A.N Varma, J.:— By means of this writ petition the petitioners have challenged the legality of certain recovery proceedings initiated by the U.P Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) against the petitioners towards recovery of a loan advanced by it to the petitioners.

2. The material facts are that the petitioners obtained a plot at Ghaziabad under a lease granted by the U.P State Industrial Corporation with a view to installing a factory for electrical goods and steel furniture. By way of financial assistance the petitioners were sanctioned by the Corporation a loan of Rs. 1,00,000/- under a written agreement as well as a mortgage deed executed by the petitioners in favour of the Corporation by way of security for the re-payment of the loan. In pursuance of this loan the petitioners received the first instalment of Rs. 28,000/- on 21-6-1974. It is not disputed that the petitioners did not re-pay the amount advanced to them in terms of re-payment programme. The Corporation thereupon served a notice of demand on the petitioners asking them to pay a sum of Rs. 37,596-46 (vide Annexure CA-1) filed with the counter-affidavit of Onkar Singh Tyagi on behalf of Collector and Tahsildar, Ghaziabad towards the payment of the principal as well as the interest accrued thereon. On the petitioners failure to comply with the notice, the Corporation sent a recovery certificate to the Collector, Ghaziabad for recovery of the aforesaid amount under the U.P Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972 as arrears of land revenue. In pursuance of the aforesaid certificate the Tahsildar took necessary steps for the auction sale of the aforesaid plot together with structures standing thereon. A sale proclamation was issued for 3rd May, 1972, a notice whereof was admittedly served on the petitioners on 26-4-1978. The auction sale was postponed from time to time and eventually it took place on 8-8-1978 on which date it was sold to the respondent No. 5 and this sale was confirmed on 14-12-1978. In pursuance of this a sale deed was duly executed in favour of the respondent No. 5 on 2-3-1979. Thereafter possession over the disputed property was also delivered to the said respondent on 6-2-1979. The assertions in the petition are that the petitioners were not informed of the postponed date of auction sale. The auction sale was held without issuance of any sale proclamation for the postponed dates. Further, the Corporation had given the petitioners to understand that it was directing postponement of the sale to enable the petitioners to clear off the outstanding dues and in spite of that assurance the Tahsildar went ahead with the auction sale. The corporation had even asked the Collector not to confirm the sale as according to it the price fetched at the auction sale was much below the value of the property, but in spite of it the sale was confirmed. It is contended by the petitioners that legally resort could not be had by the Corporation to the U.P Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act as the Corporation was confined only to the specific remedy provided under S. 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act which was a Central Act and must therefore override the U.P Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act.

3. The aforesaid allegations or contentions have been controverted by all the respondents in three separate counter-affidavits which have been filed respectively on behalf of the aforesaid Corporation, the Collector and Tahsildar as well as the private respondent No. 5, the auction purchaser.

4. Three contentions have been raised by the petitioners and these are:—

(1) The auction sale having been postponed from time to time a fresh proclamation ought to have been issued in terms of R. 285-G of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules in respect of each of the postponed dates including 8-8-1978 when the property was finally auctioned and as (according to the petitioners) fresh proclamations were not issued for the postponed dates, the sale held on 8-8-1978 must be held to be vitiated in law.

(2) The entire recovery proceedings were void ab initio as the process of recovery of the dues provided under the U.P Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972 was not available to the U.P Financial Corporation in view of Ss. 31 and 46-B of the State Financial Corporations Act.

(3) The Corporation having written to the Collector and Tahsildar not to confirm the sale, the Collector acted with manifest illegality in confirming the sale.

5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we find no merit in any of these contentions.

6. We will take up the first point first. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that R. 285-G of the U.P.Z.A and L.R Rules requires that no sale after postponement shall be made until a fresh proclamation is issued as prescribed for the original sale. It was submitted that in the present case though the sale was postponed from time to time and eventually held on 8-8-1978, fresh proclamation was not issued for the postponed dates.

7. The argument is devoid of any merit. The very premise on which this submission is founded, namely, that in the present case a fresh proclamation was not issued on 8-8-1978, is wrong. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Collector and Tahsildar, that of Sri Onkar Singh Tyagi, an official posted at the Tahsil, Ghaziabad in which it has been categorically stated that fresh notices and proclamations were duly issued for each of the postponed dates fixed for the auction sale, and, that apart from proclamation by beat of drum effected on 25-7-1978 for 8-8-1978, notices were also posted for that date over a conspicuous part of the court house of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ghaziabad. Besides, notices were also pasted on the premises in dispute. These assertions find full support from the affidavit which has been filed on behalf of the auction purchaser in which it has been categorically stated that the auction sale was duly notified through beat of drum and other modes prescribed by law, including the pasting of notices on a conspicuous part of the court house as well as on the premises in dispute. It is further asserted that in fact it is through these notices that the auction purchaser and other bidders came to know of the auction sale fixed for 8th August, 1978. We find no reason for doubting the truth of the assertions made on behalf of the Collector and Tahsildar supported as it is by the private respondent also. Having considered the affidavits filed by the parties on this aspect of the case, we find no substance whatever in the assertion of the petitioners that the auction sale was held in breach of Rule 285-G.

8. Further, in this connection it may be noted that the petitioners had an alternative remedy by way of approach to the Commissioner under R. 285-I before whom they could have challenged the auction sale on the ground stated above, but they did not avail themselves of that specific remedy even after they are alleged to have acquired knowledge of the auction sale held on 8-8-1978. In any case, the petitioners fail even on merits as regards the alleged irregularities pointed out by them.

9. For the reasons stated above, we find no merit in the first contention.

10. We next turn to the second point urged in support of this petition. Elaborating the point, counsel submitted that S. 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act lays down a special machinery for enforcement of the claims by a Financial Corporation. Under this provision the Financial Corporation can recover dues claimed by applying to the District Judge for specific reliefs mentioned in Cls. (a) to (c) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 31. Recovery of the claim of the Corporation as arrears of land revenue not being among the prescribed modes mentioned in S. 31(1), the same could not be recovered by resort to the U.P Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972 in view of S. 46-B of the State Financial Corporations Act.

11. We are unable to accept the contention. In order to appreciate the argument the relevant provisions may be extracted here:—

“31. Special provisions for enforcement of claims by Financial Corporation.— (1) Where an industrial concern, in breach of any agreement, makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof or otherwise fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Financial Corporation or where the Financial Corporation requires an industrial concern to make immediate repayment of any loan or advance under S. 30 and the industrial concern fails to make such repayment, (then, without prejudice to the provisions of S. 29 of this Act and of S. 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882) any officer of the Financial Corporation, generally or specially authorised by the Board in this behalf, may apply to the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries of the whole or a substantial part of its business for one or more of the following reliefs, namely:—

(a) for an order for the sale of the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the (Financial Corporation) as security for the loan or advance; or

(b) for transferring the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation, or

(c) for an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery or plant or equipment from the premises of the industrial concern without the permission of the Board, where such removal is apprehended.”

12. Section 46-B of the said Act reads thus:—

“46-B. Effect of Act on other laws. The provisions of this Act and of any rules or orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in the memorandum or articles of association of an industrial concern or in any other instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act, but save as aforesaid, the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being applicable to an industrial concern.”.

13. We are clearly of the opinion that neither of these two provisions lends any support to the petitioners' submission. Section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act lays down a special provision for enforcement of the claims by Financial Corporations. It enables the Corporation to enforce its claim through a special mode of recovery prescribed thereunder. It, however, does not, directly or by necessary implication, imply that the Financial Corporation is debarred from taking recourse to any other process which may be conferred upon it or be available to it elsewhere by force of other laws of the land. In our considered view the remedy provided under S. 31 is not in derogation of any other mode of recovery which is available to the Financial Corporation under any other law for enforcement of its claims. The remedy under S. 31 is not, in our opinion, the sole or exclusive remedy available to the Financial Corporations. It is only an additional remedy which has been conferred upon the Financial Corporations. This has been made explicit by the latter part of S. 46-B which says that the State Financial Corporations Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of any other law for the time being applicable to an industrial concern.

14. Learned counsel, however, laid particular stress on the first part of S. 46-B which provides that the provisions of the State Financial Corporation Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent there with contained in any other law for the time being in force. Counsel submitted that the process of recovery provided under the U.P Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972 is much harsher than that provided under S. 31 and therefore it must be held that the former is inconsistent with the latter.

15. We find no merit in the contention. As already observed, the remedy provided under the U.P Act is an additional remedy. As noticed above, from the latter part of S. 46-B the legislative intent seems obvious, namely that the Corporation shall not be denied recourse to any other mode of recovery which may be conferred upon it or be available to it under any other enactment. Section 46-B expressly says that the Act is not in derogation of any other law for the time being applicable to an industrial concern. The Corporation was hence fully empowered to enforce its claim through the process enacted in the U.P Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act.

16. Further, in the case of Director of Industries, U.P v. Deep Chand Agarwal, reported in (1980) 2 SCC 332 : AIR 1980 SC 801 : (1980 All LJ 354), while upholding the constitutionality of the U.P Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act (Act 25 of 1965) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the said Act was passed with the object of providing a speedier remedy to the State Government and other Corporations mentioned therein such as U.P Financial Corporation for recovery of public dues. The Supreme Court ruled that in view of the fact that advances of loans were made by these financial institutions to assist the people in establishing industries in the State or for the development of agriculture etc. no constitutional impropriety or illegality was involved in enabling the State Government and other State Corporations to recover their dues expeditiously through the machinery provided by the said Act so that fresh advances could be made by these financial institutions to others who had not yet received the same Their Lordships upheld the validity of the Act in spite of the fact that it provided that the various modes of recovery prescribed thereunder were without prejudice to any other mode of recovery available to the State Government or Corporations to recover their dues under any other law. The ratio of that decision was that having regard to the vital role which these financial institutions were playing in the economic growth of the country, it is perfectly legitimate and in public interest to arm them with an additional remedy for recovery of their dues expeditiously.

17. The aforesaid pronouncement of the Supreme Court further supports the view which we are inclined to take, namely, that the remedy provided in the U.P Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act is not inconsistent with S. 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act. We, therefore, find no merit in the second contention either.

18. There remains then the last argument to be considered. In this connection learned counsel invited our attention to two letters, one dt. 12-9-1978 written to the Tahsildar, Ghaziabad by the Chief Recovery Officer of the Corporation and the other dt. 24-11-1978 written by the Senior Regional Manager of the Corporation to the Collector Ghaziabad. In both these letters, it has been stated that the auction sale held on 8-8-1978 should not be confirmed as the price fetched thereat was less than both the amount for which the recovery certificate was issued as well as the value of the property. Relying on these letters, counsel submitted that the confirmation of sale despite these letters was not justified.

19. We find no merit in the above contention. In the petition, it has not been stated that the Corporation pursued the matter further. The Corporation had in spite of those letters chosen to abide by the sale which was confirmed on 14-12-78. The Corporation had a right to challenge the same before the Commissioner under R. 285-1 but it preferred not to challenge the same and to accept the amount fetched at the auction sale towards liquidation of its claim. Further, the property was sold for Rs. 24,000/-. In the sale proclamation the estimated value of the property was shown as Rs. 50,000/-. The price for which the property was actually sold cannot, in our opinion, be characterised as so grossly inadequate as to lead to the inference that the sale was not conducted according to law. In our opinion, therefore, the letters relied on by the petitioners do not take their case any further.

20. No other point was urged in support of the petition. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed but we make no orders as to costs.

21. Petition dismissed.