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Mohammad Jebbas Ali & Ors. v. Rahima Bibi
Judgment Summary (Mookerjee, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from three revisional/Civil Rule matters concerning pre-emption applications under S. 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 and related appeals under S. 9(6) of that Act. The central factual context is transfers of portions or shares of raiyat holdings to strangers and competing claims by co-sharers or adjacent raiyats to pre-empt those transfers. Specific proceedings discussed include Civil Rule No. 2654 of 1980, Civil Rule No. 3346 of 1980 and Civil Rule No. 3937 of 1980. In the matters, lower courts (Munsif, Subordinate Judge, Additional District Judge) had, in various ways, allowed or rejected applications to amend S. 8(1) pre-emption petitions by inserting alternative prayers under S. 24 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 (i.e., to treat the claim as one under the non-agricultural tenancy law). The Division Bench reviews the jurisdictional question of whether such amendments can be permitted and then resolves each Rule accordingly.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, while entertaining an application under S. 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 or an appeal under S. 9(6) of that Act, the Munsif and the District Judge respectively have jurisdiction to allow amendment of the S. 8(1) application by inserting a prayer for pre-emption under S. 24 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 (i.e., whether an S. 8(1) application can be lawfully converted into or amended to include a claim under S. 24).
- Whether a court which has jurisdiction under Ss. 8 and 9 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act may permissibly allow an amendment of pleadings which would affect (and potentially oust) that very jurisdiction, and what procedure should govern such amendments.
Arguments of the Parties
Arguments advanced (as recorded in the opinion)
- Counsel for the transferee opposite parties, Mr. Ranjit Kumar Banerjee, ultimately did not dispute that the Munsif and the District Judge, when exercising jurisdiction under S. 8 and S. 9 respectively, function as courts (i.e., are not "persona designata").
- Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned advocate for a petitioner, submitted that the petitioner had acquired a vested pre-emption right under S. 8(1) in respect of plot No. 610 (recorded as a tank) based on the law prevailing on the date of transfer and that a later amendment to the statutory definition of "agricultural land" (by the 1972 Amendment Act) did not retrospectively deprive the petitioner of that pre-emption right. The court noted this submission but regarded determination of that point as unnecessary for the decision on amendment jurisdiction.
- The opinion records factual submissions by parties in relation to characterization of specific plots (No. 609 and No. 610) as agricultural or non-agricultural; those factual findings influenced the lower courts' outcomes and are referenced in the Division Bench's disposition of the rules.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Central Talkies Ltd. v. Dwarka Prased, AIR 1966 SC 606 | Supports view that officers exercising S.8/S.9 jurisdiction (Munsif and District Judge) function as courts, not persona designata. | Relied on to affirm that Munsif and District Judge are judicial officers and entertain pre-emption proceedings as constituted courts. |
| Bazler Rahman Khandakar v. Amiruddin, 48 CWN 699 | Shows Ss. 8(1) and 9(6) confer additional jurisdiction on existing civil courts. | Used to support the proposition that S.8(1) and S.9(6) confer additional jurisdiction upon existing civil courts (Munsif/District Judge). |
| Rai Harendranath Choudhury v. Sm. Daulatmani Chaudhurain, 62 CWN 143 | Also cited for the conferral of additional jurisdiction by Ss. 8(1) and 9(6). | Reinforced the conclusion that the land-reform provisions vest additional jurisdiction in established civil courts. |
| Bechu Singh v. Bicharam Sahu, 10 CLJ 91 (p.100) | Recognizes inherent power of courts to determine procedure or invent procedure where Legislature has provided none. | Adopted to justify that Munsif and District Judge have inherent/ incidental powers to allow amendments necessary to determine real questions in controversy when the statute does not provide exhaustive procedure. |
| Ajit Sanyal v. Rasiruddan Mondol, 86 CWN 708 | Applied Bechu Singh principles to permit procedural flexibility (courts may adopt suit procedure where appropriate). | Followed as authority that courts may adopt procedures of the Code in appropriate circumstances and that inherent powers remain relevant. |
| Adaikappa Chattiar v. R. Chandrasekhara Rhevar, AIR 1948 PC 12 | Rule that where a legal right is in dispute before ordinary courts the ordinary rules of procedure apply even if right arises under special statute. | Quoted to support that pre-emption proceedings before Munsif/District Judge are governed by ordinary procedural rules unless contrary intention appears. |
| National Sewing Thread & Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros., AIR 1953 SC 357 | Similar observation about appellate jurisdiction under a special statute being governed by ordinary procedure. | Referred to as additional support for applying ordinary procedural principles in special-statute proceedings. |
| S.I. Govindaraja Naicker v. K. Kassim Sahib, AIR 1928 Mad. 384 | Authority for the proposition that a court which has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit cannot allow an amendment which would bring the suit within its jurisdiction (extreme view). | Noted as one of the authorities expressing the view that courts lacking jurisdiction cannot permit such jurisdiction-affecting amendments; the court regards this as an extreme view. |
| Mst. Zohra Khatoon v. Janab Mohammad Jane Alam, AIR 1978 Cal. 133 | Cited among cases where courts refused amendments that defeated jurisdiction. | Referred to in surveying judicial approaches on amendment affecting jurisdiction. |
| Ratan Chand Khanna v. Manendra Kumar, AIR 1979 Cal. 55 | Another authority cited in the same context about amendment and jurisdiction. | Included in the jurisprudential survey concerning whether amendments that affect jurisdiction should be allowed. |
| C. Singara Mudaliar v. M. Govindaswami Chetty, AIR 1928 Mad. 400 | Expresses the principle (per Venkatasubba Rao, J.) that a plaint should not be amended so as to oust the court's own jurisdiction. | Characterized as an extreme position; considered inapplicable as a universal rule by the Division Bench. |
| Lalji Ranchhodas v. Narottam Ranchhodas, AIR 1953 Nagpur 273 | Holds that where amendment raises pecuniary jurisdiction, the plaint and amendment may be returned to the court having jurisdiction for higher value. | Used to distinguish cases raising only pecuniary jurisdiction from cases where the proposed amendment changes the statutory basis of jurisdiction; adopted in part for procedural guidance. |
| Edupuganti Raghavendra Rao Memorial High School Committee v. Potlun Atchayra, AIR 1957 Andhra Pradesh 10 | Supports the practice of returning plaints to proper forum when amendment increases the value of claim beyond original court's pecuniary jurisdiction. | Relied upon to justify returning amended pleadings when pecuniary limits are exceeded. |
| Vhavani v. Mangamma, AIR 1949 Mad. 208 | Represents the view that a court which has jurisdiction on original claim may allow amendment even if the amendment would oust its subsequent jurisdiction, and then take procedural steps. | Adopted as part of the third (preferred) line of judicial views that allows the court to consider amendment and then decide or return the amended plaint if necessary. |
| Goverdhan Beng & family of Kaniram Laxminarayan v. Govt. of India, AIR 1953 Hyderabad 212 | Supports the approach that courts should not decide merits at amendment stage and may allow amendment subject to terms. | Used to support the proposition that the court at amendment stage determines only whether amendment should be allowed, not the merits. |
| Kundan Mal v. Thikaha Siryari, AIR 1959 Rajasthan 146 | Another authority cited in favor of the third view (court may allow amendment then deal with jurisdictional consequences). | Relied upon when adopting the procedural approach for amendments affecting jurisdiction. |
| T.K. Sreedharan v. P.S. Job, AIR 1969 Kerala 75 | Cited among cases applying the third view on amendment and procedure. | Used to reinforce the court's chosen approach to amendments affecting jurisdiction. |
| Paresh Nath Mondal v. Bijan Behari Mondal, 86 CWN 491 (Anil Kumar Sen & B.C. Chakraborti JJ.) | Held that "District Judge" in S.9(6) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act means the principal civil court of the district and that appeals under S.9(6) fix the forum. | Referred to when discussing whether an appeal under S.9(6) may be heard by a Subordinate Judge; used as authority that appeal lies to the District Judge's court (principal civil court). |
| Ajit Kumar Bhunia v. Kanan Bala Devi, AIR 1960 Cal. 565 | Holds that where an application is filed before the District Court, the District Judge can transfer it under S.8(2) Bengal, Agra & Assam Civil Courts Act to an Additional District Judge. | Referred to when explaining that the District Judge may transfer to an Additional District Judge; used to explain practical aspects of forum and assignment. |
| Amulya Kumar Chakraborty v. Sm. Prasanta Kumari Pal, C.R. Case No. 3667 of 1979 (unreported; Feb. 18, 1982) | Division Bench held that amendment of an S.8 application into an S.24 application ought to be allowed where the application in substance is for enforcement of the right to pre-empt a transfer and the forum is common. | The present court respectfully agreed with the Division Bench's reasoning and adopted it in concluding that Munsif and District Judge have jurisdiction to allow such amendments affecting their jurisdiction under S.8(1) and S.9(6). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds from several foundational propositions explicitly stated in the opinion:
- Character of the adjudicating officer: The Munsif and the District Judge, when dealing with pre-emption proceedings under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, function as constituted civil courts (not as persona designata). The court cites authority to show that S.8 and S.9 confer additional jurisdiction on existing civil courts.
- Nature of jurisdiction: A distinction is drawn between subject-matter (inherent) jurisdiction and territorial/pecuniary jurisdiction. The court holds that S.8(1) confers competence on the Munsif to entertain pre-emption applications irrespective of usual pecuniary limits; objections to pecuniary limits must be taken early and are not the same as wanting inherent jurisdiction.
- Procedural regime and inherent powers: The Land Reforms Act and Rules do not exhaustively prescribe procedure for S.8/S.9 proceedings. In that statutory vacuum the courts possess inherent and incidental powers (derived from precedents such as Bechu Singh) to allow amendments necessary to determine the real questions in controversy. Order VI of the Civil Procedure Code was not expressly made applicable, but inherent powers remain.
-
Survey of judicial approaches: The court canvasses three broad lines of judicial authority on whether a court may allow an amendment that would oust its own jurisdiction:
- Extreme view: courts should refuse any amendment that would oust their jurisdiction.
- Return view: if the amended claim exceeds pecuniary jurisdiction, the plaint and amendment should be returned to the competent court.
- Permissive view: where the original claim is within jurisdiction, the court may allow amendment and thereafter decide preliminary jurisdictional objections or return the amended plaint if necessary.
- Application to S.8/S.9 context: Because Ss. 8 and 9 confer additional jurisdiction on existing civil courts and because ordinary procedural rules govern when legal rights are in dispute, the Munsif and the District Judge have discretion to permit amendments of S.8(1) applications which may affect their jurisdiction. If, after amendment, the subject-matter value exceeds the Munsif's pecuniary limit, the proper procedural step is to return the amended petition for presentation to the proper court (i.e., the Munsif should try the matter only if the value remains within pecuniary jurisdiction; otherwise return it).
- Reliance on prior decisions: The court follows and expressly agrees with an unreported Division Bench decision (Amulya Kumar Chakraborty) that allowed conversion/amendment of S.8 applications into S.24 applications where the substance of the application was enforcement of a pre-emption right; the present Bench respectfully adopts that reasoning.
-
Case-specific application: The Bench then applies these principles to the three Rules before it:
- C.R. 2654 of 1980 — the Subordinate Judge erred in rejecting the petitioner's amendment application; the matter is remitted to the Munsif for fresh disposal in accordance with the directions in this judgment.
- C.R. 3346 of 1980 — the Munsif's order allowing amendment was within jurisdiction and in accordance with law; the order is upheld and case remitted for disposal.
- C.R. 3937 of 1980 — the Additional District Judge did not err in allowing the amendment; the Division Bench discharges the Rule and remits the appeal to the lower appellate court for expeditious disposal.
Holding and Implications
Holding (core rulings):
- The Munsif exercising jurisdiction under S. 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 and the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under S. 9(6) of the same Act have discretionary jurisdiction to allow amendments of applications under S. 8(1) that may affect their jurisdiction.
- Civil Rule No. 2654 of 1980 — Rule made absolute (order of Subordinate Judge set aside and matter remitted).
- Civil Rule No. 3346 of 1980 — the Munsif's order allowing amendment is upheld and the case is remitted for disposal.
- Civil Rule No. 3937 of 1980 — discharged (the Additional District Judge did not err in allowing amendment) and the appeal remitted for expeditious disposal.
Implications (direct consequences for the parties and procedure):
- The court authorizes Munsifs and District Judges, within their discretion, to permit amendments converting or adding a S.24 pre-emption claim to an S.8(1) application, subject to the exercise of that discretion on appropriate terms and to procedural safeguards (e.g., if pecuniary limits are exceeded the amended petition should be returned to the proper forum).
- Where a Munsif allows an amendment but the value thereafter exceeds his pecuniary limits, he must return the amended petition for presentation to the proper court; where the value remains within pecuniary limits, the Munsif may proceed to try the application.
- On the three specific Rules before the Bench, orders below were either set aside or upheld as detailed above, and matters remitted for further proceedings consistent with this judgment.
- The court emphasizes that at the stage of deciding an amendment application the court should not decide merits; it should decide only whether the amendment ought to be allowed and on what terms. Jurisdictional objections may be raised later as preliminary issues and, if sustained, the amended plaint/petition may be returned under Order 7 Rule 10 CPC principles.
- The opinion does not purport to adjudicate collateral factual issues (for example, whether retrospective statute changes deprived vested pre-emption rights) where the court considered such points unnecessary to resolve the amendment/jurisdiction question; those points remain for appropriate adjudication at later stages.
Disposition recorded in the opinion: "C.R 2654—Rule made absolute. Other two Rules discharged." (Amitabha Dutta, J. agreed.)
Mookerjee, J.:—When a portion or share of a holding of a raiyat is transferred to a stranger, any co-sharer raiyat of the said holding or a raiyat possessing an adjacent holding may, within the prescribed time, under S. 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 apply to the Munsif having territorial jurisdiction for transfer of the said portion or share of the holding to him on deposit of the consideration money together with further sum of ten per cent of the total amount.
2. Any person aggrieved by an order of the Munsif under S. 9 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act may appeal to the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area within which the land is situated.
3. The principal point in these three Revisional Application is:
4. While entertaining an application under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 or an appeal under S. 9(6) of the said Act, have the Munsif and the District Judge respectively jurisdiction to allow amendment of the application under S. 8(1) of the Act by way of insertion of a prayer for pre-emption under S. 24 of the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949?. In other words, the point for decision is whether an application under S. 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act can be lawfully allowed to be amended by converting the same into an application under S. 24 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Act, 1949.
5. Mr. Ranjit Kumar Banerjee learned Advocate for the transferee opposite parties, did not ultimately dispute the proposition that the Munsif, while exercising jurisdiction under S. 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 and the learned District Judge, while hearing an appeal under S. 9(6) of the said Act, function as courts and they are not “Persona designata”. The West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 has not selected the Munsif and the learned District Judge to act in their private capacities and as individuals. The Munsif and the District Judge as judicial officers, i.e members of an ascertained class, entertain and dispose of the pre-emption proceedings under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act (See judgement of Hidayatullah, J. in the case of Central Talkies Ltd. v. Dwarka Prased AIR 1966 SC 606 (609) para 9). The Ss. 8 and 9 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 have provided for adjudication of pre-emption proceedings by constituted courts, i.e existing courts and not by courts created by the special law (West Bengal Land Reforms Act). The court of the District Judge and the court of the Munsif are among the four classes of civil courts specified in Section 3 of the Bengal, Agra, Assam Civil Courts' Act 1887. The State Government by Notification made under S. 13(1) of the Bengal, Agra, Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 fixes and afters local limits of jurisdiction of Civil Courts.
6. The jurisdiction of the Munsif and that of the District Judge under Ss. 8(1) and S. 9(6) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act have not been fixed by the State Government's Notification under S. 13(1) of the Bengal, Agra, Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 and the West Bengal Land Reforms Act has conferred such special jurisdiction upon them. Therefore, while dealing with pre-emption proceeding under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, the Munsif and the District Judge function as courts of Special Jurisdiction. This proposition slightly differently stated is follows:
7. Section 8(1) and S. 9(6) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 have conferred additional jurisdiction upon the Munsif and the District Judge who are existing Civil Courts (See Bazler Rahman Khandakar v. Amiruddin 48 CWN 699 and Rai Harendranath Choudhury v. Sm. Daulatmani Chaudhurain 62 CWN 143).
8. In view of the special provisions contained in S. 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act the Munsif having territorial jurisdiction is competent to entertain a pre-emption application under S. 8(1) of the Act even when the amount of consideration for a transfer exceeds the extent of pecuniary limits fixed under S. 19 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts, Act, 1887.
9. A fundamental distinction has been always drawn between the courts' jurisdiction of the subject matter on one hand and its territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction on the other. While an objection to the lack of the inherent jurisdiction of a court to try a cause cannot be waived and the said objection can be raised at any stage, objection as to place of suing and courts' competence with reference to pecuniary limits must be raised at the earliest and if not done, no such objection can be allowed (See Ss. 21 and 21A of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908). Therefore, absence of pecuniary limits to the Munsif's jurisdiction under S. 8(1) of the Act is not at all material.
10. Neither the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 nor the West Bengal Land Reforms Rules 1965 have prescribed exhaustively a separate procedure for disposal of applications under S. 8(1) of the said Act and of appeals under S. 9(6) of the said Act. Sub-section (1) of S. 9 of the said Act, inter alia, requires the Munsif to give notice of such an application to transferor and also to cause notice to be affixed on the land. The transferor and/or the person interested have been given right to appear and contest. The Rule 7 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Rules prescribes the form of notice. Rule 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Rules which applies to appeal under S. 9(6) of the Act is also not exhaustive. Section 57 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 has prescribed that any officer dealing with proceedings under the Act shall exercise the powers of Civil Court under Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for the purpose of the matters specified in clauses (a) to (g) of the said section.
11. Order VI of the Code has not been expressly made applicable to pre-emption proceedings under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. But the Munsif having jurisdiction and the District Judge hearing the appeal have inherent powers to allow amendment of pleadings on such terms as they might think just which may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. Such a power to allow amendment may be also considered as a part of the implied and incidental powers of the court to dispose of in accordance with law a pre-emption application.
12. Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, J. in Bechu Singh v. Bicharam Sahu 10 CLJ 91 at page 100, had observed, inter alia “The Court, where the circumstances required it, has an inherent power to do that justice for the administration of which it alone exists ………… where the Legislature has provided no procedure to be followed in cases which must and do arise, the courts must be taken to have inherent jurisdiction to decide the question of procedure and, if necessary, to invent a procedure for themselves”. Recently, M.M Dutt and M.K Mukherjee, JJ. in the case of Ajit Sanyal v. Rasiruddan Mondol 86 CWN 708, at page 713 have applied the said principles laid down in Bechu Singh's case (supra) and held that in view of the Amendment of S. 141 of the Civil Procedure Code the procedure provided for suits is no longer applicable to writ proceedings but there is no bar in adopting such procedure if thought necessary in the discretion of the court and in accordance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. We respectfully agree with the above principles of law.
13. In pre-emption proceedings legal rights are in dispute and the Munsif and the District Judge are bound to act in a manner not different from their civil jurisdiction. The West Bengal Land Reforms Act and Rules made thereunder have not indicated any contrary intention. The Privy Council in the case of Adaikappa Chattiar v. R. Chandrasekhara Rhevar AIR 1948 PC 12, had observed:
“The true rule is that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary courts of the country are seized of such dispute the courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto…………notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arise under a special statute……..”
14. The Supreme Court in their decision in National Sewing Thread & Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros., AIR 1953 SC SC 357 had made similar observations with reference to the High Court's appellate jurisdiction under the Trade Marks Act.
15. In case an application under S. 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 is permitted to be amended by inserting the prayer for pre-emption under S. 24 of the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, the Courts' jurisdiction under Ss. 8 and 9 of the Act would be no longer there. Therefore, we may next consider whether the court can allow an amendment of the pleading which takes the case out of its jurisdiction under Ss. 8 and 9 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 1955. We have already concluded that both the learned Munsif having territorial jurisdiction and the learned District Judge acting as the appellate court under S. 9(6) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 have discretionary jurisdiction to allow either party to alter or amend his pleading. The same principles which apply to amendment of pleadings in a suit ought to regulate the exercise of the power of amendment by the learned Munsif and the District Judge respectively under Ss. 8(1) and 9(6) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. Therefore, we proceed to consider some of the reported decisions regarding court's power to allow amendment of pleading affecting its jurisdiction and the procedure to be followed.
16. It has been generally held that the court, which has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit, is not competent to allow an amendment of the plaint which would bring the suit within its jurisdiction. When on the face of it the plaint shows that the court has no jurisdiction to try it, such court cannot allow amendment of the plaint (See, S.I Govindaraja Naicker v. K. Kassim Sahib AIR 1928 Mad. 384, Mst. Zohra Khatoon v. Janab Mohammad Jane Alam AIR 1978 Cal. 133, Ratan Chand Khanna v. Manendra Kumar AIR 1979 Cal. 55).
17. But in case the court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit, the courts in India are not unanimous in their views as regards the power of such court to allow an amendment of the plaint which would take the suit out of its jurisdiction and about the procedure to be followed. There are broadly following three lines of judicial views:
(1) When an application for amendment of the plaint is made which if granted will deprive the court's jurisdiction to decide on merits, the court ought to dismiss the application. No court will permit a plaint to be so amended as to oust its own jurisdiction to try the suit (vide the decision of Venkatasubba Rao, J. in C. Singara Mudaliar v. M. Govindaswami Chetty AIR 1928 Mad. 400).
(2) When the court is faced with the question of allowing an amendment which taken together with the original claim exceeds its jurisdiction, it should return the plaint together with the application of amendment of consideration by the court having jurisdiction to entertain the claim which is proposed to be made by amendment of the plaint (See Lalji Ranchhodas v. Narottam Ranchhodas AIR 1953 Nagpur 273, Edupuganti Raghavendra Rao Memorial High School Committee v. Potlun Atchayra AIR 1957 Andhra Pradesh 10).
(3) When the claim as originally made is within the court's jurisdiction but if the said claim is amended, the court might have no further jurisdiction, the said court itself is competent to allow such amendment. Thereafter, it would decide whether the amended plaint should be returned for presentation to the proper court (See Vhavani v. Mangamma AIR 1949 Mad. 208, Goverdhan Beng and Joint family of Kaniram Laxminarayan v. Govt. of the Union of India AIR 1953 Hyderabad 212 (Para 16), Kundan Mal v. Thikaha Siryari AIR 1959 Rajasthan 146, T.K Sreedharan,… v. P.S Job,…. AIR 1969 Kerala 75).
18. The aforesaid view expressed by Venkatasubba Rao J. in S.I Govindraja Naicker v. Kassim Saheb (supra), is an extreme one and the subsequent judicial authorities have not endorsed the said view. The observations of Hidayatullah and Kauselendra Rao, JJ. in Lalji Ranchhodas v. Narottam Ranchhodas (supra), were made with reference to the amendment of the plaint affecting the court's pecuniary jurisdiction. Therefore, when an application is made for raising the value of a suit, it would present no difficulty if the court in which the suit had been originally instituted returns the plaint and the amendment application for consideration by a court having jurisdiction to entertain the higher amount of claim proposed to be made in the plaint. Because the said court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim as originally valued and also the higher claim proposed to be introduced by amendment. It might not be possible to follow this procedure when by reason of the proposed amendments, court's jurisdiction under a particular law is to be changed. In such an event if both the original plaint and also the amendment application are returned for presentation to the court which may have jurisdiction only in respect of the claim proposed to be amended but not in respect of the original claim, then the latter court may not be in a position to allow such amendment in order to bring the case within its jurisdiction. In such an event the ratio of the decisions in the case of Vhavani v. Mangamma (supra). Goverdhan Bang v. Government of India; Kundan Mal v. Thikaha (supra), T.K Sreedharan,… v. P.S Job,…. (supra) etc. noted above may be applied. In our opinion, the third view set out hereinbefore ought to be followed. Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code has not expressly deprived the court of its power to allow amendments which might affect its jurisdiction to try the suit. It is settled law that the court has a large measure of discretion in the matter of allowing amendments and Court's such power is liberally exercised. On the question of amendment of pleadings we ought to adopt a procedure which would ensure proper administration of justice and at the same time shorten rather than delay fair disposal of the case. In case, upon the pleadings originally made, the court has competence to try the cause, the said court ought to consider the application for amendment of the plaint even when proposed amendment might affect court's jurisdiction to further try the suit.
19. We also agree with the observations made in the cases of Goverdhan Beng v. Govt. of Union of India (supra), Kundan Mal v. Thikana Siryari (supra) and T.K Shreedharan v. P.S Jal (supra), that when the court considers an application for amendment of the pleadings it does not enter into the merits, at the stage. The Court only decides whether or not the proposed amendment ought to be allowed on such terms as may be just in order to decide the real questions in controversy between the parties. In case, after amendment of the plaint is granted, the defendant raises an objection about the court's competence to try the suit or the proceeding, the court may decide the said jurisdictional question as a preliminary one. In case the court finds that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the amendment case, it might direct return of the plaint for presentation to the competent court of law. At the stage of deciding whether an amendment of the plaint ought to be allowed, the could woald not be justified in recording any finding on the merits or about the consequences of the proposed amendment. After such amendment is allowed, the court has ample jurisdiction to direct return of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure or according to the principles embodied in the said Rule.
20. We have already observed that Ss. 8 and 9 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act have conferred additional jurisdiction upon existing courts constituted under the Bengal Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act. In other words, these established civil courts have been vested with jurisdiction under Ss. 8 and 9 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. The Munsif and the District Judge in deciding the said proceedings under Ss. 8 and 9 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act are governed by ordinary rules of procedure applicable to suits and appeals. We are not unmindful of the legal position that applications under S. 24 of the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act are filed before the court having pecuniary jurisdiction i.e according to the value of the subject-matter whereas irrespective of the amount of consideration for transfer the Munsif having territorial jurisdiction entertains an application under S. 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act.
21. The above position in law does not really present any serious difficulty. In the event the value of the subject-matter of the application is within the learned Munsif's pecuniary jurisdiction fixed under S. 19 of the Bengal Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, then even after he allows application under S. 24 of the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act, the learned Munsif need not return the amended petition but would proceed to try the said application in accordance with law. But in case the learned Munsif allows such an amendment or a preemption application in respect of a transfer of a share of a raijat's holding valued at a figure exceeding his pecuniary jurisdiction fixed under S. 19 of the Bengal Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, the learned Munsif would return the said amended application under S. 24 of the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act for presentation to proper court.
22. Anil Kumar Sen and B.C Chakrabarti, JJ. in their unreported decision dated February 18, 1982 in C.R Case No. 3667 of 1979 Amulya Kumar Chakraborty v. Sm. Prasanta Kumari Pal have held that the amendment of an application under S. 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act for converting the same into an application under S. 24 of the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act ought to be allowed. The learned Judges observed that the application considered by them was in substance for enforcement of the right to pre-empt a transfer made by their co-sharer. Such pre-emption right was conferred upon them by S. 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act and S. 25 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act depending on whether the land transferred was agricultural or non-agricultural. Therefore, an alternative prayer for pre-emption under S. 24 of the said Act did not mean a new pleading and the question of limitation did not arise. On the facts of said case the learned Munsif's court was a common forum for entertaining of pre-emption objections under the two Acts. We respectfully agree with the above reasons given by the Division Bench consisting of Anil Kumar Sen and B.C Chakraborti, JJ. and conclude that the learned Munsif exercising jurisdiction under S. 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 and the learned District Judge exercising jurisdiction under S. 9(6) of the said Act have jurisdiction to allow amendments of applications under S. 8(1) of the said Act affecting jurisdiction of the said courts under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act.
23. We now proceed to separately consider the three Rules. In Civil Rule No. 2654 of 1980 the learned Munsif had allowed the application under S. 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. The learned Munsif had rejected the contention of the opposite parties that the application was barred by limitation. According to the opposite parties plot no. 609 have been recorded as a Danga land and the plot no. 610 have been recorded as tank. The learned Munsif over-ruled both the points. The learned Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Hooghly allowed the appeal preferred by the pre-emptees set aside the order of the learned Munsif and dismissed the application under S. 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. According to the learned Subordinate Judge, the pre-emption application was not barred by limitation. According to the learned Subordinate Judge, plot no. 609, which was recorded as Danga Land has never been used for agricultural purposes and the same was not an agricultural land.
24. The learned Subordinate Judge further held that other plot no. 610 was recorded as a tank. The definition of the expression ‘land’ under S. 2(7) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act had been retrospectively amended from February 12, 1971 by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act (Act XII of 1972). According to the said amended definition tank was not included in the expression “Land”. The learned Subordinate Judge held that both the plots could not be the subject matter of application under S. 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. The learned Subordinate Judge rejected an application filed by the pre-emptor respondents of their pre-emption application by inserting a prayer for relief under S. 24 of the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act.
25. The learned Subordinate Judge was not quite in holding that the lands recorded as Darga in the Record of Rights are prima facie non-agricultural lands. The last finally published R.S Records were prepared under the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. Section 2(6) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act lays down that “agricultural land” means ‘lands ordinarily used fro the purpose of agriculture or horticulture and include such land notwithstanding that it may be lying fallow for the time being’. But the learned Subordinate Judge has found as a fact that the land had never been used for agricultural purposes and believed the evidence of O.P.W 2 that no agriculture was possible on the plot of land. Therefore, we are unable to reverse the learned Subordinate Judge's finding that Plot No. 609 was not an agricultural land. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned advocate for the petitioner, had next submitted that the petitioner had acquired under S. 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act a vested right to pre-empt the transfer of plot no. 610 which was recorded as a tank and was an agricultural land under the law prevailing on the date of transfer. According to Mr. Mukherjee, the subsequent amendment of the definition of the expression “agricultural land” by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972, did not provide for retrospective deprivation of the petitioner's such pre-emption right in respect of plot no. 610. It is unnecessary for us to decide this point. The petitioner himself had applied before the learned Subordinate Judge for amendment of his application under S. 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act by inserting a prayer under S. 24 of the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act.
26. For the reasons already stated, we are of the view that the learned Subordinate Judge failed to exercise his jurisdiction vested in him by law by rejecting the petitioner's said amendment application. Accordingly, we propose to set aside the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, and to remit the said amendment application to the learned Munsif for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in accordance with the direction and observations made in our judgement. As this Rule succeeds on the aforesaid point, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the Subordinate Judge had any jurisdiction to hear the appeal under S. 9(6) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. In this connection our attention has been drawn to the decision of Anil Kumar Sen and B.C Chakarborti JJ. in Paresh Nath Mondal v. Bijan Behari Mondal 86 CWN 491. The learned Judges have held that the expression “District Judge” in S. 9(6) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act means the principal civil court of the district. Section 9(6) of the Act not only confers the right of appeal but also fixes the forum, namely the court of the District Judge which, according to the Division Bench, in terms of the S. 8(2) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act may include on assignment the court of the Additional District Judge appointed for the district. According to the Division Bench decision in Paresh Nath Mondal v. Bijan Behari Mondal (supra), an appeal under S. 9(6) cannot be transferred for disposal by a Subordinate Judge. P.N Mookerjee and Niyogi, JJ. in the case of Ajit Kumar Bhunia… v. Kanan Bala Devi…Opposite Party. AIR 1960 Cal. 565, hold that where an application under S. 83 of the Hindu Marriage Act is duly filed before the District Court, the District Judge can transfer under S. 8(2) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, the application to an additional District Judge for disposal. For the foregoing reasons, we make the Rules absolute, set aside the orders of the learned Munsif as well as the order of the learned Subordinate Judge and remit the case back to the learned Munsif's court with a direction to dispose of the amendment application hereinbefore mentioned and thereafter to proceed in accordance with law.
27. A learned Single Judge of this Court had originally issued Civil Rule No. 3346 of 1980 on 26th May 1982. The Rule was referred to the Division Bench. The learned Munsif by his order complained of in this Rule allowed an application for amendment of a petition under S. 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. In our view, the learned Munsif had acted within his jurisdiction and in accordance with law by allowing the said amendment. We, therefore, uphold the order passed in Civil Rule No. 3346 of 1980 and remit the case back for disposal in accordance with law.
28. Civil Rule No. 3937 of 1980 was also issued by a learned Single Judge but subsequently was referred to the Division Bench. The learned Munsif has rejected an application under S. 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act on the ground that the subject matter of the application was a Doba which had been excluded from the definition of the expression “agricultural land” by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972. In the instant case, the transfer in question was made in the year 1970. The pre-emptor preferred an appeal which ultimately came up for hearing before the Additional District Judge, 2nd Court, Birbhum. The learned Additional District Judge allowed the petitioners application for amendment of the pleading by inserting a prayer for pre-emption under S. 24 of the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act, if it was found that S. 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act was not applicable. The respondents in the said miscellaneous appeal obtained the present Rule. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the learned Additional District Judge did not commit any error of jurisdiction by allowing the said amendment application.
29. We, accordingly, discharge Civil Rule No. 3937 of 1980 and remit the case back to the lower appellate court with a direction to expeditiously dispose of the appeal in accordance with law.
Amitabha Dutta, J.—I agree.
C.R 2654—Rule made absolute. Other two Rules discharged.
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