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Mst. Bui v. Gurdip Singh

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Feb 18, 1976
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Judgment Summary: Muni Lal Verma, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (Shrimati Bui, now appellant) sued for joint possession of 87 Kanals 4 Marlas of land, claiming a one-half share as widow and successor of her deceased husband Harnam Singh. At trial she succeeded and was awarded one-half share and joint possession. Gurdit Singh (defendant/respondent) appealed; the District Judge, Kapurthala allowed the appeal and non-suited the plaintiff. The plaintiff then instituted this second appeal to the High Court.

Material undisputed facts in the record: Harnam Singh and Gurdit Singh were first cousins and co-occupancy tenants in equal shares in the pre-consolidation land; Harnam Singh died on 12 July 1949. Subsequently, the occupancy rights held by Harnam Singh were mutated in favour of Gurdit Singh on 20 July 1951 on a representation that Harnam Singh had died without a widow, and by reason of a change in law, occupancy rights matured into ownership and a mutation recording ownership in lieu of occupancy rights was sanctioned (record indicates sanction on 24 October 1951). The land in dispute is the post-consolidation parcel deriving from that pre-consolidation holding.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit is within time (i.e., whether respondent's possession amounted to adverse possession barring the suit)?
  2. Whether Harnam Singh (deceased) was owner to the extent of ½ share in the suit land?
  3. Whether Harnam Singh was merely an occupancy tenant at his death, and the legal effect of that status?
  4. Whether the plaintiff (Shrimati Bui) had remarried after Harnam Singh's death and, if so, what effect that had on succession?
  5. Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction in the matter?
  6. Whether the impugned mutation(s) were void and ineffective against the plaintiff?
  7. Relief sought and entitlement to one-half share and joint possession.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Shrimati Bui) Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Y.P. Gandhi)

  • Gurdit Singh's possession both before and after Harnam Singh's death was as co-occupancy tenant (on behalf of himself and Harnam Singh), and therefore his continued possession after Harnam's death could not be treated as adverse to the appellant who succeeded as widow to Harnam Singh's occupancy rights.
  • Because appellant succeeded by operation of law to Harnam Singh's occupancy rights on his death, any exclusive physical possession by Gurdit Singh must be regarded as possession by a co-owner and not hostile possession sufficient to prove adverse possession.

Respondent's (Gurdit Singh) Arguments (as advanced by Mr. L.M. Suri)

  • When occupancy rights of Harnam Singh were mutated in favour of Gurdit Singh on 20 July 1951 (and ownership mutation sanctioned on 24 October 1951), Gurdit Singh's possession became adverse to other claimants from the date of Harnam Singh's death (12 July 1949) or at least from the dates of the respective mutations; on that basis twelve years elapsed and his possession matured into ownership prior to the suit (the lower Appellate Court treated 29 December 1967—the date the suit was instituted—as the date ownership matured).
  • The mutations and subsequent acts showed an adverse state of affairs sufficiently public and continuous to constitute adverse possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sada Nand Saraswati v. Shiv Nath (1964 66 P.L.R. 104) Principle stated: "inheritance never remains in abeyance." (Relied on by the lower Appellate Court.) The Court observed the rule but held the facts of Sada Nand were totally different and that the decision did not assist the respondent in relation to possession by a co-owner; the precedent did not address the question whether a co-owner's possession is adverse to another co-owner.
Thakur Nirman Singh v. Thakur Lal Rudra Partab Narain Singh (AIR 1926 P.C. 1100) Mutation proceedings are not judicial proceedings determining title; orders in mutation are not evidence of proprietary title or sole legal heirship. The Court relied on observations in this case to hold that mutation sanctioned in revenue records (Exhibits D.1 and D.2) cannot by themselves establish adverse possession or sole title against a co-owner.
P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy (AIR 1957 S.C. 314) Supports the proposition that possession by a co-owner is possession on behalf of all co-owners. Cited as authoritative support for the general legal proposition that a co-owner's possession cannot be treated as adverse without evidence of ouster or equivalent conduct.
Sabura Ammal v. Ali Mohamed Nachiar (AIR 1970 Mad. 411) Supports the proposition that possession of a co-owner is possession of all co-owners. Referred to as supporting authority for the same co-ownership possession principle.
Dipnarain Rai v. Pundeo Ral (AIR 1947 Pat. 99) Supports the proposition concerning co-owner possession and adverse possession requirements. Referred to as supporting authority for the co-ownership possession rule.
Prem Singh v. Milan Tej Singh (AIR 1950 East Punj. 252) Supports the general principle that possession by a co-owner is on behalf of all co-owners. Cited as one of the judgments supporting the proposition relied upon by the Court.
Ramlakhan Singh v. Bhaia Chathu Sahi (AIR 1929 Pat. 621) Decision involved landlord-tenant dispute; therefore the co-owner possession doctrine was not applied in that case. The Court explained Ramlakhan Singh does not contradict the co-owner possession rule because the facts concerned landlord and tenant, not co-owners.
Venkatachalam Chettiar v. Annapurni Ammal (AIR 1928 Mad. 652) On facts it held there was ouster and hostile title—possession amounted to adverse possession where disclaimer/acts were within knowledge of the other party. The Court observed that Venkatachalam turned on its facts (there was an open disclaimer and knowledge); it therefore does not lay down a rule inconsistent with the co-owner possession principle.
Sardar Amar Singh v. Sardarni Shiv Patt Kaur (AIR 1937 Lah. 890) Observations by the learned Single Judge (content not accepted subsequently). The Court noted those observations were not approved by the Division Bench in the later cited case (Kirori Mal), diminishing their precedential value for the proposition at issue.
Kirori Mal Jugal Kishore v. Mst. Man Bai wife of Seho Singh (AIR 1960 Punj. 485) Statutes of limitation must be strictly construed; secret mutations and removal of heir's name from revenue papers while the true heir lives elsewhere do not amount to an overt act or ouster. The Court relied on Kirori Mal to support the conclusion that secret mutation without notice does not constitute ouster and cannot be treated as an overt act giving rise to adverse possession against an absent co-owner.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying several undisputed facts: Harnam Singh and Gurdit Singh were equal co-occupancy tenants; Harnam Singh died on 12 July 1949; subsequent mutations were recorded in favour of Gurdit Singh (one on 20 July 1951 and an ownership mutation on 24 October 1951). The trial Court had found in favour of the plaintiff on key issues (including limitation/adverse possession), while the lower Appellate Court reversed on the limitation point, treating respondent's possession as adverse from the date of Harnam Singh's death and concluding title had matured before the suit.

The High Court addressed two central legal strands in its analysis:

  1. Effect and evidentiary value of revenue mutations: Relying on Thakur Nirman Singh, the Court held that mutation proceedings are fiscal, not judicial, and do not determine proprietary title. Orders in mutation do not establish sole legal heirship or exclusive proprietary title. The Court noted the mutations here were recorded on the misrepresentation that Harnam Singh died without a widow and that the mutation-records were obtained without notice to the appellant. One mutation (Exhibit D.1) even erroneously recorded ownership in the name of a person who had died earlier, demonstrating carelessness and undermining the probative value of the revenue entries. Consequently, the mere presence of mutations in revenue records could not sustain a plea of adverse possession against a co-owner.
  2. Principles governing possession by co-owners and the nature of adverse possession: The Court reiterated the settled legal proposition that a co-owner's possession is possession on behalf of all co-owners. Possession referable to lawful title is not hostile; therefore a co-owner in exclusive physical possession must prove an ouster or equivalent conduct—an open, unequivocal denial of the other co-owner's title—before asserting adverse possession. The Court surveyed authorities supporting this proposition (including P. Lakshmi Reddy and others) and explained why other cited authorities (Ramlakhan Singh and Venkatachalam) do not contradict the rule because those cases turned on their distinct facts (landlord-tenant relationship in one; clear ouster and knowledge in the other).

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found no evidence of ouster of the appellant by the respondent. The appellant had succeeded to Harnam Singh's occupancy rights by operation of law upon his death and therefore, by operation of law, became co-occupancy tenant and later co-owner when occupancy rights matured into ownership. The respondent's physical possession was consistent with joint title. Secret mutations recorded without notice to the appellant and obtained by misrepresentation could not be treated as overt acts of ouster. The lower Appellate Court's reliance on Sada Nand Saraswati and its conclusion that possession was adverse for the requisite period was rejected because that authority did not address co-owner possession and the factual matrix differed.

On these grounds the High Court concluded the lower Appellate Court erred in reversing the trial Court on the limitation/adverse possession issue; the trial Court's finding that the respondent failed to prove adverse possession was restored.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court are set aside and the decree of the trial Court is restored. The trial Court's findings that the respondent failed to prove adverse possession and that the appellant was entitled to one-half share and joint possession were revived. The Court ordered that the parties shall bear their own costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The appellant's decree for joint possession and declaration of a one-half share in the land (as found by the trial Court) stands restored; the respondent's claim of ownership by adverse possession was rejected.
  • On precedent and broader law: The decision reinforces the established principle that possession by a co-owner is possession on behalf of all co-owners and that mutation entries in revenue records, particularly those obtained without notice or by misrepresentation, do not by themselves prove adverse possession or exclusive proprietary title. The Court did not purport to lay down a novel legal doctrine beyond applying these established principles to the facts; no new overarching precedent was announced beyond the application of existing law to the facts before the Court.
Show all summary ...

Muni Lal Verma, J.:— Shrimati Bui (now the appellant) instituted suit for joint possession of land measuring 87 Kanals 4 Marlas described in the heading of the plaint (hereinafter called the land) claiming one-half share therein with the allegations that her husband-Harnam Singh, and Gurdit Singh were joint owners and after the death of Harnam Singh she had succeeded to one-half share in the land. She succeeded in the suit. Gurdit Singh carried appeal which was allowed by the District Judge, Kapurthala and she was non-suited. Hence, she came to this Court in second appeal.

2. The material facts essential for the decision of the controversy between the parties, are that Harnam Singh was the first cousin of Gurdit Singh that they held occupancy rights in equal shades in the pre-consolidation land, that he (Harnam Singh) had died on July 12, 1949. Gurdit Singh got the occupancy rights held by Harnam Singh in the land mutated in his favour on July 20, 1951 representing that he (Harnam Singh) had died without a widow. The said occupancy rights had matured into ownership on account of change in law and a mutation to that effect was sanctioned in favour of Harnam Singh on October 24, ???. The land is the post-consolidation one of the aforesaid land.

3. Shrimati Bui claimed that she was the widow of Harnam Singh and after his death she had been living in another village with her married daughter Taking advantage of her absence from the village, Gurdit Singh misrepresented to the Revenue Authorities that be (Harnam Singh) had died windowless and thereby succeeded in getting the land mutated in his favour. As such, the said mutation was ineffective against her rights. According to her, Gurdit Singh had been previously paying her shari in the produce of the land after the death of her husband-Harnam Singh, but had stopped paying the same in or about the year 1965. So, she brought the suit.

4. Gurdit Singh contested the suit. He admitted that Harnam Singh was co-occupancy tenant with him in the land in equal share but he controverted the other material allegations of Shrimati Bui and pleaded inter alia that she had contracted second marriage with another person of village Patnura in District Jullundur and had been residing with him as his wife, and according to special law of inheritance obtaining in the Erst while State of Kapurthala (the land being situate within the limits of that State) she was not entitled to succeed to the occupancy rights held by Harnam Singh, and suit was barred by time and was not congnisable by Civil Court. The suit was tried on the following issues:

1. Whether the suit is within time? OP

2. Whether Harnam Singh deceased was the owner to the extent of ½ share in the suit land? OP

3. Whether Harnarn Singh deceased was merely an occupancy tenant at the time of his death, if so to what effect? OD.

4. Whether the plaintiff has remarried after the death of Harnam Singh if so to what effect? OD

4A. Whether the civil court has no jurisdiction in this case?

4B. Whether the impugned mutation is void and ineffective against the plaintiff?

5. Relief.

5. The trial Court returned verdict on issue Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4B in the affirmative, decided issue Nos. 4 and 4A against Gurdit Singh, and granted decree for joint possession of the land to Shmt. Bui declaring her share therein as one-half. Gurjit Singh carried appeal and the first Appellate Court confirmed the findings recorded by the trial Court on all issues other than issue No. 1, and relying on Sada Nand Saraswati v. Shiv Nath . 1964 66 P.L.R 104., took the view that possession of one-half share of the land belonging to Harnam Singh by Gurdit Singh after his (Harnam Singh's) death had been adverse and the same commenced from July 12, 1949, when he died and it had matured into ownership after a lapse of twelve years and he (Gurdit Singh) had become owner of the land on December 29, 1967, when the suit was instituted. So, the first Appellate Court reversing finding of the trial Court on issue No. 1, decided the same in the negative and allowing the appeal dismissed the suit.

6. The facts, that Harnam Singh was co-occupancy tenant with Gurdit Singh in the pre-consolidation land and their shares therein were equal, that he (Harnam Singh) died on July 12, 1949, and due to change in law, the said occupancy rights had matured into ownership and the land is the post-consolidation one of the aforesaid land wherein Harnam Singh and Gurdit Singh were occupancy tenants, are not disputed. The findings recorded by the trial Court on issue Nos. 2, 3, 4, 4A and 4B and confirmed by the lower Appellate Court were not contested, and I too do not find any defect therein. The plea raised by Gurdit Singh in the written statement that according to special law of inheritance prevailing in the Erstwhile State of Kapurthala, the appellant was not entitled to succeed to the occupancy rights held by Harnam Singh, was too not pressed, for the obvious reason that the law obtaining in the Erstwhile Kapurthala State had ceased to operate, with effect from August 20, 1948, when the said State of Kapurthala merged into Patiala and East Punjab States Union.

7. Assailing the finding recorded by the lower Appellate Court on issue No. 1, Mr. Y.P Gandhi, learned counsel for the appellant, argued that since Gurdit Singh had been in possession of the pre-consolidation land as co-occupancy tenant, his possession was on behalf of himself and on behalf of the co-occupancy tenant Harnam Singh, and his possession of the said land after the death of Harnam Singh too continued firstly as co-occupancy tenant and then as co-sharer, and since Shrimati Bui (the appellant) had succeeded to the occupancy rights held by Harnam Singh bdng his widow, his (Gurdit Singh's) possession of the land could not be reckoned as adverse to her. On the contrary, Mr. L.M Suri, learned counsel for the respondent, supporting the judgment of the lower Appellate Court, maintained that when the occupancy rights held by Harnam Singh had been mutated in Gurdit Singh's favour on July 20, 1951, his possession of the pre-consolidation land should be considered as adverse to the appellant from July 12, 1949, his possession of the land when her husband Harnam Singh, died ad the same continued to be so firstly of the pre-consolidation land and then of the land for more than twelve years and had matured into ownership before December 29, 1967 when the suit was instituted, whether the same be counted from the date of death of Harnam Singh or from July 20, 1951 when the occupancy rights held by Harnam Singh were mutated in her favour or from October 24, 1951 when the mutation respecting the grant of rights of ownership in lieu of occupancy tenants had been sanctioned. In my opinion, there is merit in the argument advanced by Mr. Gandhi and the contention raised by Mr. Suri is not well founded. Proceedings for mutation are not judicial proceeding in which title to or proprietary rights in immovable property are determined. They are much more in the nature of fiscal enquiries instituted in the interest of the State for the purpose of ascertaining which of the persons may be put into possession of land with greater confidence that the revenue for it would be paid. Orders in mutation proceedings are not evidence that the successful applicant was in possession as sole legal heir in a proprietary sense to the exclusion of the other co-owner(s) because Revenue Authorities have no jurisdiction to pronounce upon the validity of claim of ownership. Such were the observations made in Thakur Nirman Singh v. Thakur Lal Rudra Partab Narain Singh . AIR 1926 P.C 1100.. Therefore, the mere fact that mutation Exhibit D.2 recording the occupancy rights held by Harnam Singh in favour of Gurdit Singh was sanctioned on July 20, 1951, can be of no avail to the respondent and is not sufficient to sustain the plea of adverse possession. It is pertinent to note that the said mutation was recorded on a misrepresentation that Harnam Singh died without a widow and was also sanctioned on the said misrepresentation. So, it is clear that Gurdit Singh respondent was guilty of dishonesty and unfair conduct in not disclosing to the Revenue Authorities that Harnam Singh had left behind the appellant as his widow. Further, there is nothig on record to indicate and mutation (Exhibit D.2) does not disclose that any notice had ever been sent to the appellant when the occupancy rights held by Harnam Singh, were mutated in favour of the respondent. Rather the circumstance that the occupancy rights held by Harnam Singh had been mutated in favour of Gurdit Singh on a representation that (Harnam Singh) died windowless, reads consistent with the contention that no notice had been issued to her and the occupancy rights held by Harnam Singh had been mutated in favour of Gurdit Singh at her back and without her knowledge. Admittedly, Harnam Singh died on July 12, 1949. His death was within the knowledge of the Revenue Authorities, at least with effect from July 20, 1951 when mutation regarding the ??? rights held by him had been sanctioned in favour of Gurdit Singh on the ground of his (Harnam Singh's) death. Therefore, ownership rights in the land due to change in law could not be subsequently mutated in the name of Harnam Singh, but still the Revenue Authorities had sanctioned the mutation (Exhibit D.1) recording ownership rights in lieu of occupancy rights in the pre-consolidation land in favour of Harnam Sirigh on October 24, 1951, while, as indicated above, he had died long before i.e on July 12, 1949. So, the aforesaid mutation (Exhibit D.1) suffers from a patent error of mutating land in favour of a dead person and exposes the carelessness and want of interest on the part of the Revenue Authorities in recording the said mutation, and the said circumstances goes a long way to show that mutation (Exhibit D.2) might have also been recorded and sanctioned with similar negligence. Mutation (Exhibit D.1) was also sanctioned in absence of the appellant and without her knowledge. On the said state of things. I feel that it would be an error to contend, much less to conclude, that possession of the pre-consolidation land by the respondent was or could be adverse to the rights of the appellant with effect from July 20, 1951 when mutation (Exhibit D.2) was sanctioned or from October 24, 1951 when mutation (Exhibit D.1) was sanctioned.

8. There can be to quarrel with the rule laid down in Sada Nand Saraswati's case (supra) which was relied on by the lower Appellate Court, that inheritance never remains in abeyance, but the said judgement renders no assistance to the respondent. The facts of that case were totally different. That case does not deal with the proposition regarding the effect of possession of land by a co-owner which is the subject of the present controversy Under the provisions of Patiala Tenancy Act which were in force on July 12, 1949, the occupancy rights held by Harnam Singh were inherited on his death by the appellant being his widow. This proposition was conceded by the parties in the trial Court and was neither challenged in the lower Appellate Court nor before me. So, on July 12, 1949 and thereafter the appellant was a co-occupancy tenant with the respondent. When the law granted proprietary rights in lieu of occupancy rights the appellant became co-owner of the land with the respondent, her share therein being one-half and continued to be so after the sanction of mutation (Exhibit D.1). This situation prevailed by operation of law irrespective of the fact that the respondent had been in actual possession of the land and the appellant lived in another village with her married daughter. It is now well settled proposition of law that possession of a co-owner is on behalf of all the co-owners. It is based on the principle that when possession of property can be referred to lawful title it would not be considered to be adverse. The possession of one co-owner who is entitled to be in possession of the property has to be referred to be the joint title and cannot be considered adverse to the other co-owner(s) The expression ‘adverse possession’ means hostile possession i.e possession which expressly and impliedly is denial of the title of the co-owner. Since a co-owner can be in exclusive possession of whole of the property on account of the Joint title he cannot advance the plea simply on account of his exclusive possession or on the ground of non-participation in the profits of the property by the other co-owner in possession. In order to sustain a plea of adverse possession a co-owner in occupation of the property has to prove ouster of the other co-owner(s) or at least something equivalent to it. The test of ouster is that the co-owner in possession has openly and unequivocally and to the knowledge of the other co-owner(s) denied their title to the property. To put it differently, a co-owner who put forth the plea of adverse possession against the other co-owner(s) has to prove that his possession of the joint property had been inconsistent with his character as co-owner. Although the aforesaid proposition of law is so well settled that it needs no authority, yet I, am fairness to the learned counsel for the appellant, who cited, P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy . AIR 1957 S.C 314., Sabura Ammal v. Ali Mohamed Nachiar . AIR 1970 Mad. 411., Dipnarain Rai v. Pundeo Ral . AIR 1947 Pat. 99., and Prem Singh v. Mlan Tej Singh . AIR 1950 East Punj. 252., may refer to the said judgments which support the said proposition of law. The Judgments reported in Ramlakhan Singh v. Bhaia Chathu Sahi . AIR 1929 Pat. 621. and Venkatachalam Chettiar v. Annapurni Ammal . AIR 1928 Mad. 652 2., cited by Mr. Suri do not lay down a different law. The law enunciated above was not applied in Ramlakhan Singh's case (supra) because the dispute in that case was not between the co-owners but was between the landlord and tenant and it was observed that the doctrine that possession of one co-owner is possession of all co-owners would not apply to a case between the landlord and tenant. In Venkatachalam Chettiar's case supra) it was held on facts that Annapurni and her husband Munuswami had entered in possession of the house under a Cairn of title adverse to Benkatachalam and thereafter they had been dealing with the house in assertion of hostile title which was inconsistent with the right of Benkatachaiam and it was also found that the notice of the said disclaimer of his right was within the knowledge of Venkatachalam. It was on those facts that it was found that there was ouster of Venkatachalam and, as such, the finding of adverse possession was recorded in favour of Annapurni.

9. The observations made in Sardar Amar Singh v. Sardarni Shiv Patt Kaur . AIR 1937 Lah. 890. by the learned Single Judge were not approved by the Division Bench of this Court in Kirori Mal Jugal Kishore v. Mst. Man Bai wife of Seho Singh . AIR 1960 Punj. 485.. It was ruled in Kirori Mal's case (supra), that it is indisputable that statutes of limitation are to be strictly construed and unless their provisions clearly and precisely apply to a particular case no rightful owner can be deprived of his property at the instance of a wrongdoer. It is therefore obvious that secret mutation and removal of the name of heir of the true deceased owner who lives in another village from the revenue papers can by no means be construed as to amount to an over act, and will not tantamount to ouster.

10. It, thus, follows from the discussion above that the appellant and the respondent had become co-owners of the land and possession of the land by Gurdit Singh respondent was consistent with his joint title therein and on the facts of the case it could not be found, even remotely, that the appellant had been ousted and the material present on record does not warrant a finding of ouster of the appellant by him. In view of the position of law discussed above, the possession of the land by Gurdit Singh has to be reckoned as on behalf of himself and on behalf or the appellant. The mere recording of mutations (Exhibits D.1 and D.2) or the sanction of the same do not in any manner show that the appellant had teen ousted from the land. She did not have notice of the said mutations or of entries in revenue record because she was in another village. So, the approach of the lower Appellate Court was nither warranted by law nor by facts. Its conclusion that the possession of the land by Gurdit Singh had been adverse to the title of the appellant for more than twelve years is contrary to law. As such, it had erred in vacating the finding recorded by the trial Court on issue No. 1. The said reversal of the finding by the lower Appellate Court on issue No. 1 has resulted in grave injustice. So, the same cannot be maintained and I, reversing the said finding, concur with the trial Court that the respondent had tailed to prove adverse possession of the land and revive its finding on issue No. 1. As a result of that finding this appeal succeeds.

11. Consequently, I allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court and restore those of the trial Court in the peculiar circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.

12. Appeal allowed.