1. Stahdarad Chartered Bank respondent 3(herein after referred to as the Bank) is a banking company incorporated in England with limited liability by Royal Charter having its registered office at 1, Aldermandbury Square, London, petitioner was an employee of the Bank working in its office at Kanpur. By order dated 3-8-1993 petitioner has been removed from service by the Bank it is against this order that he has filed this writ petition before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution tion of India. Prayer for writ of mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere with the working of the petitioner in the Bank as Staff Officer and further to pay him salary regularly andnot to give effect to the aforesaid order of termination has also been made. This Court on 3-12-1993 has granted an interim order staying the operation of the above order of termination of service.

2. At the threshhold, a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of this petition has been raised on behalf of respondents, which has been disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is this question which is to be decided first. In the case of Shri Anandi Mukta Sadguru v. V.R Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691 : AIR 1989 SC 1607 relevant extract from which is reproduced below, Supreme Court has laid down that writ cannot be issued by a High Cqurt if rights are purely of private character or if the person or authority is private body with no public duty.

“If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are the two exceptions to Mandamus.” (Para 14 of AIR)

Although the above observations have been made with regard to mandamus but same principles will apply in the case of writ of certiorari also. This Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can issue a writ to any person or authority within the territory in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, but the “person” or “authority” should be either statutory authority or agency or instrumentality of the State. They may also cover any other person or authority performing public duty. Private persons or private bodies are not amenable to writ jurisdiction unless they exercise some statutory powers or discharge public duty. Supreme Court in the above case of Sri Anandi Mukta Sadguru ((1989) 2 SCC 691 : AIR 1989 SC 1607) has, in this connection, laid down as under (para 19):

“The wordsany person or authority” used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form, of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body, The duty must bejudged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party.

3. Questions which are required to be decided for resolving this controversy in the instant case are (i) Whether the right which is being asserted by the petitioner is of private character, and (ii) whether the Bank is a private body with no public duty.

4. Bank is neither Governmental authority nor agency or instrumentality of the State and as such is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. It is private banking company incorporated in England under the Royal Charter and is carrying on business in India at various places including Kanpur. There are no statutory Rules or Regulations framed for regulating the conditions of service of the employees of the Bank. Petitioner has been employed by the Bank under an agreement of employment, copy of which has been filed as Annexure-1 to the counter affidavit, under which his service can be terminated by the Bank after three months notice or three months pay in lieu thereof Right to work in the Bank which petitioner claims is right which is derived from agreement which has been executed by him with the bank and this agreement is not a statutory agreement. Right which the petitioners wants to be enforced by means of this writ petition is of private character. For enforcing such a right writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable.

5. No writ petition can be maintained even against the statutory authority where the impugned order has not been passed in exercise of statutory provisions, but has been passed under a non-statutory contract. In this connection reference may be made to a decision of Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajay Pal Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 116 : AIR 1989 SC 1076, where it was laid down as under (Para 21):

“There is a line of decisions where the contract entered into between the State and the persons aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights are governed only by the terms of the contract, no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple: Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, (1977) 3 SCR 249 : (1977) 3 SCC 457 : AIR 1977 SC 1496, Premji Bhai Parmar v. Delhi Development Authority, (1980) 2 SCR 704 : (1980) 2 SCC 129 : AIR 1980 SC 738 and D.F.O v. Biswanath Tea Company Ltd., (1981) 3 SCR 662 : (1981) 3 SCC 238 : AIR 1981 SC 1368).

6. In R.V British Broadcasting Corporation, exparte Levelle, (1983) 1 All ER 24.1, the applicant who was employed by British Broadcasting Copora tion under a contract of employment was dismissed from service, after giving her contractual notice, an appeal was presented against the above order, which was also dismissed. She challenged those orders before the Court for certiorari for getting them quashed. Her petition was rejected on the grdund that the right which she was asserting was of privateor domestic character based on contract of employment. Relevant passage from the judgment of this casejs reproduced below

“Not with standing the present wording of Order 53, Rule 1 and Section 31 of the 1981 Act, the position remains the same and, if this application has been confined to ah application for an order of certiorari, in my view there would have been no jurisdiction to make the order sought. However, in seeking a stay, the applicant is seeking, in effect, an injunction. The matter was argued before me on the basis that relief by way of an injunction was being sought on the application for judicial review. Paragraph (2) of Rule 1 of Order 53 does not strictly contain applications for judicial review to cases where an order for mandamus, prohibition or certiorari could be granted. It merely requires that the Court should have regard to the nature of the matter in respect of which such relief may be granted. However, although applications for judicial review are not confined to those cases where relief could be granted by way of prerogative of order, I regard the wording of Order 53, Rule 1(2) and subsection (2) of Section 31 of the 1981 Act as making it clear, that the application for judicial review is confined to reviewing activities of a public natureas opposed to those of a purely private or domestic character. The disciplinary appeal procedure set up by the BBC depends purely on the contract of employment between the applicant and the BBC, and, therefore, it is. procedure of a purely private or domestic character.

7. Bank, as mentioned hereinbefore, is a private banking company incorporated under Royal Charter in England and is a private body. It is not exercising any power or discharging any duty under any statute. It is also not discharging any public duty. It is doing only thebusiness of banking like any other businessman. The fact that Bank carries on business under the permission of Reserve Bank of India does not change either its charactor or nature of order passed by it. In Chander Mohan KHanna v. The National Council of Educational Research & Training, (1991) 4 SCC 578 : AIR 1992 SC 76, Supreme Court while dealing with similar argument, has laid down as follows (At p. 78, para 3):

It must not be lost sight of, that in the modern concept of Welfare State, independent institution, corporation of and agency are generally subject to State control. The State control does not render such bodies as State under Article 12, The State control, however, vast and pervasive, is not determinative. The financial, contribution by the State is also not conclusive, The combination of State aid coupled wlth an unusual degree of control over the management andpqlicies of the body, and rendering of an important public service being the obligatory functions the State may largely point out that the body is State. If the Government operates behind a corporate veil, carrying out Governmental activity and Governmental functions of vital public importance, there may be little difficulty in identifying the body as State, within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution, (See: (i) P.K Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 141 : (AIR 1984 SC 541; (ii) Central and land Water Transport Corporation v. Brojonath Gangoli, (1986) 3 SCC 156 : AIR 1986 SC 1571 and (iii)Tekraj Vasandhi alias K.L Basandhi v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCR 260 : (1988) 1 SCC 236 : AIR 1988 SC 469.

Although above observations were made by Supreme Court while considering the question whether respondent therein was a State within the meaning of Article 12 of-the Constitution, but those observations are equally good and appropriate in order to find out as to whether a private body, which;carries on business under the permission of the State, can be treated as ah authroity amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court. In the instant case control of the State over the bank is purely regulatory in nature. There is nothing on record to show any-financial aid by the State to the Banknor is there anything-to indicate unusual control of the State over it. The Bank is private body and has passed-theimpugned order, notin discharage of-any statutory or public duty, but inexercise of its right under a non-statutory contract. It is thus Clear that the cause of action has not arisen out of exercise of statutory obligation, but has arisen out of non-statutory contract. The right which the petitioner is asserting is purely of private character and Bank is not an authority within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution and as such is not amenable to writ jurisdiction.

8. learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on Shri Anandi Mukta Sadguru v. V.R Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691 : AIR 1989 SC 1607; Kobad Jehangir Bharda v. Farpkh Sidhwa, AIR 1991 Bombay 16; Aley Ahmad Abidi v. District Inspector of Schools, AIR 1977 All 539 (FB) and Unni Krishnan J.P v. State Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 1 SCC 645 : AIR 1993 SC 2178 in support office submission that the writ petition is frtamtainabie. These cases do not lend any support to the case of the petitioner. In the case of Shri Anandi Mukta Sadgwu (supra) Supreme Court has held that the trust was discharging public luty on account of following reasons.

(1) It is managing a college affiliated 10 the University to which public money is paid as, Government aid, which play a major role in the control, maintenance and working of the college.

(2) Government aided institutions, imparting education discharge public functions.

(3) the college being affiliated to the University is subject to Rules and Regulations, of, affiliating University and its activities are supervised by the University; and

(4) The service conditions of the academic staff tif the college are governed by the Regulations and Ordinances framed by the University and any-decision taken by the University is binding on the management of the college.

It was accordingly held that the service conditions of the staff of the college are not purely of Private character and the trust is discharging public duty and as such, it is amenable to writ jurisdiction. In this connection it may also be mentioned that while, distinguishing the cases of Executive Committee of. Vaish Degree College Shamli v. Laknshmi Narain, (1976) 2 SCC 58 : AIR 1976 SC 888 and Deepak Kumar Biswas v. Director of Public Instructions, (1987) 2 SCC 252 : (AIR 1987 SC 1422) the Surpeme Cimrfheid that members of the staff of the college of trust were neither pleading for specific performance of Contractual service nor were they claiming right tp continue in service. This is clear from para 13 of the judgment, which is reproduced below:

“But here the facts are quite different and, therefore we need not go thus far, There is rio pica for specific performance or contractual service. The respondents are not seeking a declaration that they be Continued in service. They are not asking for mandamus to put them back into the college. They are claiming only the terminal benefits and arrears of salary payable to them. The question is whether the trust Canbe compelled to pay by a writ of mandamus. In the instant case the, petitioner has prayed for qiiashihgthe order of termination and for continuance of his service. Bank, as mentioned above, is neither an authority exercising any public or statutory duty; nor, the impugned order, passed by it, comes within the domain of public law function. Similar decision of Full Bench of this Court in Aley Ahmed Abidi v. Distt. Inspector of Schools. AIR 1977 All 539 (FB) (supra) cannof be of any assistance to the petitioner, because, in that case it was laid down that private body can be amenable to writ jurisdiction of High Court,-if it has passed any order in exercise of any statutory provision Case of Unni Krishnan J.P v. State of Andh Pradesh, (1993) 1 SCC 645 : AIR 1993 SC 2178 (supra) is also of lip help to the petitioner. In that case it was laid down that right to education is fundamental right covered under Article 21 of the Constitution. While dealing with this question Hon'ble Mohan, J. referred tp the case of Supreme Court in Shri Anandi Mukta Sadguruf (1989) 2 SCC 691 : AIR 1989 SC 1607) (supra) and the decision in R. v. British Broadcasting Corporation, ex parte Lavelle, (1983) 1 All ER 241. If the educational institutions discharge public duty, they are amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court. In the case of Kobad Jehangir Bharda v. Farokh Sidhwa, AIR 1991 Bombay 1 (supra) the question was whether expulsion of student by the school, which is run by a public Charitable trust, can be challenged before High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Following the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Shri Anandi Mukhta Sad guru (supra) and provisions of. Secondary Schools Code, Bombay High Court answered the question in affirmative and held that act of suchinstitution can be challenged under Article 226 pf the Constitution. This case was decided on its own facts. When right to education is fundamental right covered under Article 21 of the Constitution, educational institutions under certain circumstances can be said to perform public duties, and their orders can be challenged before High Court under Article 226 of the, Constitution, unless they have been passed under a non statutory contract. In the instant case petitioner is asserting private right and Bank is private body with no public duty and the impugned order has been passed by it in exercise of non-statutory contract.

9. For the reasons given above, this writ petition is dismissed with costs. The stay order passed by the Court is discharged.

10. Petition dismissed.