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Deepee Shoe Fabrics ... v. M/S. Pallava Leather...

Madras High Court
Sep 13, 1996
Important Paras
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The above four revisions have been filed challenging the propriety and legality of the orders passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate No. II, Walajah in Crl.M.P 1882 of 1995 in C.C No. 168 of 1994; Cr.M.P No. 1883 of 1995 in C.C No. 153 of 1994 and Cr.M.P No. 1881 of 1995 in C.C No. 167 of 1994, on 16-11-1995. As consented to by the bar for the respective parties, these four revisions are heard and disposed of by pronouncing this common order as the nature of transaction and the respective parties and the factual aspects in all the four cases are identical and similar.

2. It appears from the case records that the common case among the parties is that the petitioner M/s. Deepee Shoe Fabrics Private Limited represented by its Director, Mrs. Meenakshi Natarajan had placed an order for the supply of finished leather goods from the respondent/complainant M/s. Pallava Leathers and Products represented by their Partner P. Srinivasan, Bharathi Nagar, Ranipet and accordingly goods were supplied, for the value of which, four cheques were drawn by the petitioner herein on different dates for different amounts in favour of the respondent and all got bounced subsequently when presented for encashment. This was followed by the exchange of legal notice and reply among themselves. However, the demand made by the respondent for the payment of the amounts referred to under the instruments had not been complied with. Therefore, for the offence S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, four cases above referred were filed by the respondent against the petitioner before the Court below. After the issue of process and before commencement of the trial, petitions on behalf of the petitioner was filed praying for discharge on the ground firstly that the name of the company has not been properly brought in the complaint and that secondly the Court in which the prosecution was launched has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as the drawing of the cheque in favour of the respondent, handing over the same, presentation of the same for encashment and bouncing had happened within the jurisdiction of Madras and that therefore no cause of action arises outside Madras so as to entertain the complaint in Walajah Court. The grounds raised were resisted on behalf of the complaint/respondent. Upon hearing both sides on merits, learned Magistrate has not accepted the grounds projected by and on behalf of the revision petitioner and consequently rejected the petitions for discharge by passing the impugned orders. Aggrieved, the petitioner has come forward with these revisions challenging the propriety and legality of the impugned orders as referred to supra.

3. I have heard Mr. David Thyagraj, learned counsel for the petitioner, in reiterating the same grounds raised before the Court below, however, added with the case laws by assailing the impugned orders and the contra from Mr. S.D.N Vimalanathan, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant justifying the impugned orders.

3-A. Before proceeding further, it has become relevant to advert to S. 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the procedural law relating to the second contention raised by the Bar on behalf of the petitioner. S. 178 Cr.P.C runs as follows :—

“Place of inquiry or trial — (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or

(b) Where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or

(c) Where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or

(d) Where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.”

It therefore follows that the above provisions of law provides the jurisdiction for inquiry or trial to be conducted by the Courts when it is uncertain in which or several local areas an offence was committed and the offence was committed partly in one area and partly in another and when such offence is a continuing one in more local areas than one or otherwise by the Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. The reading of the above Section would imply a wider scope for the jurisdiction of the Courts to conduct the trial or inquiry and it is enough for the said purpose, part of commission of offence should have taken place and not that the whole commission of offence should have taken place in the jurisdiction of a particular Court alone.

4. The Provisos to S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, have also become relevant to be adverted, which run as follows :—

“Provided that nothing contained in this Section shall apply unless :—

(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and

(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee, or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.

Explanation :— For the purposes of this Section “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.”

It would clearly mean from the wordings of the above Section of law that in the place where the legal notice is given to the drawer of the negotiable instrument making the demand to pay and in the event of which has not been complied with, would also give rise to a cause of action for the purpose of the existence of the debt or other liability as provided in the explanation added to the above Section.

5. If the above is the unambiguous position of law provided for conducting the trial in a Court of law for the offences under S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, having considered the factual aspects of the case from the very face of the complaint itself, particularly, in the first paragraph, the respondent/complainant happens to have a situs at Ranipet within the jurisdiction of the Walajah Court, where the finished goods were ordered and in accordance of which the said goods were despatched for the value of the consideration to be paid by the Revision Petitioner, irrespective of the fact that the drawing of the four cheques in the respective cases were made and given to the respondent at Madras and got bounced at Madras by itself, would not take away the jurisdiction or the cause of action arisen within the jurisdiction of the Walajah Court and that therefore, for the reason of bouncing of the cheques and the consequent non-payment of the value of the goods supplied, despite the bouncing of the negotiable instrument and the demand made was at Madras, learned Judicial Magistrate No. II at Walajah has got every competency to entertain the complaint and that under the circumstances, I am totally unable to persuade myself to accept the contention made so strenuously by Mr. David Thyagaraj for and on behalf of the revision petitioner.

6. The other attack dealt by the learned counsel that the company has not been added properly in the complaint and that therefore the complaint involved in all the four cases have no legal competency, may not have any force to stand for the very reasonings that the name of the Company, namely, M/s. Pallava Leathers & Products, Ranipet, has clearly been referred to in the complaint and in whose favour alone the four cheques in question were drawn by the revision petitioner and that therefore, there cannot be any infirmity or legal laches in the complaint entertained by the trial Court. On this ground also, the revision cannot be entertained.

7. Mr. S.D.N Vimalanathan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has justifiably supported the impugned order passed by the learned trial Magistrate for all the reasonings given above, and accordingly, for the same reasonings, I have no hesitation to endorse my view with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. However, if for any technicalities in the complaint pointed out by the petitioner/accused during the trial, for which, it is always open for him to do so, and it could he looked into by the trial Court and adjudicated upon it in accordance with law only in the trial. These revisions which lack in merits have become liable to be rejected.

8. In the result, for all the foregoing reasonings given above and my finding and observation, all the four revisions fail and accordingly stand dismissed. Consequently, the orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate No. II, Walajah in Crl.M.P No. 1882 of 1995 in C.C 158 of 1994; Crl.M.P No. 1883 of 1995 in C.C No. 153 of 1994; Crl.M.P No. 1884 of 1995 in C.C No. 154 of 1994; Crl.M.P No. 1881 of 1995 in C.C No. 187 of 1994 on 16-11-1995 are hereby maintained and confirmed.