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The Kanyakumari Dioc... v. M.I. Kesari, Bishop ...
Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to call for and quash records relating to a Sec.4(1) notification issued by the first respondent in G.O.Ms.No.810, R.D. & L.A., dated 17.5.1979 and a later Sec.6 declaration issued in G.O.Ms.No.326, M.A. & W.S., dated 12.12.1996. The Court heard counsel and directed production of the acquisition file; the parties agreed there was no controversy on facts.
Key events recorded in the opinion (selected and described only as set out in the opinion): initial Sec.4(1) notification dated 17.5.1979 (gazetted 20.6.1979); an earlier Sec.6 declaration in G.O.Ms.No.1187 dated 27.6.1981 (gazetted 15.7.1981); an award passed on 16.9.1983; the petitioner challenged those proceedings by filing W.P.No.9795 of 1983 and obtained stay orders which ultimately led to this Court allowing that writ petition on 10.10.1991 and quashing the Sec.6 declaration while retaining the Sec.4(1) notification and directing a fresh Sec.5-A enquiry.
Pursuant to that direction, the petitioner filed objections on 9.11.1991; the Land Acquisition Officer overruled objections on 8.7.1992 and forwarded proposals for a fresh Sec.6 declaration. A new Sec.6 declaration was eventually issued in G.O.Ms.No.326 on 12.12.1996 (gazetted 1.1.1997). An award enquiry was conducted on 29.7.1997 and an award passed on 8.9.1997. The present writ petition challenging the later declaration and acquisition proceedings was filed on 16.10.1997 before possession was taken.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Sec.6 declaration dated 12.12.1996 (G.O.Ms.No.326) was made beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the proviso to Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act, having regard to the earlier stay and the order of this Court of 10.10.1991.
- Whether the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Sec.11-A of the Land Acquisition Act (as contended by the petitioner).
- Whether land already used for the petitioner’s college can be acquired for another public purpose.
- Whether there is a discrepancy between the extent stated in the Sec.4(1) notification and the Sec.6 declaration, and the consequences of any such discrepancy (including consequences for compensation computation under Sec.23(1)).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The declaration is illegal because it was made beyond two years from the date of the Sec.4(1) notification (or beyond the period prescribed by the proviso to Sec.6).
- The entire proceedings have lapsed under Sec.11-A of the Land Acquisition Act.
- The land is being used for the public purpose of running the petitioner’s college and therefore should not be acquired for another public purpose.
- There is a discrepancy in the extent between the Sec.4(1) notification and the Sec.6 declaration.
- Additionally, counsel contended that an alternate site is available on the other side of the road and that acquisition would deprive the college of minimum necessary land.
Respondents' (Additional Government Pleader) Arguments
- The Sec.6 declaration was made within the prescribed time because the period covered by earlier stay orders (25.10.1983 to 10.10.1991) must be excluded from the limitation calculation.
- Sec.11-A is not applicable to the facts of the case.
- There is no discrepancy between the Sec.4(1) notification and the Sec.6 declaration.
- The acquisition is for a public purpose (widening the road); acquisition of 9 cents from the petitioner’s holding will not affect the college and is in the larger public interest.
- As to the availability of an alternate site, it is a decision for the engineering section; the petitioner cannot insist that land on the opposite side of the road be used instead.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| N. Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka, (1996) 3 S.C.C. 88 | The limitation for publication of a Sec.6 declaration (clause (ii) of the first proviso to Sec.6(1)) must be counted from the date the order of the court is received by the Land Acquisition Officer; declaration must be published within one year from that date. This interpretation gives effect to the legislative purpose of limitation and ensures meaningful judicial review. | The Court relied on this three-Judge Bench pronouncement to hold that the fresh Sec.6 declaration must be examined against the one-year limitation counted from the date the Land Acquisition Officer received the earlier order; the Court concluded the Sec.6 declaration in the present case was beyond the limitation prescribed. |
| Oxford English School v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (1995) 5 S.C.C. 206 | Referenced by the Supreme Court in N. Narasimhaiah (as part of the jurisprudential context used by the three-Judge Bench). | Referred to in the reasoning of the Supreme Court decision (N. Narasimhaiah) which the Court applied in assessing limitation and the effect of the earlier High Court order on the running of limitation; the present Court adopted the Supreme Court's approach. |
| P. Chinnnanna v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1994) 5 S.C.C. 486 | Referenced by the Supreme Court in N. Narasimhaiah (as part of the jurisprudential context). | Referenced indirectly through the Supreme Court’s reasoning in N. Narasimhaiah; the Court accepted the Supreme Court's interpretation as binding for the question of limitation. |
| D. Nandakrishnan & another v. State of Tamil Nadu & others, (1997) 2 MLJ 397 | Applied the Supreme Court's N. Narasimhaiah reasoning to similar facts and held that a Sec.6 declaration could not be issued after a long lapse following communication of a court order; where many years had passed, no fresh declaration could validly be issued. | The Court treated D. Nandakrishnan as a directly applicable precedent on facts analogous to the present case and used it to reinforce its conclusion that the Sec.6 declaration in the present case, issued several years after the earlier court order and related stay period, was beyond the permissible period. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court confined itself to the petitioner's principal contention regarding limitation for issuing the Sec.6 declaration and declined to entertain other contentions at this stage. The analytical steps as reflected in the opinion are:
- The Court summarized the procedural chronology, including the original Sec.4(1) notification (17.5.1979), the Court's earlier order of 10.10.1991 quashing a prior Sec.6 declaration while retaining the Sec.4(1) notification and directing a fresh Sec.5-A enquiry, the petitioner’s objections filed on 9.11.1991, the Land Acquisition Officer’s overruling of objections on 8.7.1992, and the eventual Sec.6 declaration issued on 12.12.1996 (gazetted 1.1.1997).
- The Court examined the parties' competing positions on whether the period of the earlier stay should be excluded in computing limitation. The Additional Government Pleader argued that the stay period must be excluded and that the Sec.6 declaration was therefore within time.
- The Court turned to the binding Supreme Court authority in N. Narasimhaiah, which held that where a court sets aside a declaration and directs fresh enquiry, limitation for publishing a fresh Sec.6 declaration should run from the date the Land Acquisition Officer receives the court order, and a declaration must be published within one year from that date to be valid.
- Applying that principle and the subsequent application in D. Nandakrishnan, the Court assessed the actual elapsed time between the High Court's order of 10.10.1991 (which quashed the earlier declaration) and the fresh Sec.6 declaration of 12.12.1996. The Court noted the period that elapsed (described in the opinion as five years and two months from 10.10.1991) and compared it to the limitation imposed by the proviso to Sec.6 as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
- The Court concluded there was no escape from the conclusion that the Sec.6 declaration was made after the period of limitation prescribed in the proviso to Sec.6. The Court found the declaration to be time-barred following the binding Supreme Court interpretation and the earlier decision of this Court in D. Nandakrishnan.
- The Court also rejected the petitioner's subsidiary contention that there are two relevant dates for computation of compensation; it held that the Sec.4(1) notification date remains the relevant date for computing market value under Sec.23(1), because a Sec.6 declaration only gives conclusiveness to the public purpose specified in Sec.4(1) and, when upheld, relates back to the Sec.4(1) publication.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The writ petition is allowed and the entire acquisition proceedings are quashed.
Consequences and implications as stated in the opinion:
- The Sec.6 declaration made in G.O.Ms.No.326 dated 12.12.1996 (gazetted 1.1.1997) was held to have been issued after the limitation prescribed by the proviso to Sec.6, and therefore the acquisition proceedings based on that declaration were invalid and quashed.
- No costs were awarded (the order states "but without costs").
- The Court made clear that the respondents remain free to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings for the road widening if they still require the land; the Court stated it is open to the respondents to proceed afresh for acquisition of the land in question.
- Applications W.M.P.No.25039 of 1997 and W.M.P.No.25040 of 1997 were dismissed as a consequence.
- The opinion records that the decision does not create a second date for computation of compensation under Sec.23(1); the relevant date remains the date of publication of the Sec.4(1) notification for valuation purposes.
Note: This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added or inferred beyond what the opinion itself states.
1. The petitioner prays for the issue of writ of certiorarito call for the records relating to the notification issued by the first respondent under Sec.4(l) in G.O.Ms.No.810, R.D. & D.A., dated 17.5.1979 and the declaration issued in G.O.Ms.No.326, Municipal Administration and Water Supply, dated 12.12.1996 and quash the same.
2. Heard counsel for the petitioner and Mr.V.Rangaraju, Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. This Court by order dated 27.10.1997 called upon the Government Advocate to produce the file relating to acquisition. Accordingly, the respondents have produced the files and arguments were advanced by the counsel for either side. There is no controversy with respect to the factual aspect of the matter.
3. By G.O.Ms.No.810, R.D. and L.A., dated 17.5.1979 Sec.4(1) notification was issued by the first respondent and the said notification was published in the Tamil Nadu Gazette dated 20.6.1979. The substance of the notification has also been published in the locality as well as in convenient places. The Land Acquisition Officer conducted Sec.5-A enquiry on 26.10.1979. Thereafter on the submission of report, the Government issued Sec.6 declaration in G.O.Ms:No.1187 R.D. & L.A. dated 27.6.1981. Sec.6 declaration was also gazetted on 15.7.1981. A notice under Sec.9(2) of the Act was also issued for passing the award on 5.8.1983. It is stated that award was also passed on 16.9.1983.
4. At that stage, the petitioner filed W.M.P.No.9795 of 1983. After hearing either side this Court passed the following order on 10.10.1991.
"In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the impugned proceedings are liable to be quashed and accordingly they are quashed and with a direction that the petitioner is permitted to file its objections to the proposed acquisition within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this order and in case the petitioner submits its objections, the Land Acquisition Officer shall follow the procedure for holding the enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act and pursue the acquisition proceedings in accordance with law. However, it is just and necessary to point out that the measurement of the land in question should be given if any subsequent declaration is issued in respect of the acquisition of the property in question, as in the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act so that there cannot be a different version over the total extent sought to be acquired under the acquisition proceedings, with this direction, the writ petition is allowed. No costs."
The said order of the learned Judge has become final, as admittedly no writ appeal has been preferred.
5. The petitioner herein in terms of the direction issued by the Govindasamy, J. had submitted objections on 9.11.1991 itself. The Land Acquisition Officer by proceedings dated 8.7.1992 after considering the objections of the Writ petitioner, and affording an opportunity, besides, complying with rule 3(b) of the Rules submitted proposals to reject the objections and to issue sec.6 declaration. Thereafter by G.O.Ms.No.326, M.A. & W.S., dated 12.12.1996 a declaration under Sec.6 of the Act has been published and the said declaration has been gazetted on 1.1.1997.
6. The Land Acquisition Officer had subsequently issued a notice under Secs.9(3) and 10 of the Land Acquisition Act. On 29.7.1997 award enquiry was conducted and award has also been passed on 8.9.1997 as seen from the files. Before possession could be taken the present writ petition has been filed on 16.10.1997 challenging the acquisition.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner raised the following four contentions:
1. The declaration is illegal as it has been made beyond two years from the date of Sec.6 declaration.
2. The entire proceedings lapses in terms of Sec. 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act.
3 The land is now being used for a public purpose of running a college of the petitioner and it should not be acquired for another public purpose.
4 There is difference between extent and the discrepancy between 4(1) notification and Sec.6 declaration.
8. It was also contended that when alternate site is available on the other side of the road and if land is acquired the petitioner college will be deprived of the minimum extent of land.
9. On the other hand, the Additional Government Pleader (L.A.), contended that the declaration has been made within the time prescribed as period covered by earlier orders of stay has to be excluded. It was also contended that Sec.11-A has no application to the facts of the present case and there is no discrepancy between Sec.4(l) Notification and Sec.6 declaration. It was pointed out that acquisition for a public purpose namely for widening the road and merely because 9 cents of the land is acquired from the petitioner's holding, the petitioner's college will not be affected and on the other hand the acquisition of the land is in the larger interest of the public.
10. With respect to alternate site, it was rightly contended that it is the choice of the engineering section, who have decided to widen the road and the petitioner cannot contend that the land on the opposite side of the road is available for extension.
11. It is not necessary to go into the other contentions. It is sufficient if the first contention is considered. This Court is also not inclined to permit the petitioner to raise any other contentions in this writ petition at this stage.
12. With respect to the various Notifications and Declarations, which are relevant there is no dispute about the following dates:
| 17.5.1979 | Sec.4(1) Notification issued in G.O.Ms.No.810, R.D. & .L.A. |
| 20.6.1979 | Sec.4(1) Notification Gazetted |
| 20.6.1979 | Sec.5-A enquiry conducted |
| 27.6.1981 | Declaration issued under Sec.6 of the Act in G.O.Ms.No.l 187, R.D. & .L.A. Dept. |
| 15.7.1981 | Sec.6 Declaration gazetted |
| 5.8.1983 | Award Enquiry conducted |
| 16.9.1983 | Award passed in Award No.3/83-84 of R.D.O.Nagercoil/Land Acquisition Officer. |
| 25.10.1983 | Petitioner filed W.P.No.9795 of 1983 and obtained stay orders |
| 6.3.1987 | Order of interim stay made absolute |
| 10.10.1991 | W.P.No.9795 of 1983 allowed. Sec.4(1) Notification alone retained. |
| Subsequent proceedings were quashed. This Court directed fresh Sec.5A enquiry. | |
| 9.11.1991 | The writ petitioner filed objections under Sec.5(A). The objection of the petitioner communicated to the requisitioning body and the remarks were also communicated to the petitioner. |
| 19.6.1992 | 5-A enquiry was conducted in respect of neighbouring land owner has filed W.P.No.9795 of 1983. |
| 6.7.1992 | The petitioner filed objections before the Land Acquisition Officer, through Advocate. |
| 8.7.1992 | Objections of the petitioner over ruled and draft declaration forwarded |
| 16.7.1992 | Sec.5-A enquiry proceedings communicated to the writ petitioner by the Land Acquisition Officer |
| 12.12.1996 | G.O.Ms.No.326, M.A. & W.S. and Sec.6 Declaration issued. |
| 1.1.1997 | Sec.6 Declaration gazetted |
| 12.12.1996 | Sec.6 Declaration published in the locality. |
| 29.7.1997 | Award enquiry conducted |
| 8.9.1997 | Award passed |
| 16.10.1997 | Writ petition filed. Possession not yet taken. |
14. The writ petitioner had the benefit of stay orders of this Court from 25.10.1983 to 10.10.1991. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that even reckoning 10.10.1991 as the date of Sec.4(1) Notification, the respondents should have made a Declaration under proviso (1) to Sec.6 within one year or even assuming this as two years from that date even in terms of proviso (ii) to Sec.6 an award should have been passed within two years from the date of publication of such declaration. However, fresh Declaration has been made only on 12.12.1996, Gazetted on 1.1.1997 and published in the locality on 12.2.1997. In this case award has been passed only on 8.9.1997 The learned Government Pleader contended that the entire period of stay has to be excluded and if the entire period of stay commencing from 25.10.1983 to 25.10.1991 is excluded, the declaration made in this case is within time terms of Sec.6 of the Act.
15. The Additional Government Pleader vehemently contended that the Sec.6 Declaration had been made within the period of limitation prescribed by the provision to Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act.
16. On a consideration of the above dates, this Court has no other alternative except to hold that the Declaration under Sec.6 of the Act has been made after the period of limitation prescribed by proviso to Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act and there is no escape. In this respect the attention of this Court was drawn to the recent pronouncement of the Apex Court in N.Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka N.Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka N.Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka , (1996)3 S.C.C. 88. The three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court after referring to the Oxford English School v. Government of Tamil Nadu , (1995)5 S.C.C. 206and P.Chinmnanna v. State of Andhra Pradesh P.Chinmnanna v. State of Andhra Pradesh P.Chinmnanna v. State of Andhra Pradesh , (1994)5 S.C.C. 486held thus:
"We are of the opinion that running of the limitation should be counted from the date of the order of the court received by the Land Acquisition Officer and declaration is published within one year from that date. It would be consistent with the scheme of the Act and it would subserve the public purpose. Parliament amended the Act and prescribed limitation since the acquisition proceedings were unduly delayed for years and the owners of lands were put to hardship. If operation of limitation under clause (ii) of first proviso to Sec.6(1) is not applied, we would come back to square one and defeat the legislative purpose of limitation prescribed under the Act. The Government is bound under the order of the court to hold an enquiry under Sec.5-A. Thereafter, if the Government still opines that the land is needed for public purpose, declaration under Sec.6 should be published within one year as indicated above. This interpretation would render judicial review efficacious and meaningful and public purpose subserved and the aggrieved owner would get an opportunity to vindicate his grievance. Thus, we hold that the limitation prescribed in clause (ii) of the first proviso to Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.6 would apply to publication of declaration under Sec.6(1) afresh. If it is published within one year from the date of the receipt of the order of the court by Land Acquisition Officer, declaration published under Sec.6(1) would be valid."
17. The second contention that there would be two dates of notification under Sec.4(1) as initially published and the one deemed to be published consequent to upholding of second declaration under Sec.6(1) and that the compensation under Sec.23(1) is required to be determined with reference to second date, is untenable. The declaration under Sec.6(1) gives only conclusiveness to the public purposes specified in Sec.4(1) and the notification under Sec.4(1) still remains valid which is relevant for the purpose of computation of market value as envisaged under Sec.23(1) of the Act. When the court upholds the declaration it would relate back to the date of publication under Sec.4(1). Therefore, there are no two dates for the purpose of computation of the market value as contended, for. The purpose of enquiry under Sec.5-A is to determine whether the land is needed for the public purpose and the affected owner or interested person gets a right to show that the public purpose mentioned in Sec.4(1) is not the public purpose or some other land is more suitable or is available for the public purpose or his lands need to be excluded from public purpose as the proposed land may be in excess of requirement. Once the Government, after holding the enquiry, has considered the objections and decided that the land is needed for public purpose, declaration published under Sec.6 would become conclusive of the public purpose. Nonetheless, relevant date for Sec.23(1) is the date of the publication of the notification under Sec.4(1).
"18. Admittedly, in this case the second declaration was published within one year even from the date of the order passed by the High Court and therefore, the view of the Division Bench is required to be upheld. Thus, we hold that the declaration published under Sec.6(1) on 13.5.1989 is valid and the notification dated 22.1.1987 under Sec.4(1) does not become invalid. The Land Acquisition Officer should conduct and complete award enquiry within one year from the date of the receipt of the order of this Court."
17. Following the said Supreme Court judgment in a case D.Nandakrishnan and another v. State of Tamil Nadu and others D.Nandakrishnan and another v. State of Tamil Nadu and others D.Nandakrishnan and another v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, (1997)2 MLJ. 397 this Court had also an occasion to consider the identicalcontention and held thus:
"The Full Bench pronouncement of the Supreme Court squarely applies to the facts of the present case. The Division Bench had allowed the writ petition and quashed the Sec.6 Declaration by order dated 21.1.1988 and the same has been communicated to the Land Acquisition Officer and the certified copy of the said judgment was received by the Land Acquisition Officer, the second respondent on 3.2.1989. Thus either rekoned from 21.1.1988 or for that matter from 3.2.1989, till now no declaration under Sec.6 of the Act has been issued by the 1 st respondent. Hence, the respondents cannot issue a fresh declaration under Sec.6 as number of years have rolled by now. Even assuming that a period of three years would not apply which contention is not correct, even then more than three years have elapsed since 3.2.1983. Reckoned from 3.2.1989 and till date of filing of writ petition on 19.2.1993 more than three years have elapsed. In the circumstances, on the facts of the case, no declaration under Sec.6 could be issued as held by the Apex Court in N.Naraisimhaiah v. State of Karnataka N.Naraisimhaiah v. State of Karnataka N.Naraisimhaiah v. State of Karnataka , ( 1996(3 S.C.C. 88."
"18. As no declaration could be issued, no purpose will be served in allowing the Sec.4(1) Notification alone to be kept pending. In the circumstances, it would be no more available to the State Government to make a Declaration under Sec.6 of the Act based upon the Sec.4(1) notification dated 29.8.1978 and published in Government Gazette dated 1.10.1975 eminent domain and make a fresh Sec.4(1) notification and proceed further and complete acquisition in terms of Land Acquisition Act, 1894."
18. In the present case, as already pointed out this Court allowed the writ petition on 10.10.1991 and quashed the sec.6 declaration. The said judgment of this Court in W.P.No.9795 of 1983, dated 10.10.1991was communicated to the respondents by the petitioner along with letter dated 9.11.1991. That apart this Court also communicated the order in the Writ petition even before 9.11.1991. In fact Sec.5-A enquiry was conducted once again on 19.6.1992 as well as on 6.7.1992. A report overruling the objections had been submitted by the Land Acquisition officer on 8.7.1992. However only on 12.12.1996 Sec.6 Declaration has been made in G.O.Ms.No.326, M.A. & W.S. and the same has been gazetted on 1.1.1997 and published in the locality on 12.12.1996.
"19. Thus, as held by the three judges bench of the Supreme Court as well as earlier Judgment of this Court reported in D.Nandakrishnan and another v. State of Tamil nadu and others D.Nandakrishnan and another v. State of Tamil nadu and others D.Nandakrishnan and another v. State of Tamil nadu and others , ( 1997)2 MLJ. 397 this Court finds that the Sec.6 Declaration had been made after a lapse of five years and two months from 10.10.1991 the date on which the earlier writ petition was allowed and four years and six months after the date of Sec.5-A enquiry and four years and five months after the Land Acquisition Officer overrulled the objections as seen from his Sec.5-A enquiry proceedings. In any view Sec.6 Declaration has been made beyond the limitation prescribed in proviso to sec.6. In the circumstances, the Writ petition is allowed and the entire acquisition proceedings is quashed, but without costs."
"20. It is made clear that it is well open to the respondents to proceed afresh for acquisition of the land in question if the respondents still require the land for the public purpose of widening the road. Consequently, W.M.P.No.25039 of 1997 and W.M.P.No.25040 of 1997 are also dismissed."
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