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Shivalingiah v. Chowdamma

Karnataka High Court
Oct 14, 1955
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Venkata Ramaiya, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The principal factual dispute concerned the legitimacy of the appellant as a son of Made Gowda. Made Gowda had been murdered in 1929. In 1946 his widow, Chowdamma (the plaintiff/respondent), filed a suit seeking recovery of thirty-four immovable properties listed in Schedule A of the plaint and six movable items listed in Schedule B, alleging that she was the lawful heir and that the defendant (the appellant) was wrongfully in possession.

The defendant's plea was that he was the son of Made Gowda and therefore entitled to the properties in preference to the plaintiff. The learned District Judge held that the defendant was not the offspring of a lawful wedlock between his mother (Channamma) and Made Gowda and consequently decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant (appellant) appealed against that decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant is the legitimate son of Made Gowda.
  2. Whether the plaintiff (Made Gowda’s widow) is entitled to ownership of the suit properties to the exclusion of the appellant.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant relied on documentary and testimonial evidence showing Made Gowda's recognition of him as his son: Ex. XXXIV (1924) where Made Gowda referred to him as his son and expressed paternal concern; Ex. IV (1925) an application to a Co-operative Society nominating the appellant as his son; and other public records and entries (khetwar, Record of Rights).
  • Evidence of community recognition and administrative acts (e.g., Amildar's order Ex. XXXV(a) dated 23-2-1932 transferring khatha to the defendant as Made Gowda's only son) supported the appellant's legitimacy.
  • The appellant's counsel argued that even without reliance on a particular document (Ex. VII), the appellant was entitled to succeed based on other evidence of legitimation and recognition.
  • Evidence of a recognized local form of remarriage (kudike) and testimony indicating consent of the first husband (D.W.2) supported the lawfulness of the union between Made Gowda and Channamma.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff contended that Channamma lived in concubinage with Made Gowda and that the appellant was the product of adulterous intercourse, not of a lawful marriage with Made Gowda.
  • The plaintiff sought to rely on a document (Ex. VII) purporting to show that Channamma's first husband Putte Gowda had effected a release/divorce, thereby implying competing accounts of the marital status; however, the court found Ex. VII to be antedated and spurious.
  • Implicitly, the plaintiff's position before the lower court led to a finding that the appellant was not the offspring of lawful wedlock and therefore the widow should succeed to the properties.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Maharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Ayyar, AIR 1925 Mad 497 Evidence about the treatment of alleged wives and their conduct in documents and proceedings is admissible (repute) under S.50 of the Evidence Act and bears on whether a marriage was regarded as valid by the family. The court relied on the principle that long-recognized conduct and official treatment of the mother and son as family members supports a presumption of legitimacy; documentary and conduct evidence (e.g., nominations, khatha transfer) were treated as admissible indicators of family repute.
A. Dinohamy v. W.L. Balahamy, AIR 1927 PC 185 Where a man and woman are proved to have lived together as husband and wife, the law presumes, unless clearly rebutted, that they were living together as a result of a valid marriage and not concubinage. The court invoked this presumption to support the view that the cohabitation and public acknowledgment of Channamma and her child as part of Made Gowda's household favored legitimacy rather than concubinage.
Rajendra Nath v. Jagendra Nath, 14 Moo Ind App 67 Long recognition of a person's legitimacy by family members and others gives rise to presumptions which the defendant may invoke when legitimacy is later questioned. The court applied this principle to hold that long-standing recognition of the appellant by the plaintiff, her husband and his brothers strengthened the presumption of legitimacy and justified protecting the appellant's status.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a fact-based analysis grounded in documentary records, contemporaneous administrative acts, witness testimony and principles of presumptions of legitimacy.

Key evidentiary points the court relied upon included:

  • Direct references by Made Gowda to the appellant as his son in Ex. XXXIV (1924) and his nomination of the appellant as nominee in Ex. IV (1925).
  • Admissions by the plaintiff in prior proceedings (Exs. II and III of 1930) that she and Channamma were both wives of Made Gowda and living together; and public acts such as the Amildar's order (Ex. XXXV(a), 23-2-1932) transferring khatha to the defendant as Made Gowda's only son.
  • Official entries (Khetwar and Record of Rights) and a genealogical tree (Ex. XXXIII) presented shortly after Made Gowda's death, together with the testimony of family members (notably Kade Gowda, D.W.11) acknowledging the defendant as the son of Made Gowda and indicating continued amicable relations between the plaintiff and Channamma.
  • The plaintiff's own testimony that she had not been in possession of the immovable properties, had not attempted to change khata, and that Kade Gowda was in possession after Made Gowda's death.

The court addressed the plaintiff's contention that Channamma lived in concubinage and that the appellant was illegitimate. The opinion examined the history and evidence regarding Channamma's earlier marriage to Putte Gowda and the local custom of "kudike" (a form of remarriage or dissolution and remarriage in the community):

  • Witnesses (P.W.s and D.W.s) described a recognized communal practice permitting separation by consent and remarriage (kudike), often involving rites and social acts rather than reliance on written documents.
  • Ex. VII, the document purporting to show Putte Gowda's release or consent (dated 16-4-1918), was found to be on paper of a later kind and was held to be antedated and spurious; the appellant's counsel did not attempt to defend its authenticity but argued the appellant could succeed without it.
  • The court emphasized that the community practice did not make a written document essential; the essence of a valid kudike marriage was the former husband's renunciation of conjugal rights and the observance of social/religious acts creating the new alliance — the court applied the doctrine of factum valet to validate alliances despite defects in non-essential formalities.
  • Even if a document were required, the court found that D.W.2 (the first husband) admitted execution of such a document — an admission the court treated as sufficient to meet the requirement.

The court then considered relevant authorities. It treated family conduct, public acts and long-recognition by family members as admissible and probative (citing Maharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Ayyar and the Evidence Act, s.50). It also applied established presumptions that cohabitation and long recognition support a finding of valid marriage and legitimacy (citing A. Dinohamy v. W.L. Balahamy and Rajendra Nath v. Jagendra Nath).

On the totality of the evidence and legal principles, the court concluded that earlier acknowledgments and community treatment of the appellant and his mother as part of Made Gowda's family were made at times when no interest existed to falsely assist them, and these pointed strongly toward legitimacy. It held the lower court's conclusion to the contrary to be erroneous.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEAL ALLOWED; THE APPELLANT IS HELD TO BE THE LEGITIMATE SON OF MADE GOWDA, AND THE SUIT FILED BY THE PLAINTIFF IS DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The plaintiff's claim to be the owner of the suit properties to the exclusion of the defendant is untenable: she can only claim rights as a step-mother against a step-son as a sole surviving coparcener. Because no relief was sought on that specific footing in the plaint, the suit must be dismissed.
  • The decree of the lower court is reversed.
  • The defendant (appellant) is disentitled to costs because one of the defendant's supporting documents was found to be "shady." Accordingly, parties are to bear their own costs throughout.
  • The court ordered that the court-fee on the plaint filed in the lower court will be recovered from the respondent (plaintiff).

Broader implications:

The opinion grounds its decision on the specific evidence, community practices and established jurisprudential presumptions; the text does not elaborate broader principles beyond application of those authorities and the factual findings. The decision resolves the rights between the parties in this appeal and reverses the lower court's decree; it does not purport to lay down a new, broader rule beyond the application of existing law and authorities cited.

Appeal allowed.
Show all summary ...

Venkata Ramaiya, C.J:— The principal point for decision in this appeal is whether the appellant is the legitimate son of Made Gowda. Made Gowda was murdered in 1929 and the suit from which this appeal arises was filed by his widow, Chowdamma, in 1946 for recovery of thirty four items of immovable properties specified in Schedule ‘A’ and six items of movable specified in ‘B’ Schedule of the plaint alleging that she is the lawful heir to Made Gowda and that the defendant has been wrongfully in possession of the same.

2. The plea of the defendant was that he is the son of Made Gowda and as such entitled to the properties in preference to the plaintiff. The learned District Judge held that he is not the offspring of lawful wedlock between his mother and Made Gowda and therefore decreed the suit. Defendant appeals. It is not disputed that plaintiff was married to Made Gowda, that subsequent to this marriage Channamma defendant's mother lived with them and that Made Gowda got children by both these. Though the plaintiff alleged that the appellant was born before his mother joined Made Gowda, the allegation has to be discarded as Made Gowda himself referred to him as his son and expressed the anxiety of a father while he desired in Ex. XXXIV of 1924 that he should be taken care of by one of his relations.

3. Again in his application Ex. IV of 1925 to the Co-operative Society for allotment of some shares Made Gowda wanted the appellant as his son to be treated as nominee and his name is entered as such in the books of the Society. Respondent herself while giving evidence in the Magistrate's Court and Court of Session in the case relating to the murder of her husband, stated that she and defendant's mother were wives of Made Gowda, that they were all on good terms and living together (See Exs. II and III of 1930).

4. Exhibit XXXV (a) is the order of the Amildar dated 23-2-1932 passed, after enquiry, for transfer of the khatha of Made Gowda's lands to defendant's name on the ground that he is his only son. On 5-12-1930 when defendant was a minor his paternal uncle Kade Gowda sold site which belonged to Made Gowda under Ex. VIII for Rs. 200/-. This was attested fey the plaintiff and defendant's mother each being described as wife of Made Gowda.

5. The entries in the Khetwar and Record of Rights with respect to suit properties are all in favour of the defendant. Exhibit XXXIII is a genealogical tree showing that defendant is the son of Made Gowda by Channamma his wife and mentioning names of others related to him. It was presented in the Taluk Office shortly after the death of Made Gowda and bears signature of his brother, and of a cousin and thumb mark of defendant's mother. The plaintiff in her evidence states:

“Neither I nor my first son-in-law ever attempted to pay kandayam for the suit properties, or to have the khata changed to my name. I have not been in possession of any of the immovable properties belonging to my husband's estate. Since his demise I have not received any income therefrom. I do not know if the defendant has been in possession of those properties and enjoying income therefrom since my husband's death. It is Kade Gowda who was in possession and enjoyment of the suit immoveable properties after my husband's death. I did not ask Kade Gowda at any time to band over possession of these properties to me.”

6. This Kade Gowda is D.W 11 and a brother of Made Gowda. He definitely says that defendant was the son of his brother, that after the brother was murdered, properties, were looked after by defendant's mother, that she and plaintiff lived in amity. When a woman lives for a number of years in close association with a man and bears children, who are acknowledged by the man as born to him, relations and persons of the village treat them as such there is a presumption of legitimacy, as vice and immorality are not usually attributed to such associations between a man and a woman.

7. In spite of the facts above mentioned and inferences arising therefrom the plaintiff asserts that Channamma lived in concubinage with Made Gowda and that defendant is the product of an adulterous intercourse between the two. What is urged in support of this is not any misconduct or unchastity on the part of Channamma towards Made Gowda. The accusation against her is rather her loyalty and fidelity to him though she had been married to another man and he is alive.

8. That Channamma the defendant's mother was married to Putte Gowda and that she went to live with the Made Gowda after this marriage is not denied. Defendant's explanation for this is that the marriage was got rid of by a divorce and after this Made Gowda married Channamma. It is said that there is a custom which permits divorce and re-marriage and that no objection can be attached to Channamma's association with the Putte Gowda.

9. Separation by mutual consent and dissolution of the marital tie, so as to enable the woman to marry another man in what is called kudike form and have the full status of a wife are proved to be possible in the community to which the parties belong. The plaintiff's witnesses P.Ws 5, 6 and 7 themselves speak to this and to the formalities thereof which includes execution of document.

10. As affording compliance with this requirement, Ex. VII a document purporting to have been executed by Putte Gowda the first husband of Channamma on 16-4-1918, was produced in the case. The paper used for the writing is found to be of the kind which became available for subsequent to the date which the document bears and Ex. VII is therefore held to be antedated, spurious and not reliable to prove the termination of marital relationship of Channamma with Putte Gowda. Sri M. Narayana Rao learned counsel for the appellant did not attempt to show that Ex. VII can be treated otherwise but urged that without the aid of this the Appellant is entitled to succeed.

11. In the evidence relating to the custom no doubt reference is made to document being written to signify relinquishment of marital rights. This cannot be construed to imply that apart from its evidentiary value the document is a sine qua non for relinquishment and there can be no divorce without it. The community does not prohibit marriages without documents being executed and the efficacy of marriage or the divorce does not depend on the document but on consent of parties and the observance of traditional rites and ceremonies.

12. Between the first marriage of a woman and the second — called kudike — the only difference is as stated by D.W 17 brother of Made Gowda, that in the latter “there is no kalasa and kannadi”. P.W 7 who claims to be yajaman of 10 or 12 villages says “it is their pleasure to marry in kudike form without release deeds. They do so with their consent”. D.W 2 is the husband who ‘released’ Channamma from the bonds of matrimonial relationship and he deposes that in fulfilment of the terms imposed by him the silver vessels given by him were all returned with the “thali” the vital symbol of the marriage.

13. After this, he himself married a woman similarly ‘released’ by her first husband. D.W 3 is the husband of that woman's sister. There is no reference by him to the execution of any document for the purpose of the release as all that he says as being required for it is consent. He is the President of Manhya District Board and there is no reason to doubt the prevalence of the custom of the kudike marriage as he says it has been in vogue for several years.

14. This form of marriage seems to be common in the community and instances of its being recognised as normal, attaching no taint or stigma to it are numerous. D.W 17, elder brother of Made Gowda says that their mother was a kudike wife of their father and that he also has a kudike wife. He states that if Channamma was a mistress or concubine of Made Gowda as alleged by the plaintiff, she would not have been allowed to reside with the members of the family.

15. Made Goda and D.W 11 were recognised by the members of the community to be legitimate sons of their father though their mother was a kudike wife. The defendant and his mother cannot be treated differently and as inferior in status to the plaintiff and her children. P.W 6 a yajaman in the community says that his son-in-law is the offspring of a kudike marriage, that father-in-law of his son has a wife by ordinary marriage and another by kudike, that he has not seen any documents of release and did not enquire about this when he gave away his daughter in marriage.

16. Channamma, according to the evidence, was given up by D.W 2, when she was only 12 or 13 years of age and before the consumption of the marriage.

17. D.W 6 is also a yajaman who played an important part in bringing about the kudike marriage between Channamma and Made Gowda as it is he who tied the ‘thali’ on the neck of the woman. D.W 16 is also a brother of Made Gowda and he testified to the kudike marriage of defendant's mother and D.W 2 having consented to it.

18. What may be gathered from the evidence as a whole is that the relationship of marriage may be dissolved by consent of the husband and that a document in token of this has to be or will be executed by him. No one says that in the absence of a document there can be no divorce. Persons who have kudike wives have not produced any document so that it is difficult to know the form and terms thereof. Many of these are in the village & may or may not be literate. The documents are to be written if at all by others and may not stand the test of being satisfactory if a particular standard is applied.

19. It seems to me that the essence of the requirement for the validity of the second marriage or kudike as it is called is not so much the existence of the document as the fact of the former husband renouncing the conjugal rights over the woman and the observance of the social or religious acts to create the fresh alliance of the woman with another man as wife and husband. Marriages are not nullified and considered invalid because of failure to conform to all the formalities in vogue or of the qualifications prescribed. The doctrine of factum valet has been applied to overcome defects of an unessential nature.

20. Assuming that a document is absolutely necessary to leave the parties, at any rate the wife, free from the marital obligations, there is the admission of D.W 2 about its execution and this should serve as sufficient to meet the requirement. The fact that the date given in Ex. VII is not correct, that the document cannot be deemed to have been executed on the date it bears; cannot take away or nullify the admission of D.W 2 and the evidence of others supporting it.

21. In — ‘Maharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Ayyar’, AIR 1925 Mad 497 (A) it was held when the question is as to the legitimacy of a certain type of marriage contracted by the members of a family much may be gathered from the treatment accorded to the alleged wives and from the way in which they speak of themselves in official documents and petitions and legal proceedings in which they were parties. Evidence of this kind is conduct admissible under S. 50, Evidence Act, as it shows the repute in which such marriage was held in the family. The illustrations given by the section are clear about this. Lord Shaw in — ‘A. Dinohamy v. W.L Balahamy’, AIR 1927 PC 185 at p. 187 (B) states:

“Where a man and woman are proved to have lived together as husband and wife the law will presume unless the contrary be clearly proved that they were living together in consequence of a valid marriage and not in a state of concubinage”.

22. Sir James Colville dealing with a case in which factum of an adoption was disputed observed in — ‘Rajendra Nath v. Jagendra Nath’, 14 Moo Ind App 67 (C):

“The case seems to their Lordships to be analogous to one in which the legitimacy of a person in possession is questioned, a very considerable time after his possession has been acquired by a party who has a strict legal right to question his legitimacy. In such a case the defendant in order to defend his status should be allowed to invoke against the claimant every presumption which reasonably arises from the long recognition of his legitimacy by the members of the family or other persons”.

23. The plaintiff herself, her husband, his brothers acknowledged and recognised defendant as legitimate son, his mother as lawful wife of Made Gowda. This was long before the present litigation and at a time when there was no motive or interest on the part of any one to state anything calculated to help the defendant and his mother knowing it to be false. The conclusion arrived at by the lower Court is wrong and the appellant must be held to be the legitimate son of Made Gowda.

24. The claim as put forward by the plaintiff in the plaint is untenable as she cannot be the owner of the properties to the exclusion of the defendant. Her rights against the defendant are only those of a step-mother against a step son as a sole surviving coparcener. As no relief is sought on this footing the suit has to be and is hereby dismissed in reversal of the decree of the lower Court. As the document put forward by the defendant in support of his case is found to be shady, he is disentitled to costs. Parties will therefore bear their own costs throughout. Court-fee on plaint filed in lower Court will be recovered from respondent (plaintiff).

K.S.B
Appeal allowed.