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Prem Prakash Gupta v. Iind Additional District Judge Allahabad
Judgment Summary — S.P. Srivastava, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners (sons and heirs of the original landlord) challenged orders of the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority which had rejected an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 seeking release of a shop (building No. 33, Thatheri Bazar, Allahabad).
Procedurally: an application for release was filed by the petitioners' father (the original landlord) asserting a bona fide and pressing need for the disputed accommodation for two partnership businesses (Dakhini Prasad Makhan Lal Agencies and Kailash Finance Company). The Prescribed Authority rejected the release application, finding the new firms possibly created to evade taxes and to oust the tenant. The landlord appealed. During the appeal the original landlord died and his sons were substituted. The Appellate Authority reversed the Prescribed Authority's finding on mala fides as to firm-formation but dismissed the appeal on the ground that, on account of the death of the original landlord, a room earlier used as a drawing room had become available to house one of the firms and, taking into account relative hardships, the tenant would suffer greater hardship if eviction were ordered. The petitioners filed this writ petition under Article 226 seeking quashing of the impugned orders and consequential relief.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Appellate Authority acted rightly in holding that the landlords' need for the shop had ceased on the death of the original landlord because a drawing room became available for use as an office.
- Whether the Appellate Authority erred in assessing comparative hardships and in concluding that the tenant would suffer greater hardship than the landlord if the release were granted.
- Whether the impugned orders of the Prescribed Authority and Appellate Authority should be quashed and whether the High Court should direct the authorities to proceed from the stage of Section 21(5) of the U.P. Act, subject to conditions (including deposit of two years' rent at Rs. 150 per month) as relief under Article 226.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' (landlord) Arguments
- Having accepted the landlords' bona fide need for separate rooms for the two new firms, the Appellate Authority acted with manifest illegality in later treating a drawing room as an available office room after the original landlord's death; a drawing room, given the landlords' status and joint-family occupancy, could not be compulsorily converted to business use.
- Section 21 of the U.P. Act and specifically sub-clause (ii) of the third proviso demonstrate a legislative policy against converting residential accommodation to business use; therefore the Appellate Authority's reasoning allowing conversion of a drawing room into office space was contrary to the Act's object.
- The Appellate Authority wrongly evaluated comparative hardships: the mere fact that the tenant lacked an alternative is no ground to withhold release when the landlords' bona fide need had been established, and on the appellate authority's own findings there was no justification to refuse release.
Respondent's (tenant/heirs of deceased tenant) Arguments
- The findings recorded by the Appellate Authority on the bona fides of requirement and on relative hardships were findings of fact reached after appraisal of evidence; being factual findings they should not be disturbed by the High Court in writ proceedings under Article 226 when no infirmity warranting interference is shown.
- Satish Chandra Gupta (one of the landlords' sons) had acquired alternate accommodation (described as 22/30 Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Allahabad, by permission dated 3-5-78) which was sufficient to meet the claimed requirement, and that acquisition controverted the landlords' claim for release.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rajeshwari Prasad v. Fateh Bahadur Chaturvedi, 1984 (1) A.R.C. 347 | Bonafide need is the foundation of an application for eviction; hardship is a relative concept and depends on facts of each case. | The Court relied on this principle to emphasise that the landlords' bona fide need must stand as the basis for release and that hardship must be judged in context. |
| Prem Prakash Dhawan v. Special Judge (Additional District Judge), Saharanpur, 1990 (1) A.R.C. 20; 1989 (15) A.L.R. (Sum.) 134 | If a landlord is forced to conduct business in a drawing room because of shortage of space, that may establish a genuine need for separate accommodation. | The Court cited this to support the view that using a drawing room for business because of space shortage does not invalidate a landlord's genuine requirement for separate premises. |
| Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahmad Khan, (1979) 1 SCC 273 : A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 272 | The fact that a tenant will ultimately be evicted is not by itself a valid ground for refusing an eviction decree; eviction alone does not preclude the grant of relief to a landlord. | The Court invoked this precedent while considering relative hardship and to reject the proposition that the mere consequence of eviction justifies denying release. |
| N.S. Datta v. VII Additional District Judge, Allahabad, 1984 (1) A.R.C. 113 | The proviso requires regard to advantages/disadvantages of grant or refusal; each party must adduce evidence on hardship and availability of alternatives; tenant must show attempts to find alternative accommodation. | The Court used this to hold that the tenant's failure to show attempts to obtain alternative accommodation is a relevant factor against the tenant when weighing comparative hardship. |
| Dr. Munni Lal v. IV Additional District Judge, Etah, 1984 (1) A.R.C. 378 | Tenant's failure to bring evidence of efforts to obtain alternative accommodation during pendency of proceedings is a relevant circumstance when assessing comparative hardships. | The Court relied on this to reinforce that tenant inaction during pendency of proceedings counts against a claim of greater hardship. |
| Mohd. Muslim v. District Judge, Varanasi, 1978 A.R.C. 328 | The assessment of release applications requires consideration of cumulative effect of factors; no single factor is conclusive. | The Court applied this principle to evaluate the totality of facts (bona fides, availability of alternatives, tenant inaction, closure of shop) rather than resting on any solitary factor. |
| Dwarika Nath v. Income Tax Officer, 1966 A.I.R. S.C. 81 | High Courts, under Article 226, may issue directions/orders other than traditional prerogative writs; the writ jurisdiction is wide and discretionary to fashion effective relief. | The Court cited this to justify granting relief in the form of direction to proceed from Section 21(5) stage and to make the quashing order effective by issuing consequential directions. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The following exposition sets out the Court's step-by-step legal analysis as recorded in the opinion.
- The Prescribed Authority initially held that the new partnership firms were recently formed and possibly created to evade taxes and to obtain a ground for eviction; it also found the Kailash Finance Company's business could be conducted from the back portion of house No. 33 and hence the landlords' need was not genuine.
- The Appellate Authority revisited the question of mala fide formation of the firms and reversed the Prescribed Authority's finding, holding that the new firms were not constituted with malafide intention and that the landlord had a right to seek release for them.
- Despite accepting the bona fide requirement for separate rooms for the two firms, the Appellate Authority proceeded on the assumption that, during pendency of the appeal and after the landlord's death, a ground-floor room formerly used as a drawing room had become available and could satisfy one firm's need; accordingly it concluded no pressing need for release remained. The Appellate Authority also concluded that, given the availability of that room, the tenant would suffer greater hardship if eviction were ordered.
- The High Court scrutinised the Appellate Authority's inference that the drawing-room requirement ceased with the death of the father. The Court found this inference to be conjectural, perverse and unsupported by evidence: there was no record basis to conclude that the joint family ceased using the drawing room after the father's death or that any other room became available for family use.
- The Court emphasised the purpose and policy of Section 21 (and its provisos) — designed to protect landlords' rights to obtain release where genuinely required, while also preventing reduction of residential accommodation by arbitrary conversions — and held that the Appellate Authority misapplied the Act by compelling a conversion of residential drawing-room use to business use against the landlords' entitlement.
- On comparative hardship, the Court noted evidence (a commission report dated 11-12-91) that the disputed shop remained closed and no visible business activity existed. The Court observed that the tenant had not adduced evidence of attempts to find alternative accommodation or to secure allotment of other premises; the acquisition by Satish Chandra Gupta of alternate premises was not shown to be available to the landlords for satisfying their claimed need.
- Relying on cited authorities and the scheme of the Act and Rules (including Rules 7, 13, 15), the Court held that the tenant's inaction in searching for alternatives during the pendency of proceedings is a material circumstance that can outweigh the tenant's claim of greater hardship where the landlord's bona fide need is established.
- Considering the totality of relevant factors — the Appellate Authority's own finding of bona fide need during the original application, the lack of evidence that the drawing room became available after the landlord's death, the tenant's failure to show alternative accommodation or efforts to obtain it, and the closure of the shop — the Court concluded that the Appellate Authority erred in dismissing the appeal.
- Exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and guided by the principle that relief should be effective, the Court determined it was appropriate not only to quash the impugned orders but also to direct the respondents to proceed from Section 21(5) stage, subject to a condition that the petitioners deposit two years' rent at Rs. 150 per month before the Prescribed Authority for payment to the tenants as compensation.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
DISPOSED OF — The writ petition is allowed; the impugned orders dated 30-7-79 and 26-8-81 are quashed.
Consequential directions and conditions:
- The Court directed that this order shall be sufficient authority to deem the building in question released in favour of the landlords as contemplated under Section 21(5) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972.
- The Prescribed Authority and respondent authorities are to proceed further from the stage of Section 21(5) in accordance with law, provided the petitioners deposit two years' rent payable for the accommodation in dispute calculated at the rate of Rs. 150 per month before the Prescribed Authority for payment to the tenants as compensation under the second proviso to Section 21.
- Any rent due up to the date of making the aforesaid deposit shall be adjustable against the amount of compensation specified.
- There shall be no order as to costs.
Implications:
The direct effect on the parties is that the petitioners are to be treated as having the building released in their favour subject to the deposit condition; the Prescribed Authority must continue proceedings from the Section 21(5) stage. The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond applying established authorities and statutory provisions; it addresses the concrete dispute and provides consequential relief in the exercise of Article 226 jurisdiction.
S.P Srivastava, J.:— Being aggrieved by the order passed by the appellate authority dismissing the appeal against the order passed by the Prescribed Authority rejecting the proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction), Act, 1972 (U.P Act No. 13 of 1972) initiated by the father of the present petitioners praying for the release of the shop in building No. 33. Thatheri Bazar, Allahabad which had been rejected, the present petitioners have approached this Court seeking the quashing of the aforesaid orders.
2. The facts, shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of the present case are that an application praying for the release of the accommodation in dispute which was being utilised for business purposes by the tenant-respondent No. 3, since deceased, was filed by the father of the present petitioners asserting that the accommodation in dispute was required for the business purpose of Dakhini Prasad Makhan Lal Agencies and Kailash Finance Company which were partnership business in which one or the other son and one or the other lady of the family of the original applicant were partners. It was asserted that the aforesaid two partnership business were being run for the time being from a room in the inter or residential portion of house No. 33. Thatheri Bazar, Allahabed and to lack of space it was not possible to open show display and reatail show-room of the above concerns. It was also asserted that Kailash Finance Company required an office-cum-visitors room and on account of lack of accommodation the business of the aforesaid two concerns was badly hampered and causing irreparable loss. The landlord had asserted that the need for the accommodation in dispute was genuine, bona fide and pressing. It was also asserted that the tenant had a suitable alternative accommodation in the same vicinity where the building in question was situate and could shift his business without any difficulty. The landlord further asserted that the hardship likely to be suffered by the tenant in the event of the grant of the release application would be much less as compared to the hardship likely to be suffered by the landlord in the event of the rejection of the application. The release application mentioned above was contested by the tenant respondent on various grounds denying the allegations made by the landlord and asserting that a new firms for whom the accommodation in dispute was sought to be released had been formed with a view to oust the tenant from the building in dispute in a malafide manner. It was asserted that the alleged requirement for satisfying was not at all bonafide or genuine. It was also asserted that the tenant was bound to suffer greater hardship in the event of the grant of the released as compared to the hardship likely to be suffered by the landlord in the event of the rejection of the release application. The Prescribed Authority after considering the evidence and materials on record came to the conclusion that the formation of the new partnership firms which were hardly one year old at the time of the presentation of the release application, indicated the possibility of the firms being created only to save Income-tax and Sales-tax and making out a ground for eviction of the tenant from the disputed shop could not be ruled out. It also came to the conclusion that there was no need for creating another firm in the name and style of Dakhini Prasad Makhan Lal Agencies doing the same type of business which was being carried on by the father of present petitioners in the name of style of Dakhini Prasad Makhan Lal Agencies. So far as the business run in the name and style of Kailash Finanace Company was concerned, the Prescribed Authority was of the view that it could easily be run from the back portion of house No. 33. Thatberi Bazar and no shop was required for doing this business. Accordingly the Prescribed Authority held that the need set up by the landlord for the release of the accommodation did not appear to be genuine.
3. The Prescribed Authority, while considering the question relating to the relative hardships observed that whereas the landlord was not likely to suffer any hardship in the circumstances indicated above, the tenant was likely to suffer great hardship if he was asked to vacate the shop in dispute as he had no other suitable alternative accommodation where he could shift his utensils business.
4. Thus, coming to the conclusion that the need of the landlord was not genuine and greater hardship was likely to be caused to the tenant if the application was allowed the release application filed by the landlord was rejected.
5. Feeling aggrieved by the rejection of release application in appeal was filed challenging the same. During the pendency of the appeal, Sri Anant Behari Lal Gupta, the original landlord expired and the names of his three sons Prem Prakash Gupta, Satish Chandra Gupta and Vijay Prakash Gupta were substituted in his place.
6. The appellate authority noticed that the original applicant and his sons and their wives were jointly residing in upper portion of house No. 33, Thatheri Bazar, Allahabad and he bad two room on the ground floor in his occupation which were being used as a drawing room and for the purpose of the office of the new businesses under the names and style of Kailash Finance Company and Dakhini Prasad Makhan Lal Agencies. It was also noticed that these two partnership firms had been constituted with one of his sons and ladies of the family as partners therein, in the year 1975 and had been registered under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act as also under the provisions of the the Income-Tax Act and the Sales-Tax Act. He also noticed that the nature of the financing business of Kilash Finance Company required an office room and for receiving and supplying order of paint items, Dakhini Prasad Makhan Lal Agencies also required an office room. However, the original landlord has located these new partnership business in his own accommodation consisting of one room in the ground floor of the same house whereas the other room on the ground floor was being used for his drawing room.
7. The appellate authority after carefully considering the evidence and circumstances brought on record reversed the finding recorded by the prescribed authority to the effect that the firms had been created only to save Income-tax and Sales-tax and also to create the ground for eviction of the tenant from the disputed shop. The Appellate Authority held that the two new firms had not been constituted with a malafide intention and the ground of release of the shop in question for the new firms could not be with held on this ground. It was clearly held by the Appellate Authority that it could not be said that the landlord had no right to get the release of the shop in question for the new firms and that the prescribed authority was not at all justified to call the new firms as ‘fake firm’ with the motive of getting the shop released.
8. However, the appellate authority proceeding on the assumption that the nature of the financing business of Kailash Finance Company and also the agency business of Dakhini Prasad Makhan Lal Agencies was such that it required only an office accommodation which the work was to be carried on through correspondence and only few customers were visiting the office of these Arms, carried at a conclusion that the second room on the ground floor was previously in occupation as drawing room of the original landlord had became available for making an office for one of the two new firms inasmuch as the need for the drawing room had ceased with the death of Sri Anant Behari Lal Gupta. The appellate authority recorded a clear cut finding that the new firms required a separate room for them but proceeding on the assumption that the room need for the purpose of drawing room had not become available for one of the firms from which it could satisfy its need, the appellate authority concluded that the requirements of the two new firms stood sufficiently fulfilled on account of the availability of the room in the ground floor of the same hourse and consequently no pressing need continued to exist for getting the shop released. Accordingly, the appellate authority on the aforesaid facts, determined that the need set up by the landlord for the release had ceased to be genuine and pressing.
9. On the question of relative hardships the appellate authority came to the conclusion that since the landlord could on account of the availability of the extra-room during the pendency of the appeal carry on the business of the new firms without any inconvenience and the business of utensils of the tenant was of a long period and further the tenant had no other suitable alternative accommodation where he could shift his business he was likely to suffer greater hardship as compared to the landlord, in the event of the grant of release taking into consideration the relevant principles envisaged under Rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Act. As a result the appeal was dismissed.
10. Being aggrieved the landlord has not approached this court for redress seeking the reversal of the orders passed by the appellate authority as well as the prescribed authority referred to hereinbefore.
11. I have heard Sri R.P Misra, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri A. Kumar, learned counsel representing the heirs of the deceased tenant-respondent. I have also carefully perused the materials on record.
12. The learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that having reversed the finding recorded by the prescribed authority on the question of bonafide need and having come to the conclusion that the requirement of the landlord for one separate room for each of the new firms was bonafide and genuine, the appellate authority acted with manifest allegality in evaluating the pendency of the appeal and on its basis erroneously negatived the claim of the landlords about the requirement for the additional accommodation for the purpose of business as not genuine proceeding on the assumption that a room which was being utilised a drawing rooms could serve the purpose of satisfying the need for the release, ignoring altogether that considering the status of the landlords a drawing room for the family was necessity and the landlords could not be compelled to dispense with the said requirement and use a portion of the residential house for a business purpose. It has further been urged that Section 21 of the U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 had been enacted for the benefit of the landlords and the underlying policy of the Act clearly appeared to be that no portion of any residential building could be released for occupation of business purpose indicating thereby that the object of the Act was not to permit any portion of the residential accommodation for being used for business purposes. Learned counsel for the petitioners in this connection referred to the provision contained in sub-clause (ii) of the third proviso to Section 21 of the Act which prohibits release of any residential building for occupation for business purposes. The contention raised is that when under the provisions of the U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 an accommodation let out for residential purpose cannot be released for occupation for business purpose the question of refusing release of an accommodation utilised for business purpose on the ground that a portion of a residential building be utilised for business purpose cannot be justified. The learned counsel emphased that from the aforesaid provision the basic policy behind the provisions contained in Section 21 of the Act clearly appeared to be that the intention was not to convert any portion of residential building so as to reduce the availability of the residential accommodation by permitting change of user of any portion of the residential building from residential purpose to commercial or non-residential purposes.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further urged that the respondent authorities have acted with manifest illegality in considering the question relating to comparative hardships. It has been urged that the mere fact that the tenant is left with no alternative accommodation can be no ground for withholding the grant of a release of an accommodation. It has further been contended that on the findings recorded by the appellate authority on the material questions of fact there could be no justification for withholding the release sought for.
14. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand has urged that the findings recorded by the appellate authority on the questions relating to the banafide requirement and relative hardships are findings which has been arrived at after appraisal of evidence on the record and being findings on questions of fact they should not be disturbed in the present proceedings specially when they do not suffer from any such infirmity which may justify interference in the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
15. It has further been contended that Satish Chandra Gupta acquired an accommodation having the seize of 20.8×6 metres in the capacity sub-tenant with the permission of the competent authority granted under the Order dated 3-5-78 which accommodation, situate at permises 22/30. Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Allahabad was more than sufficient for satisfying the alleged requirement of the landlord and the acquisition of the aforesaid accommodation unmistakebly falsified the claim for the release in question. It has been asserted that in the facts and circumstances of the case no ground has been made for any interference in the impugned orders.
16. As observed by this Court in its decision in the case Rajeshwari Prasad v. Fateh Bahadur Chaturvedi; reported in 1984 (1) A.R.C page 347, the bonafide need is the foundation of the application for eviction of the tenant without which it cannot be allowed. Hardship is relative word. In our society with divergence of economic prosperity no single test can be laid down for it. In some cases drawing room, consultation room may be necessary. In other a pretext only. What may be valid and relevant consideration in relation to one land landlord and his tenant may not be relevant for the other.
17. In its decision in the case of Prem Prakash Dhawan v. Special Judge (Additional District Judge), Saharanpur reported in 1990 (1) A.R.C page 20 : 1989 (15) A.L.R (Sum.) 134, this court bad observed that if the landlord is forced to carry on business in the landlords drawing room because of the shortage of space and he requires the accommodation for carrying on business it cannot be said that the need of such a landlord was not genuine.
18. In the present case the appellate authority had come to the conclusion that the requirement for one room for both the firm was genuine and pressing. It has, however, negatived the claim of the landlord regarding the requirement of the premises in dispute in the ground that during the pendency of the appeal the original landlord, the father of the present petitioners, had died and on his death the requirement of a room for the purpose of the drawing room had ceased and that this room could be utilised for satisfying the need. The appellate authority has recorded a finding that Anand Bihari Lal Gupta formed a joint family with his sons and that one of the rooms at the ground floor was in fact being utilised as a drawing room and could not therefore, be used as a separate office for one of the new two firms. This having been found that the room in question was in fact being utilised as a drawing room during the life time of Anand Behari Lal Gupta who formed a joint family with his sons, it is not understandable as to how the need of the family for the drawing room, specially considering their status as brought on the record got ceased. The finding that the necessity for the drawing room which was there during the life time of the father ceased to be in existence on his death is purely conjectural and is perverse. There is no evidence on the record worth the name which could lead to on inference that after the death of Anant Behari Lal Gupta his sons who continued to form a joint family had ceased to use the said room as a drawing room or that there was any other room in the building which could be utilised for the purpose. In the circumstances of the case the requirement set up by the landlord which had been found to be genuine and pressing during the life time of Anant Behari Lal Gupta could not be held to be not bonafide and not pressing on account of his death. Further the death of Anant Behari Lal Gupta could not have any such effect of making available an additional accommodation to the landlord as inferred by the appellate authority. The appellate authority has, therefore, manifestly erred in interpreting the effect of the death of Anant Behari Lal Gupta on the bana fide and pressing requirement of the landlord for the release of the shop in question and has refused to grant the benefit of his own finding on this question to the petitioners on wholly irrelevant consideration.
19. It may further be noticed that taking into consideration the policy and the object behind Section 21 of the U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 which is for the benefit of the landlord there can be no manner of doubt that the intent ion has been not to reduce the availability of the residential accommodation. Sub-clause (ii) of the third proviso to Section 21 prohibite release of any portion of residential accommodation for business purpose. This provision re-enforces the above aspect. When an accommodation in the occupation of a tenant which is being utilised for residential purpose cannot be allowed to be used for business purpose and released on this account, there can be arise any question of compelling a landlord to convert part of the residential building in his occupation for use of business purpose and refuse the grant of release on the ground that a part of the residential accommodation can be utilised for business purpose compelling thereby the reduction of residential accommodation contrary to the policy underlying the provision contained in Section 21 of the Act.
20. While considering the question relating to the relative hardship the appellate authority has observed that there was no doubt that the business of the tenant which was being carried on in the premises in dispute had get a set back and had recently been closed. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that in fact the shop in dispute is lying closed even now and no business was ever transacted during the long period which had lapsed since the order passed by the appellate authority in the year 1981 till today. In order to verify whether the shop was still lying closed as asserted, a commission was issued on 11-12-91 who inspected the premises in dispute on the same day and reported that the shop was continuing to remain closed and no visible sign of any business activity was found to exist showing any business activity by the tenant since quite some time. In the case of Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahmad Khan, reported in (1979) 1 SCC 273 : A.I.R 1979 S.C 272, the Apex Court had observed that while it was no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from a house if decree of eviction had been passed yet such an event by itself could not be a valid ground for refusing a decree for eviction. While considering the question of relative hardship the requirement of the landlord having regard to his prosession or calling or even the status have to taked into account. In the present case while the landlord bad led sufficient evidence to show that no other alternative accommodation was available, the tenant had not let any such evidence which could show that he had ever attempted to each for an alternative accommodation or ever attempted to seek allotment of any accommodation which could be utilised for shifting has business which was dwindling day by day and as observed by the appellate authority itself, had been closed during the pendency of the appeal. So far as the accommodation acquired by Satish Chandra Gupta is concerned, to which a reference has already been made above, suffice it to say that no attempt whatsoever was made by the tenant to estabilish that Satish Chandra Gupta was a partner of the firms for the purpose whereof the accommodation was sought to be release. It cannot be overlooked that an alternative accommodation to satisfy the requirement of the landlord should be one which is available to the landlord and the immediate possession whereof is secured in his favour so as to satisfy the requirement on which release ??? founded. The tenant in the present case had not let any such evidence in this regard whatsoever.
21. In the cases where there is in-action on the part of the tenant in searching for an alternative accommodation by seeking allotment or otherwise inspite of coining to know that the building in his tenancy is genuinely required by the landlord for satisfying his bonafide need, the question of relative hardships envisaged under the 4th proviso to Section 21 of the Act deserves to be considered liberally in favour of the landlord specially when the bonafide need for the grant of release sought for its established. While it is true that a proviso embraces the field which is covered by the main provision and the main part cannot be construed in such a manner so as to render a proviso redundant yet under the scheme of the act the 4th privso to Section 21 does not appear to fall within those exceptional case where this proviso may be said to be a part of the substantive provision itself. It should also not be lost sight of that a proviso cannot be permitted to defeat the basic intent expressed in the substantive provision which, as is apparent from the perusal of section 21 of the Act, is to enquire the availability of the demised premises to the landlord on his successfully establishing the bona fide requirement of the same for the envisaged in that section. It may be noticed in this connection that where the the language of the mainenactment is clear and unambiguous a priviso cannot be permitted to have any repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment so as to exclude from it by implication what clearly falls within its express terms. Failure of tenant to make attempt to find out an alternative accommodation during the pendency of the release/ejectment proceedings would certainly be a factor against the tenant's case for greater hardship.
22. The connotation of the term ‘requirement’ should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get an order of release. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which effords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds contemplated under Section 21 of the Act. The provisions contained in the Act strike a just balance between the genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and the great inconvenience and troubles of the tenants on the other Since Section 21 of the Act is meant for the benefit of the landlord, therefore it must be so construed as to advance the object behind the said provision. The tenant has to establish that if he is evicted he will suffer greator hardship as compared to the landlord and must lead clear evidence to show that inspite of the best efforte he was unable to get another alternative suitable accommodation in the absence whereof the scale of relative hardships may be titled in favour of the landlord as the inconvenience, less or trouble resulting from a denial of the order of release in fovour of the landlord will for outweigh the prejudice or the inconvenience which may likely be caused to the tenants.
23. This Court in its decision in the case of N.S Datta v. VII Additional District Judge, Allahabad, reported in 1984 (1) A.R.C Page 113 had observed that the proviso in question requires a mandatory regard being had to the advantages or dis-adventages either in the event of the application for release being allowed or otherwise but each party was required to adduce evidence to show that hardship could be caused to him by grant or refused of the release of the building under tenancy and that the tenant must also adduce evidence to the effect that other reasonable accommodation was not available to him. It was further observed that the court is entitled also to take into account the fact that the tenant has neither alleged nor proved to have made effort to have an alternative accommodation and that non-avail-ability of alternative accommodation to the tenant is not in itself an adequate ground to reject the landlord's application for release. In its decision in the case of Dr. Munni Lal v. IV Additional District Judge, Etah, reported in 1984 (1) ARC page 378, this court has clarified that the fact that nothing is brought on record indicating that the tenant had made any effort during the period of the pendency of the release application for getting some accommodation allotted in his favour or otherwise or that he had failed in his attempt is a relevant circumstances while considering the question relating comparative hardships. Taking into consideration the scheme of the Act, I am of the firm opinion that such an inaction on the part of the tenant constitutes an additional circumstances which entitles the landlord to have a preference shown to him while striking the just balance between the genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and the likely inconvenience or trouble of the tenant on the other. It may further be borne in mind that the use of the phrase ‘having regard to” as envisaged under the fourth proviso to Section 21 of the Act would clearly show that this provision was not obligatory. The factors mentioned in Rule 15 of the Rules, should, however, to be kept in mind while deciding the release application. No single factor can be held to be conclusive. As observed in its decision in the case of Mohd. Muslim v. District Judge, Varanasi, reported in 1978 A.R.C page 328 it is the cumulative effect of all that has to be seen. The in-action of the tenant to search for an alternative accommodation, as already indicated hereinbefore, constitutes an additional factar which may out-weigh the hardship if any, likely to be suffered by the tenant in the event of the grant of the release application in case where the bona fide requirement for the release stands conclusively established.
24. The application for release of the accommodation in dispute had been filed in the year 1978, the appellate authority had found that when made the requirement for the accommodation in dispute as set up initially was genuine. Bona fide and pressing. In the facts and circumstances of the case as indicated herein above, the aforesaid finding did not require to be disturbed. Further so far as the question of relative hardships is concerned, in the circumstances, indicated hereinbefore the tenants-respondents could not be deemed to suffer a greater hardship as compared to the petitioners in the event of the grant of the release sought for.
25. Rule 13 of the Rules framed under the U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 provides that every application for release of a vacant building shall as far as possible be decided within one month from the date of its presentation. Rule 15 of the Rules provides that every application for release of the building under the occupation of a tenant shall as far as possible be decided within two months from the date of its presentation. Rule 7 of the Rules which relates to appeals and revisions contemplated under Sections 18 and 22 of the Act provides that as far as possible a revision under Section 18 shall be decided within one month and appeal under Section 22 shall be decided within six months from the date of its presentation.
26. In view of what has been noticed above, it is apparent that the underlying policy of U.P Act No. 13 of 1982 is that the matter of release of an accommodation should be decided most expeditiously, so that the landlord may not suffer. While it is true that U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 is a beneficient piece of legislation and was intended for the benefit of tenants in view of the shortage of housing accommodation in the State, yet it cannot be over looked that the aforesaid Act and the rules framed thereunder take care of the interest of the landlord also and in case, sufficient ground is made out for the grant of the release of a vacant building or a building occupied by a tenant, the proceedings have to be disposed of expeditiously as far as possible within the time limit prescribed under the rules to which a reference has already been made above. The word ‘as far as possible’ as used in the aforesaid Rules signify that the time limit should be adhered to unless for cogent reasons, it is not possible to do so. Such a provision has obviously been made to protect the interest of the landlord and to ensure that in case sufficient ground has been made out, the accommodation should be made available at the earliest to satisfy the requirement of the landlord.
27. In the circumstances, I do not find it necessary to remit the case for reconsideration. The petitioner had made a prayer before this Court that apart from queshing the impugned orders, a direction may be issued to be respondents to deliver to him the vacant possession of house No. 33, Thatheri Bazar, Allahabad. The jurisdiction of the writ court is wide enough to give substantial relief to the petitioner, even though not specifically asked for in the writ petition. Article 226 of the Constitution of India confers on the High Court very wide powers, which were never possessed before and since the powers under this Article are discretionary, no limit can be placed upon discretion but of course, the discretion must be reasonable and not arbitrary. The concluding words of clause (1) of Article 226 ‘and for any other purpose’ make the jurisdiction of the High Court quite extensive. It is by now well settled that the High Courts should not feel bounded by the procedural technicalities of the English prerogative writs in the exercise of jurisdiction contemplated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has to be kept in mind that such orders should be passed, which are truely effective. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Dwarika Nath v. Income Tax Officer; reported in 1966 A.I.R, S.C 81, has clearly held that High Court can issue directions orders or writs other than the prerogative writs.
28. In the facts and circumstances indicated hereinbefore, I am clearly of the view that it is a fit case, in which not only the impugned orders dated 30-7-79 and 26-8-81 should be quashed but a direction should be issued requiring the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to proceed further from the stage of Section 21(5) of the U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 deeming the building in question to have been released as contemplated therein, subject to the condition that the petitioners deposit two years rent payable for the accommodation in dispute calculated at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month before the Prescribed Authority for payment to the tenants as compensation as envisaged under second proviso to Section 21 of the U.P Act No. 13 of 1972. In view of the conclusions indicated hereinbefore, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders dated 30-7-79 and 26-8-81 are quashed. It is further directed that this order shall be sufficient authority for deeming the building in question, released in favour of the landlord, as contemplated under Section 21(5) of the U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 and the respondent authority shall proceed further from that stage in accordance with law provided the petitioners deposit two years rent payable for the accommodation in dispute calculated at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month before the Prescribed Authority for payment to the tenant as compensation. Any amount of rent due in respect of the building in question upto the date of making the aforesaid deposit, shall, however, be adjustable as against the amount of compensation indicated above.
29. There shall be no order as to costs.
30. Petition allowed.
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