- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Jai Kishen Joshi v. Budhanand Joshi
Analytical Summary of the Court's Opinion (Reference under Rule 17, Kumaon Division, 1894)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a reference by the Local Government under Rule 17 of the Rules and Orders relating to the Kumaon Division, 1894.
The dispute concerns family property that originally belonged to one Debi Dat Joshi, who had four sons: (1) Krishna Nand (deceased, his son Chandramani also died without issue), (2) Yangya Dat (whose son is the plaintiff, Jai Krishna), (3) Narotain (died without issue), and (4) Jai Dat (defendant No. 2).
In 1860 Debi Dat Joshi gave a usufructuary mortgage of part of the family property to Debi Dat Panth for over Rs. 400. After Debi Dat Joshi's death, Jai Dat repaid Rs. 100 to the mortgagee, who released the property now in suit. To obtain this Rs. 100, on 13 December 1877 Jai Dat made a similar mortgage of that property in favour of Jai Krishna Joshi (deceased), father of defendant No. 1, Buddhi Ballabh Joshi (the eventual purchaser). The 1877 deed stated the mortgaged property belonged to Jai Dat and described it as his maurusi village share; the mortgage term was ten years.
The mortgagee (and his successors) remained in possession until 26 May 1898, when Jai Dat, unable to pay off the debt, sold the property to defendant No. 1 for Rs. 300 (Rs. 236 of which paid off the debt). The purchaser remained in possession from that date until the suit was brought in 1912 (about fourteen years thereafter).
The plaintiff's suit sought to redeem the original 1860 mortgage by payment of Rs. 100 and to obtain possession of the whole property. The trial court decreed the plaintiff's claim upon payment of Rs. 328-8-6. The Courts of first and second appeal dismissed the suit. The reference to this Court posed two primary questions: (1) whether the case should be remanded to the Court of first appeal because that Court failed to decide whether Jai Dat had a right to represent the joint family, and (2) whether the decision of the Court of second appeal was correct.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the case should be remanded to the Court of first appeal for re-decision because that Court did not decide the factual issue whether Jai Dat Joshi had the right to represent the joint family.
- Whether the decision of the Court of second appeal (dismissing the plaintiff's suit) was correct.
- Which limitation provision (Article 144 or Article 134 of the Limitation Act Second Schedule) applies to a suit by a co-owner to recover his share from a transferee of a co-owner who paid off an earlier mortgage — and relatedly, whether the co-owner who redeems acquires merely a charge (Section 95, Transfer of Property Act) or is to be treated as a mortgagee for limitation purposes (invoking the Full Bench decision in Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The pleadings are not consistent, but in this Court the plaintiff asserted that the family had separated though the properties had not been physically divided; on that basis he argued that Article 134 of the Limitation Act should apply (as if the suit were by a mortgagor against a transferee from his mortgagee) and invoked the principle in Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali to preserve his right despite the passage of time.
Defendant's Arguments
- The defendants contended the family was joint and that Jai Dat acted throughout as the managing member; in that event either the plaintiff had no standing or the defendants had acquired title adverse to the joint family.
- Regarding limitation, the defendants argued Article 134 does not apply because this is not a case of a transfer by a mortgagee in the strict sense; Ashfaq Ahmad should be confined in its application, and Section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act shows that Jai Dat became only a charge-holder (not a mortgagee). Therefore Article 144 of the Limitation Act ought to apply rather than Article 134.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali, 14 A. 1 : 11 A. 423 : A.W.N. (1891) 211 (Full Bench) | Applied by the Full Bench previously to treat the possession of a co-owner who redeems an earlier mortgage as analogous to that of the original mortgagee for the purpose of applying Article 148 (thereby allowing an extended limitation period — sixty years — in a suit to recover the co-owner's share). | The present Court considered the decision but limited its application. The Court held that while the Full Bench had applied Article 148 in that circumstance, it did not follow that the charge-holder is a mortgagee in all respects; the present case involved transfers by the charge-holder (mortgage and sale) and a suit against a transferee, so the Court applied Article 144 rather than extending Ashfaq Ahmad's principle to the present facts. The Court therefore did not extend the Full Bench's reasoning to override the statutory distinction in Section 95 (Transfer of Property Act). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by examining alternative factual assumptions (joint family with Jai Dat not managing; joint family with Jai Dat managing; and family separate though properties not divided) and applied statutory rules and prior authority strictly as stated in the opinion.
1. Procedural point regarding remand and the omitted factual issue: The Court noted that no issue had been framed on whether Jai Dat was or was not the managing member of the joint family. The trial court had assumed the family was joint and expressed doubt that Jai Dat was the manager. The reference asked whether the case should be remanded because the Court of first appeal failed to decide that point. The Court held it was unnecessary, given the facts and limitation bar, to make any finding on that point in this case (even though ordinarily a suit might not be decreed without deciding such an issue).
2. If the family were joint and Jai Dat was not the managing member: The Court observed that a member who is interested in mortgaged property had power to redeem the earlier 1860 mortgage, and that mortgage consequently ceased to exist and could not be redeemed later. The second mortgagee had paid his money to Jai Dat and Jai Dat had discharged the first mortgagee; the doctrine of subrogation did not operate to preserve the plaintiff's position in this factual scenario. Because the purchaser (defendant No. 1) had held adversely for over twelve years, the suit must fail.
3. If the family were joint and Jai Dat was the managing member: The Court held that no suit for redemption of the mortgage of 1860 could lie against the purchaser, and the purchaser's possession had been adverse since the date of purchase; again the suit must fail.
4. If the family were separate (but property undivided): The Court analysed the effect of Jai Dat's redemption of the 1860 mortgage in 1877. Citing Section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Court held that a co-owner who redeems acquires a charge on the other co-owners' shares (a charge distinct from a mortgage). Although the statute post-dated the transactions, it did not alter the legal distinction for present purposes. The Full Bench decision in Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali had previously permitted application of Article 148 (sixty years) to a suit of this nature, treating the charge-holder's possession as analogous to a mortgagee's possession in order to permit a longer limitation period. However, the Court in the present case emphasised that that decision did not convert a charge-holder into a mortgagee in all respects.
5. Which limitation article applies: The Court carefully considered Articles 134 and 144 of the Limitation Act Second Schedule. The plaintiff urged Article 134 (as if the action were a mortgagor recovering from a transferee of a mortgagee), which would require examination of whether the transferee took in good faith and without knowledge of the plaintiff's rights. The defendant urged that Article 134 did not apply and that Article 144 governed. The Court held that Section 95 establishes that Jai Dat was only a charge-holder; the mere analogy of his position to a mortgagee vis-à-vis co-owners did not make him a mortgagee in law. Therefore Article 144 was the applicable limitation provision to a suit for possession of the plaintiff's share against the transferee.
6. Application of limitation and facts about possession: The Court found no fraud or collusion, both the mortgage and the later sale deed were registered, and the defendant had been in long and adverse possession (the opinion records the transferee had held as a mortgagee and then as purchaser for decades). The plaintiff had remained silent. On these facts the Court concluded the defendant had held adversely for a period exceeding the statutory limitation (Article 144), so the claim was time-barred whether the family was joint or separate.
7. Conclusion on remand and correctness of decree: Because the suit was barred by limitation under the Court's application of Article 144 and the facts as stated, it was unnecessary to remand the case to decide whether Jai Dat represented the family. The Court considered the Commissioner's decree correct, albeit perhaps for reasons different from those stated by the Commissioner. The Court therefore answered the reference questions accordingly and ordered costs against the plaintiff.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim on the ground of limitation and adverse possession. The Court concluded that Article 144 of the Limitation Act applies to the present suit and that, on the facts, the defendant had held adversely for more than the statutory period. Accordingly, the Court answered the reference as follows:
- On remand: It is unnecessary to remand the suit for a finding on whether Jai Dat represented the family in the circumstances of this case.
- On correctness of the appellate decree: The decree of the Commissioner is correct, though perhaps not for the reasons stated by him.
- Costs: The plaintiff was ordered to pay all costs in all Courts.
Implications: The direct consequence is that the plaintiff's suit to redeem the original 1860 mortgage and obtain possession is dismissed as time-barred under Article 144. The Court declined to extend the Full Bench's application of Article 148 (as in Ashfaq Ahmad) to the facts here where the co-owner who redeemed (a charge-holder under Section 95) subsequently transferred the property and the transferee held adversely for the statutory period. The opinion does not announce a new broad precedent overruling prior authority; rather it clarifies that a charge-holder under Section 95 is not to be treated in all respects as a mortgagee for limitation purposes and that Article 144 governs suits of this character when a transferee's adverse possession has run.
This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the text.
1. This is a reference by the Local Government under Rule 17 of the Rules and Orders relating to the Kumaon Division, 1894.
2. One Debi Dat Joshi had four sons: (1) Krishna Nand, (2) Yangya Dat, (3) Narotain, (4) Jai Dat, defendant No. 2. The first is dead and his son Chandramani has also died without issue.
3. The plaintiff, Jai Krishna, is the son of the second son. The third has died without issue. Jai Dat, defendant No. 2, is the fourth.
4. The property now in suit is part of the family property. On 13th August 1860, Debi Dat Joshi gave a usufructuary mortgage of this and other property to one Debi Dat Panth for a sum of over Rs. 400.
5. After the former's death, the defendant Jai Dat repaid Rs. 100 out of the mortgage-debt to the mortgagee, who thereupon released to him the property now in suit. Jai Dat, to obtain this sum, made a similar mortgage of this same property for the sum of Rs. 100 in favour of Jai Krishna Joshi (deceased), father of defendant No. 1, Buddhi Ballabh Joshi.
6. This was on 13th December 1877, and for a period of ten years. In the deed, Jai Dat clearly stated that the mortgaged property belonged to himself, that it was his maurusi village and he owned this share; that it had been mortgaged by his father to Debi Dat Panth and as the latter was pressing for payment he, therefore, mortgaged it, in order to be able to pay off Debi Dat Panth. He agreed that when he paid off the mortgage-money he would also repay to his mortgagee whatever sum the latter had paid to Government as revenue during the running of the mortgage.
7. For nearly twenty-one years his mortgagee remained in possession as such until the 26th May 1898. On this latter date Jai Dat Joshi being unable to pay off the debt sold the property to the defendant No. 1, Buddhi Ballabh Joshi, the son of the mortgagee, for the sum of Rs. 300. Of this Rs. 236 paid off the debt and the vendor took the balance in cash. Prom that date the vendee has remained in possession until the present suit was brought in the year 1912, i.e., some fourteen years afterwards.
8. The suit is one to redeem the mortgage of 1860 created by Debi Dat Joshi and the plaintiff claims possession of the whole of the property on payment of Rs. 100. The Court of first instance decreed the claim on payment of Rs. 328-8-6. The Courts of first and second appeal dismissed the suit. In the reference to this Court we are asked our opinion as to (1) whether or not the case should be remanded to the Court of first appeal for re-decision of the appeal as that Court has failed to decide the issue whether Jai Dat Joshi had a right to represent the joint family or not; (2) the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the Court of second appeal. There has been great confusion in the pleadings in the case. In the order of reference it is assumed that the family was joint whereas in the argument before us that is a disputed fact. The defendant's case is that the family was joint and Jai Dat Joshi acted throughout as the managing member. The plaintiff's case is not clear from the pleadings in the various plaints filed. In this Court on his behalf it is stated that the family had separated but the property had not been divided.
9. No issue whatever was framed as to whether the defendant Jai Dat was or was not the managing member of the joint family. The Court of first instance assumed that the family was joint and in its finding on the fourth issue--how do the mortgage of 1877 and the sale of 1898 affect plaintiff's right of redemption"--it remarked: "I am not satisfied that he was the manager of the joint family."
10. Assuming for the moment that the family was joint and that Jai Dat was not the managing member, the facts are that one member of a joint family mortgaged a part of the family property in 1877, paid off a prior mortgage-debt due thereon from the family and then in 1898 sold the property to the second mortgagee who has been in possession for over twelve years.
11. As a person interested in the mortgaged property he had power to redeem the mortgage of 1860 and that mortgage no longer exists and cannot now be redeemed. There is no question of subrogation" in the matter. The second mortgagee paid his money to Jai Dat as the deed shows, and the latter paid off the first mortgagee. If the principle did at all operate it would do so for the benefit of the second mortgagee. The defendant No. 1 does not seek to stand upon the first mortgage. In the circumstances assumed it is clear that he, having purchased from a member of the family incompetent to sell, has held adversely to the joint family for over twelve years and the suit against him must fail.
12. Next, if we assume that the family was joint and that Jai Dat was its managing member, no suit for redemption of the mortgage of 1860 can lie and the defendant has clearly held adversely against the joint family since the date of his purchase. In this aspect the suit must equally fail.
13. Assuming, however, that the family was separate (though the properties had not been divided among the co-owners) other considerations arise.
14. When in 1877 Jai Dat redeemed the mortgage of 1860 he acquired a charge on the plaintiff's share for the latter's share of the debt paid (vide Section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act). This Statute no doubt was not then in force, but it did not on this point make any alteration in the law of mortgage as previously administered. If Jai Dat had not dealt further with the property but had merely taken possession and held it, the plaintiff would [under the ruling of this Court in Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali 14 A. 1 : 11 A. 423 : A.W.N. (1891) 211 (F.B.)] have had a period of sixty years from the date of the mortgage of 1860 within which to recover his share from Jai Dat on payment of his share of the debt. Article 148 of Schedule IT of the Limitation Act of 1877 was applied by the Full Bench of this Court to a suit of such a nature, though that Article in terms applies only to a suit to redeem a mortgage; whereas Section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act shows that the co-owner redeeming merely acquires a charge which is very different from a mortgage. In any case the co-owner thus suing cannot sue to redeem the original mortgage bat only to recover his own share of the property redeemed by payment of his share of the expense. In the case before us, however, the matter is complicated by the transfer by Jai Dat, i.e., the mortgage of 1877 and the sale of 1898.
15. In the case of each of these he purported to transfer property belonging to himself and his transferee has held for thirty-one years as mortgagee and fourteen years as vendee.
16. Either Article 144 or Article 134 of the Second Schedule of the Limitation Act will apply to a suit for possession of the plaintiff's share. On behalf of the plaintiff, it is urged that he is in the position of a mortgagor suing to recover possession of property from a transferee from his mortgagee and that Article 134 would apply and, therefore, under the rulings of this Court, there must be a finding as to whether the transferree took in good faith and in ignorance of the plaintiff's rights or with a full knowledge of those rights, and, therefore, the suit should be remanded to the Court of first appeal for a finding on that question of fact. On behalf of the defendant, however, it is urged that Article 134 does not apply, as this is no case of a transfer by a mortgagee; that the decision in Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali 14 A. 1 : 11 A. 423 : A.W.N. (1891) 211 (F.B.) can only be applied to a suit by one co-owner to redeem his share from the co-owner who has paid off the mortgagee and its principle should not be extended to Article 134, where the suit is one between the co-owner and a third person, a transferee, and that Section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act clearly shows that Jai Dat was merely a charge-holder and not a mortgagee and that Article 144 is the only Article which can and ought to apply. In my opinion, Section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act clearly shows that Jai Dat became merely a charge-holder when he paid off the mortgage of 1860. The fact that, as regards his co-owners, his position became analogous to that of a mortgagee, does not make him a mortgagee when the law clearly states that he is only a charge-holder.
17. In my opinion, Article 144 applies. The defendant-appellant, has held adversely clearly from the year 18'8. There is no question of fraud or collusion. The contending defendant has held the property some thirty-five years prior to suit as usufructuary mortgagee and vendee from Jai Dat and the plaintiff has remained silent and unquestioning. Both mortgage and sale-deed were registered. It, therefore, is clear to my mind that whether the family was joint or separate the suit was bound to fail. I would, therefore, answer the two questions as follows: 1) It is unnecessary, in the circumstances of this case, to have any finding on the question as to whether Jai Dat Joshi represented the family or not; though it is obvious that the suit could not be decreed against the defendant until a decision thereon had been reached. (2) The decree of the Commissioner is correct though perhaps not for the reasons stated by him.
18. I would order the plaintiff to pay all costs in all Courts.
Piggott, J.
19. I concur generally. It is obviously useless to remand the suit if it is barred by limitation on the facts stated by the plaintiff himself. The case for the latter is only arguable on the assumption that Jai Dat and his brothers had separated but had left the property in suit undivided. Assuming these facts, the question is whether the plaintiff can invoke the principles laid down by this Court in Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali 14 A. 1 : 11 A. 423 : A.W.N. (1891) 211 (F.B.) so as to save limitation. The point may be stated thus : ¦ 'If the holder of a charge under Section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act (No. IV of 1882) is in possession of the property which is the subject of that charge, what is the limitation applicable to a suit by the owners of the said property for recovery of possession on payment of the charge?" The question is not free from difficulty and the view taken by this Court has not been universally accepted. The operation of Article 144 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act can only be avoided by bringing the case under the operation of some other article of the schedule. if article '. 44 be applied, then the further question would arise as to the circumstances under which the possession of the charge-holder becomes adverse to that of the owners. This Court saw a way out of the difficulty by laying down the principle that the possession of the charge-hulled should be regarded as that of the original mortgagee, the provisions of Article 148 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act being applied so as to permit the owners to sue for possession by redemption of the charge within sixty years of the date of the original mortgage. The question then before the Court was one of limitation only; it was not laid down that the possession of the charge-holder should be regarded as in all respects equivalent to the possession of a mortgagee That point was not considered at all. In the present case the charge-holder has been claiming title in himself adversely to the persons whom we must, for the sake of argument, regard as the true owners, ever since he redeemed the original mortgage. He has himself transferred the property in suit, first by way of mortgage and then by way of sale. The present suit is not against the alleged charge-holder only, but principally against his transferee. It seems to me obviously impossible to apply the provisions of Article 148 to the present suit; nor is such application necessitated by any principle laid down in the case of Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali 14 A. 1 : 11 A. 423 : A.W.N. (1891) 211 (F.B.). It follows that the present suit can only be saved from the operation of Article 144 by bringing it under Article 134. On this point I have felt some doubts. It is very difficult to apply Article 134 on its strict wording; the only doubt in my mind is whether the learned Judges who decided the case of Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali 14 A. 1 : 11 A. 423 : A.W.N. (1891) 211 (F.B.), would not have regarded its application as a legitimate extension of the principle which they laid down as to the charge-holder's stepping into the shoes of the original mortgagee. On the whole, I think it sufficient to say that I am not prepared to dissent from the view taken by my learned colleague. For one thing I do not think it worth while to do so on the facts of the present case; the application of Article 134 might necessitate a remand for a further finding as to the bona fides of the transferee-defendant and the payment of consideration, but I do not feel any serious doubt that it would result in the dismissal of the suit. Accepting Article 144 of the Schedule as the proper Article to be applied, I can feel no doubt whatever that the possession of the principal defendant has been adverse to the plaintiff for more than the statutory period of twelve years. I concur, therefore, in answering the reference as proposed by my learned colleague.
Alert