because other heirs are not impleaded within limitation. The court held this ratio "is attracted in full force" and applied it to find no abatement because Opposite Party No. 2 (one heir) was already on record and represented the joint interest of the heirs.
Chandra Deo Pandey v. Sukhdeo Ram Full Bench held an application for substitution of heirs in revision is effectively an application under Section 151 CPC and limitation is governed by Article 137 (residuary) of the Limitation Act (three years). The court held it was bound by the Full Bench ratio and therefore rejected the opposite parties' contention that Article 120 (90 days) applied; applied Article 137 to allow substitution.
Harbans Lal Gupta v. Sain Das Held that Article 120 is not attracted to revision proceedings; followed Chandradeo Pandey and supported by High Court decisions. Used to support the view that Article 120 (90 days) does not apply to revision and that Article 137 governs substitution in revision.
Surat and Sons v. Bhargunath On analogy held that Article 120 cannot be attracted to miscellaneous proceedings which will come under Article 137. Referred to for the proposition that substitution in revision falls under Article 137 rather than Article 120.
In Re: Baburam Authority for the proposition that on expiry of 90 days prescribed by Article 120 the suit or appeal abates automatically. Referred to in explaining the operation of Article 120 and automatic abatement after 90 days.
Dip Narain v. Lachman (1925 23 A.L.J. 232) Support for the proposition that abatement occurs automatically on expiry of Article 120's 90 days. Referred to alongside In Re: Baburam to explain abatement mechanics under Article 120.
Ram Pratap v. Lalchand (1904 9 C.W.N 369) Indicates that abatement must be set aside under Order 22 Rule 9(2) CPC. Quoted to explain procedures and consequences following abatement under Article 120.
Mohammad Abdul v. Secretary of State (I.L.R 1914 36 All. 235) Authority showing that abatement can be set aside even after expiry of 150 days by obtaining enlargement of time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Referred to in explaining that abatement may be set aside using Section 5 after 150 days.
Sarat Chandra v. Maihar Stone & Lime Co. Ltd (I.L.R 1921 49 Cal. 62) Similar authority to Mohammad Abdul regarding setting aside abatement after expiry of the 150-day window with aid of Section 5. Referred to in support of the proposition that Section 5 can be used to extend time beyond 150 days for setting aside abatement.
Churya v. Baneswar Illustrates that unless abatement is set aside the suit or appeal is dead. Referred to when explaining the effect of abatement and the need to set it aside to keep proceedings alive.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise manner, applying binding authorities and the facts as presented:

  1. Application of Mahabir Prasad: The court found that the ratio in Mahabir Prasad applied "in full force" because one heir (Opposite Party No. 2) was already on record and represented the joint interest of all heirs. Because the tenancy and the heirs' interests were pleaded as joint (no splitting of tenancy or landlord interest was alleged), Opposite Party No. 2 was held to represent the whole interest and there was "no question of abatement" in the absence of other heirs on record.
  2. Determination of applicable limitation for substitution: The court examined the question whether Article 120 (90 days) or Article 137 (three years) applied to substitution in a revision. Following the Full Bench decision in Chandra Deo Pandey (and the subsequent authority Harbans Lal Gupta and other High Court decisions cited), the court held that substitution in revision is effectively an application under Section 151 CPC and falls under the residuary Article 137. The court concluded that Article 120 is directed to suits and appeals (uses expressions "plaintiff", "defendant", "appellant", "respondent") and is not attracted to revision proceedings.
  3. Effect of timing in the present facts: The court noted the death occurred on 6.11.1996. Although the 90-day period under Article 120 would have expired on or about 6.2.1997, the substitution application was filed on 4.4.1997. The court observed that this date was within three years (Article 137) and also within 150 days of death; accordingly, the substitution application was held to be allowable.
  4. Result on the substitution/dismissal applications: The court allowed the application for substitution, ordered that the heirs named be brought on record and the cause title be corrected, and dismissed the Opposite Party No. 2's earlier application dated 12.12.1996 for dismissal of the revision. The court also directed that Opposite Party No. 2 may be appointed guardian of the minor heir.
  5. Consideration of Order 15 Rule 5 (U.P. amendment) and the impugned striking off of defence: The court examined the amended Rule 5, its provisos and sub-rules. It found that the lower court's order showed the defendants did not comply with Rule 5. The court outlined the present Rule 5's two obligations: deposit of the entire amount admitted to be due (with interest) and regular deposit of current monthly amounts whether admitted or not. The court emphasized sub-rule (2) (the right to make a representation within ten days) as the procedure to avoid application of Rule 5; noted the ten-day period is mandatory and not extendable under Section 148 CPC; and concluded that failure to make the mandatory representation prevents consideration of the defence on that ground in the trial court at that stage.
  6. Limitations on consequences of striking off defence: The court clarified that striking off the defence does not relieve the trial court of its duty to ensure the plaintiff proves his case. Even if the defence is struck off, defendants are not disallowed from adducing evidence on matters of quantum, period, right, inter-se liability or to prove that a particular defendant was not a tenant (and thus not liable to pay rent). The court therefore refused to interfere with the impugned order striking off the defence but qualified the consequence by preserving certain evidentiary rights for defendants at trial.
  7. Case management direction: The revisional application was disposed of with a direction to the learned trial court to dispose of Original Suit No. 22 of 1993 as early as possible and preferably within six months of production of a certified copy of this order; lawyers were asked to cooperate and avoid unnecessary adjournments.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The application for substitution of the heirs filed on 4.4.1997 is allowed. The heirs specified in that application are to be brought on record and the cause title corrected accordingly. The application dated 12.12.1996 filed by Opposite Party No. 2 for dismissal of the revision is dismissed. Opposite Party No. 2 may be appointed guardian for the minor heir Rahman Ahmad.

The court also upheld (did not interfere with) the impugned order striking off the defence under Order 15 Rule 5 (U.P. amendment) but clarified that striking off the defence does not preclude defendants from adducing evidence on quantum, period, right, inter-se liability or to prove that a particular defendant was not a tenant and hence not liable for rent.

Implications:

  • The immediate practical consequences are (i) substitution of heirs on record, (ii) dismissal of the earlier application seeking dismissal of the revision, (iii) appointment of a guardian for the minor heir, and (iv) direction for expedited disposal of the original suit within six months.
  • The court applied binding Full Bench authority that substitution in revision is governed by Article 137 (three years); accordingly, Article 120 (90 days) was not applied to bar the substitution in this revision. This application of precedent resolved the limitation issue in favour of substitution.
  • The court emphasized procedural strictness of Order 15 Rule 5 (and its sub-rule (2) remedy) — the mandatory representation within ten days — and affirmed the consequence of non-compliance (striking off defence), while preserving defendants' rights to contest specific factual matters at trial. The decision does not purport to set a new precedent beyond applying existing authorities and the U.P. statutory provisions; it applies those authorities to the facts before the court.

Other orders: The revisional application is disposed of in the terms indicated and there will be no order as to costs.

Show all summary ...

D.K Seth, J.:— The Opposite Party No. 2 on 12.12.1996 filed an application for dismissal of the Revisional application on account of death of Opposite Party No. 1. The Opposite Party No. 1 died on 6th November, 1996, which is not disputed by the defendant applicants. The defendant applicants on the other hand filed an application for substitution on 4.4.1997 seeking to substitute the heirs of the deceased plaintiff Opposite Party No. 1. Two applications namely application dated 12.12.1996 for dismissal of the revisional application and the application dated 4.4.1997 for substitution were taken up for hearing.

2. Sri M.S Heq, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Opposite Party No. 2, contended that the application for substitution filed on 4.4.1997 can not be entertained since the same has been filed after expiry of ‘90’ days without any application under Section 5 of Indian Limitation Act for condonation of delay. Sri. M.C Tewari, learned counsel for the defendant applicants contends that since one of the heir of the deceased namely the Opposite Party No. 2 is already on record and represents the joint interest of the heirs, therefore there is no scope of abatement of the proceedings. In support he relies on the decision in the case of Mahabir Prasad v. Jage Ram.1 Secondly, he contends that limitation of ‘90’ days for substitution would not apply in a revision before the High Court. In view of decision in the case of Chandra Deo Pandey v. Sukhdeo Ram, 2 the limitation would be governed under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, which is three years and, therefore, no application under Section 5 of Indian Limitation Act, would be necessary. Admittedly, the suit is a suit for eviction of the defendant-applicants who are three in number. The said three defendant applicants were alleged to be the tenant under the plaintiff-opposite parties. No case of splitting of tenancy or splitting up of interest of the landlord have been pleaded. Both the interest in the property have been pleaded to be joint while tenancy has also not been pleaded to be separate. The heirs sought to be substituted are also interested jointly in the property. All the heirs jointly inherited the interest of the deceased and, therefore, there is no splitting up of interest of any of the heirs in respect to the suit property. Such joint interest is also existing in the Opposite Party No. 2 who is one of the heirs of the deceased. Amongst the heirs one is also minor for whom, the mother namely Opposite Party No. 2 had prayed for appointment of herself as guardian of the minor.

3. In the case of Mahabir Prasad (supra) it is held, the fact that the person jointly interested in the decree has been made a party-respondent and on his death his heirs have not been brought on the record, does not per-se divest the appellate court of his jurisdiction to pass decree in appeal under order 41 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The jurisdiction of the appellate Court under Order 41 Rule 4 of the Code is open when the other persons who are parties to the proceeding before the subordinate court, and against whom a decree proceeded on a ground which was common to the appellant and to those other persons are either not impleaded, as parties to the appeal or has been impleaded as respondents. Where in a proceeding a party dies and one of the legal representatives is already on the record in another capacity, it is only necessary that he should be scribed by an appropriate application made in that behalf that he is also on the record, as an heir and legal representative. Even if there are other heirs and legal representatives and no application for impleading them is made within the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act the proceeding will not abate.

4. In the facts and circumstances of the present case the ratio decided in the case of Mahabir Prasad (supra) is attracted in full force. In as much as the heir Opposite Party No. 1 who was the co-plaintiff is already on record. The Opposite Party No. 2 is also one of the heir of the deceased Opposite Party No. 1 and is also representing interest of the minor heir of the said deceased. The Opposite Party No. 2 is also interested jointly alongwith other heirs of the Opposite Party No. 1. The interest having not been splitted up the Opposite Party No. 2 represents the whole interest and there is no conflict of interest between Opposite Party No. 2 and the heirs of the deceased. In that view of the matter in the present case there is no question of abatement even in absence of heirs of the deceased in as much as the Opposite Party No. 2 is representing the interest of other heirs. Over and above in a suit for eviction where there are more than one landlord having joint interest one of the co-landlord, is entitled to the carriage of the proceeding even all alone. If one of the co-landlord can carry on the proceeding even when other co-owner do not join him and he may very well proceed with the suit itself, in revision in absence of the other heirs of the deceased it can not be said that though such person is the Opposite Party, the revisional application filed by other side abates.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that even then the present case being a revision the limitation for making an application for substitution is governed under Article 137 and not under Article 120.

6. An examination of Article 120 shows that it had used the expression “plaintiff”, “defendant” and “appellant”, “respondent” in its first column. Inasmuch as the use of those expressions are significant and/or indicative of the legislative intent that this Article is attracted only in case of applications in a suit or appeal. A revision is not an original proceeding. Therefore, Article 120 is not attracted. It was so held in Harbans Lal Gupta v. Sain Das, following the decision in Chandradeo Pandey (supra) and deriving support from similar view taken by the High Courts of Delhi, Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh in judgments reported in A.I.R 1972 Delhi 253, A.I.R 1979 Rajasthan 179, A.I.R 1978 A.P 410. In Surat and Sons v. Bhargunath, on similar analogy a view was taken that Article 120 can not be attracted to a miscellaneous proceedings which will come under Article 137.

7. Then again Full Bench in the case of Chandra Deo Pandey (supra) has laid down that an application for substitution of the heirs of the deceased in revision is in effect an application under Section 151 and as such limitation therefor would be governed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, being residuary Article. The period of limitation under Article 137 is three years. In view of the ratio decided by the Full bench, by which I am bound, the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite parties can not be sustained.

8. The Full bench had also observed that there was need to amend the rule of this court so as to prescribe uniformity for the period of limitation in substitution. Sri Haq has not been able to enlighten me as to whether any rule has been so framed in terms of the observations made by the Full bench. Sri M.C Tewari on the other hand vehemently contends that no such rule have been prescribed to bring uniformity in terms of the judgment of the Full bench. My attention has not been drawn to any such enactment or change in the rule.

9. Article 120 of the Limitation Act prescribes limitation of 90 days from the date of death for making the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or appellant or a deceased defendant or respondent, party under the Code of Civil Procedure. On the expiry of the said 90 days from the date of death if no substitution is effected the suit or the appeal abates automatically, see In Re: Baburam3 and Dip Narain v. Lachman . 1925 23 A.L.J 232.; such abatement is required to be set aside (Order 22 Rule 9(2) C.P.C) Vide Ram Pratap v. Lalchand . 1904 9 C.W.N 369.. The period of limitation for setting aside abatement as provided in Article 121 is 60 days from the date of abatement. The abatement can be set aside even after expiry of 150 days by obtaining enlargement of time showing sufficient cause taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, see Mohammad Abdul v. Secretary of State . I.L.R 1914 36 All. 235., Sarat Chandra v. Maihar Stone & Lime Co. Ltd. . I.L.R 1921 49 Cal. 62. In other words abatement is automatic after the 90 days prescribed by Article 120 have expired, and unless the abatement is set aside on an application prescribed within 60 days (Article 121) or a period further extended in virtue of Section 5 of Limitation Act (Order 22 Rule 9(3) C.P.C), the suit or appeal is dead, see Churya v. Baneswar. To put in a more simple form if substitution is not effected on the expiry of 90 days the resultant automatic abatement takes place. The abatement is subject to be set aside without the aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act if applied within 60 days from the date of abatement viz. 150 days from the date of death.

10. In the present case the death took place on 6.11.1996 The limitation 90 days expired on or around 6.2.1996 Whereas application for substitution has been made on 4.4.1997, which is not only within three years but also before expiry of 150 days.

11. In that view of the matter the application for substitution is allowed and the heirs mentioned in the said application be brought on record and the cause title be corrected accordingly. The application dated 12.12.1996 filed by the Opposite Party No. 2 is dismissed. The Opposite Party No. 2 may be appointed as guardian for opposite party No. 1/11 Rahman Ahmad (minor).

12. At this stage Mr. Haq submits that he has instruction to appear on behalf of all the substituted heirs and he represents the interest of the substituted heirs as well. He thereupon submits that since the original proceeding is very old namely of the year 1973 and the opposite parties are suffering greatly, therefore the matter may be treated as ready and be taken up for hearing. The learned counsel for the petitioners has no objection to the hearing of the case on merit. By consent of the parties the matter is treated as ready and as on day's list. Both the learned counsel for the parties had addressed the court extensively on merit of the case.

13. Sri Tewari assailed the order dated 7.3.1995 passed in Original Suit No. 22 of 1993 by the Additional District Judge IX-Court Allahabad/Judge Small Causes Court on the ground that since in the written statement the petitioner No. 1 had pointed out that he is not a tenant, therefore, striking out of defence under Order 15 Rule 5 of the U.P Amendment of Civil Procedure Code can not be attracted. According to him Rule 5 Order 15 of the Code is attracted only against the tenant. According to him the defendant petitioner No. 1 was never a tenant in respect of the suit property under the plaintiff-respondent. Therefore, his defence is not liable to be struck off under Rule 5 Order 15 of the Code. Though, however, he does not dispute the relationship of landlord and tenant as between the plaintiff-respondents and the defendant-applicants No. 2 and 3. His further contention is that security of a sum of rupees sixty thousand is lying in deposit with the plaintiff Opposite Parties, therefore, there is no question of deposit of any further amount and by reason of such deposit Order 15 Rule 5 is not attracted. Furthermore he contends that it is only the admitted amount that is to be deposited and not the disputed amount. In the present case according to him the defendant applicant No. 1 not being tenant the amount is disputed and as such provision of Rule 5 is not attracted. His last contention was that as and when relationship is disputed until the decision with regard to relationship is established, the provisions of Order 5 Rule 15 can not be attracted. According to him it is attracted only when the dispute is decided and relationship of landlord and tenant is established between the parties.

14. Sri Haq on the other hand opposes the said submission on the ground that an objection was filed by the defendant petitioner No. 1 jointly alongwith defendant petitioners No. 2 and 3. Presently the revisional application is also filed jointly by all the defendants. The case made out and the objection was that a sum of Rs. 60,000/- is lying in deposit. It has not been pointed out that the said sum was deposited by the defendant applicants No. 2 and 3 and not by the defendant applicant No. 1. He contends further that in view of the Proviso to Order 15 Rule 5 of the Code whether the amount is disputed or not the deposit is mandatory and in default the consequences provided therein is definite to visit the defendant applicants. The expression used, in the rule does not postulate the decision on the question of relationship. The question of relationship can be raised only when the amount is deposited. The deposit of amount is pre-requisite for deciding the suit for eviction. Unless the pre-condition is fulfilled there is no scope for raising any defence. The defence is available only after compliance of the said rule.

15. In order to appreciate the situation it is necessary to refer to Order 15 Rule 5 of the Code as amended in Uttar Pradesh. Rule 5 was introduced by U.P Act No. 35 of 1972 which runs as under:—

5. Striking off defence on non-deposit of admitted rent etc.—(1) In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from any immovable property after the determination of his lease, and for the recovery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the continuance of the lease, or of compensation for the use or occupation thereof, whether instituted before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972, the defendant shall at or before the first hearing of the suit, (or in the case of a suit instituted before the commencement of the said Act, the first hearing after such commencement) deposit the entire amount of rent, or compensation for use and occupation admitted by him to be due and thereafter throughout the continuance of the suit, deposit regularly the amount of monthly rent or compensation for use and occupation, due at the rate admitted by him and in the event of any default in this regard, the Court may, unless after considering any representation made by him in that behalf if allows him further time on security being furnished for the amount, refuse to entertain any defence or, as the case may be, strike off his defence:

Provided further that if the amount deposited includes any sums claimed by the depositor to be deductible on any amount, the court may require the plaintiff to furnish the security for such sum before he is allowed to withdraw the same.”

16. Rule 5 was inserted by U.P Act No. 37 of 1972 and the Proviso to Rule 5 was introduced by U.P Act No. 57 of 1976.

17. Under the said provision the entire amount of rent or compensation for use and occupation admitted to be due was to be deposited. Therefore, in case of dispute Rule 5 would not be attracted. The said provision also contemplates extension of time in case of default and only on failure to apply for extension upon furnishing security for the amount, the defence was to be struck off.

18. The above rule was substituted by Notification dated 10.2.1981 with effect from 3.10.1981 The present rule 5 is coined in the following expression:

“5. Striking off defence on failure to deposit admitted rent etc.—(1) In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the defendant shall at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual and in the event of any default in making the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid, the Court may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off his defence.

Explanation 1—The expression ‘first hearing’ means the date for filing written statement or for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned the last of the dates mentioned.

Explanation 2—The expression ‘entire amount admitted by him to be due’ means the entire gross amount, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation calculated at the admitted rate of rent, for the admitted period of arrears after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessor's account (and the amount, if any, paid to the lessor acknowledged by the lessor in writing signed by him) and the amount, if any deposited in any court under Section 30 of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.

Explanation 3—(1) The expression ‘monthly amount, due means the amount due every month, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation at the admitted rate of rent, after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessor's account.

(2) Before making an order for striking off defence, the Court may consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf provided such representation is made within 10 days, of the first hearing or of the expiry of the week referred to in sub-section (1) as the case may be.

(3) The amount deposited under this rule may at any time be withdrawn by the plaintiff:

Provided that such withdrawal shall not have the effect of prejudicing any claim by the plaintiff disputing the correctness of the amount deposited.”

19. There is a marked difference in between the two provisions with regard to the applicability and scope of the said Rule. The defendant-applicants are liable to deposit entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine percent per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due he shall throughout the continuance of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual. In the event of default in making deposit either of the amount or both as the case may be, the defence is to be struck off subject to sub-rule (2). sub-rule (2) provides for making representation within ten days of first hearing or of the expiry of the week referred to in sub-section (1). If such a representation is made the court has to consider the same before striking off the defence.

20. The impugned order has been translated in English by Sri Tewari. I have perused the same. It does not appear from the said order that any dispute was raised about the amount due. On the other hand it was contended that a sum of rupees sixty thousand was in deposit from which the amount can be adjusted. The other dispute was that the defendant applicant No. 1 was not a tenant. Therefore, he is not liable to pay admitted amount or the current rent. Learned court below had disbelieved the case and had found that the defendant applicants did not comply with the provision of Rule 5 of Order 15 of the Code. In the course of argument Sri Tewari has not argued anything so as to support the case of the defendant-petitioners No. 2 and 3. He has concentrated only on one point argument with regard to defendant applicant No. 1 and since all the defendant applicants have joined together and have not pleaded splitting up of the tenancy, the defence can not be split up.

21. A plain reading of Rule 5, as it stands today divide the range of comprehension into two parts, (i) admitted arrears to be due and, (ii) current dues. Now the liability is to deposit the arrears admitted. Irrespective of admission it cast the liability of depositing current dues month by month. In default of either of the deposit the defence is liable to be struck off.

22. In order to avoid the applicability of Rule 5 the defendant-applicants have been given right under sub-rule (2) to make a representation within the period prescribed under the said sub-rule. The provision is a complete code in itself providing for remedy towards avoidance of attraction of rule 5 by making a representation. Now this item is crucial one. The defendants applicants are required to make up their mind as to what stand they would take. If he disputes the amount or relationship, in order to avoid attraction of rule 5 he has to make a representation within the time prescribed and if he wants not to deposit the arrear. In the present case no steps have been taken. Only when the plaintiff-respondents have applied for striking off the defence the defendants-applicants had filed objection to that extent, making out a different case, denying their liability. The same has also been included in the written statement.

23. Admittedly, rule 5 is mandatory because of the nature of the expression used therein. The Court while striking out defence has to exercise its discretion judiciously. In case the provision is not complied with evil consequences would visit the defendants-applicants. The court has no alternative in case of non-compliance of rule 5 by the defendants-applicants but to strike off the defence.

24. But there may be cases where defendants-applicants may not be tenant and may not be liable to pay rent or arrears. In such event the question is to be decided by the Court before striking out defence for which sub-rule (2) has been provided under which such objection may be raised, but within the time provided. The limitation has been specifically provided in sub-rules(2) itself as within ten days and no provision has been incorporated empowering the court to extend the time. The period having been fixed by the legislature and it is not being a period to be fixed by the court the same is not subject to extension under Section 148 of the Code. The period of ten days is, therefore, mandatory as well. Since specific provision has been provided the defendants-applicants are to take resort to the same. In case the defendants-applicants failed to take shelter of sub-rule (2) in that event the court can not help the defendant-applicants even though such objection is raised either in the written statement or after the application for striking out of defence is made. Specific provision that has been provided can not be circumvented by raising the dispute in the objection or in the written statement. Be that as it may the defence raised in the written statement can not be entertained since the same is the defence, which is liable to be struck off by reason of rule 5. Therefore the same can not come to the aid of the defendant-applicants even if raised in the written statement. Similarly, defence to the objection to the application striking out of the defence can not be entertained since such question can be considered by the court provided the representation is made within time prescribed in sub-rule (2).

25. But then even if the defence is struck off the plaintiff respondent has to succeed on the basis of the case made out in the plaint and proved before the court, though such defence is not available to the defendants-applicants, but yet it is the duty of the court to see that the plaintiff has been able to prove his case for establishing that there is relationship of the landlord and the tenant between the parties. In the present case the defendant petitioner No. 1 is not claiming to be tenant and, therefore, he is not opposing eviction. The question is only with regard to his liability to pay arrears or current rent. The court has to determine the amount payable as arrears of rent prior to the date of first hearing and the rate of rent and current amount due and payable. The plaintiff can not be allowed to reap an undue harvest. The defence as contemplated is to be confined to the defence with regard to eviction, but ascertainment of mesne profit can very well be defended by the parties either on the question of quantum or the period or right or question of liability to pay by one or the other or inter-se defendant-applicants.

26. Therefore, I do not find any reason to interfere with the order impugned for striking out the defence but in view of my observation made above the striking of defence would not dis-entitle the defendant-applicants to adduce evidence with regard to determination of quantum or period or right or interest or arrears of liability to pay inter-se defendants-applicants. The defendants-applicant No. 1 may also adduce evidence to prove that he having not been a tenant is not liable to pay rent which is the liability of defendant-applicants No. 2 and 3 exclusively. In the facts and circumstances of the case the revisional application is, therefore, disposed of in the light of the observation made above with the direction that the learned trial court shall dispose of the Original suit No. 22 of 1993 as early as possible preferably within a period of six months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before the court below. The lawyers representing the respective parties assured that they will not take unnecessary adjournment and shall be co-operative in the matter for early disposal of the proceeding. The learned Trial Court shall decide the suit in the light of observations made in this judgment to the extent indicated here-in-above.

27. There will be, however, no order as to costs.

Order 41 Rule 4 of the Code