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Bithaldas And Others v. Chandratan
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Dave, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a first appeal by the defendants against a judgment and preliminary decree passed by the Civil Judge, Bikaner on 9-1-1953 in a suit for sale of mortgaged property. The mortgaged property is a house in Mohalla Binaniyan, Bikaner. All four appellants are brothers (sons of Madan Gopal Maheshwari). Appellants Nos. 1 and 2 are adults; the decree against them proceeded ex parte at trial. Appellants Nos. 3 and 4 are minors and were represented by a guardian-ad-litem at trial; they contested the suit and oppose the appeal.
At trial the plaintiff (respondent in this appeal) relied on two mortgage deeds concerning the same house: a first mortgage for Rs. 3,000 dated 6-3-1946 (registered 7-3-1946) executed by appellants Nos. 1 and 2 and their father (as manager of the joint family) in favour of Chhaganlal Chura; and a later mortgage dated 3-3-1948 (registered 4-3-1948) for Rs. 6,000 in favour of the plaintiff, executed by appellants Nos. 1 and 2 and Mst. Ram Pyari (mother and guardian of the minors).
The plaintiff sought sale of the mortgaged property for recovery of principal and interest (including interest pendente lite and future interest at 9% per annum). The trial Court held Ex. P-1 (the second mortgage) was executed and binding on appellants Nos. 1 and 2 and Mst. Rampyari. It held appellants Nos. 1 and 2 liable for the entire debt; as to appellants Nos. 3 and 4 (minors), the trial Court held they were liable only for Rs. 3,000 plus interest (totalling Rs. 4,325) and ordered sale of their share only to that extent.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the mortgage deed Ex. P-1 (dated 3-3-1948) was admissible in evidence in view of S. 68 of the Evidence Act (i.e., whether its execution required proof by an attesting witness and whether that requirement was met).
- Whether the persons who executed the mortgages (appellants Nos. 1 and 2, Mst. Rampyari, and the father as manager of the joint family) were authorised to mortgage the house — specifically, the extent of the authority of a father or a non-father manager to alienate or burden a minor member's share in the joint family property.
- Whether the minors (appellants Nos. 3 and 4) are responsible for the debts secured by the two mortgages, and, if so, to what extent.
- Procedural (as framed by this Court): whether new issues should be framed and the case remanded to the trial Court to decide (a) whether the first mortgage dated 6-3-1946 was executed for legal necessity or to pay antecedent debts of the father, (b) whether the second mortgage dated 3-3-1948 was executed for legal necessity or because there was pressure on the estate to pay antecedent debts, and (c) whether three-fifths share in the mortgaged property would be liable for the respondent's debt even if issues Nos. 1 and 2 go against the respondent.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The mortgage deed Ex. P-1 should not have been admitted in evidence because its execution was not proved by any attesting witness and hence it is inadmissible under S. 68 of the Evidence Act.
- Appellants Nos. 3 and 4 (the minors) are not bound by either mortgage: the first mortgage (6-3-1946) executed by their father as manager of the joint family did not show legal necessity nor payment of antecedent debts; the second mortgage (3-3-1948) executed by their mother (a non-father manager) could not bind the minors' shares unless there was legal necessity because, they contend, the privilege to burden the estate for antecedent debts belongs to the father alone.
Respondent's Arguments
- The second mortgage Ex. P-1 is admissible and its execution is established; appellants Nos. 1 and 2 are bound (the plaintiff produced a power of attorney from appellant No. 2 to appellant No. 1 showing authority to execute Ex. P-1).
- As to appellants Nos. 3 and 4, they argued that the minors were under a pious obligation to pay their father's debts (the father had mortgaged for Rs.3,000; the mother paid that debt and re-mortgaged) and that the trial Court had already absolved the minors from liability for the Rs.2,850 portion of Ex. P-1; the respondent also noted no objection on legal necessity was raised in the trial Court and, if needed, requested that fresh issues be framed and the respondent be allowed to produce evidence on these points.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 'Brij Narain Rai v. Mangla Prasad', AIR 1924 PC 50 | Five propositions concerning the authority of a managing co-parcener: (1) manager cannot alienate except for necessity; (2) father-manager may lay estate open to execution for his debt (if not immoral); (3) mortgage by father not for antecedent debt binds only his interest; (4) antecedent debt must be antecedent in fact and time; (5) the result is not affected by whether father is alive or dead. | The Court set out these propositions as the fundamental framework for assessing whether the two mortgages bound the minors' interests and examined both mortgages in light of these propositions. |
| 'Chiranji Lal v. Bankey Lal', AIR 1933 All 273 (Full Bench) | Observation that the privilege to burden family estates by mortgage to discharge an antecedent debt is the father's privilege; a non-father manager cannot bind estate merely by discharging a pre-existing family debt; where a non-father acts, it must be shown the mortgage was executed for legal necessity. | The Court considered this authority and treated its observations as fact-specific; it rejected a narrow, absolute reading urged by appellants' counsel and used the case to reason that non-father managers may bind the estate only if necessity is shown. |
| 'Ramsingh v. Sri Charan', AIR 1938 All 147 (Division Bench) | Held that an elder brother-manager who transferred shares to meet past debts could bind the family property where legal necessity existed (i.e., if debts could not be paid except by sale/mortgage); mere antecedency of father's debt did not alone justify transfer. | The Court cited this decision to support the proposition that legal necessity (pressure on estate/danger to be averted) can justify alienation by a manager who is not the father. |
| 'Lakhmi Singh v. Mahendra Singh', AIR 1949 All 501 | Held that alienation to discharge antecedent debts may also be supported on the ground of legal necessity independently of antecedency; necessity must be of a character entailing pressure on the estate to justify transfer. | The Court relied on this to explain that "necessity" must be significant (pressure, danger or benefit) and that such necessity, not mere antecedency, justifies alienation by a non-father manager. |
| 'Hunooman Pershad Pandey v. Mt. Babooee Mundraj Koonweree', 6 Moo Ind App 393 | Manager could alienate family property only "in a case of need, or for the benefit of the estate"; criteria are the actual pressure on the estate, danger to be averted, or benefit to be conferred. | Quoted in support of the "necessity" test; used to show the qualitative nature of circumstances that justify alienation. |
| 'Jagdeo Singh v. Sitla Prasad', AIR 1954 All 71 | Re-examined prior cases and held it incorrect to assert that only the father could alienate to pay antecedent debts; the key question is whether alienation was justified by pressure/necessity beyond antecedency. | The Court relied on this later authority to consolidate the view that non-father managers can bind the estate only where sufficient necessity exists. |
| 'Ambalavana Pillai v. Gowri Ammal', AIR 1936 Mad 871 | Where guardian mortgages minor's property to pay debts of minor's deceased father, if substantial portion of consideration is proved to have been properly applied, court may presume remaining funds also applied properly; once necessity shown, bona fide lender not required to see actual application. | The Court noted this case dealt with different factual questions and had limited bearing on the present dispute, but referenced it in discussing proof of application of mortgage proceeds. |
| 'Shantaya Kotraya v. Mallappa Basappa', AIR 1938 Bom 500 | Held that only those born at time of alienation could challenge it to the extent of their share at the date; case factually distinguishable from present enquiry. | The Court observed this case was not directly helpful on the legal questions before it and distinguished it on facts. |
| 'Dharamrajsingh v. Chandrashekhar Rao', AIR 1942 Nag 66 | Majority held non-father manager can alienate minor's share to satisfy father's antecedent debt provided such action is necessary — i.e., no other reasonable course open. | The Court treated this authority as consonant with its view that mere antecedency is insufficient and that a necessity/pressure test governs the non-father manager's power. |
| 'Khushi Ram v. Mehr Chand', AIR 1950 EP 272 | Where joint family consists of adults and minors, consent of adult members including manager is not by itself proof of legal necessity, though such consent may fill evidentiary gaps regarding necessity. | The Court noted this case addressed a slightly different question and therefore had limited illumination for the present determination, but it was referenced when discussing evidentiary sufficiency for necessity. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two main strands of analysis: (A) admissibility and proof of Ex. P-1 under evidence law, and (B) substantive Hindu joint-family law on the authority to alienate or burden minors' shares.
A. Admissibility and proof of Ex. P-1 (S. 68 Evidence Act)
- The Court first examined S. 68 of the Evidence Act and observed that the section applies only to documents that are required by law to be attested.
- It then considered S. 59 and S. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act: S. 59 prescribes attestation (two witnesses) for mortgages where principal is Rs.100 or upwards; S. 3 defines "attested".
- The Court noted the Transfer of Property Act was not in force in Bikaner on the date of registration of Ex. P-1 (4-3-1940 is when it became adapted), and therefore the technical attestation requirement of S. 59 did not apply in Bikaner when Ex. P-1 was registered on 4-3-1948.
- Hence, S. 68 could not be invoked to exclude Ex. P-1 solely because an attesting witness was not called, because there was no local law requiring attestation at the relevant time.
- Independently of that, the respondent had produced both attesting witnesses (P.W.4 Jetha and P.W.5 Kewalchand) who stated they had attested Ex. P-1; additionally, the scribe P.W.3 Sarafuddin and the plaintiff P.W.2 Chand Ratan expressly said Ex. P-1 was executed in their presence and the signatures/thumb impressions were made in their presence.
- The Court criticized imperfect proof procedure in Bikaner practice (witnesses sometimes not shown the document or properly questioned) and set out the proper method to prove attestation (show the document, identify signatures, ask if executant signed in witness's presence or acknowledged signature, etc.).
- On the facts, execution of Ex. P-1 was amply proved by the scribe and plaintiff witnesses; appellant No.1 did not deny his signature and the appellants did not produce Mst. Rampyari to deny her thumb impression. Therefore Ex. P-1 was admissible and proved.
B. Authority to alienate / burden joint family estate (minors' liability)
- The Court framed the central substantive question as the extent of authority of a father or a non-father manager to alienate or burden the minor members' interests in joint family property.
- It relied on the propositions from Brij Narain Rai v. Mangla Prasad (Privy Council) which limit a managing co-parcener's power to alienate to cases of necessity and set special (but limited) authority for a father — notably that a father can burden the estate by mortgage only to discharge an antecedent debt.
- The Court explained the meaning of "antecedent debt" per the Privy Council: antecedent both in fact and in time (i.e., truly independent, not part of the same transaction under challenge).
- The Court observed settled law: where debts are contracted by the father as manager for family purposes, sons are bound to extent of their interest; where debts are contracted for father's personal benefit, sons may be bound by pious obligation if not illegal/immoral — but that personal-liability route would be time-barred here (first mortgage registered 7-3-1946; suit filed 27-3-1952; more than six years elapsed), so pious-obligation principle (Privy Council proposition No.2) did not apply.
- The Court concluded that for the first mortgage (6-3-1946) the respondent had not proved either antecedent debt or legal necessity: the mortgage document did not show antecedent debts or legal necessity for the father to incur the debt; therefore the father was not shown to have been authorised to burden the estate so as to bind the minors.
- As to the second mortgage (Ex. P-1, 3-3-1948) executed by the mother, the Court considered arguments whether a non-father manager can bind minors' shares by paying antecedent debts. The Court surveyed and distinguished relevant cases (Chiranji Lal, Ramsingh, Lakhmi Singh, Jagdeo Singh, Dharamrajsingh, Khushi Ram, etc.), and distilled the correct position of law: a non-father manager may bind the estate for father's antecedent debts only where further circumstances show legal necessity — i.e., pressure on the estate, danger to be averted, or benefit to be conferred — not by antecedency alone.
- Because the respondent had not led evidence at trial on legal necessity and the appellants had not pointedly raised these precise objections at trial, the Court considered it proper to frame fresh issues about both mortgages and remit the case to the trial Court to permit both parties to lead evidence on (a) whether the first mortgage was for legal necessity or to pay antecedent debts of the father, (b) whether the second mortgage was for legal necessity or due to pressure on the estate to pay antecedent debts, and (c) whether three-fifths share would be liable even if the new issues are decided against the respondent.
Holding and Implications
The Court made the following dispositive rulings and directions:
- On admissibility of Ex. P-1: The Court held Ex. P-1 admissible and its execution proved. It rejected the contention that S. 68 Evidence Act barred admission because (a) the local law (Transfer of Property Act attestation requirement) was not in force in Bikaner when Ex. P-1 was registered and (b) the execution was in fact proved by the scribe and the plaintiff's witness and attesting witnesses were produced.
- As to appellants Nos. 1 and 2: The Court found no reason to alter the trial Court's decree against appellants Nos. 1 and 2 — their liability under Ex. P-1 stands and the decree against them is to remain unchanged (the plaintiff had also produced a power of attorney showing appellant No.2 had authorised appellant No.1 to execute Ex. P-1).
- As to appellants Nos. 3 and 4 (minors): The Court held the respondent had not proved that either mortgage was binding on the minors by showing antecedent debts or legal necessity at trial. Consequently, the Court remanded the case to the trial Court, framed three specific issues (set out below), and directed the trial Court to allow both parties to lead evidence and return its findings within six months.
- Issue No.1: Whether the first mortgage dated 6-3-1946 was executed for legal necessity or for paying off the antecedent debts of the appellants' father.
- Issue No.2: Whether the second mortgage dated 3-3-1948 was executed for some legal necessity or whether there was some sort of pressure on the joint family estate to pay off the antecedent debts of the appellants' father.
- Issue No.3: Whether three-fifths share in the mortgaged property would still be liable for the respondent's debt even though Issues Nos.1 and 2 are decided against the respondent.
Direct effect: the decree against appellants Nos. 1 and 2 is maintained; the question of the minors' liability is left open for fresh consideration after evidence at trial on the newly framed issues. The Court did not purport to establish a new legal precedent; it applied and synthesized existing authorities to state the governing test (necessity/pressure beyond mere antecedency) for when a non-father manager can bind minors' shares.
JUDGMENT
Dave, J.
1. This is a first appeal by the defendants against the judgment and preliminary decree in a suit for the Sale of mortgaged property passed by the Civil Judge, Bikaner on 9-1-1953. The property in respect of which the decree has been given is a house situated in Mohalla Binaniyan in Bikaner. The parties are also residents of Bikaner. All the four appellants are brothers being sons of one Madan Gopal Maheshwari. Appellants Nos. 1 and 2 are major and the decree against them is ex-parte. Appellants Nos. 3 and 4 are minors. The suit was contested by them in the trial Court through their guardian-ad-litem and the present appeal is also contested mainly by them.
2. The case of the plaintiff-respondent in the trial Court was that the property in dispute whose description is given in para one of the plaint, was first mortgaged by appellants Nos. 1 and 2 and their father Madan Gopal as manager of the joint family with one Chhaganlal Chura for Rs. 3,000/-on 6-3-46 and the mortgage deed was registered on the nest day i.e., 7-3-46. On 3-3-1948, appellants Nos. 1 and 2 and Mst. Ram Pyari, mother and guardian of appellants Nos. 3 and 4, executed another mortgage deed for Rs. 6,000/- in respect of the same property in favour of the plaintiff-respondent and it was registered on the next day i.e., 4-3-1948. It was stated in this document that Rs. 3,000/- for the principal and Rs. 150/- for interest, in all Rs. 3,150/- were paid to the prior mortgagee Chhaganlal Chura to redeem that mortgage and Rs. 2,850/- were borrowed by the appellants for their joint family expenses. Thus in all Rs. 6,000/- were borrowed by the appellants with interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum.
The plaintiff calculated Rs. 2,250/- for interest till the date of the suit. It was prayed by him that a decree for the sale of the mortgaged property be passed against the appellants and that if the amount is not realised from the sale of the property, a personal decree be given against the appellants. He also prayed for interest pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum. Appellants Nos. 1 and 2 did not present any written statement and therefore the suit proceeded against them ex parte as mentioned above. As regards appellants Nos. 3 and 4, it was contended on their behalf that they had no knowledge of the transactions and they were not bound by them since neither Mst. Rampyari nor anybody else had any authority to alienate their right and interest in the property. The trial Court therefore framed the following three issues:
(1) Whether defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and Mst. Rampyari were authorised to mortgage the house in dispute; whether they had executed the mortgage in the plaintiffs favour and whether it was with consideration?
(2) Whether the minor defendants are responsible and if so to what extent?
(3) What relief the plaintiff is entitled to?
3. After recording evidence of both parties the trial Court came to the conclusion that the mortgage deed Ex. P. 1 was executed by appellants Nos. 1 and 2 and Mst. Rampyari and that the previous mortgage was also executed by appellants Nos. 1 and 2 and their father Madan Gopal. It was held that appellants Nos. 1 and 2 were liable to repay the entire debt. As regards appellants Nos. 3 and 4 it was held that they were liable to repay only the debt of 3000/- which was incurred by their father together with interest amounting to 1,325/-, that is, Rs. 4325/- in all. Their share in the mortgage property was ordered to be sold only for this amount.
4. The appellants' learned advocate has raised two arguments in this Court. His first argument which is on behalf of all the appellants, is that the mortgage deed Ex. P-1 should not have been used in evidence by the trial Court; nor this Court should look into this document because its execution has not been proved by any attesting witness and therefore it is inadmissible under S. 68, Evidence Act. His next contention, which is only on behalf of appellants Nos. 3 and 4 is that they are not bound by any of the two mortgage deeds produced by the respondent.
5. As regards the first contention it would be proper to set out S. 68, Evidence Act, on which the argument is founded.
S. 68. If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence.
It would appear from the very opening words of the section that it applies only to those documents which are required by law to be attested. S. 59, Transfer of Property Act no doubt lays down that where the principal money secured is one hundred rupees or upwards, a mortgage other than a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds can be effected only by a registered instrument signed by the mortgagor and attested by at least two witnesses. In the present case the principal money secured was much more than Rs. 100/- and therefore if the Transfer of Property Act were applicable, attestation by at least two witnesses would have been absolutely necessary.
But it is conceded by the appellants' learned advocate that the Transfer of Property Act was not in force in Bikaner till 4-3-1940 when Ex. P-1 was registered. He has tried to urge that the principles of the Transfer of Property Act used to be taken into consideration by the Courts in the former state of Bikaner and for that reason he wants to urge that S. 59, Transfer of Property Act should be held to be applicable. In our opinion it is one thing to take into consideration the broad principles of law and it is a very different thing to apply the technical provisions of a certain Act. The provision relating to the attestation of documents is certainly a technical one and so long as the Transfer of Property Act was not adapted, it cannot be said that there was any law in the former state of Bikaner whereby Ex. P-1 was required to be attested. Under the circumstances S. 68, Evidence Act could not bar the admissibility to Ex. P-1 simply because one attesting witness was not called for the purpose of proving its execution.
Moreover in the present case not only one but both the attesting witnesses viz. P.W. 4 Jetha and P.W. 5 Kewalchand were produced by the respondent in the trial Court and both of them had stated that Ex. P-1 bore their signatures and that they had attested them at the request of appellant No. 1 Bithldass and Mst. Ram Pyari on behalf of appellants Nos. 3 and 4. What happened in fact was that the learned counsel for the respondent did not take care to get the execution of the document proved by these two witnesses in the manner it should have been done. We have seen in more than one case that the procedure to prove the execution of document was perhaps not properly understood by litigants or their counsel in Bikaner. It was considered enough to put a question to a witness if he had attested a particular document. In certain cases even the document was not shown to them.
We may therefore remark here that the proper procedure to follow is that the witness should not only be asked whether he had attested a particular document but the document itself should be shown to him and he should be questioned whether it bears his signature. It should be further put to him whether the executant had also signed the document in his presence or that he had admitted his signature on the document before him. If the witness says that the executant had signed the document in his presence he should also be asked to identify the signature thereon. As defined in S. 3, Transfer of Property Act "attested' in relation to an instrument, means and shall be deemed always to have meant attested by two or more witnesses each of whom has seen the executant sign or affix his mark to the instrument, or has seen some other person sign the instrument in the presence and by the direction of the executant, or has received from the executant a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark, or of the signature of such other person and each of whom has signed the instrument in the presence of the executant.
It is therefore necessary to bring out from the witness that he has attested the document in the sense referred above. In the present case although the execution of Ex. P-1 was not proved by an attesting witness in the above manner, its execution is proved by the scribe P.W. 3 Sarafuddin and the plaintiff P.W. 2 Chand Ratan. P.W. 2 Chandratan and P.W. 3 Sarafuddin have unequivocally stated that Ex. P-1 was executed in their presence and that Bithaldas and Mst. Rampyari had respectively put their signature and thumb impression in their presence. Appellant No. 1 has not dared to deny his signature on this document. Appellants Nos. 3 and 4 have also had not the courage even to produce Mst. Rampyari to deny her thumb-impression on the document. The execution of the document Ex. P-1 is amply proved and therefore the appellants' learned advocate cannot justly invoke the technical provisions of S. 68, Evidence Act to his aid simply on the ground that the attesting witness was not properly examined when there was no law in Bikaner requiring attestation of the document at all.
The plaintiff had produced power of attorney given by appellant No. 2 to appellant No 1 to show that appellant No. 1 was authorised as his, brother and general attorney to execute the document Ex. P-1 on his behalf. Appellants Nos. 1 and 2 are therefore bound by Ex. P-1 and so far as they are concerned there is not the slightest reason to make any change in the decree of the trial Court.
6. Coming to the second argument raised on behalf of appellants Nos. 3 and 4 it is urged by the appellants' learned advocate that the first mortgage deed dated 6-3-1946 was not binding on these two appellants even though it was executed by their father as manager of the joint family. It is contended that the father could alienate their interest only if there was legal necessity or if he had to pay off his antecedent debts. This document does not show that the mortgage was executed for paying off the antecedent debts. It is also not proved that there was any legal necessity on account of which the father of the appellants was justified in mortgaging their share in the property. As regards the second mortgage evidenced by Ex. P-1, it is further urged that the appellants' mother could alienate their share in the property only in case of legal necessity. She could not alienate the property even for paying off the antecedent debts of their father because such a right was restricted only to a father as manager of the joint family and a person who was not a father had no right to alienate the property for paying off antecedent debts even though he may be a manager of the joint family.
Learned advocate for the respondent on the other hand has tried to justify the preliminary decree on the ground that the appellants were under pious obligation to pay off their father's debt. Their father had mortgaged the property for Rs. 3000/-. Their mother paid off that debt and mortgage the same property with another person at the same rate of interest. It is urged that the trial Court has already absolved appellants Nos. 3 and 4 from their responsibility to pay off the further loan of Rs. 2,850/- incurred by Ex. P-1. Lastly it is urged that no objection about the absence of legal necessity either at the time of the execution of the first or the second mortgage was raised in the trial Court and therefore there was no issue on these points. It is requested by the respondent's learned advocate that in case the appellants' arguments carries weight with this Court fresh issues should be framed and the respondent should be given an opportunity to produce his evidence.
The question for determination therefore is as to what is the extent of the authority of a father or a non-father as manager of the joint family to alienate the right and interest of the minor members of the family in the joint family property. The reply to this question depends upon the interpretation of the following propositions of law which were laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of - 'Brij Narain Rai v. Mangla Prasad', AIR. 1924 PC 50 (A). They are as follows:
(1) The managing co-parcener of a Joint undivided estate cannot alienate or burden the estate qua manager except for purposes of necessity; but
(2) If he is the father and the reversioners are the sons he may, by incurring debt, so long as it is not for an immoral purpose, lay the estate open to be taken in execution proceeding upon a decree for payment of that debt.
(3) If he purports to burden the estate by mortgage, then unless that mortgage is to discharge an antecedent debt it would not bind more than his own interest.
(4) Antecedent debt means antecedent in fact as well as in time; that is to say, that the debt must be truly independent and not part of the transaction impeached.
(5) There is no rule that this result is affected by the question whether the father who contracted the debt or burdens the estate, is alive or dead.
It would be proper to examine both the mortgages separately in the light of the above observations.
7. It is settled law that where the sons (which expression includes grand sons and the great grand sons) are joint with their father and debts are contracted by the father in his capacity of manager and head of the family for family purposes, the sons as members of the joint family, are bound to pay the debts to the extent of their interest in the co-parcenary property. Similarly if the debts are contracted by the father for his own personal benefit the sons are liable to pay the debts to the extent of their interest in the Joint family property by reason of pious obligation, if such debts are not incurred for an illegal or immoral purpose. The argument of the respondent's learned advocate regarding the appellants' liability to pay their father's debt on the ground of mere pious obligation could be taken into consideration if this was a case of simple loan obtained by the appellants' father and the suit on the basis of personal obligation would have been brought within time. In the present case the date of the registration of the first mortgage deed is 7-3-46 whereas the suit was filed on 27-3-52 and since more than six years had elapsed, the suit on the ground of personal liability was clearly time-barred. Proposition No. 2 laid down by their Lordships above is therefore not applicable to the present case.
The present suit is one for the sale of mortgage property and therefore the question to be considered is whether the father of appellants Nos. 3 and 4 was authorised to alienate or burden their estate in the joint family property. It would appear from propositions Nos. 1, 3 and 4 laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council referred above, that the manager of the joint family in his capacity as such, can alienate or burden the joint undivided estate only for purposes of necessity. If such managing co-parcener happens to be the father then he is given additional authority but that also is limited, that is, if he wants to burden the estate by mortgage then he can do so only to discharge an antecedent debt. In other words, even a father cannot burden the estate by mortgage if it is not executed for discharging an antecedent debt or for the necessity of the family. Their Lordships have also made it clear that an antecedent debt means a debt which is antecedent both in fact and in time, that is, the debt must be independent of the transaction which is impeached and not a part of it.
In the present case although it has not been shown by the respondent that the debt incurred by the appellants' father was not tainted with immorality, that alone is not sufficient to hold that the father was entitled to burden the estate. It was for the respondent to prove further that either the appellants' father obtained the loan for legal necessity including family purposes or it was necessary for him to incur that debt in order to pay off his antecedent debts. The debts which were incurred by him at the time of mortgage could not be called 'antecedent' because as observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council an antecedent debt must be 'antecedent' in fact as well as in time. The document dated 6-3-46 does not show that the appellants' father Madangopal had antecedent debts or that there was some legal necessity for him to incur the debt.
8. The respondent's learned advocate says that appellants No. 3 and 4 did not raise such an objection in the trial court and that if this contention were raised in the written statement and an issue were framed on that point, he would have led evidence to show that the mortgage was binding because the father had certainly mortgaged the property for legal necessity i.e. family purposes. We shall consider at later stage whether the case should be remanded after framing new issues. It would be proper to discuss first if the second mortgage is binding on appellants No. 3 and 4.
9. Coming to the second mortgage evidenced by Ex. p-1, it urged by respondent's learned advocate that since the mother of appellants Nos. 3 and 4 had burdened the estate only for paying off the antecedent debts of their father it is binding on these appellants. Learned counsel for the appellants on the other hand contends that this argument is untenable. According to him proposition No. 3 of their Lordships of the Privy Council mentioned above means that the right to burden the estate for paying the antecedent debt is given only to a fattier as manager of the joint family and not to any other manager. The mother of appellants Nos. 3 and 4 or their brothers could not therefore burden the estate so far as the estate of appellants Nos. 3 and 4 was concerned unless there was some legal necessity.
In support of his argument he has referred to the case of - 'Chiranji Lal v. Bankey Lal',: AIR 1933 All 273 (FB) (B), and laid special emphasis on the following passage appearing therein. It was observed in that case that
it was the privilege of the father alone to burden the family estates by a mortgage by discharging an antecedent debt, which must be a debt of his own. A manager of the family who is not the father, cannot bind the estate merely by discharging a pre-existing debt of the family. Hence where the person other than the father prefers to act on behalf of the family in mortgaging the family property for paying off debts, it is not enough if it is shown that the mortgage was executed to pay off antecedent debts. It must be shown that the mortgage was executed for legal necessity binding on the family. The question whether a debt is antecedent or not arises only when the father makes the transfer.
10. It may be pointed out that this observation has itself been a subject of interpretation in other cases in that High Court and other High Courts. Learned counsel for the appellants wants to put a very narrow interpretation on these remarks. According to him the learned Judges meant to lay down that a non-father manager of the joint family has absolutely no right to alienate the shares of the minor members in the coparcenary property to pay off their father's antecedent debts in any case. We have gone through this judgment and we feel that the learned judges had made the above remark having regard to the particular facts of that case and not in the sense in which it is sought to be interpreted by learned counsel. These remarks could not be better explained than by one of the learned judges who decided that case.
11. The same kind of question came for consideration in -'Ramsingh v. Sri Charan',: AIR 1938 All 147 (C), before a Division Bench of that Court. In that case the elder brother as manager of the family had transferred his own and his brother's share for the past debts incurred by their father and himself. It was urged on behalf of the minor brother that the elder brother was not entitled to transfer his brother's share and that he should have waited till the creditor had obtained a decree and proceeded to sell the family property in satisfaction of the debt due from the plaintiff's father. 'Chiranji Lal v. Bankey. Lal', (B), was quoted in support of the said argument. This argument was negatived by Niamatullah, Ag. C.J. who was also a patty to the previous case. It was held that all that the above case decided was that mere antecedency of father's debt did not entitle one of the sons to sell the family property.
It was observed that
if the debt contracted by the father was not tainted with immorality and if it could not be paid without the sale of family property, a case of legal necessity for the son to transfer undoubtedly exists.
It was found by the learned Judges in that case that the recurring expenses of the family amounted to Rs. 360 a year while the income was much less and that the debt due from the two brothers could not be paid except by sale of the family property. It was therefore held that although the elder brother was not entitled to sell the family property merely because there was an antecedent debt of his father, but having regard to this circumstances of the family, the sale in question was warranted by legal necessity in so far as binding debts could not be paid otherwise than by sale of the family property.
In the case of - 'Lakhmi Singh v. Mahendra Singh',: AIR 1949 All 501 (D), two brothers had executed a sale-deed of a property in which the third brother also had a share. He brought a suit for cancellation of sale-deed. In the consideration for the sale-deed some debt incurred by their father was also included. It was contended by the plaintiff's advocate that so far as the alienation of the family property for discharging the antecedent debts of the father was concerned it could not be upheld because the transferor was not the father himself. Reliance was placed for this argument on the Full Bench decision in - 'Chiranji Lal v. Bankey Lal' (B). It was thereupon observed by the learned Judges that
while the contention is true, it is also a fact that the alienation of the property for discharging such debt may itself be supported on the ground of legal necessity independently of the antecedent debts.
Then referring to the 'necessity', it was further observed that:
the necessity, such as may justify the alienation, apart from the question of the object being the repayment of antecedent debts, should be, in every case of a character as would justify the transfer. Necessity 'per se' is not the justifying element. It must be of a type which entails a certain degree of pressure on the estate to justify the alienation.
A reference was made to the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in - 'Hunooman Pershad Pandey v. Mt. Babooee Mundraj Koonweree', 6 Moo Ind App 393 (E), in which it was held that a manager could alienate the family property only "in a case of need, or for the benefit of the estate." and that:
The actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted, or the benefit to be conferred, in the particular instance, are the criteria to be regarded.
Then concluding from the above observations, it was remarked that:
the test..................would, in every case, be the presence of such circumstances as could make the act of transfer an eminently desirable or urgently called for step to ease the situation existing on the date of the transfer.
12. In the case of - 'Jagdeo Singh v. Sitla Prasad',: AIR 1954 All 71 (F), all the previous cases referred above were again examined and it was held that it was not correct to say that under the Hindu Law no other member of the family except the father could alienate the joint family property in order to pay up the antecedent debts of the father and that the important question in such cases to consider was whether the alienation was justified on account of some pressure or necessity apart from the fact that the debt was an antecedent debt of the father.
13. In our opinion the correct position of the law may be summed up as follows:
A manager of the joint family other than the father can also alienate or burden the estate of the joint family so as to bind other members including minor members to the extent of their interest in that property for paying off the antecedent debts of their father. But such a manager cannot bind the estate merely for discharging the antecedent debts of the father. This privilege is confined to the father alone. In other words, mere antecedency of the father's debts does not authorise a manager other than the father to alienate or burden the estate. There should be further circumstances to show that there was ft necessity to pay up the father's debt and that necessity was of a type which entailed either a certain degree of pressure on the estate, some danger to be averted or some benefit to be conferred or some other circumstance which would show That the alienation was eminently desirable or urgently called for, to ease the situation existing on the date of transfer.
14. Learned counsel for the respondent has also referred to some other cases of other High Courts and therefore it would be proper to deal with them as well. The first case is - 'Ambalavana Pillai v. Gowri Ammal',: AIR 1936 Mad 871 (G). In that case it was held that:
Where a guardian of a minor mortgages minor's property to pay debts due by minor's deceased father, once the proper application of a substantial portion of the consideration has been proved, the Court might, in the absence of circumstances creating suspicion, presume that the small balance is also likely to have been required and applied for proper purposes. There is no reason for drawing distinction between a sale and a mortgage. Moreover once the circumstances of necessity are shown, a bona fide lender is not bound to see to the actual application of the money lent.
It may be pointed out that the question which has arisen in the present case before us did not come for consideration in the above case. It dealt with different questions of law and therefore it has little bearing on the present case.
15. The next case referred by him is - 'Shantaya Kotraya v. Mallappa Basappa',: AIR 1938 Bom 500 (H). In that case plaintiffs 1 to 6 who were brothers forming a joint Hindu family with their father brought a suit for declaration that certain alienations by their father, defendant 1, were not binding on them as not being for payment of antecedent debts or for legal necessity. At the time of alienation, the joint family consisted of plaintiff 1, the father, and the mother and a step-brother of plaintiff 1 who subsequently separated from the family and who never challenged the alienations. Plaintiffs 2 to 6 were born subsequent to the alienation.
It was held that:
only the plaintiff No. 1 who was born at the time of the alienation, cut of all the plaintiffs could challenge the alienation and that too for the purpose of setting it aside to the extent of his share at the date of the alienation and that the mother was not entitled to a share in plaintiff 1's share, as she would have been entitled to receive a share equal to that of a son, only if the partition had taken place between her husband and her sons or between the sons after her husband's death.
It is obvious that in this case also the questions of law before the learned Judges were different from those in the present case and therefore this case is also not helpful to the respondent.
16. The third case is - 'Dharamrajsingh v. Chandrashekhar Rao',: AIR 1942 Nag 66 (I). In that case there was some difference of opinion between two learned judges and it was held by a majority judgment that:
the non-father manager can alienate the minor son's share to satisfy an antecedent debt of the son's father, binding on the son, provided it is necessary for him to do so in the sense that owing to the circumstances in which the family is placed there is no other reasonable course open to him.
The proviso appearing in the said observation clearly shows that in the opinion of these learned judges also, mere antecedency of the father's debt did not authorise the non-father manager to alienate the minors' share and that the view taken in the above case is in consonance with and not against the views which we have expressed above.
17. The last case relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent is - 'Khushi Ram v. Mehr Chand', AIR 1950 EP 272 (J). In that case it was held that:
where a joint family consists of adults and minors the mere fact that all the adult members including the manager have consented to the alienation is not proof of legal necessity. Such consent, however, may supply any lacuna that may exist in the evidence of legal necessity.
In this case also the question before the learned Judges was slightly different and therefore it does not throw much light on the points which we have determined.
18. It remains now to consider whether we should allow the respondent's request for framing new issues and remanding the case to the trial Court, we think that it is obvious that the arguments which have been raised by the appellant's learned advocate in this Court were not pointedly raised in the trial Court and the respondent has therefore not been able to lead any evidence on these points. It seems proper that fresh issues should be framed about both the mortgages and the case should be remanded to the trial Court.
19. Respondent's learned advocate has also raised a question that even if it be assumed that both the mortgages were not binding upon appellants Nos. 3 and 4, it should be held by this Court that three-fifth share in the joint family property was liable for the entire debt because the appellants' father also had one share in the property along with his four sons. Since we are remanding the case we think it proper to frame an issue on this point also which requires consideration. We shall decide it after the parties have produced their evidence and the trial Court has also expressed its opinion on all the new issues.
We therefore frame the following new issues and remand the case to the trial Court with the direction that it will allow both parties to lead evidence and send the case back to this Court with its finding thereon.
ISSUE No. 1. Whether the first mortgage dated 6-3-46 was executed for legal necessity or for paying off the antecedent debts of the appellants' father.
ISSUE NO. 2 Whether the second mortgage dated 3-3-48 was executed for some legal necessity or whether there was some sort of pressure on the joint family estate to pay off the antecedent debts of the appellants' father.
ISSUE No. 3 Whether three-fifths share in the mortgaged property would still be liable for the respondent's debt even though issues Nos. 1 and 2 are decided against the respondent.
20. The trial Court would send the record back within six months from the date it reaches there.
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