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Dwarka Singh And Another v. Emperor

Patna High Court
May 6, 1946
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Meredith, J.; concurring: Bennett, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arise from convictions for dacoity under Section 395, Penal Code, of two appellants, Dwarka Singh and Bhaswa Dhanuk, by the 1st Assistant Sessions Judge, Patna (Mr. A.C. Banerji). Each was sentenced to five years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200, with six months' further imprisonment in default. One appeal was from jail and one was a regular appeal. At admission of the appeals, a rule was issued to show cause against enhancement of sentence if the convictions were upheld.

The underlying offence was a dacoity on 2 July 1943 at the house of Raiju (Baiju) Pasi (P.W.1) in village More (police station Mokamah). Ornaments and cash valued at Rs. 351/4 were taken, and several persons were assaulted and injured. The occurrence itself was not disputed at trial.

The prosecution's account included Baiju's fard-i-beyan recorded by a Sub-Inspector at 9 a.m.; Baiju named the appellants among those he claimed to have identified by lantern and torchlight. Both accused were initially absconding. Bhaswa was arrested earlier (before 25-8-1943) and had a Magistrate-conducted test identification on 18-9-1943 (about two months after the occurrence). Dwarka was arrested on 1-7-1944 and had a test identification only on 13-11-1944 (about 16 months after the occurrence).

Trial evidence included identifications by Baiju and other witnesses: Ram Saroop Pasi (P.W.2), a boy of 10; Ajnasia (P.W.4), Baiju's daughter aged 16 for Bhaswa; and testimony (under Section 33 of the Evidence Act) from a witness examined at committal (Pauzdari / Fauzdari), whose deposition was tendered though he could not be produced at trial. The Magistrates who conducted the test identifications also gave evidence about those proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the identification evidence (including late test identifications) and other testimony sufficed to sustain convictions of the two appellants.
  2. Whether the trial judge complied adequately with his obligations under Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code in examining the accused and thus whether inferences adverse to the accused could properly be drawn.
  3. Whether statements made to police (referred to Section 162 of the CrPC) were properly used in cross-examination and whether that use prejudiced the defence.
  4. Whether the sentence imposed (including a fine) was appropriate, and whether enhancement of sentence upon conviction was warranted.

Arguments of the Parties

Dwarka Singh's Position

  • Denied participation in the dacoity and filed a written statement asserting specific enmity on the part of Baiju (an allegation that Dwarka had cut a crop belonging to Baiju on instructions connected to a dispute between two women, i.e., Musammat).
  • Relied on the suggestion that the identification evidence against him (particularly test identifications held long after the event) was unreliable—he was a co-villager of some witnesses and there were long delays before test identifications.
  • Claimed (by implication through defence) that the procedure under Section 342 had not been properly carried out and that his written statement should be considered in mitigation/explanation.

Bhaswa Dhanuk's Position

  • Denied the offence at trial; the recorded answer was that he did not commit the offence and that he had nothing further to say when pressed.
  • No allegation of enmity against him was raised in cross-examination of prosecution witnesses; he did not put forward an affirmative story of concoction or motive for false implication.
  • Relied on identification evidence and contest of the prosecution's case as to involvement in the dacoity.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a focused analysis addressing evidential sufficiency, reliability of identifications, procedural compliance with statutory safeguards, and sentencing policy.

1. Identification evidence and delay:

  • The court differentiated between the two accused because the quality and quantity of identification evidence differed. Bhaswa was identified by multiple witnesses (Baiju, Ram Saroop Pasi, Ajnasia) and at an earlier test identification (two months after the event) supported by a Magistrate's report. For Bhaswa the court found positive and consistent identification by several witnesses.
  • By contrast, Dwarka's identification turned on Baiju's testimony largely, with the test identifications conducted much later (16 months after the event) and involving co-villagers—factors that impaired their reliability. The court explained why lengthy delay and village proximity reduce evidential value: a co-villager is more likely to be known beforehand (so identification is unsurprising) and a long gap makes accurate memory of a strange face at night improbable.

2. Corroboration and omissions:

  • The prosecution alleged that Baiju had told names of identified dacoits to five villagers immediately after the incident, but only one of those villagers (Misri Pasi, P.W.6) was called and he denied that Baiju named the dacoits to him. The prosecution did not call the other four. This omission weakened the corroborative account relied on by Baiju.
  • The court treated the absence of contemporaneous naming to police by certain witnesses and the failure to call expected corroborative witnesses as factors reducing confidence in Baiju's solitary identification of Dwarka.

3. Procedural defects under Section 342 CrPC and effect of written statements:

  • The learned Judge did not properly examine either accused under Section 342: rather than putting the main features of the evidence and asking for explanation, he asked only whether they were aware of the charge and whether they had anything further to say. Dwarka filed a written statement; Bhaswa simply denied guilt.
  • The court emphasized that a written statement prepared by defence counsel is not an adequate substitute for a properly conducted viva voce examination under Section 342. A written statement is treated as a formal convenience only, and the accused should be given an opportunity to make a positive explanation in his own words which the judge can weigh directly.
  • Bennett, J. elaborated that when an accused indicates he will file a written statement, the court must read Section 342 to him, explain that he has no right to file such a statement in lieu of oral explanation, and put necessary questions until it is manifest that the accused will refuse to answer. If the accused refuses, that refusal should be clear on record to justify any adverse inference.

4. Improper use of prior statements (Section 162 CrPC):

  • The trial judge allowed the Crown to cross-examine a prosecution witness by suggesting that the witness had stated before the Sub-Inspector that Baiju had named Dwarka. The appellate court observed that Section 162 of the CrPC permits the defence to contradict a prosecution witness by reference to his statements to police but does not permit the prosecution to use such police statements against its own witness at trial. The court treated that as a procedural defect prejudicial to the accused.

5. Differential assessment and ultimate conclusions:

  • Applying the above considerations, the court concluded there was "just room for doubt" in Dwarka's guilt because the case against him rested essentially on Baiju's testimony which lacked satisfactory corroboration and was supported by questionable late test identifications and by procedural defects in the trial. Consequently, Dwarka was entitled to the benefit of doubt and acquitted.
  • By contrast, the court found Bhaswa's guilt established beyond reasonable doubt by multiple independent identifications, including a credible account of a specific assault on Baiju and Ajnasia's testimony of handing ornaments to Bhaswa. The appellate court rejected the trial judge's recorded assertion (in his judgment) that Bhaswa had said he had been falsely implicated; the appellate court found no such statement on record and thus considered the trial judge in error on that point. The conviction of Bhaswa was accordingly sustained.

6. Sentencing analysis and enhancement:

  • The appellate court held that imposing a fine in such dacoity cases was inappropriate because (a) the defendants are typically of little means, (b) a fine in addition to long imprisonment causes hardship to dependants, and (c) a fine often results in sale of the convict's property and severe deprivation of family members. Accordingly, the fine imposed on Bhaswa was set aside.
  • Given the gravity of the offence (serious injuries, loss of property, molestation and theft from a 16-year-old girl, and injury to a child), the court considered five years' rigorous imprisonment inadequate and enhanced Bhaswa's sentence to ten years' rigorous imprisonment. The appellate court stated that such crimes are a disgrace and should be met with the utmost rigour of the law.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling:

Dwarka Singh: Conviction set aside (acquitted).
Bhaswa Dhanuk: Conviction upheld; sentence of five years' rigorous imprisonment enhanced to ten years' rigorous imprisonment; the fine of Rs. 200 is set aside.

Practical consequences and implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: Dwarka Singh is acquitted and will be released from the conviction; Bhaswa Dhanuk remains convicted and will serve an enhanced term of imprisonment of ten years rigorous imprisonment, with no fine enforced.
  • Procedural-legal implications emphasized by the court:
    • Court must properly conduct Section 342 CrPC examination: the accused should be asked specific questions about the principal evidence against him and given an opportunity to make a personal oral explanation; a mere written statement from defence counsel is not a substitute and should not be treated as such.
    • The prosecution may not invoke or use statements made to police under Section 162 CrPC against prosecution witnesses; only the defence has the statutory privilege to use such statements to contradict a prosecution witness.
  • On sentencing policy: the court signalled reluctance to impose fines alongside long custodial sentences in offences of this nature because of the disproportionate hardship inflicted on dependants; courts should consider the socio-economic impact of fines when passing sentences involving long imprisonment.
  • The opinion did not purport to lay down novel binding precedent beyond applying established statutory safeguards (Sections 162 and 342 CrPC) and sentencing considerations; its reasoning reinforces careful observance of procedural rights during trial and proper evaluation of identification evidence.

Note: This summary is derived exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not introduce information beyond that opinion.

Show all summary ...

Meredith, J.:— These two appeals, one from jail and one a regular appeal, are by the same two persons and relate to the same case. The appellants, Dwarka Singh and Bhaswa Dhanuk, have been convicted under S. 395, Penal Code by the learned 1st Assistant Sessions Judge, Patna, Mr. A.C Banerji and have been sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment each and to pay fines of Rs. 200 each, or in default to suffer six months further rigorous imprisonment each. At the time of admission of the appeal a rule was issued to show cause against enhancement of the sentence in the event of the convictions being upheld.

2. This was a supplementary trial, as another person accused of this dacoity had been previously tried and convicted. The dacoity in question took place in the house of one Raiju Pasi (P.W 1) of village More, police station Mokamah, on 2-7-1943. Ornaments and cash to the total value of Rs. 351/4/- were taken by the dacoits, and Raiju and his son and a relative and one of the villagers were assaulted and injured by the dacoits. The occurrence of the dacoity was not challenged at the trial, and was well established. Raiju, on account of his injuries and inability to secure a conveyance, was not able to set out for the thana, six miles distant, in the morning, but the village Chaukidar was sent. It so happened he met the Sub Inspector of Police near the village, as the Sub-Inspector was going that way in connection with some other inquiry, and according to the prosecution the Chaukidar gave him a brief intimation of the occurrence of dacoity but without any details. There is, I think, reason to doubt whether he ever actually met the Sub-Inspector, who was going through More in any case. However that may be, the Sub-Inspector did not record any statement, but when he arrived at the village at 9 A.M he recorded the fard-i-beyan of Baiju. In this information Raiju claimed to have identified, amongst others both the appellants, Indeed, he attributed some of his injuries to Bhaswa, saying that this man, whom he had recognised by the light of a lantern burning in the verandah and by the light of the dacoits' torches had struck him on the head with a spear. He also said that the appellant Dwarka Singh and another man Pauzdar Dusadh had carried out of his house a wooden box containing money, paper and ornaments.

3. Both the appellants were found absconding. Bhaswa was arrested in connection with some other case some time before 25-8-1943, and a test identification of Bhaswa was held by a Magistrate on 18-9-1943, some two months after the occurrence. Dwarka Singh could not be arrested until 1-7-1944 and a test identification in his case was not held until 13-11-1944, 16 months after the occurrence. At the trial Baiju identified both the appellants. As against Dwarka the only evidence in addition to Baiju's identification was that of Raijn's own son, Ram Saroop Pasi (P.W 2), who at the time of the dacoity was a boy of 10, and also of the son-in-law of a sister of Baiju's named Pauzdari. This man was examined by the committing Magistrate, but could not be examined at the trial as he had disappeared and could not be found, the allegation being that he had made himself scarce owing to threats by relatives of the accused Dwarka. However that may be, his deposition was taken in under Section 33 of the Evidence Act. The evidence of these two witnesses was that they had identified Dwarka, who was unknown to them previously, at the test identifications, and the test identifications were proved by the Magistrates who held them to corroborate that.

4. As against Bhaswa, in addition to the identification by P.W 1 there was also positive identification by the boy Ram Saroop (P.W 2) already referred to, and by Baiju's daughter, Ajnasia (P.W 4), a young girl of 16, who testified that the dacoits invaded her room and told her they would kill her if she did not give them her ornaments, and on this she took off her ornaments and made them over to Bhaswa. Moreover, there was the evidence of Pauzdari, supported by the Magistrate, that he had identified Bhaswa at the test identification held two months after the occurrence.

5. The accused were not properly examined by the learned Judge under Section 342 of the Cr PC. The learned Judge ought to have put to them the main features of the evidence against them, and asked them definitely for their explanation if they had one. Instead of that, he merely asked them whether they were aware of what offence they had been charged with, and when they said ‘yes,’ he only asked them whether they had anything further to say. Dwarka said he would file a written statement, and did file one which contained a specific allegation of enmity on the part of Baiju. It was asserted that Dwarka, under the orders of a certain Musammat, had cut a crop grown by Baiju upon land taken in settlement from another Musammat, said to have some dispute with the first Musammat. This case was also made out to Baiju in cross-examination but was denied, and no attempt was made to establish it by evidence.

6. As for Bhaswa, he simply said he did not commit the offence, and when asked “Do you want to say anything more” he replied: “What else shall I say.” Nor was any suggestion of enmity against him put to any of the prosecution witnesses in cross-examination.

7. It will be seen that there is a wide difference between the cases of the two appellants, and, in my opinion, while there can be no possible doubt about Bhaswa's guilt, there is just room for doubt in the case of Dwarka, despite the fact that he absconded for so long, and made no attempt to establish his defence positively. In Dwarka's case there is really nothing, except the evidence of Baiju himself; because little or no value can be attached to the test identification held so long after the event, particularly in view of the fact that Dwarka is a man of the same village. One would expect, in fact, that Ram Saroop must have known his co-villager Dwarka. If he did know him, then he would have no difficulty in picking him out at a test identification; whereas if he did not, it is difficult to believe that he could really remember a strange face seen at night after a year and four months. If we assume that Ram Saroop did know him and really saw him, then he should have named him before the police, which he did not do. As for Fauzdari, who is a man of a different village we get it from the test identification report that as soon as Fauzdari Pasi came to the place where the test identification was held suspect Dwarka Singh cried out that the witness was a resident of his village, and so could identify him. In the circumstances not much value can be placed upon the identification by Fauzdari. Thus as I have said, the case really rests on the evidence of Baiju. Now, Dwarka had made very definite and very specific allegations of enmity on the part of Baiju. On the one hand, Dwarka made no attempt to substantiate these allegations but possibly he might have been handicapped by the fact that his allegations could only be substantiated by his companions in cutting the crop, or by the evidence of the Musammat, and such people, if it was really a case of cutting a crop grown by somebody else, might well hesitate to give evidence. On the other hand, as I have said, there was no adequate examination under S. 342. Had the learned Judge told Dwarka that a written statement could be no real substitute for his own positive explanation in his own words, and had he put specific questions, it seems possible that Dwarka's story might have been put forward by himself in a form and in a manner which might have led to the learned Judge attributing considerably more weight to it. It is important that accused persons, and the lawyers defending them, should realise that a written statement drafted by the defence lawyer cannot possibly be regarded by the Court as more than a formal statement of the defence case drawn up by the defence lawyer for the convenience of the Court, and admitted only for that purpose, since the law no where provides for the admission of any written statement at sessions trials. On the other hand, a positive statement of his defence by the accused himself in his own words and his explanation of why the witnesses had given the evidence against him in his own words may well, if put forward convincingly and with assurance and the appearance of truth, carry very great weight with the Judge. Therefore, it is not only desirable for the Court to give the accused a full opportunity of taking this course by putting specific questions but it is desirable for the defence, when given that opportunity, to adopt it.

8. There is another circumstance which makes me hesitate to accept what is practically the sole evidence of Baiju, without corroboration. It is this. Baiju states that he told the names of the dacoits he had identified to five villagers, whom he named, who had come up directly after the departure of the dacoits. The prosecution made no attempt to examine four of these. The fifth, Misri Pasi (P.W 6) was examined, but he said “Baiju did not tell me the names of the dacoits identified by him.” He was allowed to be declared hostile and cross-examined by the Assistant Public Prosecutor. But here again there was a defect in the procedure of the learned Judge. He allowed it to be put to the witness in cross-examination by the Crown that he had stated before the Sub-Inspector that Baiju had told him that he had identified Dwarka and others. Under Section 162 of the Cr PC, the defence is entitled to contradict a witness called for the prosecution by reference to his statements before the police; but the prosecution is not. Section 162 lays down in the most positive manner that, apart from this privilege extended to the accused, the statements to the police shall not be used for any purpose at the trial. In my opinion, Dwarka Singh must get the benefit of the doubt, and must be acquitted. No such considerations arise in Bhaswa's case, Bhaswa having been identified as a known person by three different witnesses, to none of whom was it suggested that they did not name him to the police at the earliest opportunity. It is true that the examination of this man also under S. 342 was inadequate; but I am confident that if any enmity or season for false accusation had existed, that would have been the first thing which Bhaswa would have blurted out in answer to the general question put to him. Not only did be make no allegation of any enmity, but, as I have said, he did not suggest to any of the witnesses that any reason existed for false implication. The learned Judge in the course of his judgment says:

“The other accused Bhaswa Dhanuk, who defended himself, simply made a statement that he is innocent, and has been falsely implicated out of grudge.”

9. I find no such statement anywhere on record, and I think the learned Judge is in error and cannot have referred, when writing his judgment, to Bhaswa's statement which he had himself recorded. I am quite satisfied that Bhaswa has been rightly convicted.

10. With regard to the enhancement rule, I must point out, in the first place, that a sentence of fine is not appropriate in dacoity cases of this kind. These dacoits are generally persons of little or no means. Where there are also sentences of long term imprisonment it simply means that the sentence of fine will cause hardship and suffering to the unfortunate members of their family, who have been deprived of their bread winner. Such sentences generally result in what small property there may be being sold up during the absence of the convict in jail, and his womenfolk being not only severely harassed through no fault of their own, but being left without any means of livelihood pending the return from jail of their men years hence. The sentence of fine on Bhaswa must be set aside. The sentence of five years is, in my opinion, inadequate. This was a nasty dacoity in which not only Baiju received injuries (one, as he says, caused by a deadly weapon wielded by Bhaswa), but a little boy had a number of his teeth knock-ed out, and a young girl of 16 was molested and deprived of her ornaments. As my learned brother said in a recent case, crimes like this are a disgrace to any civilised community, and should be put down with the utmost rigour off the law. I would enhance the sentence upon Bhaswa to ten years' rigorous imprisonment.

Bennett, J.:— I agree and I associate myself particularly with what my learned brother has said as to the nature and effect of a written statement. When written statements were first admitted in sessions case and regarded merely as a formal statement of the defence case drawn up by the defence lawyer for the convenience of the Court and admitted only for that purpose, there was no harm in the practice provided the examination under Section 342 of the Cr PC, was properly carried out. But when after a general question, the acceptance of a written statement is substituted for any further examination under Section 342 of the Cr PC, the Court is adopting a procedure which is doubly illegal in that it is nowhere authorized in the Code of Criminal Procedure and is adopted soloy to avoid the procedure which is authorized by that Code. When an accused person in answer to a general question under Section 342 of the Cr PC, denies the offence and says that he will file a written statement, the duty of the Court is to read Section 342 of the Cr PC, over to him and explain that he has no right to file a written statement, and also explain what may be the consequences of his refusal to answer any further questions. Having done so, the Court should proceed to put the necessary and proper questions, and should only desist when the accused makes it; abundantly apparent that he will refuse to give any explanation whatever of any of the circumstances in evidence against him. The primary matter to be ensured under Section 342 of the Cr PC, is that the accused has been given a proper opportunity to explain the vital matters in evidence against him, but it must not be forgotten that, if he fails or refuses to give an explanation, it is of equal importance that his failure or refusal should be made abundantly apparent on the face of the record, in order that the inference against him thereon, authorized by S. 342, may be well-founded. A mere written statement does not afford a proper or sufficient basis upon which to base such an inference, because it proceeds merely by way of argument from the mind of his lawyer.

V.R/D.H

11. Sentence enhanced.