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Viddya Matri Mandir (Regd.) v. Rajinder Nath And Others

Allahabad High Court
Mar 27, 1991
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

These two appeals arise from judgments and orders passed by two Additional Civil Judges, Ghaziabad, in Suit No. 1010 of 1989 Viddya Matri Mandir v. Rajender Nath dated 25-8-1990 and Suit No. 1188 of 1990 Pradeep Kumar v. Satya Pal Singh dated 3-9-1990. Both suits concern the same property and were disposed of together due to commonality of issues.

In both suits, plaintiffs sought temporary injunctions restraining defendants from interfering with their peaceful possession of the disputed land. Suit No. 1010 of 1989 was filed by Vidya Matri Mandir (the Society) alleging that the land was joint family property, with defendant No. 1 holding a 1/6th share. The Society claimed to have paid for this share and constructed charitable institutions such as a Gaushala and orphanage on the land. The defendants contested the Society's title and right to sue, and the lower court rejected the injunction application.

Suit No. 1188 of 1990 was filed by Pradeep Kumar, Ashok Kumar, Vijay Kumar, and the Society against the defendants of Suit No. 1010 and an additional defendant. It alleged that co-sharers had agreed to constitute the Society and dedicated the property to it, which was then used for charitable purposes. Defendant No. 3 contested maintainability and title. The injunction application was also rejected by the lower court.

Both suits involved claims over the same property, with the Society as a central party. The appeals challenge the rejection of temporary injunctions in both suits.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs (particularly the Society) had a prima facie case and right to claim injunction restraining defendants from interfering with possession of the disputed property.
  2. Whether a co-sharer can be restrained by temporary injunction from making constructions on joint property.
  3. Whether Suit No. 1188 of 1990 was maintainable during the pendency of Suit No. 1010 of 1989.
  4. The appropriateness of consolidating multiple suits involving the same property and parties.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Society had invested significant funds in constructing charitable institutions on the land and possessed it peacefully for over twelve years, entitling it to injunction.
  • The plaint in Suit No. 735 of 1989 showed admissions by defendant Rajinder Nath that some co-sharers had sold their shares to the Society, establishing its interest in the property.
  • Even a co-sharer may be restrained from making constructions if it would cause irreversible harm before final adjudication, citing Gangubai v. Sitaram.
  • The Society's possession and user of the land indicated dedication by co-sharers, despite lack of formal documentation.
  • The lower courts failed to consider the existence of constructions and the Society's user of the land as evidence of dedication and right to injunction.
  • Suit No. 1188 of 1990 should be maintainable and the Court should grant injunction to prevent multiplicity of litigation and protect the Society's interests.

Respondent Rajinder Nath's Arguments

  • Rajinder Nath holds a 1/6th share in the property and cannot be restrained from exercising his rights as a co-sharer.
  • The Society had no right or title over the property and was unregistered, thus lacking locus standi to sue.
  • The second suit (No. 1188 of 1990) was not maintainable as similar allegations were already raised in Suit No. 1010 of 1989 where injunction was rejected.
  • Denied receiving any price for his share or relinquishing his interest in favor of the Society.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gangubai v. Sitaram Temporary injunction may restrain a co-sharer from making constructions if such actions could cause irreversible harm before final adjudication. The Court acknowledged that injunction against co-sharers making constructions is permissible based on equity, good conscience, and justice.
Chhedi Lal v. Chhotey Lal The right of co-sharers and reliefs for exclusive appropriation by one co-sharer must be considered separately; courts exercise discretion based on facts, equity, and justice. The Court emphasized discretion guided by justice and equity in granting injunctions, rejecting inflexible rules.
Raj Narain v. U.P.S.E Board Principles relating to grant of temporary injunction: plaintiff must show prima facie case, balance of convenience in his favor, and risk of irreparable loss. The Court reiterated these principles as the standard for granting injunctions in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the factual matrix and procedural history of the two suits, noting the commonality of issues and parties. It observed that the Society had constructed charitable institutions on the disputed land and had been in possession for over twelve years. Admissions in a related suit (No. 735 of 1989) established the Society's interest in the property, negating the respondent's claim of no interest.

The Court recognized established legal principles that even co-sharers may be restrained by injunction to prevent irreversible harm, guided by equity and justice. It found that the lower courts erred in not granting injunctions and not considering the constructions and user of the land as evidence of dedication and possession.

The Court also noted the multiplicity of suits and the need to consolidate to avoid repetitive litigation. It held that the injunction should be granted to protect the Society's interests and the beneficiaries of its charitable activities, as they would suffer irreparable loss otherwise.

However, the Court limited the injunction to six months with discretion for extension by the lower court. It directed the lower court to decide the maintainability of Suit No. 1188 of 1990, consider consolidation of related suits, and to appoint a commissioner to inspect the site and report on existing constructions.

Holding and Implications

The appeals are allowed. The judgments and orders of the two Additional Civil Judges rejecting the injunction applications are set aside.

The respondents are restrained from altering the status of the disputed land and from making any constructions thereon for a period of six months from the date of the order. The lower court is empowered to extend this injunction period as necessary.

The lower court is directed to decide the maintainability of Suit No. 1188 of 1990 in light of the pendency of Suit No. 1010 of 1989, allow amendments if necessary, and consider consolidating all related suits involving the same property and parties.

Both parties shall bear their own costs.

No new precedent is established; the decision primarily affects the parties by granting interim relief and directing consolidation to avoid multiplicity of litigation.

Show all summary ...

G.D Dube, J.:— The aforesaid two appeals arise from judgment and order of two Additional Civil Judges, Ghaziabad in Suit No. 1010 of 1989 Viddya Matri Mandir v. Rajender Nath, an 25-8-1990 and Suit No. 1188 of 1990 Pradeep Kumar v. Satya Pal Singh, on 3-9-1990. Both the suits are in respect of the same property. Since the matter involved in both the suits is common, we are deciding the two appeals together. The Circumstances, under which we decided to dispose of the two appeals together, will appear from the facts narrated below.

2. In both the suits, the plaintiffs had sought temporary injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in their, peaceful possession over the same property in dispute. In Suit No. 1188 of 1990, an additional prayer was made to restrain the respondents from making any constructions over the land in dispute. The lower courts rejected both the applications. Suit No. 1010 of 1989 was filed by Vidya Matri Mandir against Rajinder Nath and Satya Pal Singh on 6-11-1989. In this suit, the plaintiff-appellant had alleged that the land in dispute was a joint family property of which defendant No. 1 was a member having 1/6th share. On account of family settlement, Vidya Matri Mandir (here in after referred to as the Society) had paid the price of 1/6th share to defendant No. 1 and came into possession. The Society had constructed a Gaushala, orphanage, boundary wall, houses for residence of employees and also the Samadhi of Chaudhari Chhabil Das who had been an Honourary Magistrate for a considerably long time. It was urged that the Society did not care to get the revenue records mutated. Consequently, the name of defendant No. 1 continued in the village papers. The defendant No. 1's intention became dishonest. The price of land of Ghaziabad started escalating. Hence he made some negotiations with defendant No. 2 and had also executed some documents in his favour. The defendant No. 2 planned to make constructions over the land and collected building material near the land in dispute. Hence the suit was filed.

3. The injunction application had been moved in the above suit on the above allegations. The defendants, of suit No. 1010 of 1989 contested the matter and stated that the plaintiff Society had no right and title over the plot in dispute. In was also urged that the Society is unregistered and it has no right to file the suit. The defendant No. 1, Rajender Nath alleged that he has 1/6th share in the land in dispute and has got a right to make constructions according to his desire.

4. On hearing the parties, the learned Fifth Additional Civil Judge rejected the application on 25-8-1990 coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff Society had no prima facie case. It was also held that balance of convenience also lay in favour of defendant No. 1 and he will suffer irreparable loss if injunction was granted. As against this judgment, F.A.F.O No. 1198 of 1990 has been filed.

5. It transpires from the papers on record of two appeals that on 30th August, 1990, Suit No. 1188 of 1990 was filed by Pradeep Kumar, Ashok Kumar, Vijay Kumar as plaintiffs 1 to 3 and the aforesaid Society as plaintiff No. 4 against the two defendants of Suit No. 1010 of 1989 and one Jagpal Singh. In the suit, some more facts relating to the property in dispute were indicated. It was stated that during the years 1959 and 1961, Swatantra Kumar, Ashok Kumar, Vijay Kumar (plaintiffs), Rajender Nath (defendant) along with Prem Nath and Surendra Kumar purchased the property in dispute. Each of them had 1/6th share. About twelve years back all the co-sharers sold some portions of the land in dispute leaving 2.357 acres only in their possession. After purchase of the land, it was agreed amongst Swatantra Kumar, Ashok Kumar, Vijay Kumar and Rajinder Nath to constitute the Society (plaintiff No. 4). It was got registered on 4-5-1961 and the property in dispute was dedicated. Thereafter, the Society constructed orphanage, Gaushala etc. It has been urged in the suit that after dedication and relinquishment of their interest by the co-sharers, defendant No. 3 had no right. However, in order to exploit and extract more money from the plaintiffs, defendant No. 3 filed suit No. 736 of 1989 in the court of Civil Judge, Ghaziabad against Swatantra Kumra, Ashok Kumar and claiming his share in the property. It was urged that defendant No. 3 with the help of defendants 1 and 2 was trying to interfere in the possession of the plaintiffs. On this allegation, a relief was claimed for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant perpetually from interfering in the possession and use and enjoyment by plaintiff No. 4 over the property in dispute. On the above allegations, an application had also been filed for temporary injunction.

6. The application for temporary injunction had been opposed by defendant No. 3. He had alleged that on similar allegations the plaintiff had filed Suit No. 1010 of 1989 and the temporary injunction application had been rejected by the court on 25-8-1990. The present suit was not maintainable. It was also urged that the plaintiff had no right and title over the property in dispute. He had denied that he had received any price of his share in the property in dispute. He had denied that he had relinquished his share in the property in dispute in favour of the Society.

7. The Second Additional Civil Judge heard and disposed of this application on 3-9-1990. He too held that the plaintiff bad no prima facie case. It was also held that the findings and the order dated 25-8-1990 in Suit No. 1010 of 1989 are still operative against the Society (plaintiff No. 4) on this ground too the Society was not entitled to any injunction.

8. The respondent has been served. All the material documents are on record. Hence with the consent of the parties counsel, we are disposing of these two appeals at the very admission stage. From the facts narrated above, it is apparent that the facts in Suit No. 1188 of 1990 are the same as contained in Suit No. 1010 of 1989. Only the facts contained in Suit No. 1010 of 1989 have been paraphrased and a bit detailed. The crux of the matter in both the suits is the same. The Society is the main beneficiary. In both the suits, the relief has been sought to restrain the respondents from interfering in the peaceful possession of the Society over the land in dispute.

9. It has been argued by learned counsel for the appellant that the Society has spent lot of money over the constructions of orphanage, Gaushala and other constructions standing over land in dispute. Since this possession of the society is for more than twelve years, then on the basis of this possession alone the plaintiffs were entitled to injunction. Our attention was drawn to the plaint of Suit No. 735 of 1989 which is Annexure ‘A’ to the affidavit accompanying the application under Or. 39, R. 1 and 2 and Sec. 151, C.P.C in FAFO No. 1199 of 1990; Pradeep Kumar v. Satya Pal Singh Yadav.1 This suit was filed by respondent Rajinder Nath against Swatantra Kumar, Ashok Kumar, Vijay Kumar and the Society. It was urged that in this plaint the respondent Rajinder Nath had admitted that Prem Nath and Surendra Kumar co-sharers had sold their 1/6th share each to the Society. It was urged that in this view of the matter, the Society is not unconcerned with the property. It has ample interest in the property and this itself was sufficient to indicate that the Society had a prima facie case. It was also pointed out that in Suit No. 735 of 1989 the plaintiff had obtained an injunction order against the Society. Hence it would be equitable to restrain respondent Rajinder Nath and others also from changing the status of the land or making constructions over the land in dispute.

10. In support of his contention that even a co-sharer may be restrained by temporary injunction from making constructions, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon Gangubai v. Sitaram. In this case, it was held that injunction restraining the co-sharer, from making constructions on entire land may be granted if the court feels that the situation may become irreverseable at the time of final decision, if the defendant is allowed to make constructions.

11. Our attention was also drawn to Chhedi Lal v. Chhotey Lal.2 In this case, a Full Bench of this Court had held that the question of the right of Co-sharers in respect of joint land should be kept separate and distinct from the question as to what relief should be granted to a co-sharer whose right in respect of joint land has been invaded by the other co-sharers by exclusively appropriating a land himself. It was held that each case will be decided upon its own peculiar facts and it will be left to the court to exercise its discretion upon proof of circumstances showing which side the balance of convenience lies. Thus exercising its discretion the court will be guided by consideration of justice, equiry or good conscience. It was also held that it was not possible for the court to lay down an inflexible rule as to the circumstances in which the relief for demolition and injunction should be granted or refused.

12. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that even though there is no documentary evidence to indicate the dedication of the share of respondent Rajinder Nath to the Society for its charitable purpose, but the way in which the Society had been dealing with the property is indicative of the fact that actually all the co-sharers had dedicated their property to the Society and as now the sircumstances have changed when the prices of land have escalated, respondent Rajinder Nath is now somer saulting and denying his very act of dedication of the property. It was urged that keeping in view the above circumstances it is just and equitable to restrain respondent Rajinder Nath from interfering in the possession of the Society over the land in dispute.

13. Learned counsel for respondent Rajinder Nath urged that Rajinder Nath has admittedly 1/6th share in the land in dispute. In these circumstances, respondent Rajinder Nath cannot be restrained from exercising his right as a co-sharer over the property in dispute. Our attention was drawn to Raj Narain v. U.P.S.E Board.3 In this case, the principles relating to grant of temporary injunction were enuntiated by this Court.

14. It is now a well-settled principle that in order to get an injunction the plaintiff will have to show that he has a prima facie case, the balance of convenience lies in his favour and he will suffer irreparable loss. It is also established by several pronouncements of various Courts that in suitable cases even a co-sharer may be restrained from making construction over joint property if he is doing so to the detriment of the interest of the other co-sharers. It is also established that while doing so the Courts will be guided by the principles of equity, good conscience and consideration of justice.

15. Learned counsel for the appellants was asked to indicate as to how the second suit was maintainable Learned counsel for the appellants urged that this matter ought to be decided by the lower court and it would not be appropriate for this Court to express any opinion on the said matter. Learned counsel for the appellants urged that at least an injunction may be granted in the first case. The lower court ought to have examined the matter whether any construction of the Society existed or exists on the land in dispute. If the parties were treating the land in dispute as dedicated to the Society, then execution of any formal document conveying the property to the Society is not an essential factor. Actually, the existence of construction and the user by the Society of the land in dispute would indicate the intention of the co-shares. It was urged that the two Civil Judges have not considered the case of the plaintiff-appellants from the above angle.

16. It is unfortunate that the court below had not cared to consolidate Suit Nos. 735 of 1989, 1010 of 1989 and 1188 of 1990 when all the three suits are in respect of the same property and most of the parties are common. The Society is either a plaintiff or defendant in all the above suits. A question will arise in this case whether during pendency of Suit No. 1010 of 1989 second Suit No. 1188 of 1990 was maintainable. In Suit No. 735 of 1989, Rajinder Nath had admitted in paragraph 2 of his plaint that Prem Nath and Surendra Kumar had sold out their 1/6th share in favour of defendant No. 4 (in Suit No. 735 of 1989) the Society. Rajinder Nath admits that the Society is a co-sharer in the property in dispute. From Annexure “A” to injunction application in F.A.F.O No. 1199 of 1990, it transpires that the suit was filed on 15-9-1989. It is, therefore, not open to respondent Rajinder Nath to plead that the Society has no interest what so ever in the property in dispute. The Vth Additional Civil Judge has noticed that Samadhi, Gaushala and tube-well etc. exists as reported by the Commissioner. Thus, on a perusal of the pleadings of respondent Rajinder Nath in his own suit, and the report of Commissioner it is amply clear that the Society has prima facie some interest in the property in dispute. Hence, in the circumstances of the case, when Rajinder Nath is himself seeking perpetual injunction against the Society and three others and has also obtained a temporary injunction against the Society and others it is expedient in the interest of justice and to safeguard the interest of the Society, it would be appropriate to restrain respondent Rajinder Nath and others from changing the status of the land in dispute, as it exists and making any construction over the land in dispute.

17. It is noteworthy that even though the Second Additional Civil Judge had noticed that the order passed by the Fifth Additional Civil Judge in Suit No. 1010 of 1989 will operate as res judicata against the appellants, yet he has not proceeded to decide whether Suit No. 1188 of 1990 was actually maintainable. However, the two Civil Judges ought to have directed the respondent to maintain status quo and refrain from making any construction over the land in dispute. In this case, the parties are indulging in multifarious litigation. Hence, in order to curb this tendency of litigations, multiplicity of suits and to avoid future litigations, we feel that suitable injunction should be issued against the respondents. In the circumstances mentioned above, we feel that it would be appropriate in this case to restrain the respondents in both the suits as indicated above. It transpires that the Society had been utilizing the property for charitable purposes like maintaining orphanage etc. Hence not only the interest of society the interest of the beneficiaries of the institutions are also involved. They would suffer irreparable loss if injunction is not granted. Hence balance of convenience obviously tilts in favour of the Society. In these circumstances, the proper discretion would be to restrain the respondents as stated above.

18. We, however, feel that this injuction should be granted only for a limited period allowing discretion to the lower court to extend it from time to time if the circumstances necessitate. However, the lower court should be directed to decide as to which of the two suits, namely, Suit Nos. 1010 of 1989 and 1188 of 1990 is maintainable.

19. In the result, both the appeals succeed and are allowed. The judgment and in the two cases are set aside. The applications for injunction are allowed. The respondents are restrained from changing the status of the land in dispute, as it exists today, from making construction over the land in dispute. This injuction shall remain operative during a period of six months from the date of this order. The lower court shall be competent to extend this period from time to time.

20. The lower court shall, however, after receipt of certified copy of this order before taking further proceedings except issuing commission as directed below and preferably within two months decide after hearing parties as to whether Suit No. 1188 of 1990 is maintainable in view of pendency of Suit No. 1010 of 1989. In case the lower court is of opinion that Suit No. 1188 of 1990 is not maintainable, it shall permit the plaintiff of Suit No. 1010 of 1989 to make adequate amendments in the plaint. The lower court shall also issue a commission at the expense of the Society to make a local inspection of the site to ascertain the present position and to report about the existence of the constructions over the land in dispute. The learned Commissioner shall also be directed to submit a site-plan on scale showing various constructions over the land in dispute and also the extent of the disputed land. The lower court may also make such direction to the Commissioner as it deems necessary in the circumstances of the case and also as prayed by either parties. After receipt of certified copy of this order, the lower court shall also consider about consolidation of Suit Nos. 735 of 1989, 1010 of 1989, 1188 of 1990 and such other suits which are pending between the parties in respect of this very property in dispute. A certified copy of this order shall also be placed before the District Judge, Ghaziabad, who shall transfer Suit Nos. 1010 of 1989, 735 of 1989 and 1188 of 1990 and such other suits which are pending between the parties to one court. After receipt of the records, the court, to which cases are transferred, shall consider about consolidation after hearing the parties. Both the parties shall bear their own costs.

21. Appeals allowed.